CHAPTER 8

War and Peace in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigerian-Biafran War, July 6, 1967 - January 15, 1970

Egbule Philip Onyekachukwu

Department of Arts and Social Science Education,

Faculty of Education,

University of Delta

INTRODUCTION

In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Britain. Six years later, the Muslim Hausas in northern Nigeria began massacring the Christian Igbos in the region, prompting tens of thousands of Igbos to flee to the east, where their people were the dominant ethnic group. The Igbos doubted that Nigeria’s oppressive military government would allow them to develop or even survive; so, on May 30, 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu and other non-Igbo representatives of the area established the Republic of Biafra, comprising eastern and southern states of Nigeria.

After diplomatic efforts by Nigeria failed to reunite the country, war between Nigeria and Biafra broke out in July 1967. Ojukwu’s forces made some initial advances, but Nigeria’s superior military strength gradually reduced Biafran territory. The state lost its oil fields–its main source of revenue–and without the funds to import food, an estimated one million civilians died because of severe malnutrition. On January 11, 1970, Nigerian forces captured the provincial capital of Owerri, one of the last Biafran strongholds, and Ojukwu was forced to flee to the Ivory Coast. Four days later, Biafra surrendered to Nigeria.

The fighting occurred principally in the Biafra region, located in southeastern Nigeria. On May 30, 1967, Biafra declared itself an independent state. The federal government declared this act of secession illegal. On July 6, 1967, which marked the onset of the war, federal troops invaded the eastern region. The Northern armies of the ruling power advanced into Biafra and pushed the Biafrans into a small enclave where food inflows were cut off. The result was extensive famine among the Igbos and other minority Biafran ethnicities (Miller, 1970).

THE BIRTH OF NIGERIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE

In 1885, the claim of the British to West African sphere of influence received international recognition, and in the following year, the Royal Niger Company was chartered under the leadership of Sir George Taubman Goldie. In 1900, the company's territory came under the control of the British government, which moved to consolidate its hold over the area of modern Nigeria. On January 1, 1901, Nigeria became a British protectorate, part of the British Empire, the foremost world power at the time. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the independent kingdoms (Edo, Hausa/Fulani, Oyo, among others) of what would become Nigeria fought a number of conflicts against the British Empire's efforts to expand its territory. By the time of the war, the British conquered Benin in 1897 and, in the Anglo-Aro War (1901-1902), defeated other opponents. The conquest of these states opened the Niger area to British rule.

The name Nigeria was taken from the Niger River running through the country. This name was coined in the late 19th century by a British journalist, Flora Shaw, who later married Lord Lugard, a British colonial administrator. The origin of the name Niger, which originally applied only to the middle reaches of the Niger River, is uncertain. Her advice was accepted, and the name Nigeria came into being. Despite of the name, Nigeria was not yet a political entity as the colony of Lagos and the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria were still administered separately. In 1906, the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria merged to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was not until 1914 when Lord Lugard “amalgamated Protectorate of Southern Nigeria” with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria into one political unit that Nigeria became a political entity (Etymonline.com, 2017). The major reason for the amalgamation was that the North was not administratively and economically viable while the South was generating surpluses. Following World War II, in response to the growth of Nigerian nationalism and demands for independence, successive constitutions legislated by the British government moved Nigeria toward self-government on a representative and increasingly federal basis. By the middle of the 20th century, a great wave of independence was sweeping across Africa. Nigeria attained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 and obtained a republican status in 1963 (Garba, 2012). However, after the above successes, on May 26, 1967, the Igbo-dominated Southeast declared that it had broken away from Nigeria to form the independent Republic of Biafra. This touched off a bloody civil war that lasted for two and a half years (July 1967-January 1970). In 1970, on the brink of widespread famine resulting from a Nigeria-imposed blockade, Biafra was forced to surrender.

