Figure 7.1

Critical Belief Analysis Example

Analysis Topic: U.S. 2003 Decision to Invade Iraq.

[ √ ] Step 1: Orient Yourself to the Project.

• Research purpose (specify):

To explain why a state may employ a preemptive military attack.

• Research question (specify):

Why did U.S. President George W. Bush order a 2003 preemptive military invasion of Iraq? (Calls for an explanatory study using after-the-fact analysis.)

• To-be-evaluated agent and target belief (specify):

President George W. Bush’s belief that an invasion of Iraq with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party from power was justified.

• Sources of information utilized (specify):

The following analysis was developed primarily from Bob Woodward’s book: Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq.^[1] Other pertinent references were consulted as needed.

Bob Woodward developed Plan of Attack using interviews with President Bush and his principal advisors, information from U.S. government records, and other journalists’ reports. Woodward’s original reporting on the Watergate scandal, for which he shared a Pulitzer Prize with Carl Bernstein, was followed by many highly regarded books on succeeding presidential administrations. The esteem in which Woodward is held by the Washington establishment afforded him unique access to the top decision-makers in the U.S. Government.

• Circumstances in which the belief developed, if relevant (specify):

After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which U.S. and Coalition forces expelled invading Iraqi military forces from Kuwait, United Nations (U.N.) and U.S. security policymakers remained concerned about what to do with Iraq. In response to a number of post-1991 U.N. Security Council resolutions, Iraq agreed to destroy its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles, laboratories, and programs. Iraq had used chemical and biological WMD against Iranians as well as Iraqis who opposed its policies during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

Despite the 1991 Iraq-U.N. peace agreement, a quasi-war continued between Iraq and the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.), and (until 1996) France. Those nations enforced no-fly zones to protect the majority Shi’ite Muslim population in southern Iraq and the minority ethnic Kurdish population in northern Iraq. It was believed that without the no-fly zones Hussein would use air attacks against those vulnerable populations, both of which opposed the Ba’ath Party. (Saddam and his ruling Ba’ath Party were primarily minority Sunni Muslims.) The no-fly operations, which were still in effect when George W. Bush was inaugurated U.S. president in 2001, were not approved by the U.N. Security Council.

Iraq initially agreed to allow U.N. inspectors to document their WMD disarmament. However, in 1998, Iraq expelled the U.N. weapons inspectors. On October 31, 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), which declared the U.S. would support efforts to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his ruling Ba’ath Party from power. Clinton enforced the ILA by increasing support to a number of Iraqi opposition groups and working with the U.N. to isolate Iraq politically and economically.

President George W. Bush brought a new level of passion to achieving the goals of the ILA. Bush held a personal grudge against Hussein, who was behind a failed April 1993 assassination attempt on his father, former President George H. W. Bush. Before the second Bush’s January 2001 inauguration, Vice President-elect Dick Cheney asked that Bush receive Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefings focusing primarily on the situation in Iraq. Cheney, who had served as Bush’s father’s Secretary of Defense (SecDef), felt U.S. and Coalition forces had ended the 1991 Persian Gulf War prematurely. Cheney believed U.S. and Coalition forces should have invaded Iraq and removed Hussein from power after they liberated Kuwait.

However, the pre-inaugural threat briefing CIA Director George Tenet gave Bush focused primarily on (a) Osama bin Laden (OBL) and his al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network, (b) the possibility AQ or other terrorists would obtain WMD, and (c) the rising power of China. Iraq was barely mentioned.

After Bush’s 2001 inauguration, his principal advisors on security matters were Cheney, SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State (SecState) Colin Powell, Deputy SecDef Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy SecState Richard Armitage, CIA Director Tenet, and National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice. Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and their like-minded advisors and staff members, who were later dubbed “neo-conservatives (neocons),” advocated a more aggressive U.S. security policy. Rumsfeld characterized the Clinton administration's response to challenges and attacks as a passive “reflexive pullback.” The new security approach, which Bush approved, would be more active, aggressive, and “forward-leaning.”

The neocons’ enthusiasm was intensified by VP Cheney’s and SecDef Rumsfeld’s belief that the U.S. needed military success in the Middle East to re-establish itself as a dominant regional actor. Bush explicated his vision of “forward-leaning” when, in preparation for his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address, he told his advisors and speechwriters he viewed the U.S. as obliged to reform Muslim societies by advocating for democracy, women’s rights, civil and political liberties, and free markets.

In the spring and summer of 2001, there were a number of U.S. National Security Council (NSC) meetings addressing Iraq. These included NSC Principals’ meetings — cabinet-level meetings chaired by Cheney or Rice, and NSC Deputies’ meetings — deputy cabinet-level meetings chaired by Rice or her primary assistant, Deputy NSA Stephen Hadley. These meetings focused mainly on approaches to increasing intelligence collection on Iraq, improving support to Iraqi opposition groups, and refocusing and strengthening the enforcement of Iraqi U.N. economic sanctions. It was hoped these actions, in combination with continuing no-fly zone enforcement, would pressure Hussein and his Ba'ath Party to surrender power.

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) AQ attacks on the Pentagon and New York City’s World Trade Center refocused U.S. national security attention on the “War on Terror” and inspired the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, whose Taliban government provided OBL and AQ with a safe haven in which they planned and prepared for the 9/11 attacks. Denying OBL and AQ the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven required the removal of the Afghani Taliban government.

On November 21, 2001, with most initial U.S. goals in Afghanistan either accomplished or on track, Bush questioned SecDef Rumsfeld about the deferred-but-never-forgotten Iraq War Plan. Bush’s inquiry provoked a year-long review and revision of the war plan led by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, U.S. Army General Tommy Franks and his staff, in consultation with SecDef Rumsfeld, the SecDef staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military services. This planning effort was intended to ensure the availability of a robust military option that could be used if diplomatic and economic efforts to remove Hussein from power failed. By the fall of 2002, Franks had developed a plan to remove Hussein from power with minimal U.S. and Coalition military forces while minimizing Iraqi civilian casualties.

