CHAPTER 6

The Niamey Experience: OAU Peace Mediation and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the Nigerian Civil War

Oluchukwu Ignatus Onianwa, PhD

Department of History, Strategic and International Studies

Dennis Osadebay University, Asaba, Delta State-Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Developing Africa is hinged on total emancipation of the continent from colonialism and neocolonialism. African countries felt a strong compulsion to build up their institutions and their constitutional arrangements in a manner that reflected African values and African imperatives. African leaders had also endeavored to build effective institutions of governance and formulate policies needed for sound economic and political developments. However, the process of nation-building was completely aborted as civil conflicts broke out in major parts of the continent. Toyin Falola and Emmanuel Mbah aptly argued that “the challenges are even tougher because personal differences and ethnic cleavages created during colonial rule have produced many disputes and stifled inter- and intra-state dialogue.”^[1]

The Nigerian Civil War fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under Major-General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra led by Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was one of the earliest postcolonial conflicts in Africa. Factors that led to the tragic war could be traced to the numerous political crises that erupted immediately after the country gained her independence from the British colonial rule.^[2]

The coup d’état of 15 January 1966 which terminated the first democratic government in Nigeria, and ushered in the first military government headed by Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi and the 29 July 1966 counter-coup d’état, served as melting points for the spate of civil war in Nigeria. There followed a series of meetings and constitutional conferences that were held towards restoring public confidence in the country’s governance system.^[3]

The meeting of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Nigeria organized in Aburi Ghana on 4 and 5 January 1967 was expected to be a landmark in “resolving the Nigeria’s political crises”. Nonetheless, the parley ended up in a discordant accord.^[4] The British Foreign Office on 25 January 1967 said that “the Accra setting was more of ‘shot-in-the-arm’ than a solution to all of Nigeria’s problems. Tribal and personal rivalries ran very deep, especially between the North and East. Reorganization of the army, sharing of revenue, and a system of government were major bone of contention after the Aburi gathering.”^[5]

However, the endless negotiation over the Aburi Accord and the creation of twelve states structure by General Yakubu Gowon without the consent of the Eastern region developed serious tensions which resulted in the region’s move towards the declaration of the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967.^[6] The refusal to recognize Biafra by the Nigerian government eventually led to the civil war. While the Federal Military Government of Nigeria called the conflict “a police action,” the Biafran government regarded it as a struggle for survival and freedom from all forms of domination in the Nigerian State.^[7]

Peace mediation was taken seriously by African leaders due to the influx of external forces in the conflict and was driven by the spirit of solidarity and unity to find solutions to the war under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Cardinal to this effort was the goal of attaining national conciliation and consensus.^[8]

Venues were strategically selected for peace talks to settle the fighting. In each of the venues, African leaders were hopeful of achieving positive outcomes. However, each time they convened to discuss the matter the presence of the great powers was usually felt. Therefore, the overbearing influence of the great powers in the peace process made the civil war to be highly complex. Massive division of opinion took place among Africans and eventual breakdown of peace settlements.

This chapter discusses the Niamey peace initiative of the Nigerian Civil War. However, it implements specific focus on Anglo-American diplomacy to the activities of the OAU Consultative Committee at the gathering. The study is very significant because it shows that genuine desire for peace had been a major feature of African civil conflicts in the 1960s as a strategy to avoid too much loss of human lives. Hence, peace negotiations had been part of the international politics of Africa’s civil wars with the great powers as the leading contenders in view of their vested interests on the continent. The study adopted a historical narrative approach and based its analysis on primary sources namely archival materials employed from the British National Archives Kew London and secondary sources obtained from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN) in Enugu State, Nigeria.

The author argued that a significant attribute of the Niamey assembly was an Anglo-American presence throughout the meeting, conceived and carried out as “a joint operation”, thus, synchronized to avoid creating an impression of influencing the outcome of the summit. Anglo-American moves at the gathering hinged on strengthening their diplomatic investments in the war. Meanwhile, there developed a supremacy battle between certain African leaders which resulted in a quick decision of moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa, an action that reflected political rivalry for primacy in talks or enhancement of personal prestige. While the situation indicated that agreement on substantive issues was not going to be achieved, it paved the way for diplomatic maneuvering to get the talks away from Niamey. The Niamey episode showed that while the OAU had attempted to patch up inter-African conflicts, foreign meddling into its affairs made it difficult for the organization to deal with the internal problems of the African states. While it was politically and diplomatically correct to ascribe the OAU as an undoubtedly intermediary in resolving the conflict, the tragedy was that the continental body was too unwieldy to enforce its decisions regarding the war.^[9]

