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Full Text: Chapter 10: Old Wine in a New Bottle: Is 'Africapitalism' an Antidote to Africa's Developmental Crisis

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Chapter 10: Old Wine in a New Bottle: Is 'Africapitalism' an Antidote to Africa's Developmental Crisis
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table of contents
  1. Accessibility Statement
  2. Dedication
  3. Preface
  4. Chapter 1: The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade
  5. Chapter 2: From Many Kingdoms, We Became One: The History of Ghana
  6. Chapter 3: Diplomacy and War in Pre-Colonial Eggonland of Central Nigeria, c. 1640-1945
  7. Chapter 4: "God Was With Us": Child Labor in Colonial Kenya, 1922-1950s
  8. Chapter 5: Prelude to the Establishment of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1949-1955
  9. Chapter 6: The Niamey Experience: OAU Peace Mediation and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the Nigerian Civil War
  10. Chapter 7: Historical Discourse of War and Peace in Post-Independence West Africa: An Analysis of Causes, Impact, and Peace Efforts
  11. Chapter 8: War and Peace in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigerian-Biafran War, July 6, 1967 - January 15, 1970
  12. Chapter 9: The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967 - 1970
  13. Chapter 10: Old Wine in a New Bottle: Is 'Africapitalism' an Antidote to Africa's Developmental Crisis
  14. Chapter 11: Colonial Legacies: Neo-Colonialism and Nation-Building Challenges in Post-Colonial Africa
  15. Chapter 12: The Nexus Between Culture and Human Rights in Africa: The Case of LGBTQ Rights in Zimbabwe
  16. Chapter 13: Predicament of Muslim/Christian Relations Within the Context of Indigene/Settler Segregation in Jos, Northern Nigeria
  17. Chapter 14: Kinship Ties Among the Igbo: A Sociolinguistic Overview
  18. Chapter 15: The Roles of Sanctions and the Contributions of African Americans in the March from Apartheid to Freedom in South Africa, 1913 - 1914
  19. Chapter 16: The Next Generation of African Immigrants in Kentucky
  20. Chapter 17: Ronald Reagan's Constructive Engagement and the Making of a Political Order in Southern Africa, 1981-1989
  21. Chapter 18: Deliberative Democracy Without Public Participation in Kenya's Elusive Search for Electoral Justice
  22. Chapter 19: Perceptions of Secondary School Igbo Language Students on the Use of Mobile-Assisted Language Learning Application: A Case Study of JSS Students in Lagos State
  23. Chapter 20: Greasing the Wheels of Human Progress: Emerging Technologies and Africa's Societal Transformation
  24. Chapter 21: Immigration Policies of Developed Nations: A New Wave of Sympathetic Imperialism
  25. Notes On Contributors

CHAPTER 10

Old Wine in a New Bottle: Is ‘Africapitalism’ an Antidote to Africa’s Developmental Crisis?

1Olasupo O. Thompson and 2Olabisi Sikiru Adekoya

1History and International Studies Unit, Department of Communication and General Studies, Federal University of Agriculture Abeokuta, Abeokuta., Ogun State, Nigeria

2Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos State, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Africa has been enmeshed in a crisis of development since its integration into the global market through colonialism and globalization. While governments across the continent and other stakeholders have attempted an array of solutions to the continent’s perennial and existential challenges, these solutions have recorded some fluctuating fortunes. This chapter examines the phenomenon of Africapitalism as one of the solutions to Africa’s developmental crisis. An eclectic theoretical orientation weaved around the Marxist, dependency, and the world system theories is the basis of this analysis. The study argues that the concept of Africapitalism, despite being homegrown, has fallen short to solve this developmental crisis because it was anchored on modernization and neoliberalism. The study, therefore, recommends, among other things, that as long as the concept of Africapitalism is domestic with foreign components, it may not be able to address Africa’s perennial development crisis. Thus, a homegrown antidote that addresses Africa’s historical, socio-cultural, and economic peculiarities must be developed.

Africa is blessed with mineral, human, and capital resources. However, these tripartite endowments have not lifted the continent out of poverty and its developmental crisis. This explains Africa’s underdevelopment paradox. The continent has an abysmal record in terms of development. Some reasons have been specified as causes of Africa’s development crises, from the nature of the post-colonial state;[1] the debt crisis[2] impact of colonialism;[3] colonial capitalism, state terrorism, and racism;[4] oligarchy and its lack of political will; religion; institutions; cross-border conflict; weak institutions; and multi-dimensional dimensions,[5] among other factors. To address these issues, scholars, think-tanks, agents, and global development financial institutions have proffered models and policies to address these developmental crises of the continent and its developing countries.[6] However, resolving the problem of the post-colonial state after many decades seems to have defied all possible solutions. Prominent political scientist Julius Ihonvbere posits that all attempts to tamper with Africa’s role and peripheral location in the world capitalist system have been cosmetic.[7]

