CHAPTER 11

Colonial Legacies: Neo-Colonialism and Nation-Building Challenges in Post-Colonial Africa

Paul C. Banda

Tarleton State University

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on two of contemporary Africa’s main challenges, those of neo-colonialism and nation-building. While these challenges have exhibited new and emerging characteristics, and unlike scholarship that analyzes them as being recent, this chapter argues that both have antecedents set during the colonial period in Africa. In the post-colonial era, the continued influence of the former European colonial powers, their allies, and indeed other international actors, both states and multi-national firms, has made the challenges even worse. The exposure of African economies to the international community, the global geopolitics of the Cold War, and the intrusion of international monetary organizations have not only placed African economies and politics on the global scene but have also contributed to economic and socio-political instability. This does also not absolve the intra-state challenges in the continent, including poor quality of leadership; economic mismanagement; inefficient bureaucracies; and ethnic, political, racial, and religious tensions, all of which have contributed to Africa’s current position. Approaching these issues from such local and transnational perspectives is important in putting socio-economic and political developments in Africa on a global map, for better and for worse. This chapter covers these issues in three major sections, namely the motivations for the colonization of the continent, economic and socio-political changes under colonial rule, and post-colonial Africa’s challenges on neo-colonialism and Nation-building.

COLONIZING THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

Modern Africa is comprised of 54 independent states. European powers created the boundaries that separate the various states in the continent at the end of the 19^th century. According to Uzoigwe, this mapping occurred after the convening of the Berlin Conference from 1884 to 1885, itself the peak of the historical process called “The Scramble and Partition of Africa.” Several factors precipitated the scramble, chief among them being economic motivations. In modern African history, the period between 1880 to the end of the 19^th century was one of the most significant eras, laying the foundations of what has since happened to most African countries. Four main perspectives explain the processes of scramble and partition of the African continent. First, there is economic theory, or the so-called “economic imperialism.” Its proponents, including such figures as Vladimir Lenin and J.A. Hobson, argue that the European Industrial Revolution played a key role in influencing European imperialism at the time. The Industrial Revolution, which occurred in the mid-18^th century to the early 20^th century, created demands for raw materials from Africa. It also made Africa an alternative potential market for European manufactured goods, especially those that the European population could not consume. There was also the need to export surplus capital outside of Europe, where banks and industries created “super profits,” in what has elsewhere been described as “the highest stage of capitalism.”^[1]

The second motivating factor comprises of psychological theories. These, among other things, focus on the notion that the Europeans’ superiority complex drove European imperialism. The Europeans, it is argued, were of the view that their race, religion (especially Christianity), and indeed civilization were superior to those of Africans, justifying their colonization and domination of Africa.^[2] Then there are the so-called diplomatic theories, which mainly explain the political motivations for European imperialism. They pinpoint the national egotism or prestige of European states that often pushed them toward competition within and outside Europe. The notion of popular nationalism drove part of this, whereby “the creation of new nations of Italy (1866) and Germany (1870)” threatened the European balance of power that had been there since the age of Napoleon at the beginning of the 19^th century. African colonization was thus a prerequisite for the great power status for such European countries as Belgium, Germany, and Portugal, who envied the extensive and established empires of Britain and France, among others. In other words, the European powers occupied Africa for strategic and political interests and not always because of the African continent’s economic worthiness.^[3] Lastly, there is the African dimension theory. This ideology asserts that Africans themselves had a role in what became the process of Scramble and Partition. The process traced back to over three hundred years of African and European economic contacts, chief among them being the slave trade. Following the abolition of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade at the beginning of the 19^th century, and the subsequent transition to “legitimate trade,” African resistance to increasing European influence precipitated the actual European conquest of the continent. This, in some parts of the continent, created room for “smooth” European acquisition of African territories.^[4]

In 1884 the Berlin Conference, convened by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, deliberated and recognized claims of the various European powers to African territories. The conference culminated in the partition of the African continent, a process completed by the close of the 19^th century. Among other key issues, the conference emphasized the principle of effective occupation, whereby a territorial claim by a European power had to be followed by establishing^[5]structures. This process included the installation of European officials in charge of colonial and territorial administration. The European powers gave themselves legal rights to claim African territories without the approval of the African peoples. The various motivations and processes that led to the partition and colonization of African territories at the close of the 19^th century set in motion the political, social, and economic processes that African states and their peoples have undergone. Later, this chapter will show that the processes of neo-colonialism and challenges to achieve the nation-building agenda are attributed to the incorporation of current African countries into European colonial empires from the late 19^th century through the mid-20^th century.