AFRICAN LEADERS GO TO NIAMEY

The intensity of the military operations and the huge influx of external forces such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and France in support of either sides of the war prompted the OAU to open a frontier of diplomatic and peace interventions in the war. The Consultative Committee inaugurated at the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Kinshasa on September 11-14, 1967, was the first OAU peace initiative of the Nigerian Civil War. The members of the committee were the Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié, Chairman; President Williams Tubman of Liberia, Vice Chairman; General Ankrah, leader of the National Liberation Council (NLC) in Ghana; General Mobutu, President of Congo (Kinshasa); President Ahidjo of Cameroon; and President Hamani Diori of Niger. The first assignment carried out by the Committee was the visit to Lagos, where they held consultations with General Gowon in pursuit of the resolution on the Nigerian situation adopted by the OAU Conference in Kinshasa.^[10]

After the meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee in Lagos, which did not yield much of a result, the head of the Committee Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié continued series of consultations with other members of the committee on whether there was anything more they could do regarding the Nigerian situation. This was disclosed by the Ethiopian Ambassador Dawit Abdou, who had earlier received instructions to present a letter from the Emperor to Presidents Hamani Diori and Ahidjo. The letter consisted primarily of a report from General Ankrah to the Emperor that listed various ways by which the General had tried to contact Ojukwu to discuss with him the outcome of the OAU peace mission to Lagos and communiqué on the Nigerian Civil War. Ankrah reported to the Ethiopian Emperor that at the end of January 1968, all efforts had come to naught, and he regretted that the OAU Mission to Nigeria did not succeed. The emperor was unhappy about the lack of success of the OAU peace mission but did not describe it as a complete failure. In transmitting Ankrah’s report and letter to Ojukwu to other members of the committee, Emperor asked for views on whether the OAU should try to do anything more about the Nigeria-Biafra conflict.^[11]

The appealing condition of the civilian population in the war areas roused world-wide concern and made further African peace action inevitable. Humanitarian considerations were behind the initiative of Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié to revive the work of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria at Niamey.^[12]

THE NIAMEY MEETING

The first meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee in Niamey began on July 15 and ended on July 18, 1968. The following members of the OAU Consultative Committee were present at the Niamey meeting: Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié, Chairman; President Williams Tubman of Liberia, Member; President Diori Hamani of Niger Republic, Member; President Ahamdou Ahidjo of Cameroun, Member; General Ankrah, Chairman of National Liberation Council in Ghana (NLC), Member; Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Congo-Kinshasa, Member; and the OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli.^[13] The Nigerian delegates in Niamey formed the Chargè d’ Affaires to Niger, including Vice President of the Executive Council and Federal Commissioner of Finance and also Chief of Delegation, Obafemi Awolowo; Military Governor of Kano State Audu Bako; Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice T.O. Elias; Permanent Secretary for Ministry of External Affairs A.A. Baba Gana; Permanent Secretary for Economic Development Q. A. Ayida; Permanent Secretary for Information A. Joda; Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia Eme Sanu; Nigeria Chargè d’Affaires^[14]

The Biafran delegates were Colonel Ojukwu, the Biafran leader; Nnamdi Azikiwe, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Biafra Commissioner of Information Ifeagwu Eke; Gabonese Minister of Information Pierre Rouley; and Chief of Cabinet of President Houphouet-Boigny.^[15] Before the meeting began, President Diori requested the permission of the French, U.S., and the Soviet Union to make use of their telegraphic and telephonic facilities to speed up regional communications with principals and interested OAU parties in the talks.^[16]

To keep Biafrans from contacting the media in Niamey, President Hamani Diori imposed tight security protection around Biafrans. They were housed in the military compounds across the street from the palace, and reporters found it impossible to penetrate the gate. An estimated 180 Igbo servants and laborers in Niamey were detained during the conference. One guard even threatened to shoot a photographer who had obtained advance permission to take a picture. Interestingly enough, Biafran delegates made very few attempts to contact the press in order to present their case to them.^[17]

The meeting was opened at 3:15 p.m. by the Chairman, Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié. In his opening address, the emperor stated that it was important for the committee to help the federal military government to ensure peace and stability in Nigeria. If peace was not obtained in Nigeria, it would be tragic not only for Nigeria but also for the whole of Africa, and therefore, everything possible should be done for Nigeria to achieve peace and tranquility. To stop the fighting in Nigeria, Selaṥṥié went on, it would be necessary for many sacrifices to be made; without these sacrifices, it would not be possible to achieve the OAU objective. He said that he was aware of the many good gestures which the Nigerian government had made, and he prayed to God to help the federal government and the committee to achieve success in their joint efforts.^[18]

