CHAPTER 13

Predicament of Muslim/Christian Relations Within the Context of Indigene/Settler Segregation in Jos, Northern Nigeria

Dauda Abubakar

Department of Religion and Philosophy, University of Jos

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa encompassing more than 217 million people that belong to more than 470 ethnic and linguistic groups that are not only distinguished by language, culture, and myth of origin but also vary in size, power, religious affiliation, and influence (Bagudu 2004: 10). The population of Nigeria is expected to reach more than 400 million by 2050, which will make it a third position in the world. These are what makes Nigeria more complex than most countries in the world (Alemika and Okoye 2002: xviii and Alubo 2006: 1). The largest ethnic groups that have the largest population and political influence in the country are the Hausa/Fulani^[1], followed by the Yoruba and then Igbo, which all exist in the different regions though with significant mixture in other regions especially in the northern part probably due to its tolerant disposition towards the other ethnic groups from the South. Officially, there are 6 regions in Nigeria, 3 in the north and 3 in the south: North West, North East, and North Central in the northern part with 19 states excluding the Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,^[2] which is also located in the north. The other regions include South-West, South-South, and South-East with 17 states.^[3] Northern Nigeria here includes the North Central, which is often referred to as the Middle Belt,^[4] which is characterized with ethnoreligious diversity (Best 2014: 7).

The Hausa/Fulani dominated the northern region from inception amidst other numerous smaller ethnic groups, while the Yoruba dominated the South-West and the South-East is dominated by the Igbo apart from other smaller ethnic groups that intertwined in the different regions. The South-South also consists of different ethnic groups such as the Ibibio, Ijaw, Efic, Urhobo, Ogoni, etc. Ethnic groups in Nigeria are a group of people that relentlessly share a common ancestral origin, which created a persistent sense of common cultural, decent, interest, and identity^[5] (Tanko 2002: 201). Ethnic groups in Nigeria are always in solidarity with one another and it was the main reason why politicians constantly promote ethnic affiliation because they always benefit from votes from such affiliates during local elections even when they do not merit it. Ethnicity has been the cause of many violent conflicts in Nigeria, which has resulted in the death of thousands of people in the country from 1980 until today. Ethnicity often becomes even more dangerous when it is mix up with religion or politics, while local politicians know when to instigate the dispute and cause havoc. For example, many people are killed during conflicts as they move across boundaries not because they commit any crime, but because they belong to a different ethnic identity. It has become a culture in places such as Jos (Plateau) and Kaduna to look out for the other members of a ethnicity that are considered as enemies during conflicts and eradicate them. This often happens especially when a person is trapped at the “wrong” side of the divide while traveling or passing through an area dominated by a different ethnic group during tension (Bagudu 2003: ix). For example, the Daily Trust Newspaper of 15^th August, 2021 reported the following heading: “Irigwe Youths Kill 25 Fulani Travellers in Jos, over 50 missing.” This incident almost led to the outbreak of conflict between Christians and Muslims in Jos.

This is because the different ethnic groups in Nigeria are spread over the various regions and states of the federation,^[6] and mostly belong to either Islam or Christianity. For example, as one travel to Kaduna from Jos, the road passes through Muslim and Christian villages and towns, the identity of the villagers always reveal that. Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in Nigeria, almost equally divided, though Muslims have the largest population of about 53.5% against the Christian population of 45.9% according to the 2020 Pew Report on religion in Nigeria. A limited percentage of Nigerians still practices the African Traditional Religion^[7] mostly in the countryside (i.e., rural areas), which is the original traditional belief and practice among the various ethnic groups in the country before the coming of Islam and Christianity and still persists today. The diversity and bringing together of the different regions in Nigeria is considered an intentional creation of the British colonials (Tanko 2002: 199).

The British colonials established Nigeria as a large colony probably “to put together a large and powerful state” in Africa that consisted of different ethnic and religious diversity, which was expected to play a leading role in the whole of Africa with its multiplicity. This assumption has proven to be a wrong idea considering today’s negative developments in the country especially of the proliferation of ethnic and religious conflicts among the diverse people probably due to lack of an established system of governance or a strong central state that might bring the different parts together, which the British failed to pay particular attention to (Tanko 2002: 199). Therefore, ethnic and religious diversity of Nigeria ended up causing more harm than good to the country and its people. Today, Nigerians first see themselves as members of their ethnic group/region, then religion, then the state at large. For example, region and state of origin seems more important than country of origin for most Nigerians. In order to be identified with certain ethnic group or particular area of residence, many Nigerians today have a certificate of origin as a requirement, which is presented during admission into higher institutions of learning, when applying for a scholarship, or when seeking for employment. The National Identity Card (NIN) does not matter in Nigeria considerably except in few occasions such as in the bank when opening a new account, obtaining a driving license, etc.

There are fundamental issues of consideration in the situation of Nigeria. First, Nigeria is the largest Black Country in the world today, which would have ordinarily united the citizens as a great and unified country of the African continent. Second, Nigeria as a nation ought to have become a basis for the unity of its citizens like the situation of most developed countries where citizens look up to the country as their source of pride, inspiration, and unity. Third, the major religions in Nigeria, Islam, and Christianity, are sister religions that have emerged from the same source, the Middle East, with history, civilization, and scriptures that are similar not only in context but also the same source. Economically, the huge population in Nigeria would have to make up a great source of economic prosperity for the state and its citizens as one people. These commonalities would have benefited Nigerians more than the harm brought by promoting negative views of ethnicity and religion. For example, the next section analyzed the similarities of the Muslim and Christian belief systems, scriptures, and prophets. Yet, Nigerians seem to be one of the most divided people in the world, a division that often cause misunderstanding and bloody conflicts, as well as the destruction of one another’s property.