In his June 2002 speech at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) graduation ceremony, Bush outlined his administration's "preemption doctrine," a commitment to "confront the worst threats to the United States before they emerge by taking the battle to the enemy."

Over the next several months, Bush and his neocon advisors hinted at the possibility of a preemptive strike against Iraq in speeches and interviews. Bush's September 2002 speech to the U.N. General Assembly can be interpreted as suggesting the U.S. would act to stop Hussein's transgressions if the U.N. failed to do so. While Bush allowed diplomatic and economic efforts to continue, he was clandestinely preparing for war.

Some commentators later dubbed the Bush administration’s Iraq preemptive intervention information campaign a “Great Deception” or “Great Manipulation.” By making frequent references to preemptive intervention, Bush and his surrogates created the illusion that preemption was a widely accepted solution to the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. Eventually, both the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public supported military engagement with Iraq. In October 2002, a U.S. Congressional resolution authorizing the use of U.S. military force in Iraq was passed by the House (296-133) and Senate (77-23). By March 2003, surveys revealed that 70 percent of the U.S. public supported U.S. military intervention in Iraq.

Throughout the fall of 2002, Bush continued to build international support for an invasion of Iraq. His new coalition, while far smaller than the coalition supporting his father and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, included the United Kingdom (U.K.), Poland, Spain, and Australia.

Bush arguably began the groundwork for the invasion of Iraq as early as August 2002, when he authorized a CIA clandestine intelligence team to deploy to northern Iraqi Kurdish territory to work with the Kurds and other anti-Hussein groups with access to Baghdad and the Iraqi military. The CIA team established a clandestine intelligence collection network to provide intelligence on the locations and capabilities of Iraqi military units as well as information on the locations of senior Iraqi military and government officials. In the fall of 2002, Bush authorized General Franks to gradually deploy U.S. and Coalition forces to the Middle East while disguising preparation for a large-scale invasion of Iraq.

On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution declaring Iraq would face "serious consequences" if it failed to comply with previous resolutions mandating WMD disarmament and U.N. weapons inspections. Iraq immediately issued a lengthy report on its WMD disarmament efforts and allowed U.N. weapons inspectors back into the country.

Bush became displeased with the U.N. WMD inspectors' initial efforts to assess Iraqi compliance when no WMD were found. However, U.N. Security Council permanent members France and Russia, together with 2003 non-permanent member Germany, remained opposed to military action in Iraq, preferring to continue diplomatic and economic efforts and U.N. weapons inspections well into 2003.

NSA Rice noted she was convinced Bush made the decision to invade Iraq in late December 2002 after concluding neither U.N. weapons inspections nor other diplomatic and economic efforts would put an end to Hussein’s Iraqi regime. After Bush’s late-December 2002 decision to invade Iraq, Franks increased the rate at which troops and equipment were deployed to the Mideast. A main invasion force of over 200,000 U.S. ground forces, staged mostly in Kuwait, was substantially in place by late February 2003.

The U.S. invasion force was tasked with capturing Baghdad, Iraq’s largest city and its capital. U.S. and U.K special forces units based in Jordan were readied to take control of SCUD tactical ballistic missiles based in western Iraq and thought to be targeted on Israel. Around 45,000 U.K. troops were readied to deploy from Kuwait to invade southern Iraq. Those U.K. troops were tasked with securing Iraq’s southern oil fields against Iraqi sabotage and seizing Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city. Due to Turkey’s denial of U.S. requests to deploy military forces through Turkish territory, U.S. CIA and military special forces teams, supported by U.S. airborne (parachute) troops, deployed to northern Iraq to organize, equip, and train ethnic Kurdish troops to secure their homeland, which included Iraq’s northern oil fields. Two U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups were stationed in the Persian Gulf for combat air support. Additionally, over 60,000 U.S. Air Force personnel and numerous combat support aircraft were deployed to friendly countries across the Middle East and Southern Europe.

On January 13, 2003, Bush informed SecState Powell of his decision to go to war in Iraq. Powell and Deputy SecState Armitage had been the two most ardent cabinet-level advocates of diplomatic and economic solutions to the Iraqi problem. Upon learning that Bush had decided to invade Iraq, Powell opted to support him. On February 5, 2003, Powell gave a speech at the U.N. he had prepared with CIA assistance. This speech, which was intended to justify military action against Iraq, was filled with false and misleading information. Powell, who knew some of the assertions in his speech were fraudulent, later described that speech as a “blot” on his professional record. The Bush administration did not request a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, as they expected France and Russia to veto any such resolution.

Bush and the neocons supplemented their campaign to gain the support of the U.S. Congress, U.N. Security Council, and Coalition Forces with efforts to gain U.S. domestic and international public support. Among those efforts was the broadcast of SecState Powell’s February 5, 2003, U.N. speech to U.S. domestic and international television and radio audiences.

While, as noted above, these efforts garnered the overwhelming support of the U.S. public, during the weekend of February 15-16, 2003, an estimated six to ten million protesters in more than 600 cities worldwide demonstrated against the proposed U.S. invasion. Protests were concentrated in Europe but included gatherings in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, South Africa, and countries in western Asia and the Pacific Islands.

On March 19, 2003, Bush ordered the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. codename for the invasion of Iraq. Bush was convinced U.S. intelligence information on Iraq justified the invasion. With the backing of the U.S. Congress, U.S. public, and Coalition partners, Bush defended his decision by citing the November 8, 2002, U.N. Security Council resolution calling for “serious consequences” if Iraq did not comply with previous U.N. resolutions mandating WMD disarmament and U.N. weapons inspections. (It should be noted, however, that several U.N. Security Council members disputed Bush’s interpretation of the November 8, 2002, resolution as an authorization for war.)