After his brief opening statement, the emperor invited General Gowon, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Nigeria, at 12:30 p.m. to take the floor. The General delivered his opening speech, thanking the members of the Committee for listening to his statement and further assuring them that the federal government would do everything it could to bring peace and to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria.^[19] According to the Ryan, the U.S. Ambassador in Niamey:

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Committee appreciated the General for his resounding speech and responded: “I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude to General Gowon for delivering such a lucid report to the Committee.” He went on to say that as he had previously stated, continuation of the fighting in Nigeria would bring more problems and difficulties to the people of Nigeria as indeed General Gowon himself had stated in his speech on the question of the humanitarian problem. But everybody knew the OAU Consultative Committee was not sitting in judgment of the federal government on its internal problem, but rather, it was given the task to facilitate peace in Nigeria.^[21]

The emperor then said that he would like the rest of the members of the Committee to either comment on the statement of General Gowon in his presence or ask for any clarification from him, but if there was nothing anybody would say, then the meeting could be adjourned for 10 minutes. Meanwhile, the head of the Ghanaian delegation, General Ankrah, after addressing the Chairman and the other members of the Committee, advised that as they had heard the statement of Gowon, he would suggest that the latter should take leave of them for a few minutes to enable them to decide on how best to consider the issue. The Chairman agreed with the suggestion, and since there was no other member of the Committee willing to make further statements, the meeting resumed at 1 p.m.^[22]

Before the meeting reopened, the OAU Administrative Secretary-General Diallo Telli brought a resolution to Gowon for verification before publication, and its purpose was to invite Biafran leader Ojukwu or his representatives to come by Thursday, July 19, 1968, to Niamey or contact the committee at any time thereafter. The resolution was to be issued to the press and stipulated that no direct invitation would be sent to Biafrans according to the Secretary-General. Gowon, after consulting his entourage, argued for the resolution to be made public as in his view there would be no objection to Biafrans being heard by the Consultative Committee.^[23]

On July 17, 1968, President Hamani Diori of Niger told the British Chargè d’Affaires in Addis Ababa, Mark McMullen, that he proposed to persuade the President of Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, to encourage Biafrans to attend the meeting. He had intended to propose to the Consultative Committee that he, President Williams Tubman of Liberia, and General Ankrah of Ghana should persuade Houphouet-Boigny and Ahidjo to influence Albert Bongo of Gabon, and the emperor to convince Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to pressure Ojukwu into making concessions. Diori thought that the Consultative Committee and General Gowon would agree to Biafran representations being available in Niamey for consultations. If they could be convinced to come, he suggested that they form part of a specially invited delegation from some African countries that recognized Biafra, such as Ivory Coast, to overcome fears and suspicions at the gathering.^[24]

According to the Evening Standard on July 17, 1968, Biafra authorities accepted an invitation to send a top-level delegation to Niamey. An official broadcast by Radio Biafra welcomed the invitation but said that because of the transport difficulties in the blockaded war territory, a delegation would not be able to go before the weekend. The statement did not indicate whether Ojukwu would go to Niamey personally but confirmed the return of General Gowon to Niamey for another round of peace talks.^[25]

Consequently, the Committee continued its meeting at 5:30 p.m., yet it was not possible for them to produce any concrete proposals for discussions with Gowon. Gowon therefore gave an excuse and returned to Lagos. He promised to return the following morning and asked them to let his delegation have a copy of their proposed resolution so that they could examine and advise him when he returned the following morning to enable him to make a quick decision on it. This request was agreed to by the committee, but they were unable to come to any agreement on their proposed resolution that evening. Gowon returned the following morning and waited for the draft resolutions until in the afternoon when it was brought.^[26]

The draft resolution, which was later discovered to have been produced by the Ghanaian delegation, contained the following basic points, which were all opposed by Nigeria: that the Ghana Government offered staging facilities for stockpiling, inspection, and airlifting direct into Biafra of relief supplies; that there should be a temporary truce and a temporary renunciation of secession; that there should be a demilitarized zone for disposal of relief supplies of 10 and 20 miles on either side; and that the demilitarized zone should be supervised by an observing peacekeeping force.^[27]

The Nigerian side commented on the points as follow: that this resolution involved an air corridor, which would not be acceptable because of the possibility of the illegal arms traffic through the corridor from other airports during times allowed for supplies from authorized airports; and there could not be a temporary ceasefire as it would not achieve the principal objective of the federal government and therefore the question of a demilitarized zone following the temporary cessation of hostilities would not arise nor should the question of an external observer force, as the foreign force would be admitted into Nigeria until after the renunciation of secession.^[28]