Two theories benefited this work: hybridity theory and the theory of autochthony. Autochthony means exclusive belonging as some section of the citizens are considered allogène (or strangers) within their own country. The term autochthony is mostly promoted in low-income countries such as Nigeria, especially by selfish politicians (Geschiere 2010: 46). Hybrid theory on the other hand refers to state fragility that often engenders violent conflict among the citizens, a situation that often leads to state collapse e.g. the case of Somalia. One of the major roles of the state is the provision of security for the citizens. Closely related to this is the concept of hybrid government, which refers to the emergence of local institutions, organizations, and individuals that often become powerful and fill the gaps created by weak states, which are unable to protect the lives and property of their citizens (Meagher et al 2014: 1). The use of these theories in this work is important because the success of ethnicity (autochthony in other words) is only achieved in situations where there is a weak state that is unable to provide equal rights to its citizens. Unlike the situation in most African countries today, the impact of the state in advanced societies is evident in almost every aspect of the life of citizens, its authority, social welfare, and security. This has enabled the society to advance its interest in the life of the individual and family who constantly feels its presence (Lambach 2004: 2). Both the state and society become interdependent on molding the other, a working system that produces a better result. The empirical reality in Africa, especially the situation in Nigeria, presents a contrast. The existence of the state is not felt except in limited parts of the life of a few individuals like the civil servants who collect insignificant monthly emolument far less than what is obtainable in even some African countries. This led us to the discussion on the theory of fragile state in Africa. (Boege 2008: 2). Fragile state is considered “an obstacle to the maintenance of peace and development,” and by implication, it lacks the willingness or capacity to perform adequate state functions in the area of security and welfare of its citizens (Boege 2008: 3). This is because fragility of the state is characterized by the control of many actors that compete for the authority of the central state. In Nigeria for instance, this could be likened to ethnic and religious figures that function as “second state” within their domain either because of their connections with top politicians or because they have become untouchable. The state functions alongside these diverse “non-state” actors/authorities who have developed stronger mechanisms of civilian control, which gives them almost equal authority with politicians who constantly need civilian votes to ascend to positions of power.

On the other hand, it is important to note that central or national identity is losing meaning in Nigeria due to the ebullition of other more powerful identities i.e., religion and ethnicity, one of the worst challenges confronting the country today. Religion and ethnicity would not have become destructive in Nigerian politics (destroying relations between ethnic and religious groups) without introducing the ideology of autochthony, and today, a section of citizens were excluded and considered allogeneous in their own country (Geschiere 2005: 10). Peter Geschiere (2010: 46) confirmed this assertion:

Politicians in Nigeria choose the path of autochthony instead of the path of national unity and cohesion that will bring development and reduce poverty because it yields private benefit for them. They play the autochthony card supporting their various religions and ethnicities to further divide the nation for their advantage to ascend to position of power and control of the masses. This makes them ethnic heroes rather than national heroes (Geschiere 2010: 10).

This chapter outlined the challenges faced by the minority Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos (for being considered allogène or non-indigenes/settlers), the capital of Plateau State especially the younger generation as they struggle to recreate their own identity and belonging within an aggressive Christian dominant population. It also looks at the reaction of the majority Muslim population in northern Nigeria to the situation in Plateau State. These attitudes, responses, and reactions produce both positive and negative impacts on relations between Christians and Muslims within the city of Jos in particular and northern Nigeria at large. Plateau State is chosen for this analysis because of its uniqueness of bringing together more than 50 ethnic groups from different parts of Nigeria.

Apart from the introductory part, this chapter starts by analyzing the position of Jos as a meeting point of Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. This is important as most cities lack the quality to ascend to that position even despite the incessant crises situation in Jos and Plateau State at large. The context of ethno-religious relations in Jos is discussed in order to understand how ethnicity is intertwined with religion in the politics of Plateau State. Despite the lack of development in Plateau State and the individual benefit that few acquire as a result of the series of ethnic and religious conflicts yet, the people in Plateau hold on tied to the ideology of ethnic divide. The sub-heading that follows look at the ethnic and religious segregation that was ingrained in the politics of Plateau State alongside the status of Hausa/Fulani migrants in Jos as settlers. The last sub-heading, i.e., “determinant of Muslim-Christian peaceful coexistence and conflict” provide the details of how politicians take advantage of the use of religion and ethnicity to obtain political and economic power in the State.

JOS: MEETING POINT OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS

Religion serves as a major source of inspiration in Nigeria and apart from Islam and Christianity, Nigeria has become a notable religious market^[8] due to the emergence of many new religious movements that have gained popularity (Meagher 2009: 397; Orok 2014: 47). The new religions in Nigeria and which mostly have branches in Jos include: Hare Krishna Consciousness, Rocicrusians, Guru Maharaji, Eckankar, Grail Message, Christian Science, Latter-Day Saints, etc. Despite the fact that Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in the country, Nigeria runs a secular constitution, which does not recognize a state religion; therefore, all religions are considered equal by law and this is guaranteed in the federal constitution. Islam has the largest population, especially among the Hausa/Fulani and other related ethnic groups in the northern region. Christianity followed closely with dominance in the South-East and South-South among the Igbo and some minority ethnic groups of Cross Rivers, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom, whereas the South-Western region has a divided population between Muslim and Christian. Muslims and Christians often engage in disputes and even bloody conflicts in Nigeria, especially in the North-Central. Understanding the origin and relationship of the two major religions is fundamental.

