Chapter 4

Viewpoints of Beliefs

Characteristics of Viewpoints of Beliefs

The third consequential but commonly ignored characteristic of beliefs to which Critical Belief Analysis (CBA) directs analysts’ attention is their viewpoint. The term viewpoint denotes two closely related attributes of a belief: (a) the nature of the issues the belief addresses and (b) the belief’s relationships with beliefs in other viewpoints. The easiest way to understand this concept is to examine CBA’s five viewpoints (listed from lowest to highest) — Existential, Realist, Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment.

The Existential Viewpoint

An agent’s most fundamental beliefs are proper to the Existential Viewpoint. Such beliefs embody agents’ answers to questions such as “What kind of person do I wish to be?” and “What institutions, laws, regulations, assumptions, values, relationships, standards of discourse, and approaches to evaluating beliefs might help me become that kind of person?” Agents’ answers to such questions reveal their ideals and determine their functioning in all higher viewpoints. Informative Existential Viewpoint beliefs augment agents’ willingness to take responsibility for their choices and strengthen agents’ commitments to wonder, objectivity, insight, communication, reason, doubt, mastery, and love. Reassuring Existential Viewpoint beliefs diminish that willingness and weaken those commitments.

The Realist Viewpoint

Realist Viewpoint beliefs answer the question, “What is?” Such beliefs reflect views of objective reality. One such belief is, “In 2018, over a third of those who died in vehicular accidents tested positive for alcohol.” This belief and other apparent facts are proper to the Realist Viewpoint.

While Realist Viewpoint beliefs are nominally factual, they can be biased. Absent encouragement for objectivity, agents are likely to attend to information validating their preconceptions or satisfying their emotional needs. To make matters worse, agents can be blind to that penchant. For example, alcoholics in denial about the severity of their drinking problems are less likely to seek out information about the relationship between drinking and traffic deaths than are members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). Further, neither is likely to view their choice of information sources as biased. Bias may also affect agents’ understanding of political issues. Passionate progressives are likely to view reports on MSNBC and CNN about conservative ideas and politicians as credible; conservatives, on the other hand, are unlikely to do so. What agents take to be raw data are rarely the products of immaculate perception.

The Ethical Viewpoint

Answers to the Realist Viewpoint question, “What is?” are likely to inspire agents to seek answers to the archetypal Ethical Viewpoint question, “Is ‘what is’ good?” For example, most readers will probably respond to Realist Viewpoint information about the relationship between drinking and traffic deaths by wondering about the goodness of this state of affairs. They are also likely to arrive at the Ethical Viewpoint belief that the prevalence of driving “under the influence” is troubling.

While distress over the prevalence of driving while intoxicated is undoubtedly justified, not all Ethical Viewpoint beliefs are well-grounded. An agent’s justifiable confidence in an Ethical Viewpoint belief is limited by their justifiable confidence in the Realist Viewpoint beliefs supporting it. Justifiable confidence is further limited by both the agent’s Existential Viewpoint integrity and the integrity of those whose reports the agent chooses to trust.

The Visionary Viewpoint

Aroused by beliefs portraying some realities as better than others, agents may imagine realities that are better still. Although such imagined realities may have never existed, agents may view them as possible. Beliefs describing those possibilities are proper to the Visionary Viewpoint.

Agents’ fantasies may range from visions of modest improvement (such as a five percent reduction in drunk driving) to visions of dramatic improvement (such as a world free of drunk drivers). Often, such beliefs are shaped by the assumption that if a bit of X produces a bit of Y, lots of X will produce lots of Y, and that increasing X will have no other effects. Such assumptions are often false.

Visionary Viewpoint beliefs have the power to engender passion and commitment, rendering agents indifferent to harm their efforts to bring their beatific visions to life might do. However, Visionary Viewpoint beliefs may not merit the zeal they inspire. After all, Visionary Viewpoint beliefs depend on Ethical Viewpoint beliefs, which depend on Realist Viewpoint beliefs, which, in turn, depend on Existential Viewpoint beliefs and commitments. If there are flaws in the lower-viewpoint beliefs supporting agents’ Visionary Viewpoint beliefs, their faith in those Visionary Viewpoint beliefs may be unfounded.