Bush viewed the invasion of Iraq as a “just war” under international law. In accordance with the Just War Doctrine,^[2] a preemptive attack may be justified if:

1. There is a manifest intent to injure the preempting party.

2. There is a degree of active preparation making the intent a positive danger.

3. Waiting or doing anything other than fighting greatly magnifies the risk.

In the eyes of Bush and his advisors, the Iraqi situation met these “just war” criteria, thus justifying a preemptive attack.

• Psychobiography (specify relevant history and characteristics):

For a comprehensive psychobiography of George W. Bush see Dan P. McAdams’ book, George W. Bush and the Redemptive Dream: A Psychological Portrait.^[3] McAdams is a Northwestern University Professor of Psychology who specializes in the study of personality and social development. McAdams’ book is widely considered a uniquely comprehensive analysis of Bush’s psychological makeup.

In a review of McAdams’ study on Psychology Today’s online blog, William Todd Schultz, Professor of Psychology at Pacific University and editor of the Handbook of Psychobiography (2005)^[4] states, “. . . McAdams hits the mark . . . he sees things in the record that are new, and he does so by bringing to bear current, scientifically validated research findings that shed a bright light on who Bush was and why he did what he did.”^[5]

Schultz describes McAdams’ findings as indicating that “Bush is an extravert . . . [who is] charming, sociable, energetic, but prone to impulsiveness and recklessness. Bush was also low on the cognitive side of openness to experience. He was incurious, the opposite of a thinker or deliberator. These two traits combined disastrously, depending on your political position, when it came to the invasion of Iraq, Bush moved impulsively to act, more or less thoughtlessly.”^[6]

• Target belief’s second-order precepts (specify):

Bush and his principal advisors constructed a supporting narrative and a set of second-order precepts that shaped the ways they thought about, communicated about, and defended the eventual invasion of Iraq. This narrative and those precepts enabled Bush and his principal advisors to ignore or discount criticism of the invasion in the U.N. Security Council as well as later international protests. By January 13, 2003, even SecState Powell supported the narrative and complied with its precepts. The principal advisors took their lead on how to think about, defend, and communicate about the invasion from Bush and VP Cheney. This campaign, later called the Great Deception, helped convince the U.S. public, U.S. Congress, and Coalition partners of the need for the invasion.

The principal arguments driving the eventual invasion of Iraq were:

• Iraq possessed WMD.
• Those WMD constituted a threat to Iraq’s Middle East neighbors, the United States, and the world at large.
• The then-current Iraqi regime posed a threat to the oil reserves of the Middle East.
• Those oil reserves were important to the world’s economy.
• Iraq had collaborated with AQ and other terrorist groups.
• Iraq was likely to provide AQ and other terrorist groups with WMD.
• AQ and other terrorist groups were likely to use those WMD to expand their attacks on the United States and its allies.
• Saddam Hussein had little or no regard for human life.
• Iraq was not in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions designed to remove its WMD capabilities.
• Fostering regime change in Iraq and installing a democratic government would make the Iraqi population safer, enhance Iraqi human rights, and help secure U.S. interests in the Middle East as well as the future of the world at large.

The second-order precepts that shaped the deliberations of Bush and his advisors encouraged conformity, giving rise to groupthink. Groupthink is a term used to characterize deliberative processes in which those with particular points of view dominate discussions while the arguments of those with differing views are silenced or discounted. Groupthink manifested itself when members of Bush’s inner circle felt compelled to support Bush’s belief that invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party from power was justified. CIA Director Tenet, who had been widely criticized following AQ’s 9/11 attacks on the U.S., supplied Bush and his neocon advisors with intelligence supporting their points of view, apparently motivated, at least in part, by the desire to show Bush he could still lead the CIA effectively. Even SecState Powell, who opposed the Iraq invasion until Bush made his final decision, joined in groupthink efforts after the decision to invade Iraq was made.

When groupthink dominates; discussion, analysis, and decision-making are usually compromised. Bush and his principal security advisors, less SecState Powell and Deputy SecState Armitage at first, manifested strong “confirmation bias.” This bias facilitated acceptance of information supporting the belief that an invasion of Iraq was necessary and neglect or rejection of information disputing that belief. When confirmation bias is combined with “cognitive dissonance,” objectivity is likely to be severely impaired.

Cognitive dissonance arises when someone holds two conflicting ideas at once. In such situations, people often strive to eliminate the resulting conflict by discarding information that fails to support their preferred idea. The combination of groupthink, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance is likely to powerfully impede the rationality of any decision-making process.

For another security studies example of groupthink, see Security Analysis, Chapter 2. This chapter describes a situation in which groupthink influenced John F. Kennedy’s presidential advisors’ deliberations regarding the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.^[7] If President Kennedy had not liberated his advisors from groupthink, a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union may have occurred.

• Situations in which the target belief strongly influenced the agent’s thoughts, feelings, or actions (specify):

While the target belief is superficially specific to the Iraqi situation, Bush had decided to invade Afghanistan under arguably similar circumstances. After AQ’s 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the Bush administration demanded the Taliban Afghani government deliver OBL and other AQ senior leaders to the United States and stop allowing AQ to use Afghanistan as a support base, training site, and safe haven. The Taliban refused. In response, Bush ordered a U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan, forcing OBL, AQ, and the Taliban to flee the country. Inspired by the desire to reduce the terrorist threat to Western countries, NATO military forces also participated in the invasion.