RELIGION IN NIGERIA

Many religions are practiced in Nigeria, and the constitution guarantees religious freedom. Christians predominantly live in the south of the country, whereas Muslims live predominantly in the north. In native religions people believe in deities, spirits, and ancestors; these groups are spread all over the country. Many Muslims and Christians also intertwine their beliefs with more unorthodox Indigenous ones. A minority of the population practice religions Indigenous to Nigeria, such as those native to the Igbo and Yoruba ethnicities. The major Christian celebrations of Christmas and Easter are recognized as national holidays. Muslims observe Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, and the two Eids. Working hours in the north often vary from those in the south so that Muslims do not work on their holy day, which is Friday.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND PEACEFUL INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS

In the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chapter IV, Sections 38: the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, enumerated the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens as follows: (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance; (2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or a religion not approved by his parents or guardian; (3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination; and (4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity, or be a member of a secret society.

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (1967-1970): HOW IT STARTED

In 1966, the disequilibrium and perceived corruption of the electoral and political process led to back-to-back military coups. The first coup in January 1966 was led by some middle-ranked soldiers under Majors Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The coup plotters succeeded in murdering Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Premier Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region, and Premier Ladoke Akintola of the Western Region. As the coup plotters struggled to form a central government, Senate President (Acting President) NwaforOrizu handed over government control to the army, then under the command of an Igbo officer, General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. The countercoup of 1966, supported primarily by Northern military officers, facilitated the rise of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon to Head of State. Tension rose between the North and South. Igbos in Northern cities suffered persecution and many fled to the Eastern Region.

In 1967, following two coups and turmoil that led to about a million Igbos returning to the south-east of Nigeria, the Republic of Biafra seceded with 33-year-old military officer Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu at the helm. The Nigerian government declared war, and after 30 months of fighting, Biafra surrendered. On January 15, 1970, the conflict officially ended. The government's policy of "no victor, no vanquished" may have led to a lack of official reflection, but many Nigerians of Igbo origin grew up on stories from people who lived through the war.

In May 1967, the Eastern Region declared independence as a state called the Republic of Biafra, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Emeka Ojukwu. The Nigerian Civil War began as the official Nigerian government side (predominated by soldiers from the North and West) attacked Biafra (South-East) on July 6, 1967, at Garkem. The 30-month war, with a long siege of Biafra and its isolation from trade and supplies, ended in January 1970. Estimates of the number of dead in the former Eastern Region are between 1 and 3 million people from warfare, disease, and starvation during the 30-month civil war (Metz, 1991).

There is correlation between Biafra war and genocide as asserted by the 2012 publication of Chinua Achebe’s There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra written a few months before he died in March 2013, two years after the death of the wartime Biafran leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. The famous novelist had worked for the Biafran cause during the war, and the genocide issue appears throughout the book. Commenting on Achebe’s views, another famous Nigerian author, Wole Solyinka, whose imprisonment during the war by the FMG is recorded in The Man Died (1971), concurred that Biafrans had indeed been victims of genocide even though he did not support the Biafran secession (Achebe, 2012).

THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR

Many of the published historical accounts of the active participants and observers of the war averred three main factors that ignited the war. The perceived Ibo coup of January 15, 1966, saw the death of prominent political and military leaders from the Northern, Western, and Midwestern regions of the country. The May civil riots in the North with the countercoup of July 1966 saw the killing of mainly military leaders from the Eastern region of the country by young officers from the Northern region, and the pogrom unleashed on the Igbo people living in the Northern part of the country led to the death of about 30,000 people.

The May 30, 1967, “declaration of Republic of Biafra” by Lieutenant Colonel (Later Gen.) Odumegwu Ojukwu offered a clear secession from Nigeria on the premise that people of the Eastern region no longer felt safe in other parts of the Federation (The Aburi Conference, 1967: 3). The conflict was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria. Like many other African nations, Nigeria was an artificial structure initiated by the British who had neglected to consider religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences. When Nigeria won independence from Britain in 1960, the population of 60 million people consisted of nearly 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups.