The Quest and Commitment Viewpoint

Provoked by visions ranging from the modest and realistic to the Quixotic and Utopian, agents may ask, “What do my visions of improvement and perfection demand of me?” In response to this question, they may formulate quests inspired by questions such as, “How can I play a part, however small, in reducing drunk driving?” “Am I committed to doing whatever may be within my power to get every intoxicated driver off the road?” and “Am I committed to doing my part to eliminate every traffic death?”

More broadly, agents might ask, “What am I willing to do to bring about the Utopia my ideology promises?” “What am I willing to do to alleviate poverty?” “Am I willing to do whatever I can to bring about social justice?” and “Am I willing to do whatever my God or my movement may ask of me?”

In each case, the question, “What am I willing to do to achieve the goal I have set?” is accompanied by such implicit questions as “What am I unwilling to do to achieve this end?” “How much am I willing to sacrifice?” “How radically am I willing to narrow my vision?” “How much am I willing to ask my allies and those I love to sacrifice?” “How much am I willing to demand of outsiders, skeptics, and others who don’t share my values?” “What lesser values might my quest justify compromising?” and “How much pain am I willing to cause?” The answers to these questions belong to the Quest and Commitment Viewpoint.

Of course, Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs rely on Visionary Viewpoint beliefs. Visionary Viewpoint beliefs, in turn, rely on Ethical Viewpoint beliefs, and Ethical Viewpoint beliefs rely on Realist Viewpoint beliefs, which, in a like manner, rely on commitments, attitudes, habits, and skills proper to the Existential Viewpoint. All too often, however, agents treat Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs as if their grounding were unquestionable. If agents think and act responsibly, flaws in beliefs critically undergirding their Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs should raise red flags.

Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs can bring out the best and worst in those who embrace them. Those who temper their passion for progress with prudence and humility may cautiously strive to heal the world, sensitive to the unintended consequences of their actions. However, those intoxicated by images of paradise may run headlong toward their visions, indifferent to the chaos and suffering their actions may cause. History reveals that beliefs promising heaven on earth have repeatedly failed to achieve what they promised; instead, they have delivered tyranny, oppression, persecution, injustice, and slaughter.

Relationships between Viewpoints and Precision/Ambiguity

Viewpoint-Related Limits on the Precision of Beliefs

The precision of a belief is limited by the ambiguity inherent in its viewpoint. Let’s examine how that limitation manifests itself in beliefs about drunk driving.

The Realist Viewpoint belief about drunk driving was, “In 2018, over a third of those who died in vehicular accidents tested positive for alcohol.” This Realist Viewpoint belief is (allegedly) a straightforward fact and a precise belief. Those data could also give rise to imprecise beliefs such as, “Drinking increases drivers’ chances of dying in a traffic accident.” They could inspire rules of thumb such as, “If you drink, don’t drive.” Lastly, they could motivate lurid catalytic narratives, such as heartbreaking stories about drinking-related tragedies. As these examples illustrate, the Realist Viewpoint can host beliefs of any degree of ambiguity.

The Ethical Viewpoint belief about drunk driving — “The number of persons who drive under the influence of drugs and alcohol is intolerable” — cannot be reasonably interpreted as precise. The least ambiguous belief that can be derived from this statement is an assertion such as, “If asked, a majority of persons (or authoritative persons) would describe the prevalence of drunk driving as disgraceful.” While imprecise beliefs are the least ambiguous beliefs the Ethical Viewpoint can host, nothing prevents the Ethical Viewpoint from hosting rules of thumb or catalytic narratives, for example, value-laden rules of thumb about drinking and driving or value-laden stories about the consequences of drunk driving.

The Visionary Viewpoint belief about drunk driving — “The world would be better if drunk driving were reduced” — makes neither precise nor imprecise predictions. Instead, it encourages agents to consider the advantages of reducing drunk driving. This statement is a rule of thumb, the least ambiguous category of beliefs the Visionary Viewpoint can host. The Visionary Viewpoint can, of course, host catalytic narratives: inspiring stories about a world free of drunk drivers.

The Quest and Commitment Viewpoint belief about drunk driving — “I’m obliged to do my best to reduce drunk driving” — describes the sort of person the agent wishes to be. As existentialists and cognitive psychologists have observed, such choices are self-validating and unfalsifiable. Thus, the answer to the question, “What am I called upon to do to achieve the improvement or perfection I envision?” is a catalytic narrative, the only category of beliefs the Quest and Commitment Viewpoint can host.