• Results of policies, etc., shaped by the target belief (specify):

U.S. and NATO military goals inspiring the invasion of Afghanistan were quickly achieved: OBL, AQ, and the Taliban were promptly removed. However, little thought had been given to the long-term costs of the invasion, the number of U.S., NATO, and Afghani (military and civilian) personnel who would be killed or injured, or the resources required to rebuild Afghanistan politically, economically, and socially. Bush could not have known it at the time, but the occupation of Afghanistan ultimately cost over 2 trillion dollars and lasted 20 years — after which a 2021 U.S. withdrawal allowed the Taliban to return to power in Afghanistan. Throughout the 20-year U.S. and NATO occupation, the Taliban and AQ continued a guerilla-like insurgency in Afghanistan. The occupation failed to establish a more democratic, more effective, less corrupt Afghani government, build a new Afghani security structure, or expand Afghani human rights.

• Agent’s responses to failures or unanticipated consequences of the above policies (specify):

Despite the failure to achieve long-term goals in Afghanistan, throughout Bush’s term of office, the United States and NATO continued to pour money and resources into Afghanistan to help restructure its government, build its security forces, and fight insurgents. However, as Barak Obama discovered upon assuming the presidency in January 2009, U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan lacked an overarching military strategy, failed to deploy sufficient military forces to overcome the continuing insurgency, and failed to prepare Afghan forces to assume responsibility for the security of their territory.^[8]

• Situations in which the target belief seemed likely to influence the agent’s thoughts, feelings, policies, or actions (specify):

Since this analysis is being written when President Bush’s decisions and their consequences are known, it has the advantage of hindsight. However, as detailed above, the pattern of thought influencing Bush’s approach to Iraq appears to resemble the pattern of thought influencing Bush’s approach to Afghanistan. In both cases, Bush underestimated the long-term costs and complexities of occupation and nation-building.

[ √ ] Step 2: Locate the Belief on Figure 6.1, The Periodic Table of the Beliefs.

1. Determine the nature of the guidance the agent assumed the belief provided.

• The agent’s history suggests he assumed the target belief satisfied his desire for (circle or bold one and, if necessary, justify or explain your choice):

Information (In)

Reassurance (Reas)

Both

Justification/Explanation (optional): Bush’s words and actions indicate he assumed the target belief (i.e., an invasion of Iraq with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party from power was warranted) to be informative. That is, he assumed that belief to be the result of sincere, disciplined efforts to understand the realities of the situation in Iraq, objectively assess the possible consequences of diverse strategies, and identify the best available course of action.

• The agent’s history suggests the agent assumed the belief was primarily concerned with (Circle or bold one and, if necessary, justify or explain your choice.):

Existential Viewpoint issues (Ex)

Realist Viewpoint issues (Real)

Ethical Viewpoint issues (Eth)

Visionary Viewpoint issues (Vi)

Quest-and-Commitment Viewpoint issues (QC)

Justification/Explanation (optional): Bush’s words and actions indicate he assumed the target belief dealt with Realist Viewpoint issues, i.e. that it was shaped by and addressed an array of palpable realities. Bush assumed the target belief provided reliable information about the diverse threats Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party posed to Iraq, the region, and the world at large and about how those threats could be alleviated. He believed U.S. intelligence reports allowed him to not only understand what was happening in Iraq but to divine the consequences of various strategies. He believed Iraq continued to possess WMD in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions. He knew Iraq had used chemical and biological weapons in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. He knew U.N. weapons inspectors found stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons before they were expelled from Iraq in 1998. He believed Iraq was pursuing radiological and nuclear WMD programs. And he believed that Iraqi officials had met with senior leaders of AQ and other terrorist groups.

Bush viewed any radiological or nuclear weapons in Iraqi hands as constituting a threat to Israel, Iraq’s other Middle East neighbors, the U.S., and the world at large. And he considered it likely Iraq would provide AQ and other terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction, further increasing the threat to the U.S. and its allies. He took these threats more seriously because he viewed Hussein as a tyrant whose treatment of his own citizens had demonstrated a disregard for human life. In addition, he viewed Iraq as threatening the oil reserves of the Middle East and thus, the world economy. And he believed removing Hussein from power would require armed intervention. He believed the “Just War Doctrine” and related international law justified a preemptive strike to eliminate the threats posed by Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party. Bush viewed all of these assertions as answering the Realist Viewpoint question, “What is?”

• The agent’s history suggests the agent assumed the belief offered the guidance of (Circle or bold one and, if necessary, justify or explain your choice.):

A precise belief (P)

An imprecise belief (I)

A rule of thumb (RoT)

A catalytic narrative (CN)

Justification/Explanation (optional): While many, with the advantage of hindsight, have accused Bush and his advisors of overconfidence, no one has suggested Bush and his advisors believed they could predict the results of their proposed actions in detail. Rather, it appears that, although they knew the evidence on which they based their plans was questionable, the way the proposed invasion would unfold was uncertain, and the aftermath of the invasion was unpredictable, they assumed that acting under the guidance of the target belief markedly increased their odds of bringing about diverse desirable outcomes. Thus, it appears Bush and his advisors viewed their Realist Viewpoint belief as providing the sort of directional guidance CBA characterizes as "imprecise."

• Based on the above, the agent likely assumed the belief to be proper to the cell of Figure 6.1 specified below (Circle or bold one in each row.):

In Reas

Ex Real Eth Vi QC

P I RoT CN

• Designate the appropriate cell of Figure 6.1 with an “A” for assumed.