Blasphemy is another major factor, and most religions consider it a religious crime. Blasphemy is the act of insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence to a deity, or sacred objects, or toward something considered sacred. In a very broad sense, blasphemy is concerned with insults to god(s) and the sacred; more specifically, it constitutes “the use or abuse of language, or behavioral acts, that scorn the existence, nature or power of sacred beings, items, or texts” (Nash, 2007). Accordingly, not only god(s) but also other sacred beings and things can be the object of blasphemy—for example, the Virgin Mary or the prophet Muhammad, a crucifix, or Holy Scriptures. A further question that needs to be addressed for a sufficiently clear understanding of blasphemy and that can be used for the analysis of blasphemy as violence concerns the question of who can be injured and hence be the victim of blasphemy, which is not the same as being an object of blasphemy. This is quite clear in the case of inanimate things such as crucifixes or icons (i.e., they cannot be injured since they do not have interests of their own), but even if a god is scorned, it does not go without saying that the deity is considered a victim in a sense that is relevant for the analysis of blasphemy as violence (Baumgartner, 2013).

The causes of the Nigerian civil war were exceedingly complex. More than fifty years ago, Great Britain carved an area out of West Africa containing hundreds of different groups and unified it, calling it Nigeria. Although the area contained many different groups, three were predominant: the Igbo, which formed between 60-70 percent of the population in the southeast; the Hausa-Fulani, which formed about 65 percent of the peoples in the northern part of the territory; and the Yoruba, which formed about 75 percent of the population in the southwestern part.

The semi-feudal and IslamicHausa-Fulani in the North were traditionally ruled by an autocratic, conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of over 30 Emirs who, in turn, owed their allegiance to a supreme Sultan. This Sultan was regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority. The Yoruba political system in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, consisted of a series of monarchs (Obas). The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less autocratic than those in the North, and the political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater upward mobility based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title. The Igbo in the southeast, in contrast to the two other groups, lived in over 600 autonomous, democratically organized villages. Although there were monarchs in these villages (whether hereditary or elected), they were largely little more than figureheads. Unlike the other two regions, decisions among the Igbo were made by a general assembly in which every man could participate.

The different political systems among these three groups produced highly divergent sets of customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through their village head who was designated by the Emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political decisions were to be obeyed without question. This highly centralized and authoritarian political system elevated to positions of leadership persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors, the same virtues required by Islam for eternal salvation. One of the chief functions of the traditional political system was to maintain the Islamic religion. Hostility to economic and social innovation was therefore deeply rooted. In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo often participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their own personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to arbitrate disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth. With their emphasis upon achievement, individual choice, and democratic decision-making, the challenges of modernization for the Igbo entailed responding to new opportunities in traditional ways.

These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and perhaps even enhanced by the British system of colonial rule in Nigeria. In the North, the British found it convenient to rule indirectly through the Emirs, thus continuing rather than changing the Indigenous authoritarian political system. As a concomitant of this system, Christian missionaries were excluded from the North, and the area thus remained virtually closed to Western education and influence, in contrast to the Igbo, the richest of whom sent many of their sons to British universities. During the ensuing years, the Northern Emirs thus were able to maintain traditional political and religious institutions, while limiting social change. As a result, the North, at the time of independence in 1960, was by far the most underdeveloped area in Nigeria with a literacy rate of 2 percent as compared to 19.2 percent in the East (literacy in Arabic script, learned in connection with religious education, was higher). The West enjoyed a much higher literacy level as the first part of the country to have contact with Western education in addition to the free primary education program of the pre-independence Western Regional Government.

CONFLICTS DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

The British political ideology of dividing Nigeria during the colonial period into three regions of North, West, and East exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social competition among Nigeria’s different ethnic groups. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. On this basis, the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the federal legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively, formed political parties that were largely regional and tribal in character: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the North, the Action Group in the West (AG), and the National Conference of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East. Although these parties were not exclusively homogeneous in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up, the later disintegration of Nigeria results largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe. To simplify matters, these can be referred to as the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo-based; or Northern, Western, and Eastern parties.

During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the fight for independence from Britain. They also wanted an independent Nigeria to be organized into several small states so that the conservative and backward North could not dominate the country. Northern leaders, however, fearful that independence would mean political and economic domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the perpetuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, eager to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands (New World Encyclopedia).