AFRICA UNDER EUROPEAN COLONIAL RULE: LATE 19TH CENTURY TO THE MID-1960s

The period when African states were under colonial rule lasted up to the mid-1960s (at most). This section focuses on the economic policies and practices of the European powers that set in motion the neo-colonialist tendencies that modern-day African countries are struggling to resolve. The focus will also shift to the socio-political impacts of European colonial rule in African colonies, some of which laid the foundations for modern Africa’s nation-building challenges.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL INTRUSION

Once the European powers formally colonized various African territories, they began to get directly involved in the dynamics and trajectories of African economies. Their involvement was in multiple areas, including the production of cash crops, extraction and trading of mineral resources, and the use and exploitation of African wage labor. This sub-section discusses these encounters in detail.

As noted by Gilbert (2002), before European colonial intrusion, Africans were already economically engaged with the outside world, including with Europeans. Africans sold agricultural products, manufactured goods, forest products, and later, enslaved labor to Arabic, Asian, and European merchants. In return, the Africans received such products as cloth, iron, onions, and^[6]salt. Walter Rodney has argued elsewhere, that during that time, the involvement of Africans in such trade transactions, from the late 15^th[7], a trend that has continued for the hundreds of years that have followed.^[8] The advent of colonial rule, however, increased and accelerated the levels of foreign intrusion in the economies of African states. In many instances that was to the detriment of the African economies.

Prior to colonial rule, most African societies were involved in subsistence agricultural production with households that produced foodstuffs for self-sufficiency or self-survival. They traded only surplus foodstuffs, not by using money, but by using a barter system (i.e., exchange of goods with other goods). Such forms of production also did not require the use of wage labor. Subsistence production often thrived from the labor of close family relations, friends, and neighbors. Other Africans with means also purchased and utilized enslaved labor, although they rarely used the latter. Africans in such societies also rarely paid regular taxes, as known in their modern use. Rather, some societies at times required the citizens to pay “tributes” to the rulers, either chiefs or kings and queens. They paid tributes based on the percentage that one had produced, either in the form of crops, animals, and animal products. The pre-colonial African states, big or small, never directly forced the rural producers on the types of crops to produce or types of animals to domesticate.^[9]

Once colonial rule was established and entrenched, Africans lost their economic sovereignty and experienced a new colonial economic system, which developed over time and reached its prime in the aftermath of the Second World War. Although the development of colonial economies varied from colony to colony, in general terms, the period from the late 19^th century up to the eve of the Second World War laid the foundations of what came in the war’s aftermath (McCracken, 2012).^[10] The transport and communication sectors were developed to create the basis for the economic exploitation of Africans and their resources. The Europeans constructed roads and railways and laid down telegraph lines. They strategically constructed these communication networks in areas that served European economic and administrative interests, and in the process they helped to accelerate the processes of colonial economic exploitation. These infrastructural projects, or commercial networks, also accelerated the integration of various parts of the African colonies into global economic processes. The networks operated beyond African borders and helped to link Africans and their products to European metropoles.^[11]

Apart from the infrastructural projects and commercial networks, the colonized Africans were also enticed—or in other cases coerced—into growing cash crops that would be sold for money (in European currencies). These crops included coffee, cotton, palm oil, sisal, tobacco, and tea. African colonial states produced, distributed, and controlled the money given to the Africans, and the colonial government or a government-controlled marketing board judged the quality and set prices for African-produced goods. These trends, where Europeans and other foreign buyers determine prices for African goods (both agricultural goods and mineral resources), have continued in post-colonial Africa.

Furthermore, European colonial intrusion also accelerated the practice of wage labor, both by subsistence farmers and the European producers. The wage laborers helped to increase the amount of produce from the agriculture and mining sectors. The laborers also needed to work for wages in order to meet the taxation demands (payable only with money) set by the colonial state. The major forms of taxation demanded from Africans included such names as “poll tax,” “head tax,” and “dog tax.” Other African laborers also needed the money to pay school fees for their wards, to pay hospital fees, and sometimes to buy consumer goods, both raw and manufactured.^[12]