The purpose of this chapter is to align with the provision of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy as regards to economic development. The constitution states that the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power, directs its policy toward ensuring the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development, harnesses and distributes as best as possible the material resources of the nation to serve the common good, and provides every citizen with equality of rights, obligation, and opportunities before the law.[8] This chapter examines another intervention known as “Africapitalism” as a proposed panacea to address the developmental crisis of the Nigerian State. It further examines the actors and interests of the ideology.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION

A multifaceted theoretical orientation weaved around Marxist theory, dependency theory, and the world system theories forms the basis of this analysis. Marx's analysis of capitalism is relevant to this discourse as it exposes the extraction of surplus value from owners of the only productive power (i.e., labor) by vendors of the means of production including raw materials, factories, machines, and wage labor. These unequal relations of production lead to irreconcilable class antagonisms between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The social relations of production are further cemented through the instrument of the capitalist state, which always defends capital against labor because the state's self-reproduction depends on the primitive capital accumulation. Lenin argues that the need for raw materials and foreign markets to export excess supply prompted the capitalists to foreign colonies.[9]

Dependency scholars such as Samir Amin and Walter Rodney examine how the global north under-develops the global south. For them, the relations that exist within the metropole have taken a global dimension such that the global north becomes the bourgeoisie while the south becomes the proletariat.[10] They argue that the continued dependence on the market of the global north for raw materials or extractive materials serves as the underbelly of Africa’s developmental crisis.[11] In such historically determined relations of production, the global south has to delink from the global capitalist system before the global south will undergo development. To understand the origin of this complex bourgeoisie, Segun Osoba divides them into two categories.[12] They are “the business and the technocratic or bureaucratic bourgeoisie."[13] He argues that the business bourgeoisie comprises mainly those self-employed Nigerians who are in commerce, industry, and other corporate institutions , and who closely identified with the governing parties in the regions, at the federal levels, or both while the technocratic or bureaucratic bourgeoisie includes those Nigerians with considerable academic and professional training (e.g., army officers, university professors, lawyers, senior civil servants) who work in the public or quasi-public services; for the big foreign firms; or in full or partial self-employment as lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, bankers, and similar professional roles.[14] Osoba was clear on this arrangement when he warned that the Nigerian national bourgeoisie exerts the greatest influence on the Nigerian neo-colonial state and that it is from the national bourgeoisie that the neo-colonial state is drawn.[15] Osoba has elsewhere stated that the then-former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo had divided the bourgeoisie into four categories: the commercial or business trading outpost agents, the bureaucratic trading outpost agents, the technical trading outpost agents, and the intellectual trading outpost agents.[16]

World-systems analysis, for Wallenstein, underscores how the global capitalist system constructs different regions on the basis of the division of labor involving the periphery, semi-periphery, and core countries.[17] He argues that the periphery supplies raw materials, natural resources, and market to both the semi-periphery and the core; the semi-periphery supplies cheap labor to the core and manufactured goods to the periphery; the core exploits the other two by exporting foreign direct investment to them and expatriating of capital from them. These theoretical underpinnings are relevant to the discourse because they do not only explain the concepts, but they also place the contextualization in its proper perspectives.

CAPITALISM AND THE (UNDER)DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN AFRICA

The concept of capitalism is important because Africa was forcefully integrated into the system through British Colonial incursion in the beginning of the 20th century.[18] Therefore, the structure of the neo-colonial state is related to its colonial history as a result of the centrality of the state and thus cannot be discussed in isolation from its neo-colonial base.[19]

Capitalism concentrates the means of wealth production in a few hands and by unequal distribution of the products of human labor.[20] But the core aim of capitalism is to accumulate profit. Thus, the production of goods and services as well as the commodified labor is compensated based on the interest of the owner. In other words, whatever labor gets does not come from the benevolence of the owner but his or her own interest.[21] Capitalism is, however, based on the following pillars: private property, self-interest and competition, a market mechanism, freedom to choose, and limited role of government. [22] By this setup, capitalism thrives on the basis of no government intervention. This notion changed during the Great Depression of the 1930s in which the government had to intervene to address the global economic downturn. To ameliorate the challenges, John Maynard Keynes argued that until there is government intervention by cutting taxes and increasing its spending, laissez-faire capitalist economies would fail and struggle. Keynes’ point was further asserted by some scholars that society must save capitalism from the capitalists. His assertion was based on the argument that since the capitalist economy allows for competition which results in winners and losers, some elites or capitalists may influence government’s policies to gain monopoly.[23] As prominent African scholar Claude Ake notes, “the capitalist mode of production polarizes into a very small group of people who monopolize the available means of production, and the vast majority who essentially have no means of production.”[24]

Be that as it may, capitalism appears not to have enjoyed a wide acceptability among some scholars both outside and within the African continent as they believe that the philosophy, rather than uplifting them, has made their lots worse. Thus, rather than the market forces determining price, these few individuals have continued to set the agenda and have also taken different toga. From national bourgeoisie, national business bourgeoisie, comprador bourgeoisie, to auxiliary bourgeoisie or ruling class, Osoba warned of the power they wield in the post-colonial state.[25]