Finally, since Existential Viewpoint beliefs reflect unfalsifiable choices and commitments, such beliefs are always catalytic narratives.

In short, a belief’s precision is constrained by its viewpoint. The precision of Realist Viewpoint beliefs is unlimited. Ethical Viewpoint beliefs are imprecise at best. The precision of a Visionary Viewpoint belief cannot exceed that of a rule of thumb. And neither Quest and Commitment nor Existential Viewpoint beliefs can be more precise than catalytic narratives. Those who assume their beliefs provide more precise guidance than they can deliver use the wrong tool for the job.

Limits on Precision Imposed by the Ambiguity of Supportive Lower- Viewpoint Beliefs

Two further oversights engender unmerited faith in beliefs. The first is insensitivity to how the ambiguity of lower-viewpoint beliefs limits the precision of higher-viewpoint beliefs they support. The second is blindness to how beliefs can be self-discrediting.

To explore the first issue, let us once more turn our attention to the drunk driving example. Imagine an agent had no access to statistics about the relationship between alcohol consumption and traffic deaths. Imagine, instead, the agent’s Realist Viewpoint knowledge of the effects of drinking and driving came exclusively from stories (i.e., catalytic narratives) about driving while intoxicated. Such narratives might reasonably inspire heart-rending morality tales about drinking-related tragedies. However, those narratives would not justify imprecise Ethical Viewpoint descriptions of drinking and driving as a severe, widespread problem. Nor, logically, do Realist Viewpoint catalytic narratives provide a factual foundation for Visionary Viewpoint beliefs depicting the elimination of drunk drivers as a dramatic improvement. Ignoring this issue inspires excessive confidence in judgments of goodness and conceptions of progress. It also encourages agents to have undue confidence in the effects of their plans and the moral imperatives they view as compelling action.

Limits on Precision Imposed by the Effects of Higher-Viewpoint Beliefs on Supportive lower-Viewpoints Beliefs

As mentioned above, inattention to the interaction of ambiguity and viewpoint can blind agents to how beliefs can discredit themselves. As the reader should now realize, the validity of higher-viewpoint beliefs depends on the validity of the lower-viewpoint beliefs that ground them. Consequently, any higher-viewpoint belief that biases the lower-viewpoint beliefs on which it is built — thereby compromising the accuracy of those beliefs — is self-discrediting. Such beliefs are like skyscrapers whose upper floors are made of material stolen from their foundations.

Imagine, for example, that a Quest and Commitment Viewpoint belief renders an agent passionate about bringing a political program to fruition. If the agent’s passion inspires them to (a) create unrealistically rosy Visionary Viewpoint scenarios about the joy and justice the program could bring about, (b) exaggerate or misrepresent the Ethical Viewpoint injustice and oppression the proposed program promises to remedy, or (c) distort data to support dark Realist Viewpoint portrayals of contemporary life, the validity of the agent’s Utopian Quest and Commitment Viewpoint vision is in doubt.

Summary: Why Attention to Viewpoint and Viewpoint-Precision/Ambiguity Interaction Matters

Inattention to viewpoint matters because such inattention can inspire agents to have excessive confidence in their beliefs. There are four ways this can occur. First, agents who are inattentive to the inherent limitations in the precision of Existential, Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs may assume they are more precise — and thus provide more valuable guidance — than their viewpoints permit. Second, those who are inattentive to the viewpoints of their beliefs are unlikely to acknowledge beliefs underlying or otherwise shaping the beliefs they consciously embrace. Such oversights render agents susceptible to viewing their beliefs as straightforward facts and to downplaying or neglecting their relationships with other beliefs. Third, those who are inattentive to the lower-viewpoint beliefs that ground their higher-viewpoint beliefs are vulnerable to overlooking the ambiguity of those lower-viewpoint beliefs and neglecting the implications of that ambiguity. Finally, in the absence of attention to these issues, agents are unlikely to take appropriate responsibility for the beliefs that profoundly and pervasively affect who they are — their Existential Viewpoint beliefs.

How to Identify the Viewpoint an Agent Assumes a Belief Occupies

Figure 4.1 provides a guide for determining the viewpoint an agent assumes a belief occupies.