Christianity and Islam originated from the Middle East as Abrahamic Religions from the same root, i.e., the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Ishmael. Christianity emerged on the part of Isaac and Islam on the part of Ishmael, making both sister religions (Abubakar 2014: 214 and Chentu 2010: 223). Islam and Christianity are complex, as religions and systems of belief and worship, they also represent historical civilizations that grew and flourished over many centuries with shared values and heritage of revelation and prophecy mixed with Greek philosophy and science (Lewis 2003: 4). Apart from similarities in dogma, Christianity provides a clear gap that divides the relationship between state (government) and religion, which was contrary in Islam due to the blending of state and religion as one in the Muslim’s concept of sharī’a. For example, the Bible (Mark 12:17) emphasized that: “give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God.” Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam on the other hand, establishes a state in Madīna as a political entity where religion controls both the state power and a religious community (Lewis 2003: 5). The complex nature of these religions presented a major complication for Nigerians that engage in a political and ethnic struggle against one another, which delineated their relationship and contributes to the continuous experiences of religious conflicts in the country (Abubakar 2014: 215).

The presence of Islam in Nigeria started in the present Borno State, northern Nigeria between the ninth and the second half of the eleventh century (Clarke and Linden 1984: 11). Islam was introduced in Kanem-Borno Empire through an Arab scholar called Muhammad Ibn Mani who came to Borno at the invitation of the Kanem ruler Ummi-Jimmi (rule: 1085-1097 CE). Abdul-Rahman Doi (1997: 23) emphasized that: “With the introduction of Islam in Kanem, it became the principal focus of Muslim influence in the central Sudan, and relations were established with the Arab world in the Middle East and Magrib.” Islam came to the other route through Kano in the early 14^th century through the Wangarawa^[9] traders and scholars from Mali. It was reported that about 40 Wangarawa traders brought Islam to Kano during the reign of Ali Yaji Dan Tsamiya (reign: 1349-1385CE) (Doi 1997: 24). The famous Muslim scholar Al-Maghili (1440-1505 CE)^[10] came to Kano purposely to preach and teach Islam. Later, he moved to Katsina (175.9 km from Kano) where he made it a center of Islamic learning in the whole of the Hausa land in the 15^th century. The development of Islam continued in the Hausa land until the jihad (Islamic reform) of Usman Danfodio (1754-1817)^[11] that culminated in a wider spread of Islam in the northern region, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The main focus of the reform was on Muslim morality and spirituality.

Christianity came to Nigeria in the 19^th century through the southern region. First in 1839 when several freed slaves from the West returned to Nigeria after their freedom and instead of settling in Freetown (a reserved territory for slaves now Sierra Leone, West Africa), they came to Lagos and Badagry in Nigeria (Falk 1997: 124). These few Christian converts made an individual and unsuccessful effort to spread Christianity in their different communities. Later, Christianity came again in 1842 and 1846 respectively through the effort of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), which was successful. The success of the CMS made other western missionary groups followed which resulted in the spread of Christianity in the southern region and later, it was extended to the northern part from 1857 and continued up to 1894 and afterward (Ayandele 1991: 4 Gaiya 2004: 6).

Thomas Jefferson Bowen (1814-1875)^[12] of the Southern American Baptist Mission was the first to establish a mission center in Ilorin, a Muslim-dominated town in 1855. Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809-1891)^[13] followed Bowen’s steps in 1857 with his diplomatic and patient friendship with some Emirs (kings) in the north such as that of Nupe, Egga, and Kipo, where he established mission centers with the hope of getting Christian converts. He also persuaded the Emirs of Bida, Ilorin, and Gwandu, and even the Sultan of Sokoto^[14] to receive Arabic Bibles as gifts from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) (Ayandele 1991: 118). These continued efforts have led to the success of Christianity in northern Nigeria, especially in areas where Islam has limited influence such as Plateau State, parts of Kaduna and Taraba states, etc.

Due to this development, Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria can be examined in different phases that gradually shaped their interaction over the course of history as people of the same nation. The history of southern and northern Nigeria need to be considered as completely different entities consisting of people that practice different cultures and religions altogether. The people were abruptly brought together as one under the 1914 British amalgamation policy, making Nigeria a federal entity. Explaining the challenges of the amalgamation, Matthew Hassan Kukah (1995: 102) states: “The values that have followed therefrom are values that are related to a stratified society in which the ruler and the ruled, the believers and non-believers, all lived in two worlds apart”. The first phase, therefore, was that of living apart before the coming of the British and during the early period of British occupation. During this period, there is limited interaction between the different parts. This according to Abubakar (2007: 3) was the “contact phase”, a period where each party tries to know about the other. The parties work for the British administration and engage in trade and political activities, reaching out to one another. This continues up to the independence in October 1960 and beyond it to the 1970s. This was the longest phase of Muslim-Christian relations, which unfortunately was not utilized either by the British or the founding fathers of Nigeria to produce better results for future relations between different independent groups. The second phase was termed the “trial phase” that started from 1980 to 2010 (i.e. three decades). This period was dominated with hostility, enmity, crisis, and conflicts as well as the destruction of lives and property. Thousands of people were killed from each side and properties worth billions of naira (i.e., hundreds of millions of US dollars) were destroyed (Abubakar 2007: 5). During this period, each group competes for supremacy and superiority over the other with politicians systematically instigating each side. The last phase started from 2010 until present and it is referred to as the “misunderstanding phase.” This period is full of undesirable discourses on population, political dominance over the other, conspiracy against the other, etc. This period is likely to result in future large scale armed-conflict aimed at eliminating one another or self-liberation and emancipation. The cases in Rwanda and Sudan were a good example in Africa. The following section examined Jos as an example.