MILITARY COUP

Claims of electoral fraud were the ostensible reason for a military coup on January 15, 1966, led by Igbo junior Army officers, mostly majors and captains. This coup resulted in General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo and head of the Nigerian Army, taking power as President and becoming the first military head of state in Nigeria. The coup itself failed, as Ironsi rallied the military against the plotters. Ironsi then instituted military rule, alleging that the democratic institutions had failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed revision and clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule. The coup, despite its failure, was perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbos because all but one of the five coup plotters were Igbos, and Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have promoted many Igbos in the Army at the expense of Yoruba and Hausa officers (Akpan, 1972). On July 29, 1966, the Northerners executed a countercoup, led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. It placed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (the most senior military officer from northern Nigeria) into power (Anwunah, 2007). Ethnic tensions due to the coup and countercoup increased and led, in September 1966, to the large-scale massacres of Christian Igbos living in the Muslim north.

The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Niger River delta, a sprawling network of rivers and swamps at the southernmost tip of the country, had tempted the southeast to annex the region in order to become economically self-sufficient. However, the exclusion of easterners from power made many fear that the oil revenues would be used to benefit areas in the north and west rather than their own. Prior to the discovery of oil, Nigeria's wealth derived from agricultural products from the south and minerals from the north. The north, until around 1965, had had low-level demands to secede from Nigeria and retain its wealth for northerners. These demands seemed to cease when it became clear that oil in the southeast would become a major revenue source. This further fueled Igbo fears that the northerners had plans to strip eastern oil to benefit the North.

THE WAR

The Nigerian government launched a "police action" to retake the secessionist territory. The war began on July 6, 1967, when Nigerian federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. Nigeria's army offensive was through the north of Biafra led by Col. Shuwa and designated as one division. The division was made up of mostly northern officers. The right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on July 14, while the left-hand column headed for Garkem, which was captured on July 12. At this stage of the war, other regions of Nigeria (the West and Mid-West) still considered the war as a confrontation between the north (notable Hausas) and the east (notable Igbos).

However, the Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own when on July 9, the Biafran forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian region across the Niger River, passing through Benin City, until they were stopped on August 21 at Ore, just over the state boundary and 130 miles east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos. The Biafran attack was led by Lt. Col. Banjo. They met little resistance, and the Mid-West was easily taken over. This was due to the arrangement and agreement between the federal government and the East that all soldiers should be returned to their regions to stop the spate of killings in which Igbo soldiers had been major victims. The soldiers that were supposed to defend the Mid-West were mostly mid-west Igbos and were in touch with their eastern counterpart. Gen. Gowon responded by asking Col. Muritala to form another division (2 division) to expel Biafrans from the mid-west, defend Biafra's west, and attack Biafra from the west as well. Col. Muritala later became military head of state. As Nigerian forces were to retake the Mid-West, the Biafran military administrator declared the Republic of Benin on September 19.

Although Benin City was retaken by the Nigerians on September 20, the Biafrans succeeded in their primary objective by tying down as many Nigerian federal troops as they could. Gen. Gowon also launched an offensive from Biafra's south from the delta to riverine area using the bulk of Lagos’ Garrison command under Col. Adekunle (black scorpion) to form 3 division which later changed to the 3rd marine commandos. Recruitment into the Nigeria Army increased with Biafra's offensive to the west, mostly among other southern ethnic groups, especially Yoruba and Edo people. Four battalions of the Nigerian 2nd Infantry Division were needed to drive the Biafrans back and eliminate their territorial gains made during the offensive. But the Nigerians were repulsed three times and lost thousands of troops as they tried to cross the Niger during October. However, reorganization of the Nigerian forces, the reluctance of the Biafran army to attack again, and the effects of a naval, land, and air blockade of Biafra led to a change in the balance of forces. The Swedish eccentric Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen also led a flight of MiniCOINs in action; his BAF (Biafran Air Force) consisted of three Swedes and two Biafrans.

The Nigerians then settled into a period of siege by blockading Biafra. Amphibious landings by the Nigerian marines led by Major Isaac Adaka Boro captured the Niger Delta cities of Bonny, Okrika, and Port Harcourt on July 26, and the port of Calabar on October 18 by elements of the Nigerian 3rd Marine Commando Division. In the north, Biafran forces were pushed back into their core Igbo territory, and the capital of Biafra, the city of Enugu, was captured by Nigerian forces belonging to the 1st Infantry Division on October 4. The Biafrans continued to resist in their core Igbo heartlands, which were soon surrounded by Nigerian forces.