2. Determine the nature of the guidance the target belief actually provided.

• The procedure specified in Figure 6.4 and other relevant information suggests that the agent’s overall treatment of the belief facilitates the provision of (Circle or bold information (In), reassurance (Reas), or both. If necessary, justify or explain your choice.):

Information (In)

Reassurance (Reas)

Both

Justification/Explanation (optional): It is, of course, impossible to know how Bush would have responded to each of the item pairs comprising Figure 6.4 if he were self-aware and unflinchingly honest. However, it seems likely Bush would have agreed or strongly agreed with the following Figure 6.4 statements, especially as groupthink increasingly affected his functioning:

• I want this belief to be true.
• I would see myself differently if I didn’t hold this belief.
• Information appearing to raise serious questions about this belief would upset me.
• I do my best to avoid information challenging this belief.
• Any argument challenging this belief must employ inaccurate information or faulty logic.
• I have no trouble dismissing challenges to this belief if my fellow believers consider the sources of those challenges biased.
• I avoid questioning this belief or considering incompatible beliefs because those I care about would be upset if I did so.
• I feel obliged to champion my belief, even if doing so requires me to portray biased information, falsehoods, or irrational arguments as unquestionable truths.

To determine whether the target belief, as Bush related to it, was informative or reassuring, one needs to answer the question, “Could Bush treat the target belief objectively if his relationship with that belief was shaped by even a few of these attitudes?” We respectfully propose that the answer to that question is “No.” As such, I feel confident in saying Bush’s treatment of the target belief, influenced by the views of his advisors and his negative feelings about Saddam Hussein, renders the target belief reassuring.

• The belief was actually concerned with (Circle or bold one and, if necessary, justify or explain your choice.):

Existential Viewpoint issues (Ex)

Realist Viewpoint issues (Real)

Ethical Viewpoint issues (Eth)

Visionary Viewpoint issues (Vi)

Quest and Commitment Viewpoint issues (QC)

Justification/Explanation (optional): Since the target belief is reassuring, it is, like all such beliefs, proper to the Existential Viewpoint. As we have seen, the target belief inspired relationships, standards of logic and discourse, and rules of evidence that helped Bush see himself as knowledgeable, wise, powerful, and virtuous.

• The belief actually offered the guidance of (Circle or bold one and, if necessary, justify or explain your choice.):

A precise belief (P)

An imprecise belief (I)

A rule of thumb (RoT)

A catalytic narrative (CN)

Justification/Explanation (optional): Like all reassuring beliefs, the target belief is a catalytic narrative. True to its catalytic nature, the target belief provided a lens through which Bush and his advisors viewed and interpreted the issues it addressed. Its catalytic second-order precepts discouraged Bush and his advisors from seeking, generating, or discussing challenging facts and arguments. By biasing both the information Bush and his advisors considered and the ways they interpreted that information, the target belief led them to view their understanding of the Iraqi situation and its implications as unquestionable truths they could confidently rely on to guide their most consequential decisions and actions. As noted previously, the target belief’s second-order precepts discouraged seeking, generating, and sharing challenging facts and arguments or treating such facts and arguments respectfully.

• Based on the above, the belief was actually proper to the Figure 6.1 cell specified below (Circle or bold one in each row.):

In Reas

Ex Real Eth Vi QC

P I RoT CN

• Designate the appropriate cell of Figure 6.1 with an “O” for observed or actual.

[√ ] Step 3: Assess Existential Viewpoint Issues

Note: Since President Bush assumed the target belief to be informative but it turned out to be reassuring (and thus proper to the Existential Viewpoint), CBA calls upon the analyst to evaluate the impact of the target belief on Bush’s genuineness, the (noetic) quality of his relationships, and his belief-relevant communication.

• The target belief affected the agent’s genuineness by . . . reducing his openness and curiosity with respect to the Iraqi situation, reducing his desire and capacity to understand its complexities, and discouraging him from seeking information or perspectives that may have led him to question his conclusions or refine his understanding — particularly regarding the purported existence of Iraqi WMD and Iraq’s alleged collaboration with AQ. While the target belief encouraged Bush to act on the basis of his best understanding, it closed him to the possibility that actions it inspired might turn out to be ineffective or harmful. Thus, the target belief compromised Bush’s attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.
• The target belief’s effects on the (noetic) quality of the agent’s relationships . . . while mixed, were detrimental overall. On the one hand, it made it rewarding for Bush and his advisors to bring out the best in themselves and their associates. The goal the target belief inspired (i.e., organizing and garnering support for a minimally destructive invasion of Iraq) encouraged mutual support for what the group viewed as high-level, data-driven intellectual functioning. While no single individual could hope to achieve the goal the target belief inspired, each individual’s contribution to achieving the goal made it easier for others to contribute. Groupthink also encouraged Bush and his advisors to “root” for themselves and each other as long as their contributions supported the group’s unalterable conclusions.

As such, groupthink powerfully undermined the noetic quality of Bush’s relationships. Under its influence, high-level, data-driven functioning and mutual rooting for such functioning did little but cloak bias. It is notable that during 2001 and 2002, only SecState Powell and Deputy SecState Armitage had the temerity to challenge the group’s consensus.

• The target belief’s effects on the quality of the agent’s communication style/discourse ethics . . . were devastating. They created an atmosphere that encouraged self-censorship while discouraging advocates from ensuring that nominally supportive data were authentically unbiased and nominally supportive arguments were valid.

The communications of Bush, his neocon advisors, and like-minded Coalition members were constrained by the requirement that those communications support the target belief (i.e., that a military invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party from power was justified). Bush and his neocon advisors were not open to information disputing these arguments.

Statements conflicting with the target belief, conflicting with beliefs that supported it, or challenging the second-order precepts that protected it were unlikely to be expressed. If expressed, such statements were likely to be discounted. Further, inspired by the perceived righteousness of their cause, Bush and his advisors were willing to employ false information and misleading arguments to win the support of U.S. domestic and international audiences.

• The target belief’s impact on the agent’s genuineness, the (noetic) quality of the agent’s relationships, and the agent’s communication style/discourse ethics appears to have affected (Choose those effects that applied. Justify or explain your choices.):
  • The objectivity with which President Bush treated the target belief.