Analyzing the theme of economic developments in the former British colonies in Africa, Kaniki (1985) argued that the British, just like the other European colonial powers, did not develop a universal economic theory or practice applicable to all colonies. Rather, two key variables were behind their operations—namely, the reactions of the diverse colonial societies and the influence of diverse environments (fauna, flora, land, and water) found in each of the colonies. However, there were two fundamental assumptions associated with British colonial economies: the colonies had to provide raw materials to feed into Britain’s industries, and the colonies had to import manufactured goods from the imperial power. As such, from the onset, the British Empire had two distinct economic camps, the colonies and the metropolis. The colonies were obligated to export to Britain before they could consider any other foreign buyer. On the other hand, there was no obligation for Britain to import only from any of its colonies. Britain imported products that were cheaper and of good quality, using the rational economic choice model, which provided it the liberty to do business serving its economic interests. The colonized peoples were also often at a disadvantage, as they sold cheap raw materials, and in return, bought expensive British manufactured goods, ^[13][14]

As these exploitative measures continued, it was often clear to colonial administrators that British colonial rule was never exclusively meant to develop the Africans’ socio-economic livelihoods. The British colonial states often served the economic interests of the European settlers. These were part of the capitalist class that operated banks, farms, mining firms, and other commercial entities. Their economic demands often determined the types of state-subject relations that existed in colonial states. Colonial governments created conditions for the successful operation of these businesses, including the maintenance of “law and order,” which facilitated effective exploitation of colonial resources, both human and material ones.^[15]

The capitalist class also benefited from the land alienation policies of the colonial era. Land, in most parts of Africa, was—and is still—the basic and most important means of production. The British settlers, for instance, with government support, moved quickly to secure land concessions from African chiefs. The chiefs were often compelled to sell their rights to land to the European prospectors, which often went against African communal values, where the land had no market value (and hence was n^[16]communities. With government support, the settlers often took the most fertile and profitable portions of land, while the Africans were pushed into overcrowded and unfertile reserves. For instance, in colonial Kenya, British settlers took the most fertile land in the Kenyan highlands, about 2.7 million hectares, while the Indigenous peoples settled^[17].”^[18]

South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) experienced similar trends of land alienation. Initially, the government set aside most of the alienated land for mineral exploitation, rather than agricultural production. In South Africa, things significantly changed between 1865 and 1900, when the discovery of precious stones (mineral resources) made the country become more attractive to European businesses. The discovery of diamonds took place in the Cape Colony in 1867, followed by the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886. European (mainly British) businesses dominated the South African mining industry. For instance, De Beers Consolidated Mines dominated the diamond mines in Kimberly. The company’s director was Cecil John Rhodes, who had the backing of major British financiers and controlled shares in diamond and gold mining ventures in other parts of colonial Africa, including Angola, the Belgian Congo, Namibia, and Sierra Leone.^[19] In what is now Zambia and Zimbabwe, Rhodes stretched his economic muscle to satisfy his desires for mineral exploitation. Hoping to find the so-called “Second Rand” and using funds generated from De Beers, Rhodes occupied these two countries using another company called the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The BSAC operated as a monopoly landowner and claimed sovereignty over the lands alienated from African chiefs, through dubious treaties. Rhodes even named these two countries after himself, namely Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). He and the BSAC ruled the two territories using a Royal Charter, issued by the British Crown in 1889. They earmarked Southern Rhodesia for gold and diamond deposits and Northern Rhodesia for copper deposits.^[20]

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACTS OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL RULE

European colonial rule had other social-political consequences that, as this chapter argues, have had lingering impacts as they pertain to nation-building agendas in modern-day Africa. The social changes associated with European colonial rule have been discussed by a wide range of Africanist scholars, including Afigbo (1985), Boahen (1985), and Iliffe (2017). This sub-section focuses on those impacts that had a direct impact on the nation-building agenda.

Afigbo posited that there are mainly two schools of thought regarding social impacts of European colonial rule in Africa. The first school, known as the imperial apologists school, posits that European colonial rule was responsible for many changes in Africa’s traditional societies. Such changes brought significant progress and were responsible for Africa’s linear transition from its static and barely productive culture to a dynamic and limitless modernism, seen in most parts of Africa today. The second school of thought is the colonial nationalist school.” Its proponents argue that European colonialism represented the disruption of the livelihoods of colonial societies, such that it left behind the turmoil, instability, and uncertainty currently prevalent in Africa.^[21] Afigbo argues against both schools of thought. He argues that while European colonial rule brought in some changes, it is wrong to argue that pre-colonial African societies were static. Rather, the societies were products of hundreds of years of changes. Such societies exhibited their own elements of modernization, including in such areas as occupational specialization, urbanization, social mobility, and in other instances, labor migration. Furthermore, European colonial rule did not wipe out all African cultural, political, and economic activities. There were differences from African society to society, in the ways European colonial rule affected them, with so many instances of African cultural resilience and adaptation or modification. African societies adopted those European elements that they deemed useful, including such elements as language, the use of money, western education, and western political systems.^[22]