Renowned political economist and Marxist scholar, Yusuf Bangura argues that capitalism created a high-import dependency syndrome, over-reliance on oil revenue for economic development, and expansive projects that mainly benefited the private sector.[26] Sharing a similar notion, Dunnig avers that capitalism may be the best economic option knowledgeable to mankind in the creation of wealth, but its current state has resulted in all manners of rectitude ranging from an increase in poverty to environmental and security challenges.[27] While the author may have hyped the philosophy as the best to have happened to mankind, such a statement is reckless, "Euro-Saxon’”-centric, and hypocritical; a valid and germane point was made because of its present implication. There is no doubt that the unpopularity of capitalism as well as its failure to take the post-colonial states out of the development conundrum has led to the underdevelopment crisis in Africa. What then are these crises?

The African crisis is multifaceted as it stems from social and political to economic and cultural. Onimode adds that the African crisis is also accentuated by intellectual deficits. However, he divided the crisis into structural and historical.[28] He further held that:

Africa’s political contour is disturbed, with widespread and growing repression, resulting in a massive refugee problem, coups and counter- coups, apartheid oppression and external subversion. Then, too, there is the intellectual crisis, which results not merely from the lingering colonial mentality and foreign intellectual domination, but from the dominant bourgeois scholarship’s fundamental irrelevance to African social reality, especially in the imported social services.[29]

Ihonbere avers that these developmental crises have been exacerbated by the contact with the forces of western imperialism, which did not only distort, disarticulate, and under-develop the continent, but which also ensured its structured incorporation into and peripheralization in the international division of labor.[30] He further held that the implication of such an arrangement manifests in unequal exchange, dependence of African states on the production and exportation of a narrow range of cash crops for foreign exchange earnings, dependence on cash crops, vulnerability of price fluctuations largely due to the manipulation of multinational corporations and their home governments, scientific and technological backwardness, among other effects.[31] Some scholars at an international conference in Kinshasa in 2015 called on African countries to reduce their excessive dependency on raw material exports and imported consumer goods and services as the only alternative to addressing the poverty and social inequality on the continent.[32]

Africa remains poor, and extreme poverty leads to hunger. More than 30 percent of African children suffer from growth disorders, such as stunting, due to their chronic malnutrition; the region has the highest infant mortality rate in the world; 59 million children between the ages of five and 17 years are still out of school, among other manifestations of widespread poverty.[33] Foremost African economist and investor Tony Elumelu attests to the inhumane condition of the African continent and the people.[34]

The case of Nigeria is even more pathetic. The country was designated as the capital base of poverty in the world since 2018, and the country is presently experiencing fragility and poverty with about 90 million poor people, half of whom are children under 15 years old.[35] In 2021, the country was labeled a failed state.[36] The characteristics of underdevelopment associated with the continent include infrastructural deficits, a poor healthcare system, bad governance, an unfavorable political economy, over-dependence on oil or Dutch syndrome, and a poor investment base.

While the modernists and foreign powers have attempted to address the crises of developing states, including Africa, through modernists theories and neoliberal policies that thrive on Africa as a producer of only raw materials and capitalism with privatization of its economy, respectively. Scholars and stakeholders from these areas have suggested what best suits them. It is against this backdrop that the philosophy of Africapitalism has been espoused. This raises the question: will Africapitalism resolve Nigeria’s developmental crises? Some scholars have also asked if Africapitalism is Africa’s developmental magic wand.[37]

RESOLVING AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENTAL CRISIS THROUGH (AFRI)CAPITALISM

The basis for Africapitalism is based on Ubuntu. Ubuntu was proposed by Kwame Nkrumah, who based its principles on Africa’s dignity in the thoughts of post-colonial leaders, such as Obafemi Awolowo, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, and[38] Ubuntu is an African philosophy that underscores the development of the continent based on Africa’s communalism.

The concept of Africapitalism was proposed in 2011 by one of Nigeria’s leading entrepreneurs and capitalists, Tony Elumelu. It is an economic philosophy that embodies the private sectors to take the initiative in the economic transformation of the African continent through investments that generate both economic prosperity and social wealth without depending on foreigners.[39] Political economist Kingsley Moghalu appears to also be a modernization apologist and claimed that Africa is the last frontier of capitalism, a fact which is historical considering existing realities on the continent.[40] For the proponents of Africapitalism, Africa lacks such parameters associated with a capitalist world as private ownership of means of production and foreign direct investment. Thus, these proponents see a unique ”opportunity“ for Africa's development with a greater involvement of the local bourgeoisie in determining the socioeconomic conditions of labor and other oppressed classes in Africa.