The target belief dramatically compromised the objectivity of Bush and his advisors, leading them to treat the belief as if it were certain when it was not. It led them to shield themselves from information and arguments that might have encouraged doubt and to selectively expose themselves — and those they had the power to influence — to biased and, on occasion, patently false information and illogical arguments. This information and those arguments encouraged actions with unanticipated and often tragic consequences.

More specifically, Bush’s compromised genuineness made it easy to oversimplify the complexities of the Iraqi situation. In particular, it rendered Bush and his advisors vulnerable to believing — falsely — that Iraq had WMD that threatened its Mideast neighbors and their oil, the U.S., and the world at large, that Iraq was actively collaborating with AQ and other terrorist groups, and that those terrorist groups were likely to use those WMD to attack the U.S and its allies.

• The belief-relevant data to which the agent was exposed.

See the above description of the objectivity with which President Bush treated the target belief. While Bush had access to the entire U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), he failed to look to that community for data or analyses that enhanced his understanding or disputed his arguments (see more on the IC below).

• The belief-relevant discourse to which the agent was exposed.

See the above description of the objectivity with which President Bush treated the target belief.

• The agent’s responses to belief-relevant data and discourse.

The target belief powerfully distorted Bush’s interpretation of and response to belief-relevant intelligence information. For example, in the fall of 2002, the CIA published a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) focusing on Iraqi WMD.^[9] While this report stated, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons,” it cautioned evidence for this assertion was limited. Furthermore, it warned evidence for collaboration between Iraq and AQ warranted little confidence. Bush and his neocon advisors ignored both the NIE assessment's shaky grounding and its explicit caveats. (CIA Director George Tenet famously described the narrative’s findings as a “slam dunk.”) Instead, Bush and his advisors focused on statements supporting their vision of Iraq as possessing chemical and biological weapons and collaborating with AQ. They promulgated this view to U.S. domestic and international audiences. A later bipartisan investigation concluded that the NIE’s cautious conclusions relied excessively on one unreliable human source (codenamed Curveball),^[10] the analysis lacked robustness, and its findings were based on faulty assumptions.

Bush’s perception of the target belief also led him to pay scant attention to the possibility that invading Iraq might have unanticipated consequences. While Bush’s advisors discussed the possibility that Iraq might not possess WMD and the consequences of invading Iraq if WMD were not found, Bush never ordered an expanded intelligence collection effort or deeper analysis of those possibilities.

In sum, Bush and his advisors distorted data, evidence, and reason with respect to Iraqi WMD — a set of distortions later commentators called the “Great Deception” or “Great Manipulation.” These distortions encouraged Bush to order the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

[ √ ] Step 4: Assumption-Reality Disparities and Their Implications.

1. [ √ ] Assumption-Reality Disparities Regarding Motivation.

• (Complete the following sentence. Elaborate if appropriate.) The agent assumed he accepted this belief because it satisfied his desire for . . . information. More specifically, Bush assumed the target belief provided guidance that, if followed, would make the world a safer place by eliminating the threat Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba’ath Party posed to the people of Iraq, Iraq’s Mideast neighbors, the U.S., and the world at large.

Unfortunately, many of the purported facts the target belief encouraged President Bush and his advisors to accept were false. It is now clear that:

• At the time of the Bush-ordered invasion, Iraq possessed neither WMD nor their precursors. As such, there was no cause for concern over the threat WMD might pose to Iraq’s Middle East neighbors, the U.S., or the world at large. Nor was there cause for concern Iraq might provide WMD to AQ or other terrorist groups or that those terrorist groups might use Iraq-supplied WMD against the U.S. and its allies.
• There was no evidence the Iraqi regime posed a threat to the oil reserves of the Middle East.
• There was no evidence Iraq had collaborated with AQ or other terrorist groups.
• Fostering regime change in Iraq and installing a democratic government failed to make the Iraqi population safer, enhance Iraqi human rights, help secure U.S. interests in the Middle East, or improve conditions in the world at large.

However, the target belief was not entirely baseless. In fact:

• Iraq had maintained WMD laboratories in violation of U.N. resolutions.
• Saddam Hussein had little regard for human life.
• The oil reserves of the Middle East were important to the world economy. (After the Iraq War, when Iraqi oil production was cut, the world price of oil increased dramatically, eventually tripling. That increase is widely thought to have contributed to the World 2007-2009 Great Recession.)
• (Complete the following sentence. Elaborate if appropriate.) The agent actually accepted this belief because it satisfied his desire for . . . reassurance, certainty, and rectitude when dealing with a situation in which the stakes were extraordinarily high, information was scarce and unreliable, and it seemed possible that delayed action would have catastrophic consequences.

If the agent’s assumed and actual motives differed, complete the statement below:

• This misapprehension mattered because . . . President Bush’s assumption he was treating evidence about the target belief objectively desensitized him to the possibility his understanding was inaccurate. As a result, he acted unwisely and with unwarranted confidence.

2. [ √ ] Assumption-Reality Disparities Regarding Viewpoint.

• (Complete the following sentence, highlighting the target belief’s assumed viewpoint. Elaborate if appropriate.) The agent assumed the target belief was concerned with . . . Realist Viewpoint issues.
• (Complete the following sentence, highlighting the target belief’s actual viewpoint. Elaborate if appropriate.) In fact, the target belief was actually concerned with . . . Existential Viewpoint issues.

If the assumed and actual viewpoints of the target belief differ, complete the statement below:

• The agent’s misapprehensions about the viewpoint of the target belief matter because (Specify likely errors.) . . . while President Bush assumed the target belief addressed the realities of the Iraqi situation, it actually provided him with an answer to the question, “What kind of person do I wish to be?” In this instance, he wished to be the kind of person who effectively reassured himself by distorting data, logic, relationships, and communications to serve his needs for self-deception and self-justification.