One of the lingering social effects of European colonial rule has been the political one. After European colonial rule was established in the late 19^th century (except for Liberia and Ethiopia until 1935), African societies lost most of their sovereignty and hence could not participate in global affairs as independent agents. Furthermore, the newly established state boundaries also cut off the pre-existing links (ethnic, economic, family, and religious) that existed in pre-colonial Africa. There are so many cases of such processes in colonial Africa. For instance, the split of the Efik peoples of West Africa into Nigeria and Cameroon. The Yoruba of West Africa were found in Nigeria and Dahomey (now Benin). In Southern Africa, one found the Ngoni, the Yao, the Lhomwe, and the Sena peoples in both Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) and Nyasaland (now Malawi).^[23]

In the process, European colonial states also brought together, under one political entity, African societies that never co-existed as such. During the colonial period, the system seemed to work as these multiple ethnic groups were under the stewardship of a European official, named a governor, or commissioner, or consul. The co-existence of such multiple ethnic groups in post-colonial Africa has not been as smooth. Furthermore, the artificially created colonial societies also altered the pre-existing class structures that existed in pre-colonial African societies. While the colonized Africans were not a homogenous entity, in general terms, their status dwindled as compared with that of European colonists and Asian migrants into the colonies. The European colonists had the monopoly of political, economic, and educational power, and thus left the Africans underprivileged. European colonial policies, anchored by social Darwinism, placed the Black Africans at the bottom of the order and ladder of civilization. Well-qualified Africans had limited access to well-paying jobs, business opportunities, and political opportunities. Racial-based segregation also extended to residential areas, especially in urban areas. Europeans occupied areas with better houses, better hospitals, and established European-only social clubs.^[24] Some of these practices have continued in post-colonial Africa, indicating that the end of colonial rule did not represent a complete departure from systems and practices that served imperial rule in Africa.

POST-COLONIAL AFRICA AND ITS ATTENDANT CHALLENGES

The modern-day African states gained their political independence from European rule in the period from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1960s. The remaining ones followed suit, including Mozambique and Angola in 1975; Zimbabwe in 1980; Namibia in 1991; and South Africa in 1994. Scholars of that historical phase have coined the term decolonization to refer to the processes that led to the departure of European powers from Africa. Martin Shipway (2008) termed the late 20^th century as the classic period of decolonization, considering the large number of countries that attained independence during that period, especially in Africa and Asia.^[25]

The process of decolonization requires comprehension of the context of global dynamics that culminated into the Second World War (1939-1945) and its immediate aftermath. Three major forces or explanations eventually led to the surrender of political sovereignty to African leaders. In brief, these explanations included the nationalist explanation, international explanations, and metropolitan explanations. The nationalist explanation credits the roles played by Indigenous-led organizations, either political parties, pressure groups, or guerilla movements, in fighting against colonial rule. African leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), among others, led their peoples to win back political autonomy. The international explanations consider the changing global forces during and after the Second World War to be the major driving forces in addition to the rise of two new anti-imperial powers (USA and USSR), the rise of the Cold War (an ideological and geopolitical warfare that pitted the two superpowers and their allies against each other), and the United Nations Organizations (UNO), which promoted the principle of self-determination. The metropolitan explanations focus on the decisions made by the metropolitan governments, either in Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom to decide on when to hand over power to Indigenous African rulers. Such decisions materialized after considering the economics of either continuing with colonization or handing over power to Africans.^[26]

The end of European colonial rule in Africa did not necessarily mean a complete departure from some of the processes, practices, and relationships that existed during the colonial period. In the words of Frederick Cooper (2015), a historian of the decolonization period in Africa: “It would be a mistake either to see ‘colonialism’ as a phenomenon that could be turned off like a television set—with all problems instantly into ‘African’ responsibilities—^[27] The next sub-sections of this chapter discuss the continuities that are traceable from the colonial to the post-colonial period, as these pertain to neo-colonialism and nation-building challenges.