Africapitalism emphasizes that African business meets social and economic needs by creating goods and services with an innate understanding of the local environment and needs.[41] There are three fundamental tenets of Africapitalism. These are wealth creation, entrepreneurship funds, and transparent competitive markets. Some of the defining principles of Africapitalism are inclusive capitalism, responsible capitalism, sustainable capitalism, and progressive capitalism, and its four tenets include a sense of progress and prosperity, a sense of parity, a sense of peace,and harmony, and finally a sense of place and belonging.[42] In this respect, the Africapitalism project emphasizes collective benefit whereby the advancement of communal good is expected to stimulate business progress.[43] At a conference in Ghana in 2017, Tony Elumelu, while answering some questions from journalists, affirmed Africapitalism as the magic wand to Africa’s underdevelopment and that this was achievable if Africans realized that investing at home was better than investing abroad but that government must be carried along so as to understand that whatever will be beneficial to the private sector will be better for the larger society.[44]

Evidently, African financial technology (fintech) start-ups have generated about $400 million in 2015, and there are postulations that this amount would further grow.[45] Tony Elumelu and other capitalists have also continued to give grants to African start-ups and generate employment opportunities across the continent, Nigeria in particular. But the question remains: how sustainable are these gestures, or put differently, have these gestures addressed Africa’s existential crises?

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLE? TRAVAILS OF AFRICAPITALISM IN NIGERIA

The preceding analysis has shown that Africapitalism would aid investment, promote wealth, and generally, grow Africa’s economy and Nigeria in particular. However, it appears that after almost a decade after its introduction, Africa remains neck-deep in underdevelopment.

In an assessment of the concept of Africapitalism, some factors have been specified for its failure or weaknesses in Nigeria. Adegbite, et al., gave six limitations to the potential of Africapitalism.[46] They are, for lack of a clear interpretation, inability to properly delineate the complexity of the philosophy; absence of provision for any other alternative structure for the implementation of the philosophy; the question of whether it is normative or abstract since it only suggests ways by which firms behave in a feeble institutional environment; blurry lines on ethical issues that Africapitalism has not been able to distinctively clarify; and finally the framing of the philosophy in capitalist shadows.[47] On their part they stated that corruption, political instability, bad governance, and difficulty of doing business are some of the hindrances to Africapitalism to thrive.[48] While these points are instructive, they are deficient because they only analyze the ideology of Africapitalism from an ethical or business prism. Clearly, such explanations are highly insufficient, leading to an intellectual impasse. What then are these limitations from the prism of political economy?

First, like capitalism, the ideology of Africapitalism is self-serving and based on primitive accumulation, which does not only divorce the producer from the means of production but also enslaves and exploits the laborers. In other words, it only serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and capitalist agents. The likes of Aliko Dangote, Tony Elumelu, and Wale Adenuga, among others, have only embraced the ideology in order to avoid competition from the outside. Former Ghana president and political philosopher Kwameh Nkrumah warned of such a mistake where the cookie-jar is handed over to only a few. As the concept connotes, development and investment must be from home-grown investors to take the continent and country out of poverty.[49] They also assert that the government spoon-feeds them by giving them all the necessary incentives and providing an adequate environment for them to thrive. The irony of this idea is even when the government does these things, the elite classes have never increased the number of workers or benefited the populace by reducing the prices of their products or paying the true value of its labor force. The Backward Integration Policy (BIP) of the Olusegun Obasanjo administration indicated that only importers who could guarantee the establishment of local industries would be given import licenses, and this policy has not only stifled many foreign investors but has also made the like of the Dangote Group monopolize and control the fate of cement prices in Nigeria.[50] This policy has also made the company control about 60% of Nigeria’s cement market and the largest homegrown cement producer in Africa.[51] Obasanjo puts it succinctly:

The challenges Nigerian domestic manufacturers face in many sectors are not necessarily always caused by imports but simply because they are nearly not as competitive as they need to be. There is a need for an honest recognition that industrial policies that prioritise only protection without an equal focus on capabilities and competitiveness are harmful, detrimental to our local manufacturers and undermine our efforts to diversify exports.[52]

This sense of detrimental effects has been reflected in the prices of cement, which is locally produced in Nigeria, especially by these bourgeois classes. For example, in spite of the incentives that the Dangote Group enjoys from the government, the prices of its cement moved from N1800 ($4.5) in 2013 to N3600 ($9) in 2021. It must be noted that in spite of the rise of some of these local industrialists (national bourgeoisie) as espoused by the proponents of Africapitalism in the cement industry, the prices remain one of the highest in Africa as compared to the $5.03 sale price in South Africa, which has a highly competitive market and industries.[53]

Secondly, the class struggle or internal wrangling among the capitalist class is one other factor that may continue to hinder the advancement of Africapitalism. In fact, Marx believed that this may be the end of capitalism as it would become extinct by sowing the seeds of its destruction.[54] Economic power is being concentrated in the minority class of the Bourgeoisie whereas the majority class members of the proletariat do not have economic power because of their state of alienation and indignation. [55] The way forward from the bourgeoisie is to create wealth by giving the working class or entrepreneurs a token (grant). The question remains: who owns the wealth and what is its source? Without mincing words, these are derivatives from the surplus product after the cost of production is paid. As a renowned political economist, Ekekwe argues that “there is a difference if this income/wealth derives either from wages or from revenue. The owner of the means of production or the non-owner who performs (at least part of) the function of capital derives his income from revenue.”[56]