If the target belief — whether informative or reassuring — is proper to the Existential Viewpoint or the agent assumes it to be, complete the following statements:

• The agent assumed this belief would help him become someone who . . .

could make the world a better place. As such, he tacitly assumed the belief encouraged objectivity and moral clarity and enhanced his ability to anticipate the consequences of his actions.

• However, it actually encouraged the agent to become someone who . . .

lacked objectivity, moral clarity, and the capacity to accurately anticipate the consequences of his policies and initiatives.

If the agent’s expectations regarding the existential impact of the target belief conflicted with reality, complete the statement below:

• The ways this belief fell short of the agent’s expectations about its impact mattered because . . . they led President Bush and his advisors to rely on the target belief to help manage issues it didn’t — and couldn’t — address. Bush and his advisors falsely assumed the target belief offered credible, actionable information rather than what it actually offered: a way of relating to belief-relevant information that helped them feel good about themselves.

Those misapprehensions also led Bush and his advisors to employ inappropriate standards when evaluating the target belief. If, rather than assessing the target belief by asking such Realist Viewpoint-appropriate questions as, “Is this belief true?” Bush and his advisors evaluated the target belief by asking such Existential Viewpoint-appropriate questions as, “Does the target belief help me feel knowledgeable, wise, competent, powerful, secure, and loving, however poorly or well I embody those virtues?” they might have viewed the guidance the target belief offered more skeptically.

3. [ √ ] Assumption-Reality Disparities Regarding Precision/Ambiguity.

• The agent assumed the guidance this belief provided was (Describe the guidance the agent viewed the belief as providing, highlighting its assumed precision.) . . . imprecise. As noted above, while President Bush and his advisors recognized war often has unpredictable results, they assumed acting in accordance with the target belief would dramatically decrease the severity of the diverse threats Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime appeared to pose.
• In fact, the guidance the target belief actually provided was (Describe the guidance the belief provided, highlighting its precision.) . . . that of a catalytic narrative. The biases at work in assessing the target belief (i.e., those associated with groupthink, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance as well as those associated with the target belief’s second-order precepts) rendered Bush and his advisors unable to subject the target belief to falsification or meaningful criticism. Like all catalytic narratives, the target belief was subjectively compelling but objectively uninformative.
• This misapprehension mattered because . . . it led Bush and his advisors to treat the target belief, which provided only the illusion of guidance, as if acting in accordance with its counsel was likely to have multiple positive effects. As it turned out, the invasion of Iraq was unjustified and contrary to international law. It not only lacked U.N. approval; it violated the Just War Doctrine by overstating the Iraqi threat.

[ √ ] Step 5: Consequences, Analyst Self-Critique, Analytic Narrative

1. [ √ ] Consequences

Complete the statement below. Where relevant, describe the effects of the agent’s belief-relevant second-order precepts and Existential Viewpoint functioning on each identified consequence.

• The most important consequences of the agent’s false assumptions regarding the target belief appear to be . . . President Bush and his close advisors’ belief that the target belief’s guidance was informative, proper to the Realist Viewpoint, and imprecise when it actually offered the guidance of a reassuring, Existential Viewpoint, catalytic narrative. These false assumptions left them blind to how the target belief compromised their functioning, desensitized them to their biases, imbued them with false confidence, and closed them to conflicting information and criticism. Ironically, those false assumptions also helped Bush and his principal advisors convince the U.S. public, U.S. Congress, and Coalition partners that the invasion of Iraq was a necessity.

Although U.S. and Coalition forces quickly defeated the Iraqi military and located Iraq’s WMD laboratories (the existence of which violated U.N. resolutions), they discovered neither stockpiles of biological or chemical weapons nor the precursors required for the production of such weapons. They also failed to discover radiological or nuclear weapons, precursors, infrastructure, or laboratories. And they failed to discover any evidence of Iraqi collaboration with AQ or other terrorist groups.

The post-invasion U.S. and Coalition force occupation also failed to go according to plan. Bush expected U.S. and Coalition forces to occupy Iraq for no longer than two years. During that time, he expected a democratic Iraqi government to be installed, competent, ethical Iraqi police and military forces to be created, and Iraqi economic infrastructure to be rebuilt. However, U.S. and Coalition forces found it hard to pacify Iraq. The occupation was opposed by insurgents drawn from local militias, former Ba’ath Party members, former Iraqi police, former Iraqi military personnel, and an assortment of foreign fighters including AQ. There was also significant sectarian violence among Iraqi religious groups, militias, and foreign fighters. Once reconstituted, Iraqi police and military security forces became the targets of insurgents’ attacks. Suppressing these conflicts added more than three years to the anticipated two-year U.S. and Coalition occupation. While Iraq’s economic infrastructure was partially rebuilt during the occupation, restoration efforts were hampered by Iraqi corruption and lack of political will. And while a democratic Iraqi government structure was established, the absence of a democratic political culture created significant “growing pains.”

VP Cheney initially expected U.S. financial support for the invasion, occupation, and rebuilding of Iraq to cost about 100 billion dollars. Actual costs exceeded Cheney’s estimates by a factor of ten. The toll of the Iraq War on human life and well-being was also greater than expected. While the exact numbers are unknown, the war was estimated to have caused the death of 9,000 and the injury of 32,000 U.S. and Coalition forces, the death of 16,600 and an unknown number of injuries of Iraqi military and police personnel, the death or injury of 250,000 Iraqi civilians, and the displacement of millions of Iraqi non-combatants. There was also extensive damage to Iraq’s governmental and economic infrastructure. All these costs were laid at Bush’s feet.