NEO-COLONIALISM IN AFRICA

The concept of neo-colonialism, is often associated with Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah. In Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, published in 1965, Nkrumah explained the conceptualization and practical aspects of the term. According to Nkrumah, although African countries had attained their independence, many of them lacked real sovereignty. International forces still directed their economies and political policies. The international forces were either the direct former colonial power, or a new power (either a country or a firm/consortium) that was not involved during the colonial period. Such powers were involved in processes like sending troops to the neo-colonial state, determining the prices of Africa’s raw materials, and providing funds for the sustenance of the bureaucracies of the neo-colonial state. These interventions have often left room for the imperial powers to dictate policies (socio-economic and political) in the neo-colonial states. What was and has been unfortunate for Africa is that the imperial powers are interested in exploitation, rather than the development of Africa’s material and human resources. In the process, the imperial powers have also weakened the position of the neo-colonial states on the international scene, as many of them have remained in poverty and lack a voice in most global forums. Nkrumah also argued that these trends trace back to the colonial period, especially the post-World War II era. The European colonial powers embarked on extensive colonial exploitation, with an aim of using Africa’s resources to revive the European economies damaged by the war. The European “welfare states” survived by exploiting African natural (agricultural products and mineral resources) and human resources.^[28]

Since Nkrumah’s foundational publication, various scholars have taken over the mantle to trace continued imperial intervention in Africa. They have traced the continued influence of the former colonial powers, and of new players in the field, including countries, firms/consortiums, and global monetary organizations, such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All of these ntities shoulder the blame for Africa’s stagnating economic position and the high levels of poverty. In the former sub-Saharan African French colonies for instance, France retained economic interests and influence after independence. Apart from leaving French troops and military bases in the former colonies, France also controlled the political and economic space. French companies controlled most of the industries, thousands of French expatriates continued to live and work in the former colonies. Operating through an organization called the Africa Cell, France also exerted its powers over political successions in the former colonies. France also placed the former colonies under the franc zone, which was a monetary union of the former French colonies; the franc system itself was controlled by the French Treasury. The Africa Cell’s use of French currency meant a surrender of economic autonomy by the participating African countries, as France even retained powers to devalue the currency without consulting African central banks and governments. This arrangement also saw French companies, working without proper restrictions, export products from Africa without the required investment in the African countries where they operated.^[29]

Apart from the old imperial powers, such as Britain and France, current scholarship is also skeptical of the influence of Asian powers, especially China and India. As emerging global powers, since the last quarter of the 20^th century, both countries have ventured into Africa in search of diplomatic allies and in search of Africa’s natural resources. The resources include petroleum, land, precious stones, and agricultural products to supply^[30] It is imperative for African countries to draw lessons from their economic interactions with other imperial powers and avoid repeating the same mistakes as they deal with the Southeast Asian powers. Similarly, as Africanist scholars have argued, African governments must be concerned about the roles of foreign firms, welcomed in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and organizations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the UN, and the European Union (EU). Their economic intervention and aid have usually come with strings attached, many of which have been detrimental to the development of African economies. The Bretton Woods-influenced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), for instance, contributed to worker retrenchments, company closures, ^[31]

One other entry point into post-colonial African affairs was through the rivalries of the Cold War. Although the Cold War was not of African origin, it did not take long before the two warring blocs (the Western bloc led by the USA and the Eastern bloc led by the USSR) began to “poke their noses” in African affairs.^[32] The two superpowers also looked toward Africa as a continent where they could exert their ideological (communism and capitalism), socio-economic, and political influences. They took advantage of the economic slump then taking place in European metropolitan powers in the aftermath of the Second World War. The USA and USSR seized the opportunity to impose themselves on the African continent and indeed across the globe.^[33]

Elizabeth Schmidt (2013) narrates how the Congo (formerly Zaire) became a Cold War battleground immediately after independence from Belgian rule in June 1960. The Congo was of fundamental concern to the imperial powers because it was (and still is) rich in strategic mineral resources. These include some of the world’s important deposits of cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds, tantalum, tin, uranium, and zinc. Although Belgium had granted independence to Indigenous politicians, led by Joseph Kasavubu (as president) and Patrice Lumumba (as prime minister), the Congo’s mining industry was still in the hands of the Belgians and their Western allies, including the USA, a classic example of neo-colonialism. Since Lumumba exhibited anti-Belgian and anti-Western tendencies, including being a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), he was an obstacle to the imperial powers. By September 1960, Western influence led to the removal of Lumumba from power, including placing him under house arrest. On January 17, 1960, secessionist forces from the Katanga province assassinated Lumumba under the supervision of Belgian and American security and intelligence personnel. He had ^[34] Unfortunately, the Congo, as have many African countries subjected to such Cold War interventions, has not yet achieved ^[35] The following sub-section covers the subject of instability in Africa. From these cases, however, contemporary African governments and their leaders must tread carefully in their interactions with global powers, be it the former colonial powers or the new entrants on the African economic scene. Many of them have not been interested in Africa’s economic development, for its own sake, but are rather interested in exploiting the continent’s resources.