The reason for the class struggle in most cases is not for the benefit of society as capitalism espouses; rather, it is for surplus value that the capitalists aim to gain from the labor. To be sure, when the Chairman of BUA Group, Alhaji Abdulsamad Rabiu, commissioned a sugar factory in Port Harcourt, the Chairman of Dangote Industries Ltd, Aliko Dangote, and the Chairman of Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc, John Coumantaros, accused Rabiu of not only violating the laws laid down in the National Sugar Policy but that his action would distort the country’s local sugar industry.[57] At first, it would seem that Dangote and Coumantaros were on the side of the populace, but no doubt that they were for their self-interest as they knew that having many local industries would saturate the market and drastically reduce the prices of the commodity. The wrangling among the bourgeoisie would suggest to many that they are fighting because of the proletariat or working class, but in reality, it appears that these internal strivings are only but smokescreen, as they cooperate and align with their interests among themselves and their metropolitan counterparts. This possibility was further macadamized when the Nigerian business bourgeoisie who act as commission agents visited France in 2021 to further promote trade between both countries in the pretext of a Nigeria-France bilateral relation. The leader of the Nigerian delegate, Abdul Salam Rabiu, assured the French companies and its business elite of providing the platform to facilitate their penetration into Nigeria’s market as the country was endowed with numerous potentials in solid minerals, mining, manufacturing, and food processing sectors.[58] A critical examination of these factors shows that there was no attempt to prioritize the exportation of finished goods or technological transfer, which is the hallmark of capitalism; rather, it was to further promote the imperialist and modernist ideology of Africa supplying the raw materials. Such parallel lines where the national business bourgeoisie and the national bureaucratic bourgeoisie and government walk are what some scholars have warned against because they posit that such an arrangement will not move the state forward even if the government was genuinely committed to iron-cast the foreign exchange because the Nigerian business bourgeoisie are not willing to cooperate.[59]

The idea of a transparent competitive market by the Africapitalists is also not only questionable but also jaundiced. To be sure, the government has not been fair to the major players in the industries as some seem to enjoy government patronage more than others. This unequal playfield given to the players has not only led to the demise of many industries, but it has also led to low foreign direct investment (FDI) and ipso facto, low gross domestic product. This reflects the state of the Nigerian society despite its proposal for Africapitalism. In 2016, the federal government promised to grant more than $14 billion to the Dangote Group for the establishment of his refineries and fertilizer plant even when the country was complaining of a shortage of foreign exchange due to the country’s dwindling foreign reserves because of the slump in oil prices.[60] And rather than the government mandating the capitalists to regulate their prices since they enjoy government support and subventions, the government even became the spokesperson for the group. For instance, it was not surprising when the Minister of Finance and National Planning, Zainab Ahmed, declared that Nigerians should not expect lower prices of fuel by the time Dangote Refinery takes off in 2021 because Alhaji Dangote will be selling at an international selling price.[61] It is not surprising that such a statement is coming from a member of the national bourgeoisie, whose paymaster had abandoned state refineries to give allowance and unhindered access to foreign exchange even at a lower rate than official rates to the over-pampered child, the Dangote Group.[62] Any wonder then that economic historian Moses Ochonu describes Dangote as the poster child for patrimonial monopoly capitalism in Nigeria.[63] Ochonu aptly captures it:

The Nigerian people basically sell him their oil revenue dollars at the heavily subsidized rate of 199 Naira, taking an instant loss of at least 100 Naira for every dollar they sell to him. It is undeserved instant profit at the expense of Nigeria. To compound this skewed deal, other businessmen with equally legitimate business needs do not enjoy this guaranteed Forex access.[64]

Similarly, Akinola posits that the Dangote Group enjoys nothing but rent-seeking patronage.[65] But Dangote is not the only one who enjoys such an undue advantage over other industrialists. To be sure, Dangote Group, BUA Sugar, and only a few other industrialists were allowed to export goods outside the shores of Nigeria, especially its Benin and Niger Republic borders, because the government wanted to curb smuggling and boost local production.[66] This unequal relation has also transcended into inter-state or inter-governmental levels, thereby enriching a few to the detriment of the majority. Another celebrated case was the alleged grant given to one tech company owned by Adamu Garba in 2019 to develop a homegrown application known as Crowwe to rival some foreign application software such as Twitter and Facebook.[67] While it is not a bad idea to grant such to local inventors, this particular case was not through competitive bidding in line with extant public procurement regulations and international best practices. Similarly, in 2020, the federal government gave a federating unit the license to mine its gold reserves and keep the proceeds. Although this gesture is the ideal posture of federalism, the misapplication of such gesture to some States while denying others only smacks of ethnicity, nepotism, and contradictions. This is because it not only enriches a few but also widens the poverty gap in society. Moreover, Nigeria, like most African countries, continues to play the raw material supplier to the developed economies. And in terms of expatriates, the key stakeholders and workers at the higher cadre of these industries continue to be dominated by foreigners and despite the local content law of the Federal Government, much has not been achieved to turn the tide. This is because more than half of Nigeria’s output is still generated from the primary sector, mainly agricultural and extractive industries.[68]