The federal government assured the committee, however, that an external observer could be admitted after the end of the civil war to give a sense of security to Biafrans within a united Nigeria for a limited period. The committee was admonished not to forget and to show appreciation of the many good gestures which the federal government had made toward achieving a speedy and peaceful solution to the Nigerian crisis. In view of these remarks on the draft resolution, President of the Cameroun Republic Ahidjo suggested an amendment to the resolution, considering the last remark of Gowon. This amendment resulted in the exclusion of all four suggestions of Ghana’s delegation, and when he read his amendment, all members of the Committee agreed to it. Gowon, on his own part when asked by the Chairman of the Committee to indicate whether he agreed to the amendment, replied, saying that “subject to any drafting modifications [he had] no objection to it.”^[29]

In his report on July 27, 1968, the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey on Nigeria submitted to the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C., and the British Embassy in Abidjan and sent to African capitals such as Addis Ababa, Dar-Es-Salam, Kinshasa, Lagos, Libreville, Monrovia, Yaoundé, and European capitals like London and Paris, the U.S. Ambassador in Niamey, Ryan, argued that the articles in the resolution on relief supplies were very different from the proposal discussed originally by the committee.

Gowon’s subsequent success in convincing the committee to change the articles to something acceptable to the federal government was attributed partly to his playing on the fears of each committee member that they, too, have potential Igboland. This means that African leaders that attended the meeting equally have internal problems in their respective countries, so the earlier they could work together in solving the Nigerian crisis, the better for them in resisting anything capable of dividing their respective countries. In addition, the committee delegations were probably unprepared to argue too long with the highly competent, persuasive members of the Nigerian federal government delegation.^[30]

The interesting point was General Ankrah’s violent opposition to the amendment proposed by President Ahidjo after it had been incorporated into the draft resolution and submitted for final approval. The General attacked the resolution for lacking any concrete substance. He spoke emotionally, which, unfortunately for him, exposed his delegation as being solidly behind Biafra to the extent that almost all the other members of the Committee became disillusioned. The leader of the Congolese delegation even went to the extent of asking General Ankrah if he had any ulterior motives in taking such a strong stand against a resolution which had been previously approved by them in its draft form. General Ankrah’s idea was that General Gowon should be shown the draft resolution only as a matter of courtesy and not for him to suggest his own amendments, and by implication he even accused President Ahidjo of having been influenced by General Gowon when he proposed his amendment.^[31]

Apparently, General Ankrah was unhappy because all his proposals were left out of the resolution and went to the extent of suggesting that the committee should recommend an emergency session whereby they should ask for a fresh mandate, and this, by inference, meant that the committee should be given mandate to mediate in the Nigerian crisis rather than as at that time, to help the Nigerian federal government obtain a peaceful solution to the internal crisis and maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria. This suggestion was of course strongly opposed by President Ahidjo, who stated that the committee should wait and make its report to the OAU at its next scheduled conference in Algiers and that there was no need or reason for an emergency meeting.

Then, President Tubman of Liberia also made an intervention saying as the majority of the Committee membership was in favor of passing the resolution as amended, the resolution should be passed based on democratic practices. He expressed disappointment with the way General Ankrah addressed the committee and thought that the meeting was the worst of its kind he had ever attended, where he saw an African Head of State losing his temper.^[32]

Meanwhile, commenting on General Ankrah’s attitude at the Niamey meeting, the British Charge d’Affaires in Abidjan Mark McMullen told the foreign office on September 25, 1968, that one could well understood that Ankrah’s behavior at Niamey appeared to the Nigerians as entirely pro-Biafran. Ankrah seemed to have been upset about the rough reception of his draft, which he had not anticipated. ^[33]

At this time, as it was getting late, Gowon informed the chairman of the committee that he would like to return to Nigeria due to his other pressing engagements and the impossibility for him to return to Niamey. He assured the committee that he had given a broad mandate to his delegation, which remained behind to speak on behalf of the federal government with flexibility and understanding. Gowon then took leave of the members of the committee after expressing his gratitude to them and to all leaders of Africa in general for having shown such an understanding of the Nigerian conflict and for their continued cooperation and support. Gowon, accompanied by some members of his delegation, left the meeting for the airport from which he took off for Nigeria.^[34]

On the following afternoon, the committee invited the Nigerian delegation, led by the Commissioner for Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, Obafemi Awolowo, to have a look at the amended draft resolution and comment on it. When it was read through, the Cameroonian Foreign Minister, who was the head of their delegation, suggested an amendment; President Ahidjo had travelled earlier in the morning back to his country to attend to most urgent state matters. The minister’s amendment requested an addition to the resolution: “with the objective of preserving Nigeria’s territorial integrity and of guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants.” This amendment was acceptable to all members of the committee and again Ghana expressed surprise that the Cameroonian delegation should have brought an amendment at that late moment while the mover of the amendment himself was on the drafting committee, where he could have had his point considered sooner. The chairman then asked Awolowo whether he had any comments and Awolowo replied, saying that he “had none except that the amendment was acceptable to Nigeria.”^[35]