NATION-BUILDING CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

As African countries gained their independence in the 1960s, the leaders set aside five main historic and humanistic objectives for their own countries as well as for relations with other countries in Africa and beyond (i.e., domestic and international objectives). The five objectives were decolonization, nation-building, development, democracy, and regional integration. There have generally been variations in the ways individual African countries have moved to achieve these objectives. Some have fared well, while others have not. This sub-section focuses on the objective of nation-building, aimed at bringing together multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious entities into one united nation. Since independence, this objective has been problematic, as most parts of the African continent have experienced political tensions, ethnic tensions, and economic tensions. Over the years, African countries have also experienced coups, civil wars, and perennial instability.^[36]

Influenced by local and international dynamics (including the socio-economic instability caused by the imposition of SAPs, by the Bretton Woods Institutions since the late 1970s), the last decade of the 20th century saw conflicts and civil wars in Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria (after the 1993 botched presidential election), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Some of these have spilled over into the 21st century. There have been efforts to enhance nation-building. These include such policy decisions as changing names of states; changing and re-locating capital cities; conscription for national service; the forced homogenization of religions and languages; the creation of one-party states; the creation of unifying ideologies (such as Harambee in Kenya and Ujamaa in Tanzania); the nationalization of land; and the creation of national anthems and pledges. Setting aside national days of independence celebrations, and the creation of multi-racial sports teams, among other measures, the ^[37] persist. Below, this chapter discusses the factors for such trends with the argument that some of these challenges trace back to the colonial period.

Most Africanist scholars now attest that such challenges have their roots in the colonial period. There are two interrelated crises behind this, namely the lack of nationhood and statehood, both of which have contributed to instability in most African countries. The crisis of nationhood emanates from the lack of or having a flawed collective identity. On the other hand, the crisis of statehood is a by-product of unstable political authority. The challenge of a coherent nationhood or national identity is a by-product of artificial boundaries and colonial societies created by European colonial powers, which the post-colonial governments retained. Post-colonial African leaders and their international allies, including the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, regarded the nation-state as a symbol of modernity, modeled on European nation-states. Unfortunately, most post-colonial African countries have struggled to create unity (i.e., national unity) among the heterogeneous ethnic groups brought together by colonial rule. Military intrusion into civilian politics through coups often hampered the creation of statehood. The permanent military itself was also a colonial-era creation. Here, the post-colonial states have struggled to create an effective centralized political authority and have hence faced challenges from both internal and international forces.^[38]

Other divisive colonial-era policies were also responsible for the crises of nation- and state-building. For instance, in British colonies since the 1930s, the policy of indirect rule favored working with traditional leaders, rather than the educated elite. In the post-World War II era, the same colonial governments also sided with the educated elites, who had benefited from educational opportunities under colonial development and welfare funding. In the post-colonial period, the relationship between traditional leaders and the educated elite has not always been cordial. Moreover, the civilian (western educated) political elite and the military have experienced unstable relations. African political leaders have largely failed to create a sense of nationhood—that is, bringing their people together under the larger or central political system or the nation-state (irrespective of their ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity differences). While such identities are both historical and important, they have overridden efforts to build cohesive nation-states. The ordinary people must also accept the authority of the state and be willing to co-exist with other groups of different identities. These differences have also predominated political party formation and activities, where parties survive along ethnic or regional lines. The same also applies to allocating positions in state institutions (civil service, the army, the police, and the legal system), where identities play an important role in staff recruitment and retention. These institutions or bureaucracies are themselves colonial-era creations used for accumulative purposes by the post-colonial ^[39] These practices have been divisive and ineffective, as they have left out competent personnel for not conforming to the favored identities. Instead of focusing on nation-building, the leaders concentrate on economic and political aggrandizement, both of which are also inherited colonial-era practices. The nation-building agenda will prevail only when African leaders recognize the pluralism of their nation-states and co-opt all people in valuing unity and participating in achieving national goals.