Finally, other factors such as insecurity, foreign exchange manipulation or instability, energy challenges, lack of technological and scientific knowhow to transform the primary sectors for self-utilization, and bad leadership will continue to affect the workability of Africapitalism in Africa or the developing countries and Nigeria in particular. For example, the so-called tech entrepreneurs do not own the technology under which they operate. Such imitation without owning the technology or space is even dangerous and will eventually lead to failure just as the importation of socialism by some post-colonial African states who claimed to be apprentices or appendages of socialism.[69] What then is the essence of funding entrepreneurs without the basics—technology and wealth? In other words, how can they survive in an insecure and unconducive environment for business? Any wonder then that unemployment rate in Africa’s so-called [70]

More worrisome is putting the country’s economy in the hands of a few, allowing the government to shirk from its duties as enshrined in the constitution. Even the disciples of Africapitalism or its marketing agents, Amaeshi & Idemudia, warned of the dangers of unguarded capitalism and its entirety as the causes of human rights infringements, inequality, and instability, among others.[71] If indeed they are conscious of the dangers of the Africapitalist philosophy, why then are they promoting its variant? Any wonder then that Ouma warned of any variant of capitalism which has been indicted as one of the destructive and dehumanization reagent to the global economic system and Africa’s development[72]. Indeed, the Africapitalists have made an indigenous effort to turn around the African developmental crisis; unfortunately, it is an old wine brandished in an old bottle. Also, it focuses only on the economic aspect, thereby neglecting the multifaceted nature of the African development crisis.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that in the quest to tackle the developmental crisis in Africa and Nigeria in particular, one of the national bourgeoisie proposed the concept of Africapitalism. Findings have shown that Africapitalism is but a neoliberal movement that is intended to cement the capitalist system with its local and global contradictions in Nigeria. It is rooted in an archaic form of capitalism but without an invisible hand. Supporting this assertion, Laclau argues that capitalism is based on the extraction of surplus by the capitalist class, the concentration of power in the hands of a few, and unequal distribution of resources.[73] This no doubt infringes on the rights of the African people and again alienates government and the citizenry. Thus, Africapitalism has not been able to resolve the development crisis on the continent and Nigeria because it is nothing but an old wine brandished in a new bottle.

This chapter’s point of analysis and argument is that while various philosophies to address the development crises in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, have been proposed, the case of Africapitalism has not deviated from the neo-liberal or modernist propositions. This is detrimental because these neo-liberal policies and programs have further impoverished the African continent, concretized its over-dependence on the global north, and further alienated the citizenry from its government. Simply put, Africapitalism is a desperate attempt to further the neoliberal agenda. Thus, for any development paradigm to solve Africa’s perennial development crisis, the continent must not only delink from the ideology of the neoliberals or modernists, but Africa’s development must also articulate the peculiarities of Africa’s socio-economic, political, and historical roots, which must be holistic.

ENDNOTES

  1. H. Alavi, “The Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh” New Left Review, Vol 1 No 74, (1972): 59-81; Peter P. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (1975): 91-112. ↑

  2. U. Ezenwe, “The African debt crisis and the challenge of development,” IntereconomicsNomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Vol.28, Iss. 1, (1993): 35-43, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02928100 ↑

  3. W. Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa. (Dar-ES-Salaam: Bogle-L’Overture Publications, 1972):; S. Ocheni, & B. C. Nwankwo “Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa” Cross- Cultural Communication, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2012): 46-54; W. Rodney, History of the Guyanese working people 1881-1905 ed. Franklin W Knight and Richard Price (London: Heinemann educational books 1981). ↑

  4. J. Asafa, “The Triple Causes of African Underdevelopment: Colonial Capitalism, State Terrorism and Racism” International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 3, (2015): 75-91. ↑

  5. A. O. Augustine “The Crisis of Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Multi-dimensional Perspectives” Journal of Political Science & Public Affairs, Vol.6. No 4.(2018): 1-9 ↑

  6. Some of these were the Development plans, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Green Revolution, Operation Feed the Nation, National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), etc. ↑

  7. Julius Ihonvbere, “Introduction: Underdevelopment and Crisis in Africa” In Ihonvbere J ed The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake. Lagos: JAD Publishers, (1989): 15-28. ↑

  8. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Fundamental Rights. (Abuja: Lagos Printers., 1999), Chapter II: LL 25-LL 30 ↑