PICTORIAL ANALYSIS OF THE WAR

The photos below depict symbols of resources to support the reviewed literature in this study and to draw up conclusive remarks based on the subject matter.

The picture shows the flag of the defunct Republic of Biafra

A severely malnourished child during the war. Images such as this of a starving child in the international media generated compassion for the plight of the Biafrans caused by the Nigerian blockade. Source: New World Encyclopedia

File photo of some starved children during the war. Read more: Business of Photography

Starving children pose in a refugee camp near Aba, on August 06, 1968, during the Biafran war. / AFP PHOTO Read more: Legit

In the photo, Biafran children can be seen sitting in a plane chartered by the International Red Cross (ICRC) and humanitarian organization Terre des Hommes. AFP PHOTO / Francois Mazure. Read more: Legit

In the photo, Biafrans can be seen migrating to unknown destinations

A Biafran soldier

STALEMATE

From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate with Nigerian forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas of Biafran control. But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two northern fronts and the capture of Port Harcourt on May 19, 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas. The Biafran government claimed that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war and sought aid from the outside world. A Nigerian commission, including British doctors from the Liverpool University School of Tropical Medicine, visited Biafra after the war and concluded that the evidence of deliberate starvation was overplayed, caused by confusion between the symptoms of starvation and various tropical illnesses. While they did not doubt that starvation had occurred, it was less clear to what extent it was a result of the Nigerian blockade or the Biafran government’s restriction of food to the civilians in favor of the military.

Many volunteer bodies organized blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons. More common was the claim that the arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more difficult to distinguish between the two purposes of aircraft. It has been argued that by prolonging the war the Biafran relief effort (characterized by Canadian development consultant Ian Smillie as "an act of unfortunate and profound folly"), it contributed to the deaths of as many as 180,000 civilians (Bortolotti, 2004).

Bernard Kouchner was one of many French doctors who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding centers in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being like a gag order, designed to maintain the organization’s neutrality, whatever the circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.

In June 1969, the Biafrans launched a desperate offensive against the Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance. They were supported by foreign mercenary pilots continuing to fly in food, medical supplies, and weapons. Most notable of the mercenaries was Swedish Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, who led five Malmö MFI-9 MiniCOIN small piston-engined aircraft, armed with rocket pods and machine guns. His force attacked Nigerian military airfields in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Benin City, and Ughelli, destroying or damaging a number of Nigerian Air Force jets used to attack relief flights, including a few Mig-17s and three out of Nigeria's six Ilyushin Il-28 bombers that were used to bomb Biafran villages and farms on a daily basis. Although taken off-guard by the surprise Biafran offensive, the Nigerians soon recovered and held off the Biafrans long enough for the offensive to stall out. The Biafran air attacks did disrupt the combat operations of the Nigerian Air Force, but only for a few months.

WAR'S END

The Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans on December 23, 1969, with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division (commanded by Col. Obasanjo, who later became president twice), which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind," was launched on January 7, 1970, with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on January 9, and Uli fell on January 11. The war finally ended with the final surrender of the Biafran forces in the last Biafra-held town of Amichi on January 13, 1970. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying to the republic of Côte d'Ivoire, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to Yakubu Gowon of the federal army.

ATROCITIES AGAINST IGBO

The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money, and infrastructure. Up to one million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease caused by Nigerian forces. More than half a million people died from the famine imposed deliberately through blockade throughout the war as well as lack of access to medicine. Thousands of people starved to death every day as the war progressed. The International Committee of the Red Cross in September 1968 estimated 8,000-10,000 deaths from starvation each day. The leader of a Nigerian peace conference delegation said in 1968 that "starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels." This stance is generally considered to reflect the policy of the Nigerian government. The federal Nigerian army is accused of further atrocities, including deliberate bombing of civilians, mass slaughter with machine guns, and rape.

AFTERMATH AND LEGACY

During the war, there were 100,000 military casualties and between 500,000 and two million civilians' deaths. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease. Reconstruction, helped by oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues (Madiebo,1980). Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it was hard to make this work in practice.