From the look of things, all was well and there was nothing left but to unanimously pass the resolution, which indeed was passed. But when Awolowo asked that the resolution should be immediately publicized, objections were raised. The chairman felt that as Biafran delegation was due to arrive that evening and Ojukwu himself might be coming the following day, it would be inadvisable to make the resolution public before the Committee had a chance to hear from the Biafran delegation. It was pointed out by President Tubman also that Biafra delegation might object to this resolution being released and might accuse the committee of having made up its mind before inviting them, and this point of view might have some sympathetic reception from outside world. He would, in the circumstances, therefore, suggest that publication of this resolution be deferred until mid-day the following day.^[36]

Awolowo pointed out to the committee that the main and most important consideration was the question of how relief supplies could reach the civilians in Biafra and therefore he believed it was imperative to publish the resolution so that action on its recommendations, with regard to the delivery of relief supplies, become operative without undue delay. Awolowo further pointed out that Ojukwu would claim credit for the resolution once it was released, following his interview with the committee. Awolowo also asserted that Ojukwu would promote his usual propaganda, claiming that Nigeria refused to reach an agreement with the committee on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, and would portray himself as the one who cooperated with the committee, which made it possible for the resolution to be adopted."^[37]

Awolowo further stated that the question of renunciation of secession and cessation of hostilities were two main final considerations, and the committee would like to have the views of both sides and agreement before making any statements on them, but certainly not on the question of definite recommendation, which the committee felt necessary to make regardless of the stand taken by either side. After an exchange of opinions, it was agreed that no matter what happened, the resolution should be publicized by 6 o’clock the following evening. Awolowo and some of the members of the Nigerian delegation left for Nigeria at about 4 p.m. Akilu, Ayida, Isa, and Shanu stayed behind so that they would be available for consultation with the members of the committee outside the conference rooms in the event of Biafran representatives turning up and potentially making difficult claims to the committee.^[38]

The Biafra delegation, however, arrived on the same day, approximately at the time Awolowo’s plane took off for Lagos, and Ojukwu himself turned up the following day on July 19, 1968. Ojukwu addressed the committee for some 45 minutes, and finally before he left it was agreed that a special communiqué should be issued.^[39]

Ambassador Ryan said that there was no press release of Colonel Ojukwu’s statement to the Committee. In his interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Nigerian President was asked how he would describe Colonel Ojukwu’s mood at the conference, and Diori commented, “It is the first time I have an opportunity to meet Colonel Ojukwu. He delivered his report in a very slow voice and he is a man who has confidence of the right of his idea and of his feeling so that he delivered his speaking for more than an hour and I think his mood is like every African leader in the way committee defending his own position, his own report, and his own view and his problem that is the conflict with.”^[40]

The special or final communiqué of the Niamey meetings stated among other things that “the OAU urgently appealed to all member-states of the OAU to assist in the massive humanitarian relief efforts. It urgently invited both parties, as a matter of urgency to resume peace talks as soon as possible in order to achieve final solution of the crisis prevailing in this country, with the object of preserving Nigeria’s territorial integrity and guarantee the security of all its inhabitants.”^[41] The OAU Consultative Committee also announced that the federal military government of Nigeria and Biafran leader Colonel Ojukwu agreed to initiate preliminary talks at Niamey under the leadership of President Hamani Diori toward a rapid resumption of negotiations for peace in Nigeria, and both parties agreed to resume peace negotiations in Addis Ababa as soon as possible under the auspices of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria.^[42][43]

Ambassador Ryan, who was underground at the meeting with the British High Commissioner, Mark McMullen, said that Colonel Ojukwu came and left very quickly on July 19, 1968. Reportedly right up to the moment when Colonel Ojukwu departed Niamey on board the Mystere 20, a plane placed at his disposal by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny, committee members tried to persuade Ojukwu to stay the night while they attempted to persuade General Gowon to come back from Lagos. Considering Niamey “belligerent territory,” Ojukwu refused. Before he returned to Biafra, Ojukwu stopped briefly in Abidjan and Libreville where he held conversations with Houphouet-Boigny and Gabonese President Albert Bongo.^[44]”