Where the military has intervened in African politics, the results have not been as encouraging. Since the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 by the Egyptian army, military coups have dominated the African political scene. Other coups followed in countries such as Sudan in 1958, Zaire in 1965, Nigeria in January 1966, Ghana in February 1966, and so on and so forth. By the mid-1980s, Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, had experienced more than 70 military coups. These have continued well into the 21st century in such countries as Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Zimbabwe. The coups have emanated from various socio-economic and political forces and have local and international influences. Some begin because of ethnic conflicts; political authoritarianism; bureaucratic corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency; international influence, especially from forces against an incumbent leader; and sometimes due to conflicts between the army personnel and political leaders. Irrespective of the motivations for a military coup, once successful, most military regimes have generally failed to achieve the nation-building agenda. In trying to maintain law and order, they overlook the internal differences in their countries, and they do not sort out their citizens’ economic challenges. The overreliance on state coercion has assisted in state-building rather than nation-building, hence the continued polarization along with ^[40]racial, and other such identities. Hence, African countries must at all costs avoid creating the so-called conducive conditions for military intervention in civilian politics and state administration. The military must belong to the barracks, just as much as civilians do not and must not interfere in military affairs.

Where nation-building has not succeeded, it has created room for the rise of religious fundamentalist groups and terrorist organizations (such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, among others). On the other hand, these organizations, many of which are affiliated with other international terror organizations (such as Al Qaeda and ISIS), are also a major contributing factor to the failure of both nation-building and state-building and consolidation. In North Africa, economic strains on the populations and the feeling of being abandoned by the state bureaucracies also contributed to the “Arab Spring,” which toppled governments in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, among others, from 2011 and beyond.^[41]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has contributed to the debate on two of contemporary Africa’s main challenges, namely neo-colonialism and nation-building. The key argument is that these emanate from both historical and transnational forces. The historical ones trace back to the establishment, consolidation, and impacts of European colonial rule in Africa throughout a period that stretched from the late 19^th century to the 1960s. Most of the former colonial powers, such as Britain and France, have continued to influence the state of economic and political affairs in their former African colonies. On the other hand, the transnational forces pinpoint the influences of the Cold War, multi-national firms and consortiums, and other global organizations, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, the EU, and the UN. The policy directions from such global institutions have not been well-suited to African conditions. Current scholarship also analyzes the challenges posed by relatively new entrants in exploiting Africa’s resources, especially the Southeast Asian countries of China and India. While focusing on the foreign influences, both colonial and post-colonial, this chapter has argued that one must also focus on intra-state flaws in each African country. These include the poor quality of leadership; economic mismanagement; inefficient bureaucracies; and ethnic, political, racial, and religious tensions, all of which have contributed to Africa’s current position. African governments and their peoples must take a leading role in resolving their economic and socio-political challenges and never play the role of pawns in international relationships. The same also applies to the continent’s leaders to create conducive conditions for both economic autonomy and state survival.

END NOTES

1. G.N. Uzoigwe, “European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview,” in Adu Boahen, ed., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935 (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 20-21. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2^nd edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 263-268. See also John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 3^rd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 206-207. ↑

2. G.N. Uzoigwe, “European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview,” 21-23. For the British Empire, see Peter J. Cain, “Character, ‘ordered liberty,’ and the mission to civilize: British moral justification of Empire, 1870-1914,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40, no.4 (Nov. 2012): 557-578. For the French Empire, see Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). ↑

3. G.N. Uzoigwe, “European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview,” 23-25. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2^nd edition, 268-269.↑

4. G.N. Uzoigwe, “European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview,” 26-27. ↑

5. Ibid., 29-31. See also John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 3^rd edition, 201-205. ↑

6. Erik Gilbert, “The economic impact of colonialism,” in Toyin Falola, ed., Africa, Vol.3: Colonial Africa, 1885-1939 (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 107-108. ↑

7. Walter Rodney, “The colonial economy,” in Adu Boahen, ed., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935 (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 332. ↑

8. Erik Gilbert, “The economic impact of colonialism,” 107-108. See also John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent, 3^rd edition, 211-223. ↑

9. See for instance, John McCracken, A History of Malawi, 1859-1956 (Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2012), 74-99. ↑

10. Walter Rodney, “The colonial economy,” 332-333. See also Erik Gilbert, “The economic impact of colonialism,” 109-110. ↑