The Igbos felt that they had been deliberately displaced from government positions because their pre-war posts were now occupied by other Nigerians (mostly Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani). When Igbo civil servants left to join similar posts in Biafra, their positions had been replaced, and when the war was over, the government did not feel that it should sack their replacements, preferring to regard the previous incumbents as having resigned. This, however, led to a feeling of injustice. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria changing its currency during the war so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honored and then, at the end of the war, offering only N£20 to easterners for exchange of their Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.

On May 29, 2000, The Guardian of Lagos reported that President Olusegun Obasanjo commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."

Speaking to the BBC 30 years after the war, Chief Emeka Ojukwu said that when the civil war ended, the government promised the Ibo people that there would be “no victors and no vanquished." "The authorities," he continued, "were desperate to avoid a repetition of the ethnic tensions which preceded the war." With his own pardon in the mid-1980s, he remained concerned that since the war, "Igbos have been largely excluded from power," which "could cause instability in the future" (Momoh, 2000).

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ORIENTATION AGENCY IN MANAGING NIGERIA'S PLURALISM AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CRISES

Nigeria is no doubt a pluralistic society. The task of managing the country’s pluralism and ethno-religious crises for peace and development is a collective responsibility of government, the citizens, and other stakeholders. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) is one of such stakeholders. Its primary role is to awaken the consciousness of Nigerians to their rights and obligations in bringing about a united and peaceful Nigeria and to appreciate that every conflict can always be resolved through peaceful means.

The agency's approach to dealing with the issues of pluralism and ethno-religious crises is mainly proactive because central to the mitigation of their negativity is the issue of attitude. In the agency, the motto "Attitude Matters" appears in every aspect of life. The NOA recognizes that in two similar situations, it is the attitude that makes the difference. For instance, both Nigeria and America are pluralistic states. However, the extent to which each has achieved national integration is determined essentially by the attitude of its government and citizens.

It is instructive to mention that while it is easy to destroy values and attitudes, building them is always an arduous task. Bearing this difficulty in mind, the NOA has ensured that the ultimate objective of every program designed aims to elicit some definite behavioral change. Moreover, the task of value re-orientation is a collective responsibility which must necessarily involve all social institutions. Therefore, while recognizing the agency’s vanguard role, it also cultivates the partnership of other stakeholders to ensure that everyone is moving in the same direction. Arising from the foregoing, the agency has been playing its role through the implementation of the following programs.

PROMOTING CITIZENS’ UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION

Given the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria about the subject under consideration, a good understanding and basic knowledge of these provisions is necessary. Apart from facilitating their participation in the political process, they are also empowered to demand their rights and hold leaders accountable. Some key issues such as rights and duties of Nigerians; the dangers of ethnic, religious, and sectional manipulations; patriotism and nationalism; the importance of popular participation; and other concerns have been articulated in simple language and packaged in a booklet titled Political Education Manual. This manual has been widely distributed. Currently, the NOA is revising the manual to update it and include new issues that have recently emerged in the polity. In addition to the above, the agency is also working on producing an abridged version of the Constitution in some Nigerian languages for massive distribution.

INTRODUCTION OF CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM PROGRAMME

Civic education is about citizenship, including citizens’ rights, duties, and obligations; patriotism and nationalism; loyalty to the state; respect for constituted authorities; respect for national symbols; and promoting the good image of Nigeria among others. Therefore, the objective of civic education is to produce an ideal citizen whose passion for Nigeria cannot be quenched by any sectional interest. The agency has over the years been promoting these ideals especially among the youth.

Through the efforts of the agency, the program received a boost with the establishment of the National Technical Committee on Civic Education in 2006. The efforts of this committee led to the production and publication of civic education textbooks for secondary schools in Nigeria. These books have been carefully written to provide comprehensive coverage of the secondary school curriculum as provided by the Nigeria Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC). The successful mainstreaming of civic education in the school curriculum remains one of its major contributions to this process. Civic education is now a compulsory subject in junior secondary schools.