Jos, the capital of Plateau state, is almost at the center of Nigeria and its closeness to Abuja (Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria), giving it and the people many advantages. Its strategic location makes it easily accessible by citizens from both northern and southern parts as well as access to job opportunities in Abuja for many of its young population. Many ethnic groups are represented in Jos, meaning that almost all religions, ethnic groups, and denominations found in Nigeria are also represented in the city of Jos. The pleasant weather in Jos^[15] is another advantage, which used to attract foreigners who often compare the similarity of the weather to what is obtainable in especially western countries (Plotnicor 1969: 31). Jos is about 1,000km North-East of Lagos, 650km South-East of Sokoto, 600km South-East of Maiduguri and 300km North-East of Abuja, which makes it almost at the center of Nigeria. The city is surrounded by hills of an average height of over 1250 meters (4000ft) above sea level, with granite peaks over 1800 meters. The average monthly temperature in Jos ranges from 21 – 25 ℃ and at night sometimes the temperature drops to as low as 7 ℃ (Neiers 1979: 89). Jos weather and rainy atmosphere make it distinct from other cities in Nigeria. Plateau State is one of Nigeria’s thirty-six states known for its outlook of natural beauty and the principal feature of this beauty is partly in the surrounding plateau from which the state got its name.

The popularity of Jos started before the colonial era as a zango (Hausa: a trading link) for the Hausa/Fulani traders at a place called Narkuta (about two kilometers from the present Jos) before the movement to Jos. Many reasons contributed to the relocation according to oral narrative; relocation of the mining field from Jos to Rayfield by the British, frequent death of the sarki (chief), etc. Jos gradually grows into an exciting metropolitan. First, it became the colonial administrative headquarters of “Jos Division” during the British era and remains the seat of government until today despite the creation of Benue (1967) and Nassarawa (1996) states, which gives it a strategic position as an attractive commercial center in North Central Nigeria (Egwu 2004: 109). During the colonial period, Jos owed its development to the colonial mining economy with peculiar history of urban population, socio-economic, and socio-political characteristics. Tin mining was then critical to the expansion of the steel industry of leading industrial nations of Britain and the United States of America. Nigeria became the world’s sixth largest producer of tin ore in 1902 and 1903, contributing 5% of world production. Plateau State alone produces 80% of Nigeria’s tin and Columbite and 83% of its metalliferous output (Egwu 2004: 110). More than 80 British mining companies operate in Jos during that period, which attracted the influx of people from diverse social, cultural, and religious backgrounds within and outside Nigeria. This includes business persons from Britain and other places in Africa, colonial workforce, local miners, and colonial mining laborers and their accompanying families, traders, etc. The attraction came mainly from the enterprising ethnic groups of the Hausa/Fulani from northern Nigeria, and the Igbo and Yoruba from the south (Egwu 2004: 111). The trooping in of the different migrants from all over Nigeria makes Jos an interesting meeting point for ethnic and religious interaction in the country, an opportunity that would have brought a lot of development including investments from both local and foreign business people in Plateau State. The population of Jos city today slightly exceeds two million from few hundreds of thousands in the 1950s and 1960s. Local migrants (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, etc.) are estimated to make up about 70% – 75% of the population. These migrants were the most visible residents of Jos at the different markets, street shops, and commercial vehicles, Napep (tricycles or Indian Rickshaw), Okada (motorcycles), etc. as well as petty trading and menial jobs.

THE CONTEXT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN JOS

The end of the military rule and return to civilian administration in 1999 signifies an increase in ethnic and religious instabilities in Nigeria, which are related to claims and contestation over space and identity as a basis of determining who is included or excluded from decision-making, opportunities, and domination. The religions of Islam and Christianity are both exclusivists^[16] and since ethnic groups in Nigeria mostly belong to either Islam or Christianity, it is always a “we” versus “them” relationship. Most citizens in Nigerian see themselves as different from the other and this is clear from the way different people dress, their language, and attitude, therefore; they easily differentiate and could tell who belongs to what religion or ethnicity. Ethnic groups on the other hand often share a common ancestry, identity, language, and culture. As the culture has been in preliterate societies in Nigeria, even today most ethnic groups do not want to share their city spaces, economic prosperity, and political opportunities with others. Politicians in Nigeria explore this opportunity to enhance their effortless chances of winning elections; therefore, they often play the ethnic and religious card. For example, if they are seeking elections within their ethnic enclave, they seem to have more chances when they sing the mantra of ethnicity, their ethnic comrades will vehemently vote for them no matter the suitability of the other candidates. Religion is also used in the same way. The attitude of politicians and members of ethnic enclaves have, therefore, been the cause of many violent conflicts in the country. Within the period of 55 months, from 1999 to 2003 of civil rule in Nigeria, there were over 80 ethnic and religious clashes in different parts of Nigeria, to which Alubo Ogoh (2006: 2) concluded that it is the “defining characteristic of the return to civil rule.” These conflict situations continue until today and are claiming hundreds of lives every year in the country. For example, the Economist (October 20, 2001: 50) reported that:

The main boundary for identifying one another between groups is usually language, religion, and history of origin. Different ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria have different physical and cultural identities. Whenever they meet during regular daily interaction, they always see themselves as different whether on the street, in the marketplace, at tertiary institutions, or at private and public offices. Therefore, as citizens interact in Jos, they often generate tension among themselves, which promote a negative feeling of “we” versus “them” dichotomy. Competition over employment, promotions at work, state scholarships, and job employment as well as obtaining contracts (supply, rehabilitation or construction) with especially the government are the most fertile grounds for breeding ethnicity in Nigeria (which is very common in Plateau State). Ethnicity reinforces the understanding of a common origin, which gives a sense of belonging to certain group(s) and antagonism to others, i.e., “we” versus “them” dichotomy. This attitude often results in the discrimination and exclusion of the “other” that is characterized as not belonging to a particular place (Yusuf 2009: 19). The “other” is usually in the minority and has a disadvantaged position. Ethnicity takes a greater meaning in competitive situations as well as situations in which available resources are relatively scarce like the situation in Plateau State (Onigu 1990: 15). The state in Nigeria is to be blamed for the discourse on ethnicity and politics of inclusion of one part of its citizens as belonging and exclusion of another as not belonging like the situation of the Hausa/Fulani in Plateau State. Samuel Egwu (2004: 82) maintains that “the state remains a central factor in the discourse on identity and the crisis of citizenship” in Nigeria. For example, in 2004, Alhaji Aminu Mato (a Hausa/Fulani) was appointed as a care-taker committee chairman of Jos North Local Government but he was rejected by some indigenous ethnic groups in Jos that see the Hausa/Fulani as non-indigenes (migrants), which led to conflict between the two groups. Another Hausa/Fulani Alhaji Mukhtar was appointed by the federal government to head its state poverty alleviation program in Plateau in 2001 and the same indigenous ethnic groups conducted riots and rejected the appointment, which also led to a crisis situation. The rejection of these appointments was purely based on ethnicity not because they are incompetent. The discourse on ethnicity and citizenship as well as inclusion and exclusion defines the level of the awareness and mental development of a particular people in any country especially in plural societies today.

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS AND CONFLICT

Religion is an important part of social and economic life in northern Nigeria and its physical presence is perceived in every corner of the region, mosques and churches are erected everywhere and are always full with worshippers. Most people always identify with their religion on the street or at the market. For example, there are constant calls to prayers in Muslim areas in Jos such as Bauchi Road (the city center), Anguwan Rogo, Nassarawa, Gangare, etc. during prayer time and deafening music from churches on Sundays in Christian areas such as Gada Biyu, Anguwan Rukuba, Jenta Adamu, Apata, etc. Schools and businesses often acquire religious names and people adapt to religious phrases in whatever situation, which Abubakar describes as the attitude of physical religiosity contrary to the reality of true Nigerian life. Nigerians seem to adapt to the context of physical belonging to a particular religion without really believing in the religion. They often neglect important tenets such as truth, piousness, honesty, morality, etc., yet Nigerians could die to protect their religion or kill the “other” that abuses their religion (Abubakar 2014: 387). An example is the recent case of Deborah Samuel, a 200-level student of Shehu Shagari College, Sokoto that was gruesomely killed in May 2022 by some people in Sokoto that accused her of blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad. Rather, most religious followers in Nigeria tend to focus on issues that promote disunity, enmity, and conflict among them as a way of practice of their religion.

Relationships between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria used to be cordial before independence and afterwards probably because they are still learning to understand one another which could be described as the formation stage of Muslim-Christian relations. Most Muslims only hear of Christians from their Holy Scripture, the Qur’an labeling them as ahlul kitab that is, people of a past revealed scripture, the Bible. Therefore, Muslims in Nigeria are aware of Christianity from their Qur’an even before Christianity was introduced in the country in the 19^th century as earlier discussed. Nigerians who later converted to Christianity through the British missionaries seem to have not received proper guidance to respect and live in peace with their Muslim counterparts as citizens of one nation. Muslims on their part seem not to have received proper guidance on relations with their Christian counterparts despite the abundant information about Christians in the Qur’an. On the other hand, Nigeria’s founding fathers seem not to have also well prepared the citizens politically for a better future relation with one another, a relationship of harmony and understanding. Until the 1980s, Muslims and Christians coexisted in a relatively peaceful atmosphere with tendencies of limited misunderstanding, which was not given serious attention to manage for the future. Amidst this misunderstanding, there are instances of mutual coexistence exemplified by Muslims and Christians through the exchange of food and other pleasantries during festivities such as īd[17] and Christmas, etc. During such moments of joy, both Muslims and Christians distribute food to their neighbors and in extreme situations even buy new clothes for the children of the neighbors in order to celebrate with their own children, which actually promote good relationships with neighbors at that time. Many older interlocutors seem to remember such moments in their life.

Two decades of unregulated situations of Muslim-Christian coexistence from 1970 to 1990 produced the negative effect of what Nigerians are witnessing today in their relationship. First was the establishment of two rival but also representative religious organizations in the country’s religious scene: Jamā’at Nasril Islam (society for the support of Islam, JNI) established in 1962 representing Muslims and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) established in 1976 to represent Christians. The main aim of these groups is to defend their faith and members against all odds. This development has probably caused more divisions among the citizens than promoting national unity. These religious organizations provide immense services to their respective faith and its members as well as go to any length to protect them even at the detriment of national unity. What follows was the emergence of various other religious groups among the Muslims and Christians that further deepen divisions, inter and intra conflicts, and chaos in Nigeria. Today, there are tens of Muslim groups and Christian denominations in the country each independent of the other and struggling to get power, followers, and admiration from Nigerians. Religious leaders in Nigeria appear on the media (social media, newspaper or television and radio, or through the use of loudspeakers from their religious places, etc.) and publicize any national or local issue to the public, castigate whomever they desire as well as challenge the government since there is no strict government regulation that restricts religious involvement in political and national issues in Nigeria. This attitude constantly produces enmity, tension, and conflicts in Muslim-Christian relations in especially North Central. The division of power and loyalty may appear simple on the surface, but it is complex. The Nigerian president has the power of the secular state and the army whereas, on the other hand, prominent religious figures have the power of their congregation to even challenge the state power. Historical examples in other parts of the world show that the Filipino Cardinal Jaine Sin challenged the power of President Fernand Marcos in the 1986 revolutions in the Philippines. Ayatollah Khomeini challenged, which even led to the overthrew of President Shah of Iran in 1979 while Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu led the South African Ecumenical Council of churches against the apartheid region in the early 1990s (Chentu 2010: 223). In the context of Nigeria for example, in December 2015, the Shi’ite group under Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky challenged the state authority in Nigeria by blocking the public road during one of their activities in Zaria claiming to have more right to its usage than the Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff who came through that road on his way to pay homage to the Emir of Zazzau.^[18] During COVID-19, many Muslim and Christian religious leaders challenged the government’s ban on public religious gathering to restrict its transmission. Prominent among them are Shaykh Sani Yahya Jingir of Izala and Pastor Chris Oyakhilome of Chris Embassy. The government has arrested some religious leaders (imams and pastors) for flouting the regulations but it could not touch the likes of Jingir and Oyakhilome because they are powerful religious figures, partly because of their influence and partly because politicians need them during voting.