  9. D. G Smith, “Lenin's Imperialism: A Study in the Unity of Theory and Practice” Journal of Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, (1955): 546—569. ↑

  10. S. Amin, “On Delegitimizing Capitalism: The Scourge of Africa and the South” Africa's Development, Vol.1XXXVII, No. 4. (2012): 15-72; W. Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa. (Dar-ES-Salaam: Bogle-L’Overture Publications), 1972. ↑

  11. Ibid. ↑

  12. S. Osoba, “The Nigerian Power Elite.” - In: Gutkind, Peter and Peter Waterman (eds.): Africans Socials Studies—A Radical Reader. London: Monthly Review Press. (1977): 368-382. ↑

  13. Ibid. ↑

  14. Ibid. ↑

  15. Ibid ↑

  16. S. Osoba, “The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie” Review of African Political Economy, 5, 13: (1978): 63-77. ↑

  17. I. Wallenstein, Modern World Systems III. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989). ↑

  18. D. A. Ityavyar, “The Political Economy of Health Care Problems in Nigeria.”Ufahamu, Vol. 13, No. 1, (1983): 45-63 ↑

  19. D. A. Ityavyar, “The State, Class and Health Services in Nigeria.”Africa Spectrum, Vol. 22, No. 3, (1987): 285-314. ↑

  20. W. Rodney, History of the Guyanese working people 1881-1905 ed. Franklin W Knight and Richard Price (London: Heinemann educational books, 1981); Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa, 7. ↑

  21. S. Jahan and A. S. Mahmud, “What is Capitalism? Free markets may not be perfect but they are probably the best way to organize an economy” Finance and Development, (2015): 44-45. ↑

  22. Ibid. ↑

  23. R. Rajan, and Luigi, Z. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity. (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2003). ↑

  24. C. Ake A Political Economy of Africa. (Nigeria: Longman, 1981), 14. ↑

  25. Osoba, “The Nigerian Power Elite.” - 370-382. ↑

  26. Y. Bangura, “IMF and World Bank conditionality and Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Programme” In K.J. Havnevik, ed. The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality, Impact and Alternatives. Uppsalla: Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, 1987) 95-118. ↑

  27. J.H. Dunning, “Is Global Capitalism Morally Defensible?”, Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 24: (2005): 135–51. ↑

  28. B. Onimode, A Political Economy of the African Crisis. (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988), 2 ↑

  29. Ibid ↑

  30. J. Ihonvbere, “Introduction: Underdevelopment and Crisis in Africa” 15-16. ↑

  31. Ibid, 16. ↑

  32. Africa Development Bank Group [ADBG] “Africa must reduce its dependency on raw material exports and imports” (2015, November 5). https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-must-reduce-its-dependency-on-raw-material-exports-and-imports-14957 ↑

  33. SOS Africa, “Poverty in Africa—The Indicators” (no date) https://www.sos-usa.org/about-us/where-we-work/africa/poverty-in-africa (accessed 22 June 2021). ↑

  34. T. O. Elumelu, “Africapitalism and Africa’s Sustainable Development” Horizon, Vol 6, No. 6. (2016). At https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2016--issue-no-6/editorial (accessed 19 June 2021). ↑

  35. J. Baier, M. . B , Kristensen, and Davidsen, S. “Poverty and Fragility: Where will the poor live in 2023?” Brookings. (2021, April 19). https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030 (accessed 24 June 2021). ↑

  36. R. I. Rotberg, and J. Campbell, “Nigeria Is a Failed State” Foreign Policy (2021, May 7) ↑

  37. E. Adegbite, O. Daodu, and J. Wood, “Will Africapitalism work? Africa Journal of Management, Vol. 6, 4 (2020): 419-434  ↑

  38. C. B. N. Gade, “The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu.” S. Afr. J. Philos.Vol. 30 No. 3: (2011) 303-329 ↑

  39. Elumelu, “Africapitalism and Africa’s Sustainable Development” ↑

  40. K. Moghalu, Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy's Last Frontier Can Prosper and Matter, (United Kingdom: Penguin, 2014) ↑

  41. I. Abba, “What Does Africapitalism Actually Mean? Power, Gender and the Promise of Africapitalism.” The Republic. (2022, December 21/January 22) https://republic.com.ng/december-21-january-22/what-does-africapitalism-mean/ ↑

  42. K. Amaeshi and U. Idemudia, “Africapitalism: A Management Idea for Business in Africa?, Africa Journal of Management, Vol. 1.No. 2, (2015): 215-216, DOI: 10.1080/23322373.2015.1026229 ↑

  43. Ibid. ↑

  44. F. K. Forson, “Nigerian Millionaire Says 'Africapitalism' a Solution to Africa’s Joblessness” Voice of Africa. (2017, March 16). https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-millionaire-says-africapitalism-solution-africas-joblessness (accessed 9 July 2021). ↑

  45. T. Kene-Okafor, “How African startups raised investments in 2020” TechCrunch. (2021, February 11). At https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/11/how-african-startups-raised-investments-in-2020/ ↑