It was understood that before Ojukwu left for Ivory Coast, the Secretary-General of the OAU showed him a copy of the amended version of the committee’s resolution; he was furious about it conveyed his unhappiness with Diallo Telli about the resolution. Ojukwu was reported to have stated that he “would have nothing to do with the resolution and that [he] would withdraw the mandate which [he] had given to his delegation.”^[45] Ojukwu’s stern reactions to the resolution appeared to be understandable given the revelation made by the U.S. Ambassador concerning the matter:

When the news of Ojukwu’s reaction to the amended resolution reached the members of the Committee, Emperor Hailé Selaṥṥié asked President Hamani Diori to get in contact immediately with President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast to persuade Ojukwu to agree for his delegation to continue with the talks. The telephone line between Niamey and Ivory Coast was left open, according to reports, for nearly four hours during which intensive negotiations took place between the two presidents, and Ojukwu firstly agreed to allow his delegation to continue with the peace talks provided the special communiqué was amended to read “final communiqué.^[47]

Preliminary peace talks were held in Niamey from July 20 to July 26, 1968, in accordance with the final communiqué released on July 19, 1968, by the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria. At these talks, the two sides adopted the following agenda for peace negotiations to be held in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the Committee: arrangements for a permanent settlement, terms for the cessation of hostilities, and proposals for the transport of relief supplies to the civilian population in the war areas.^[48] African leaders who gathered in Niamey were determined to resolve the civil war peacefully and were cautious to recognize secession as the basis for a peaceful resolution of the fighting because such acknowledgement could lead to an automatic endorsement of a balkanized Africa along ethnic and tribal lines. Given the risk the war posed to the actualization of peace and stability of Africa, they shunned primordial interests in discussing the war and tried to find a common ground for the two factions in the fighting. Their deliberations strengthened the notion that ”the war is an African affair” served as a mantra to justify non-involvement of other multilateral organizations such as the United Nations in the peace mediation of the conflict.

NIAMEY GATHERING AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

The greatest feature of the Niamey peace talks was joint Anglo-American diplomatic surveillance mounted on the activities of the OAU Consultative Committee. Britain and the U.S., through their respective diplomatic missions in Niger and Ethiopia, worked tirelessly to know the outcome of the meeting. Both countries had designed their foreign policies regarding the civil war on the perception that it was an African affair to be resolved by Africans themselves, but in a manner suitable to their vested interests in the conflict.

Like the time when the Niamey conference began, British representatives experienced communication challenges. This difficulty prompted the British Charge d’Affaires in Abidjan, Mark McMullen, to inform the Foreign Office on July 27, 1968, about the need to exchange information with American officials^[49]He said, “The Americans and myself were handicapped from the start of the conference by deciding to keep very much in the background, since Niamey was a very small fish-pool in which the two delegations were in any case mostly confined to the open-plan ground floor of the Palace in which everybody’s movements could be observed, and to heavily guarded villas.”^[50]

The U.S. Ambassador could not have been more helpful. He set up a room, clerical help, and communications facilities freely for the disposal of the British Charge d’Affaires and all telegrams dispatched about the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey were discussed between the two of them. Indeed, a great number of these telegrams were results of drafting sessions involving the Ambassador, himself, and at least one other member of his staff, a technique which the Charge d’Affaires found very confusing as the American style and approach to reporting was different from the British method, and the diction of the telegrams seemed verbose by British standards.^[51] In a letter sent to the Foreign Office upon his return to Abidjan, McMullen had paid a tribute to the help and cooperation he received from the US Ambassador, Ryan. Mark McMullen said:

The Anglo-American joint policy of ostentatiously keeping out of the way except when summoned by Diori meant that their own information about the conference proceedings had to be gathered from the often inaccurate gleanings of the press, corrected at regular intervals by accounts given to the US Ambassador and McMullen by Dirori. Thus, the only inside information they received was filtered through the personality, changing moods, and sometimes hazy grasp of the finer points at issue of the president himself.^[53] McMullen suggested that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael Stewart should write a letter to Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, expressing his gratitude for the U.S. Ambassador’s kind gesture. It was quite true that McMullen would have been ineffective in Niamey without the use of American communications facilities; at the same time, the cooperation was not entirely a one-way street because McMullen got to see President Diori more than the Americans did. For the assistance granted to the British Charge d’Affaires by the U.S. Ambassador, the Foreign Office accepted the proposal of sending a letter of appreciation to the American Ambassador in London. Incidentally, McMullen was commended for doing extremely well in very difficult circumstances in Niamey.^[54]