Another angle of tense relations between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria is that of suspicion of one another, which also started from the 1970s onwards. The debate on the inclusion of the sharī’a court^[19] in the Nigerian constitution that started in 1976 and Nigeria’s membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986^[20] as well as the implementation of sharī’a in twelve states of northern Nigeria^[21] in 1999 in areas where Muslims form a majority were among major issues of disputes. A recent issue is that of the assumed Arabic inscription^[22] on the naira note. For the Christians in Nigeria, these and other related issues represent Muslims’ conscious efforts to Islamize Nigeria. Surprisingly, these were the issues majorly pointed out to me during an informal discussion with a group of pastors as processes of Islamization in Nigeria. For Christians in northern Nigeria, they constantly accuse Muslims of making a conscious effort to transform Nigeria into an Islamic state because of the decades of debate on sharī’a implementation. The implementation of sharī’a was the issue that caused Christian riots in Kaduna State, which led to conflict with Muslims in 2000, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives.

Competition between Muslims and Christians appears to form a chunk of problems in Nigeria. For example, the issue of public holidays in the country, which group has more population in the country, or who dominates the police or military forces, the national/state civil service, and even in terms of important strategic positions within those areas. Another issue includes which group has the largest number of worship places, or dominates the public space or the atmosphere in terms of sound, etc. These issues are prone to creating grievance and suspicion of one another in Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. In institutions of higher learning and in public and private workplaces, each group tries to dominate in order to show its superiority over the “other” because visibility and influence according to this understanding signifies dominance, an important drama in Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. The use of the media provides another focal point in Muslim-Christian relations through bias and favorable reporting, especially during tensions. Some journalists belonging to the “other” religion are prone to describing the other religion negatively during reportage. The introduction of social media and the popularization of fake news has also complicated relations between the two groups. In the event of slight provocation, fake pictures of burnt religious buildings and dead bodies of one religious group are often disseminated in order to instigate one faith against the “other” (Chentu 2010: 248). Boko Haram terrorism (BH) is another burning issue that has complicated Muslim-Christian relations. Surprisingly, BH is a terrorist group that is against both Muslims and Christians and has even killed more Muslims than Christians since its emergence in the North East region in 2009 yet, some Christians in Nigeria have always used its disdainful activities to criticize Muslims, which further cause disunity among them. Tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria often degenerate into violent conflicts and this is what gives way to the use of ethnicity and politics and its mix-up with religion.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION AGAINST THE HAUSA/FULANI IN JOS

There are numerous challenges confronting the Muslim Hausa/Fulani migrants as minorities in Jos due to their circumstances in Plateau State that make them unwanted citizens and owing to the indigene/settler dichotomy. To be an indigene in Plateau State for instance according to the political ideology of the people in the state, one must belong to a certain restricted ethnic group such as the Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Tarok, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Goemai, Buji, Amo, Ron, Rigwe, etc. These ethnic groups share a common historical origin in the state before the arrival of the Hausa/Fulani, each has a unique language, and they somehow share similar traditional religion and culture, and today, are predominantly Christian. Most of them share negative views of the Hausa/Fulani and northern Nigeria as a whole. On their part, the Hausa/Fulani are generally Muslims, which presented them as second class as well as opponents especially because of differences in religious belief. Though, the Hausa/Fulani have been living in Jos for almost two centuries producing about five generations yet, they are rejected and always seen as migrants that do not have a stake in the state. They can vote but do not have the right to higher political appointments, state educational scholarships, or employment in the state because they are seen as “settlers” (migrants) or allogène and so, do not belong. For example, Abubakar’s grandfather, Muhammadu Na Rimi came from Rimi, a town in Kano State, and settled in Jos since the 1930’s but being a Hausa/Fulani by birth; even Abubakar’s children cannot claim indigeneity (belonging) in Plateau State because they are not considered belonging to the ethnic groups in the area. Therefore, by the coincidence of birthright, one will automatically become a first or second-class citizen in Plateau State and by implication in Nigeria. This seems to be the typical attitude in less advanced countries, especially in most parts of Africa.

Since the 1970s, there has been tense discussion among the indigenous ethnic groups on whether to accept the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos or reject them. In fact, the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos almost relocate to the neighboring Sabon Gari in Toro Local Government in Bauchi State (a predominantly Hausa/Fulani community), but the then Military administrator of Plateau State Group Captain Dan Suleiman intervened and convinced them to stay in Jos (Egwu 2004: 103). Despite this intervention, the situation led to a stray relationship. The continued situation of crisis from 2001 has forced many Hausa/Fulani to still relocate to Sabon Gari in Bauchi State leading to the formation of a large Hausa/Fulani migrant community of what I call the “economy Jos.” People that moved there constantly come to Jos daily to seek livelihood and return.