  46. Adegbite, et al “Will Africapitalism work?” 419-434  ↑

  47. Ibid. ↑

  48. D. Tambi and V. Kum, “The concept of Africapitalism and the role of the private Sector in Africa’s socioeconomic development the concept of Africapitalism and the role of the private sector in Africa’s socioeconomic development” Working paper. Nkafu Policy Institute, 2021) ↑

  49. K. Nkrumah, K. Neo-Colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism. New York: International Publishers, 1965). ↑

  50. N. Ogbonna, “How trade policies make domestic industries uncompetitive” Stears Business. (2021, March 7). https://www.stearsng.com/article/how-trade-policies-make-domestic-industries-uncompetitive (accessed 22 June 2021). ↑

  51. Ibid. ↑

  52. Ibid. ↑

  53. Ibid. ↑

  54. M. A. Adebisi, “Reflections on Theories of social change” In Salawu B (ed.) Sociology, Concepts and Themes: An Introduction. Ibadan: Cresthill Publishers. (2007): 188-205 ↑

  55. Ibid, 194. ↑

  56. E. Ekekwe, Class and State in Nigeria. (London: Longman., 1986). 6 ↑

  57. O. Sunday, “BUA fires back as Dangote engages company in Sugar war” Daily Post. (2021, April 9) https://dailypost.ng/2021/04/09/bua-fires-back-as-dangote-engages-company-in-sugar-war/ (accessed 22 June 2021). ↑

  58. The Guardian Newspaper “France-Nigeria Business Council to bolster bilateral ties” (2021, June 30). https://guardian.ng/business-services/france-nigeria-business-council-to-bolster-bilateral-ties/ (Accessed 9 July 2021). ↑

  59. Osoba,) “The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie” 72 ↑

  60. C. Oguh . “CBN to provide forex support for Dangote refinery” Financial Nigeria. (2016, January 11). http://www.financialnigeria.com/cbn-to-provide-forex-support-for-dangote-refinery-sustainable-photovideo-details-288.html ↑

  61. P. Okafor, “Dangote refinery will not reduce price of petrol ― FG.” Vanguard. (2020, September 14) https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/09/dangote-refinery-will-not-reduce-price-of-petrol-%E2%80%95-fg/↑

  62. The refinery has not even taken off as at October 2022 ↑

  63. M. E. Ochonu, “The Dangote Paradox” Sahara Reporters. (2016, March 25) http://saharareporters.com/2016/03/25/dangote-paradox-moses-e-ochonu (accessed 22 June 2021). ↑

  64. Ibid. ↑

  65. A. O. Akinola, “rent Seeeking and Industrial Growth in Africa: The Case of Dangote’s Cement Industry” CESRAN, Vol 9, 1 (2019). ↑

  66. E, Onu and T. Alake, “Nigeria Exempts Dangote, 2 Others from Border Closure” Bloomberg. (2020, November 9) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-09/nigeria-exempts-dangote-cement-from-land-border-closure (accessed 22 June 2021). ↑

  67. M. Ileyemi, “EXCLUSIVE: Bank document expose how Buhari regime funded Adamu Garba’s Crowwe to rival Facebook, Twitter” Peoples Gazette. (2021, June 23). At https://gazettengr.com/exclusive-bank-documents-expose-how-buhai-regime-funded-adamu-garbas-crowwe-to-rival-facebook-twitter (accessed 24 June 2021). ↑

  68. L. N. Chete, J. O. Adeoti, Adeyinka, F. M. and Ogundele, O “Industrial development and growth in Nigeria: Lessons and challenges.” Working Paper. No 8. (2014). ↑

  69. A. O. Olutayo and Omobowale, A.O. (2007) “Capitalism, Globalisation and the Underdevelopment Process in Africa/: History in perpetuity” Africa Development, Vol. XXXII, No 2. 97-112. ↑

  70. 701,000 to 7.2milion in South Africa; Nigeria is second highest in the globe. Nigeria has the second highest unemployment rate with 33 percent globally. Namibia is in front with 33.4%. see also, M. Vanek, “South Africa Unemployment Rises to Record as More Look For Jobs.” Bloomberg. (2021, February 23). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/south-africa-jobless-rate-rises-to-record-32-5-in-4th-quarter ↑

  71. Amaeshi, and Idemudia, “Africapitalism: A Management Idea for Business in Africa? 210-223. ↑

  72. S. Ouma, ‘Africapitalism’ and the limits of any variant of capitalism” review of African Political Economy, (2020, July 16). https://roape.net/2020/07/16/africapitalism-and-the-limits-of-any-variant-of-capitalism/ (accessed 9 July 2021). It also appeared in the Elephant blog. At https://www.theelephant.info/ideas/2020/09/18/africapitalism-and-the-limits-of-any-variant-of-capitalism/?print=pdf ↑

  73. E. Laclau,. Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America. (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 1986). ↑

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