While it was confirmed that a letter was sent to the American Ambassador in London asking him to convey appreciation to the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador Ryan, the Foreign Office staff members were afraid that the results of the Niamey conference were disappointingly meager. The fault of this outcome obviously did not lie with President Diori, but was due to primarily what they perceived as Ojukwu’s intransigence on the central political issue. For this, they feared that President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast must bear his share of the blame although the announcement from Paris by the French government on the civil war indicated that the Ivorian President was not acting entirely on his own when he recognized Biafra.^[55]

At the Niamey peace talks, an Anglo-American diplomatic watchdog discovered what appeared to be a supremacy battle between the OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli and Nigerien President Diori Hamani. Moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa might have reflected the rivalry between Diallo Telli and Diori for primacy in talks or enhancement of personal prestige or ascendancy of OAU Headquarters over Niger. On August 2, 1968 the British Charge d’Affaires in Abidjan informed the Foreign Office that one particular story covered during the talks was the imminent closure of the talks some days before it was ended. Diori was amazed when the Charge d’Affaires asked him about the incident and Diallo Telli’s reactions when tackled by the press corps on the question of whether the purpose was for talks in Addis Ababa only or in Niamey also, the Charge d’Affaires had the idea that Telli had in fact engaged in diplomatic maneuvering to move the talks from Niamey. One had only to observe him approaching Diori to realize that he must have bitterly resented his role in the big palace.^[56] According to Mullen:

The British Charge d’Affaires suggested that Diallo Telli wanted above all things to transfer the talks away from a place where he felt under surveillance of an absolute rule that treated Diori as one of his own civil servants. Certainly, Diori revealed that at the time an imminent change of venue was announced by the Agencè Francè Press (AFP), his intention was to ensure that the talks at Niamey were at the point where all the principals could sign on a dotted line. Perhaps, a combination of factors might have contributed to the decision a few days later to call off the Niamey talks and adjourn to Addis Ababa; these were successful lobbies by Telli with the delegate, increasing exhaustion and depression on the part of Diori, as it became clear that agreement on any substantive issue was not going to be achieved—a very human and certainly African disinclination on the part of the delegations for an indefinite stretch of long hours of work.^[58]

Altogether, the meeting in Niamey represented positive and serious efforts on the part of African leaders to come to grips with Africa’s most serious problems. As argued by the former Liberian President, Williams Tubman, “the meeting was a great success to the big surprise of everyone,” because the Committee succeeded in getting the two conflicting Nigerian sides to agree to resume peace negotiations at Addis Ababa. The foreign press corps chafed under the efforts of President Diori and OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli to restrict information on the content of the meetings.^[59] The Anglo-American presence in the Niamey meetings mirrored the general context of diplomacy they instituted in the civil war. More importantly, Britain and the U.S. were in the Niamey meeting to monitor the proceedings to understand the minds of the African leaders and their approach toward resolving the conflict. This role was relevant in their foreign policy decisions and further approach to the dispute.

CONCLUSION

African leaders under the auspices of the OAU tried every means possible to resolve the Nigerian problem in an African way without relying on external assistance. At the start of the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey, there was reason to be cynical about positive results. At the end of the meeting, however, the committee could point with pride to having taken the initiative. The worldwide interest in the conflict gave the committee the needed excuse to invite Biafrans and to establish the OAU in the role of mediator between the sides. Moreover, the two sides seemed eager to resume talks, particularly Biafrans. Biafrans accepted the committee’s invitation with alacrity and chose to ignore the committee’s resolution, which was approved before they arrived, in which both in word and content favored the Lagos position. The preliminary talks appeared to have been only a partial success. Given that the meeting was held in a friendly, informal, and relaxed atmosphere, it was later referred to as “the spirit of Niamey.” On the less positive side was the Anglo-American presence throughout the meeting, which was conceived and carried out as “a joint operation,” synchronized to avoid creating an impression of influencing the outcome of the summit. Anglo-American moves at the gathering hinge on strengthening their diplomatic investments in the war. Meanwhile, a supremacy battle developed between certain African leaders, which resulted in a quick decision of moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa, an action that reflected political rivalry for primacy in talks of enhancement of personal prestige. While the situation indicated that agreement on substantive issues was not going to be achieved, it paved the way for diplomatic maneuvering to get the talks away from Niamey. Thus, the Niamey episode showed that while the OAU had attempted to patch up inter-African conflicts, foreign meddling into its affairs made it difficult for the organization to deal with the internal problems of the African states. Immediate economic interests hinged on the need to work toward the restoration of the Nigerian economy to a stable condition in which their substantial trade and investments in the country could be further developed and had underpinned the British and American support for the OAU. On the other hand, the fact that a break-up would weaken the political influence of Nigeria in Africa was weighty enough to drive British and U.S. support for the OAU on the assumption that Nigeria could be united as a genuine political whole. While it was politically and diplomatically correct to ascribe the OAU as an undoubtedly intermediary in resolving the conflict, the tragedy was that the continental body was too unwieldy to enforce its decisions regarding the war.