11. Erik Gilbert, “The economic impact of colonialism,” 108-110. ↑

12. Ibid., 109-110. The subject of colonial taxation measures has been widely covered in African history. See for instance, Leigh A. Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). ↑

13. M.H.Y. Kaniki, “The colonial economy: The former British zones,” in Adu Boahen, ed., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935 (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 382-383. ↑

14. Ibid., 383-384. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945,” Economic History Review, 40, no.1 (Feb. 1987): 1-26.↑

15. Elizabeth Colson, “The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights,” In Victoria Turner, ed., Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Vol.3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 193-196. ↑

16. M.H.Y. Kaniki, “The colonial economy: The former British zones,” 384-387. ↑

17. Ralph Austen, African Economic History (London: James Currey, 1987), 155-162. ↑

18. Ibid., 163-164 and 122-130. See also M.H.Y. Kaniki, “The colonial economy: The former British zones,” 387-390. Apart from De Beers and the BSAC, there were also other such monopoly companies in colonial Africa. This included: The British East Africa Company; The Royal Niger Company; The British United Africa Company; and the French Compagnie Francaise del’ Afrique Occidentale (CFAO). ↑

19. A.E. Afigbo, “The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures,” in Adu Boahen, ed., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935 (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 487. ↑

20. Ibid., 486-488. ↑

21. Ibid., 493. See also Kings M. Phiri, “Malawi and the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 1964-1980,” in Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe, eds., Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960-1994 (Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014), 565-583. ↑

22. A.E. Afigbo, “The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures,” 493-502. See also A. Adu Boahen, “Colonialism in Africa: Its impact and significance,” in Adu Boahen, ed., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935 (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 798-803. ↑

23. Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its impact: A comparative approach to the end of the colonial empires (Massachusetts, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 1-16; and 199-231. ↑

24. John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: A comparative perspective (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-16. ↑

25. Frederick Cooper, “Africa in world history,” in J.R. McNeil and Kenneth Pomeranz, eds., The Cambridge World History, Vol.7.1: production, destruction, and connection, 1750-present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 578-579. ↑

26. John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: A comparative perspective (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-16 ↑

27. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The last stage of imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965), ix-xiv and 1- 14. Other scholars have described the late colonial era economic exploitation as “The Second Colonial Exploitation.” See for instance, Bekeh Utietiang Ukelina, The Second Colonial Occupation: Development Planning, Agriculture, and the Legacies of British rule in Nigeria (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017). ↑

28. Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 175-180. ↑

29. See for instance, Robert I. Rotberg, ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence (Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution, 2008). See also Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, eds., The rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities, and Critical Interventions (London: Zed Books, 2012). ↑

30. Mark Langan, Neo-Colonialism and the poverty of ‘development’ in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35-57, 89-114, 119-142, and 177-202. See also Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz, “Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.114, no.3 (Autumn 1999): 479-502. ↑

31. For a thorough understanding of the origins of the Cold War and its global ramifications, see Odd Arne Westad, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). ↑

32. See for instance, Jeffrey James Byrne, “The Cold War in Africa,” in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Craig Daigle, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2014), 149-162. ↑

33. Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror, 57-65. ↑

34. See for instance, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila (London: Zed Books, 2003). ↑

35. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Africa’s Resurgence: Domestic, Global, and Diaspora Transformations (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2014), 3-5.↑

36. Liisa Laakso and Adebayo O. Olukoshi, “The crisis of the post-colonial nation-state project in Africa,” in Adebayo O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, eds., Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa (Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 1996), 7-39. See also Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor, “State and Nation-Building since Independence,” in Toyin Falola, ed., Africa: Vol.5: Contemporary Africa (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 188-190.↑

37. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay and Elliot Green, “Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa,” World Development, vol.45 (2013): 108-118. See also Lynette Steenveld and Larry Strelitz, “The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the politics of nation-building in South Africa,” Media, Culture, and Society, vol.20 (1998): 609-629. ↑

38. J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, “Nation-building and changing political structures,” in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji, eds., UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VIII: Africa since 1935 (California: UNESCO and James Currey, 1999), 435-446. See also Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 97-106. ↑

39. J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, “Nation-building and changing political structures,” 437-445. ↑

40. Ibid., 454-463. See also Philip Roessler, Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: The logic of the coup-civil war trap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army rule in Africa: Motivations and constraints, 2^nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). ↑

41. Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2018), 59-63 and 239-291. ↑