Some of the frustration of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos includes denying them recognition as indigenes of the area, which automatically excludes them from any state benefit. During President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, he faulted the promotion of the “indigene/settler” concept in Jos and Plateau State at large and branded it as unhealthy in the situation of Nigeria’s development (Danfulani 9). The president argued that going back to history; everyone could be a settler in their present place of abode. This argument challenged the “indigene/settler” concept yet, nothing concrete was done by the government to change the policy (Bagudu 2004: 15). Appointment into important positions in government is also dependent upon one’s belonging. This policy has isolated Muslim Hausa/Fulani in Jos and made them “stateless citizens” in their own country. Over the years, for the Hausa/Fulani to obtain scholarship at tertiary institutions or get employment at federal or other states in Nigeria, especially within the north, they have to falsify indigene certificate of another place. This has resulted in more enmity and had caused many violent and bloody conflicts in the State^[23] since September 2001. For example, Zainab Hashimu stressed that she has obtained three indigene certificates from Kaduna, Bauchi, and Birnin Kebbi states all in pursuit of education and scholarship (Interview 2020). Danladi, a Hausa/Fulani resident of Jos obtained employment in Abuja as a police imam using the indigene certificate of Kano State, while Kabiru, also from Jos secured a job in Jigawa State using an indigene certificate he obtained from Jigawa State (Interviews 2020). Not belonging to a particular area of residence by indigeneity makes a person stateless in Nigeria. Every person in Nigeria carries a certificate of identity as an indigene but those that cannot authoritatively claim a place are liable to lack many opportunities as citizens.

The population growth of some enterprising ethnic groups in Jos such as the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo seem to instigate envy from some members of the indigenous ethnic groups such as the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere (Egwu 2004: 112). The Hausa/Fulani were the earliest “settlers” then the Yoruba and followed by the Igbo. The attention of the indigenous ethnic groups is mainly on the Hausa/Fulani for many reasons. The Hausa/Fulani are northerners like them and share the experiences of pre-colonial wars with one another therefore, a source of animosity unlike the Igbo and Yoruba who came from the faraway south. Second, the population of the Hausa/Fulani in northern Nigeria is intimidating to them; therefore, they constantly live in fear of an imagined domination. This fear comes in three dimensions; social, religious, and political.^[24] After the independence, the north started the policy of “one north”, which for the people of central Nigeria also means domination; therefore, they prefer to align with southerners who are mostly Christians like them. Since most people in North Central are Christians, aligning with Christian brethren from the south will possibly give them formidable power to challenge the Muslim north.

However, there are some major challenges confronting the people of north central (Middle Belt), which causes them a lot of confusion and frustration. The people of southern Nigeria always see them as synonymous to the Hausa/Fulani northerners; this is partly because of their identity and the region they belong to even though they are Christians like them. There will always be suspicion of them being the same as the Muslims in the north. The Igbo in the South will never trust the people of the Middle Belt for any meaningful political alliance because for them, they are closer to the Hausa than they are to the Igbo and might betray them at the slightest instigation. This reduces the chances of any meaningful political alliance between them. For example, the Igbo in the south will scarcely vote for a Christian northerner into an important political office such as the presidency. All the political alliances that have worked for the people of Plateau State (and by extension north central or Middle Belter) since independence was with the Hausa/Fulani in the north either during the military rule or political dispensation. It is clear that if the situation of conflict and animosity persists between the people in Plateau State with the minority Hausa/Fulani in the State and the Middle Belt at large, it is most likely that the dominant Hausa/Fulani population in northern Nigeria might continuously segregate against the people in Plateau (and Middle Belt) in terms of religion and politics, which can be detrimental to them as a minority in the north. It is very unlikely for the people of the Middle Belt to have a fruitful collaboration with the Igbo in Southern Nigeria for many reasons. The Igbo in the South will only align the people in the Middle Belt for their own benefit not that of the Middle Belters. However, it is important to note that the people of the Middle Belt need the Hausa/Fulani in northern Nigeria for any meaningful political participation in the national politics more than the Hausa/Fulani might need them; after all, they were the most beneficiaries as minorities in the region. For example, Plateau State cannot provide employment to all its youths after graduation from higher institutions; they can access employment in other northern states where people pay less attention to modern education. But today, an Igbo person from the South can easily get employment in the north but not someone from Plateau State who is considered an antagonist to the Hausa/Fulani. Also, their population will never produce any political position at the national level. This negative development is detrimental to the masses in the Middle Belt whose children will be denied admission into higher institutions of learning and employment in the other northern states more than the politicians. The politics of exclusion has already isolated and Plateau State one of the poverty centers and less developed states in northern Nigeria.

DETERMINANT OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND CONFLICT

The ruling elitists (specifically the political class) in Nigeria continue to take advantage of religion and ethnicity as a means to selfish ends. In order to grab and retain political and economic power, the elitists always try to diversify their survival strategies by adopting any strategy provided it works for them. For example, the “divide-and-rule” strategy through the use of ethnicity and religion works for them while the masses serve as victims. The so call indigenes of Plateau State for instance find the idea of being manipulated by the political class provocative because this would imply that they have been brainwashed or hypnotized. They, therefore, remain oblivious to the agents, goals, purpose, and method of the elitists’ manipulation (Chentu 2010: 189).