PROMOTING NIGERIA'S CORE VALUES

Whereas there are differences among us, there are equally values that have kept us together as Nigerians. The objective of this campaign is to de-emphasize vices that tend to divide us and emphasize values that bind us and promote our commonality. Under this campaign, the agency is implementing the following programs: nationwide survey on Nigeria’s core values, promotion of the dignity of our national symbols, and the cultivation of a new crop of leadership. In 2008, the agency undertook this survey ostensibly to identify core values held by Nigerians and values peculiar to different sections of the country. The idea was to provide a comprehensive and documented database that would provide a guide for the agency's value re-orientation programs. The findings of this survey have been documented in a book which was launched in the National Institute in 2009.

PROMOTING THE DIGNITY OF OUR NATIONAL SYMBOLS

Nigeria's national symbols include the national flag, the coat of arms, and currency (Naira). Closely associated with these symbols are the Nigerian national anthem and the pledge. The national flag is the symbol of authority and conveys the country’s collective history and aspirations. The coat of arms portrays national strength and dignity as represented by the eagle and the horse. The national anthem and pledge command and redirect the loyalty of Nigerians to their country. The thrust of this program is to use the ideals which these symbols represent to invoke and galvanize the deep-seated emotions of Nigerians for patriotic purposes, such as the kind that manifests when Nigeria is in a football competition with another country. When people appreciate the true meaning of these symbols, they respect them while receiving some inspiration. In summary, the symbols of Nigerian nationhood include:

• The National Anthem (1978);
• The National Flag (1960);
• The National Pledge (1976);
• The Nigeria Coat of Arms (1960);
• The Nigerian Currency (1973);
• The Nigerian Constitution (1999);
• The National Youth Service Corps Scheme (1973);
• The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (1991);
• Nigerian International Passport (electronic) (2007);
• National Identity Card (2005);
• Permanent Voters Card (PVC) (2015);
• National Policy on Education, NPE (2014).

CULTIVATING A NEW CROP OF LEADERSHIP

Over time, there has been unanimity of public opinion on the dearth of credible and visionary leadership within the polity. The obvious consequence has been that the huge reservoir of Nigerian youths has been left with no dynamic and positive leadership role models to look up to for tutelage. Research has also shown steady deterioration in the constructive engagement of the latent energies and creative instinct of youths in the country's crucial development agenda.

To address this leadership challenge, the agency organized the first leadership reality program titled “Heir Apparent,” as its creative response to cultivate a new crop of visionary, vibrant, dynamic, responsive, and responsible leadership that epitomizes the core brand values of Nigeria. This program brought together 37 young Nigerians from different parts of Nigeria. After going through 40 days of intensive leadership and entrepreneurial training along with a historic visit and interaction with former President Shehu Shagari, the agency is proud to say that these young Nigerians are today ambassadors and advocates of Nigeria's unity, peace, and progress.

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR COMMUNITY PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Conscious of the value and benefit of peace to national development, the agency has been involved in building the capacities of communities for the promotion of peace and conflict management. The agency has been able to train community leaders on how to identify early warning signs and how to use tools such as reconciliation, negotiation, and mediation. To give further support to this effort, Nigeria is currently setting up social justice centers nationwide to provide more access to people wishing to seek justice, including the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism. This is also supported by the production and distribution of the Social Justice Manual, meant to create awareness on the issues of social justice and to encourage redress through peaceful means.

Source: A NOA Publication, 2011.

THE WAY FORWARD

• A clearer line between religion and politics should be drawn and enforced.
• Civic identity of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation should be promoted.
• The role of the government in dealing with intolerant groups should be appreciated and encouraged.
• Support for the civil society initiatives should continue and a timely response from them should be encouraged.
• Experiences and good practices of dealing with matters relating to religion and politics from other countries should be shared.

CONCLUSION

Christians in general suffered discrimination, negligence, and occasional persecution amid militarization, irrespective of tribe. The deaths of more than a million people in Nigeria because of the brutal civil war which ended 50 years ago are a scar on the nation's history. For most Nigerians, the war over the breakaway state of Biafra is generally regarded as an unfortunate episode best forgotten, but for the Igbo people who fought for secession, it remains a life-defining event. Most importantly, the chapter examined the role of the state in averting reoccurrence of a second civil war in Nigeria through the instrumentality of the National Orientation Agency (NOA).