How to Identify a Belief’s Actual Viewpoint

Usually, the viewpoints agents assume their beliefs occupy and the viewpoints their beliefs actually occupy are the same. However, there are exceptions.

1. Whatever their assumed viewpoints, reassuring beliefs are actually proper to the Existential Viewpoint.
2. Whatever their assumed viewpoints, informative beliefs are actually proper to the Existential Viewpoint if:

• They bias the lower-viewpoint beliefs that inspire and support them.
• They are catalytic narratives.
• Agents are uncritical or neglectful of the lower-viewpoint beliefs that inspire and support them.

The Value of Attention to Viewpoint and Viewpoint-Precision/Ambiguity Interaction in Security Analysis: Some Examples

Agents are likely to falsely assume their informative Existential and Ethical Viewpoint beliefs are proper to the Realist Viewpoint. Frequently, agents make the same false assumption regarding the viewpoints of their informative Visionary Viewpoint and Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs.

Agents who treat informative Existential Viewpoint beliefs as informative Realist Viewpoint beliefs are likely to:

1. Inaccurately view their decisions and actions as compelled by immutable facts.
2. Fail to appreciate their freedom to focus on different facts, interpret facts differently, and decide differently.
3. Ignore the effects of their defenses and biases on openness, objectivity, empathy, and quality of discourse.

In addition to making the three numbered errors above, agents who treat informative Ethical Viewpoint beliefs as if they were informative Realist Viewpoint beliefs are likely to fail to realize:

• The guidance of informative Ethical Viewpoint beliefs is imprecise at best.
• The guidance of such beliefs is no more valuable than that of the most ambiguous Realist Viewpoint belief that grounds them.
• To the extent such beliefs bias lower-viewpoint beliefs that ground them, they are self-discrediting.
• Such beliefs are also self-discrediting to the extent they compromise Existential Viewpoint commitments to objectivity, openness, empathy, or truthful communication.

In addition to making the three numbered errors above, agents who treat informative Visionary Viewpoint beliefs as if they were informative Realist Viewpoint beliefs are likely to fail to realize:

• The guidance of informative Visionary Viewpoint beliefs is, at best, that of rules of thumb.
• If any of the Realist or Ethical Viewpoint beliefs grounding their Visionary Viewpoint beliefs are catalytic narratives, the quality of the guidance those Visionary Viewpoint beliefs offer is limited to that of catalytic narratives.
• To the extent such beliefs bias lower-viewpoint beliefs that ground them, they are self-discrediting.
• Such beliefs are also self-discrediting to the extent they compromise Existential Viewpoint commitments to objectivity, openness, empathy, or truthful communication.

In addition to the three numbered errors above, agents who treat informative Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs as if they were informative Realist Viewpoint beliefs are likely to fail to realize:

• The guidance of informative Quest and Commitment Viewpoint beliefs is, at best, that of catalytic narratives.
• The guidance of such beliefs is further compromised if any of the Realist, Ethical, or Visionary Viewpoint beliefs that ground them are catalytic narratives.
• To the extent such beliefs bias lower-viewpoint beliefs that ground them, they are self-discrediting.
• Such beliefs are also self-discrediting to the extent they compromise Existential Viewpoint commitments to objectivity, openness, empathy, or truthful communication.

Agents’ views of reassuring beliefs, like their views of informative beliefs, are generally inaccurate. However, the signature misunderstanding of reassuring beliefs differs from the signature misunderstanding of informative beliefs. As detailed above, agents typically assume informative Existential, Ethical, Visionary, and Quest and Commitment beliefs are proper to the Realist Viewpoint. That is, they assume beliefs addressing different issues address the same issue. By contrast, agents generally assume their reassuring beliefs are proper to the diverse viewpoints they appear to address rather than to the Existential Viewpoint. That is, they assume beliefs addressing the same (i.e., Existential Viewpoint) issues address different issues.

More specifically, agents generally assume reassuring beliefs that appear to (a) describe reality, (b) depict the goodness of “what is,” (c) offer visions of what might be better, or (d) characterize agents’ obligations to realize those visions address the issues they seem to address. But whatever their apparent subject, reassuring beliefs actually answer the Existential Viewpoint question, “What kind of person do I wish to be?” This question is explored in detail in the next chapter.