Though, the 21^st century seems to present some complications to the politicians in Nigeria as they gradually lose their grip and respect in the eyes of many, especially among youth. An example was the recent #Endsars protests^[25] in 2020 in many cities in Nigeria. Those in government for instance in Plateau have failed to provide good governance and the provision of social amenities such as electricity, running tap water, road networks, security, employment, basic infrastructure, and quality education. Disrespect for politicians in Nigeria will most likely increase in the coming years for the above reasons. Most politicians in Nigeria are corrupt and selfish and are accused of squandering the country’s wealth and enriching themselves, building mansions, and sending their children abroad for studies. Religious figures, on the other hand, are continually allying with the political class to suppress the citizens and if this attitude continues, they are likely going to experience a similar fate. Most religious figures today seem to be living a luxurious life though they do not have standard employment except working for religious bodies, which does not pay well. For example, they drive expensive cars and live in mansions as well. Most religious leaders enmesh wealth through their alliance with the political class. Many young people seem to be wary of the situation in Nigeria; conflicts, bloodshed, insecurity, Muslim-Christian conflicts as well as ethnic encounters. Globalization has widened the opinions of many young people who envy their counterparts in other parts of the world and wish for similar livelihoods.

In Jos today, many Hausa/Fulani young people have overlooked the challenges of securing employment in Plateau State and have since dispersed to other places in northern Nigeria, especially Abuja. Others have engaged in various forms of trade and manual work such as tailoring, commercial driving, local manufacturing, mining, etc., and were often successful. Every area within Jos has become a mini market, and shops and stalls have sprung up all over the city. This has engaged many Hausa/Fulani youths away from idleness and has to some extent reduced conflict between Muslims and Christians in the city where each party is considering another as opposition. This does not however mean that there are no idle youths that engage in negative things that might lead to disturbances in the city such as drug abuse and cultism, which have become very popular recently, especially in places such as Congo-Russia, Gada-Biyu, and Angwan Rukuba, etc., areas that have become spots of turbulences.

Despite this situation, there are also instances of new initiatives on the relationships between Muslim and Christian youths today, and even the instances of inter-marriages in Jos. Young Muslims and Christians in Jos are making desperate effort to reestablish cordial relationships among themselves. Some of these youths have created many social media platforms that connect them with one another to organize a series of events in Jos. According to Abdussalam Ibrahim (Interview September 2022), there are many social media platforms, but one of the popular social media platforms used by the youths to conduct various activities on Facebook is called “ChopLife.” Through this platform, they organize hiking and mini hangouts, where they eat and interact with one another. They also organize īd and Christmas feaster to eat and merry make. The youths often visit orphanages and vulnerable people in society and distribute money, foodstuff, books, and other relief materials. Videos and pictures of these activities are often uploaded on their site. When I checked the “ChopLife” social media site in September 2022, there are about 70,000 members. Another group of young Muslims and Christians is called the “Jos Town Ambassadors.” The group according to Abdussalam carries out a peace football project called “Music plus football equal to peace.” They organize music concerts and football matches with teams created around peace components such as “Team Love,” “Team Reconciliation,” “Team Unity,” etc. Muslim and Christian youths are mixed up together in each of the teams so that it will attract as well as enlighten both Muslim and Christian fans as they come to watch the matches. Muhammad Lawal (Interview September 2022) agrees that new forms of relationships have emerged among Muslim and Christian boys and girls in the post-crisis era in Jos. One of these relationships is the increase of proper and recognizes marriage among them, which is legitimate among Muslim religious circles though with some challenges. In this case, mainly Muslim boys marry Christian girls but not the other way around. Another type is the illegal relationship, which is seen as a form of protest against the traditional societies in Jos, especially among some parents where young people stay together and even have children without proper and recognized marriage. Both Muhammad Lawal and Abdussalam gave me examples of Muslim girls (Zainab and Walida) that rebelled against their parents and went to stay and even have children with Christian men. This shows that as politicians struggle to disrupt relations between Muslims and Christians, situations are slowly changing, and a new form of relationship is emerging among the youth. These developments if continued among Muslim and Christian youths, it will define the future of ethnic and religious relations in Jos.

CONCLUSION

Jos is a twentieth-century city that has attracted various people from different regions of Nigeria especially the Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslims. The British missionaries brought Christianity to Jos, which increase colonial workers that are mostly Christians making Jos a meeting point for Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria, especially with the conversion of most Plateau people from traditional religion to Christianity. Hausa/Fulani minority Muslims in Plateau State are considered “settlers” (migrants) and by extension second-class citizens in Jos while the other ethnic groups are seen as indigenous and therefore first-class citizens. From 2001, Jos has witnessed the beginning of decades of bloody ethnic, political, and religious conflicts between “settler” Muslims and “indigene” Christians, a situation that has polarized not only Plateau State but also northern Nigeria along religious and ethnic lines. Although the dispute of “indigene/settler” continues in Jos with adverse effects in the whole of Northern Nigeria, there seems to emerge no success probably because it is a preliterate attitude in a 21^st-century world. The minority Hausa/Fulani Muslims face many challenges in Jos as “settlers” especially the young population as they struggle to recreate their own identity and belonging within an aggressive “indigene” Christian population. These attitudes, responses, and reactions produce both positive and negative impacts on relations between Christians and Muslims within the city of Jos in particular and northern Nigeria in general. The people of Plateau State have promoted the “indigene/settler” dispute for decades, which was probably heralded by opportunistic politicians to ascend to power making Plateau a political and ethnic war zone, which underdeveloped the state, making it one of the poorest and less developed states in the region. The chapter uses Peter Geschiere’s (2005) theory of autochthony to examine the “indigene/Settler” concept and its implication for relations between Muslims and Christians in Jos and northern Nigeria at large. It has been the reason for segregation, animosity, and conflict with devastating consequences for many citizens.

END NOTES

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