END NOTES

1. Toyin Falola and Emmanuel Mbah, Change and Continuity in Contemporary Africa eds. Toyin Falola and Emmanuel M. Mbah Contemporary Africa: Challenges and Opportunities (African Histories and Modernities Series New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1.↑

2. Amuwo Kunle, “Historical Roots of the Nigerian Civil War: An Explanation”, in Perspectives on the Nigerian Civil War ed, Siyan Oyeweso (Lagos: OAU Humanities Series and Campus Press Limited 1992), 1.↑

3. Britain-Biafra Association, Nigerian/Biafra Conflict: an International Commission of Jurists and Prima Facie Evidence of Genocide (London: Grays Inn, 1968), 86. ↑

4. Audu, M.S., Osuala, S. Uzoma & Ibrahim I. Baba, “Contextualizing the International Dimensions of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970” International Journal of Politics and Good Governance 4, no.4.3 (2013):6.↑

5. Confidential: Note of Record on Nigeria and Ghana utilized at the Meeting between US Senator Robert Kennedy and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Secretary Michael Stewart from P.H. Moberly to Niles and E.G. Norris in the Foreign Office London, Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Bilateral, Nigerian Political and Diplomatic Relations with United States of America during the Civil War Years, 25^th January, 1967-31^st December, 1968, File No. TX 3/3/6C/1066/Part A/ West and General African Dept. / FCO 38/236, TNA. ↑

6. Audu, Osuala, and Ibrahim, International Dimensions, 6.↑

7. Confidential: Minute on War and Oil in Nigeria Despatch No. 9 from the British High Commissioner Sir David Hunt to Herbert Bowden MP and British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs in the Commonwealth Office, London, 27^th July, 1967, FCO 38/284, File No. TX 10/16/6C/10/66/Part A/West and General African Dept. / Title: Nigeria, Defence, Military Operations against Biafra, 8^th July, 1967-31^st December, 1968, TNA.↑

8. Statement on the Situation in Nigeria by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2^nd before the Sub-committee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September, 1 FCO 38/237, TNA. ↑

9. ↑

10. Confidential: Minute on OAU Mission to Nigeria from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 23^rd November, 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.↑

11. Confidential: United States Embassy Report on Nigeria to the State Department from Lagos to Foreign Office Telegram No. 248, 22^nd February, 1968, FCO 38/233, File No. TX 2/4/6C/1066/West and General African Depart/ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Multilateral, Nigerian Civil War and the OAU, 1^st January, 1967-31^st December, 1969, TNA.↑

12. Confidential: Minute on OAU and Nigeria from Accra to Commonwealth Office Telegram No. 349, 5^th June, 1968, FCO 38/233, TNA. ↑

13. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

14. Confidential: Principal Nigerian Delegation Members at the OAU Consultative Niamey Meeting, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

15. Confidential: Biafran Principal Members at the Consultative Committee Meeting, 27^th July, 1968, FCO 38/243, TNA. ↑

16. Confidential: Telegram on Current Status OAU Talks on Nigeria from Niamey to Foreign Office, 23^rd July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

17. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC , 27^th July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

18. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

19. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

20. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC , 27^th July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

21. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

22. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

23. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

24. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

25. Biafra Says Yes to Peace Talks. Evening Standard. 17^th July, 1968.↑

26. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

27. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

28. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

29. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

30. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

31. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

32. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

33. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27^th July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

34. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

35. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

36. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

37. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

38. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

39. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

40. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27^th July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

41. Confidential: Communiqué Issued by Organization of African Unity Consultative Mission at Niamey. London: Press Release from Nigerian House, 9 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2, 22^nd July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

42. Confidential: Communiqué Issued by Organization of African Unity Consultative Mission at Niamey. London: Press Release from Nigerian House, 9 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2, 22^nd July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

43. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

44. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA↑

45. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27^th July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

46. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27^th July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

47. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

48. Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16^th -19^th July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

49. TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27th July, 1968.↑

50. Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27^th July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

51. TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27^th July, 1968. ↑

52. TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from D.C. Tebbit to E.G. Norris, 1^st August, 1968.↑

53. Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from D.C. Tebbit to E.G. Norris, 1^st August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

54. Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from P.H. Moberly of West and General African Department to the British Charge d’Affaires British Embassy in Abidjan, 6^th August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.↑

55. Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d’Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2^nd August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA ↑

56. Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d’Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2^nd August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

57. Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d’Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2^nd August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑

58. Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC, FCO 38/234, TNA. ↑