The domestic and international reputation of the U.S. in general and the Bush administration in particular suffered badly as a consequence of the Iraq War. The U.S. was cast as a bully and an international rogue state. U.S. support in domestic and international public opinion polls plummeted. Bush’s domestic job approval ratings, which were at 90% after the September 2001 AQ attacks, dropped to 71% at the March 2003 start of the Iraq War. When Bush left office in January 2009, after an extended occupation of Iraq, his job approval rating was 34%. The decline in U.S. domestic and international support reduced the credibility and influence of the U.S. in international forums. Before the 2003 invasion, SecState Powell warned President Bush that he would "own" Iraq’s problems after a military victory. Powell turned out to be right.

One cannot be certain a more thoughtful and circumspect approach would have allowed Bush and his advisors to foresee the full range of realities they had failed to anticipate. However, had Bush and his advisors treated the target belief more realistically, it seems likely they would have more accurately estimated the difficulties of pacifying Iraq, the number and severity of casualties associated with the occupation, the economic and social impact of the occupation, and the harm the invasion and occupation would do to the reputation of the U.S. at home and abroad.

2. [ √ ] Critique the agent-focused CBA.

a. Critique the claim, “My (the analyst’s) CBA of the agent’s target belief meets the standards such analyses are expected to satisfy” by responding to the prompts below as appropriate:

Complete the following sentence, making sure to identify and describe the potential impact of every Figure 6.4 “A” statement with which you agreed or strongly agreed:

• Self-examination (including the use of Figure 6.4 to help uncover my possible biases) suggests the following attitudes, beliefs, or penchants, motivated by the need for reassurance, may have biased my conclusions:

None of my responses to Figure 6.4 suggested I looked to the target belief for reassurance. My responses to twelve (12) Figure 6.4 statement pairs suggested I looked to the target belief for neither information nor reassurance, and my responses to eleven (11) Figure 6.4 statement pairs suggested I looked to the target belief for information. To the best of my knowledge, I did not have a predetermined view of the situation under analysis.

• If you neither agreed nor strongly agreed with any Figure 6.4 “A” statement, say so.

I did not agree or strongly agree with any Figure 6.4 “A” statements (i.e., statements that, if endorsed, would suggest I related to the target belief in a way that rendered it reassuring).

• If appropriate, include the following sentence (or something similar) in your report: Since, despite my best efforts to be objective, it is possible the desire for reassurance biased the conclusions of my agent-focused CBA, I suggest those who read this report keep the following caveat in mind:

Despite my best efforts to be objective, my desire for reassurance may have biased some aspects of this report.

○ Review and, if necessary, revise your analysis to ensure the following statement is accurate: “I have reviewed and, if necessary, revised my agent-focused CBA to ensure its conclusions address factual (i.e., Realist Viewpoint) concerns.” Include a statement to that effect in your report.

I have reviewed and, if necessary, revised my agent-focused CBA to ensure its conclusions address factual (i.e., Realist Viewpoint) concerns.

• Review and, if necessary, revise your report to ensure the following statement is accurate: “I have reviewed and, if necessary, revised my agent-focused CBA to ensure its conclusions (a) are no more precise than the most ambiguous beliefs or observations that provide those conclusions with crucial support and (b) do not bias those supportive beliefs or observations. If indicated, I have dialed back the exactitude and precision of my conclusions.” Include a statement to that effect in your report.

I have reviewed my agent-focused CBA to ensure its conclusions (a) are no more precise than the most ambiguous beliefs or observations that provide those conclusions with crucial support and (b) do not bias those supportive beliefs or observations.

• Include one of the two statements below (and, if indicated, your response to that statement) in your report:

1. “Having completed the above critique and all indicated corrective actions, I feel justified in describing my CBA of the agent’s target belief as satisfying all expected standards.”

2. “I am concerned that my analysis of the agent’s target belief may (a) fail to meet the following standards (specify), (b) those failures may have compromised my understanding of the agent’s target belief, and (c) such compromised understanding may have contributed to the following flaws in my analytic narrative” (specify):

Having completed the above critique, I feel justified in describing my CBA of the agent’s target belief as satisfying most, if not all, expected standards. My analysis was grounded in good social science research methodology informed by critical thinking. However, I did not have access to all of the information used by Bush and his advisors.

• Estimate the likelihood/probability the conclusions of the analyst’s agent-focused CBA are correct. Justify or explain your estimate.

Justification/Explanation: I consider it highly (85%) likely that the events described in this CBA occurred due to the factors specified. This is a subjective evaluation.

• Specify your degree of confidence that your agent-focused CBA is a “quality analytic product.” Explain your view.

Justification/Explanation: There is Moderate Confidence (on a scale of High, Moderate, or Low) that the facts and logic on which my CBA relied were credibly sourced and plausible and the analytic methodology employed was proper. I acknowledge that the information used was open to multiple interpretations and that the information and methodology were of insufficient quality to warrant a higher level of confidence. This is a subjective evaluation after reviewing the analytic process (information and methodology) used. See more below.

• Prepare caveats for the analytic narrative provoked by both the agent’s self-critique and limitations in the CBA of the agent’s target belief.

Because of the Likelihood and Confidence Level assessments above, the following caveat should be included in the final analytic narrative:

“The conclusions of the CBA, while considered highly Likely (85%), are only of Moderate Confidence. The reason for the Moderate Confidence rating is the uncertain accuracy of the information used in the analysis. The information used was primarily drawn from Bob Woodward’s book Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (2004).^[11] That document, while considered reliable, is nonetheless a secondary source. A more precise analysis would require the examination of primary sources such as unclassified and de-classified U.S. government records pertaining to the case, examination of such additional secondary sources and journalistic reporting from the case, and interviews with the principals involved in the decision-making process. If this were an actionable analysis (where the decision-maker was going to make policy or direct actions), its conclusions could do nothing more than provide guidance that increased decision-makers’ odds of success.”

3. [ ] Analytic Narrative

• Prepare the analytic narrative (written report, verbal briefing, etc.).