Appendix III

Analyzing Political Culture

Political Culture Defined

Political culture defines a sub-set of a state or societal group’s larger culture. Cultural studies often look at the customs, languages, music, dance, dress, food, religions, history, literature, economics, and politics of states and societal groups. In its most general sense, culture defines the social conventions surrounding lifestyles, beliefs, and values that influence a state or societal group’s pursuit of their goals. The remainder of this appendix specifically addresses the sub-set of political culture and provides an aggregated theory equally applicable to not only individual countries (states) but also to the analysis of smaller political entities and social organizations in the public and private sectors. Organizational cultures may be assessed similar to political cultures and include societal groups such as government departments, military services, political parties, international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, corporations, community groups, and many others.

Political culture stipulates the general process used by a state or societal group to reach its goals (i.e., decisions about who gets what, when, and how¹). This includes determining how a state or societal group is organized, how decisions are made, how power flows within the organizational structure, how both the leaders and the masses (members) view their roles, and how leaders and organizations interact with the government and among themselves to reach their goals.² Political culture is a major sub-component in explaining and predicting societal outputs, behaviors, and conditions. It also helps identify the constraints (or lack thereof) placed on societal leaders.

In 1963, U.S. political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s groundbreaking work The Civic Culture3 first associated culture and modernization. Since then, there have been many scholarly attempts to classify differing political cultures and to use political culture as a factor to explain the strength of democracies and levels of development within states. A synthesis of political culture literature reveals three principal types of political culture— egalitarian, individualistic, and authoritarian. Uncovering the differences in these three types of political cultures helps analysts understand the varying conditions in states and societies. A discussion of the theoretical foundations and empirical conditions of political culture are shown in Figure III.1 below.

Theoretical Foundations

Near the top of Figure III.1 are rows establishing the theoretical foundations for the Theory of Political Culture encompassing the three principal types of political cultures. This material comes from the liberal rule-oriented constructivist approach to theorizing offered in U.S. social theorist Nicholas Onuf’s World of our Making.⁴ The figure summarizes the key components of the rule-oriented constructivist theory of social rules and their corresponding empirical conditions in differing political cultures. Social rules tell people (or agents) what they should do (or think), what they must do, and what they have a right or duty to do. When people fail to follow rules, other supporting rules bring consequences. Considering their material circumstances, some people choose to follow or disregard rules to achieve their goals. The term institution refers to patterns of rules, not just to the people and infrastructure (buildings, equipment, etc.) that make up an entity. Structure is a pattern of rules, institutions, and their intended or unintended consequences.⁵

Rule-oriented constructivists offer complex institutions consist of a constantly changing mix of three different categories of social rules. Each of the three categories of social rules has distinct purposes and functions.⁷ First, instruction rules delineate the principles and beliefs informing agents (people and societal groups) of an institution’s purposes. Instruction rules tell agents what they should do (or think). Second, directive rules provide specificity to the instruction-ruled principles and beliefs. Directive rules support instruction rules by telling agents what they must do. For directive rules to be effective; however, they must be supported by other rules (sanctions) stipulating the consequences if an agent does not follow a particular rule. Third, commitment rules create roles for agents; they tell agents what they have a right or duty to do. Commitment rules give some agents well-defined powers, while ensuring other agents those powers will not be abused. How well these three categories of rules perform their assigned function depends upon their strength and formality. A rule’s strength is determined by how frequently agents follow the rule. A rule’s formality refers to a variety of conditions that set the rule apart and emphasizing its importance. Figure III.1 displays the correlation of the three different categories of social rule with the three principal types of political culture.

Onuf further offers three principal interests or motives that govern social decision making and behavior—standing, security, and wealth.⁸ An agent’s decision-making process includes consideration of all three of these interests; however, one interest usually dominates the final behavior or decision based on the situation’s surrounding structure. Where instruction rules dominate the decision making situation, the agent’s principal interests are their standing or reputation among other internal or external agents. Standing entails an agent’s status or reputation among other agents and engenders feelings of esteem or envy. Where standing is the agent’s principal interest, the agent compares their situation with that of several other agents and then orders their behavioral preferences so they can be the best among agents. Where directive rules dominate a decision-making situation, the agent’s principal interests are security because as an interest, it presents the agent with an awareness of threat (war, physical harm, job security, etc.). Where security is the agent’s principal interest, the agent compares their situation to that of one other agent (the one presenting the threat) and then orders their behavioral preferences so they can be the winner among agents. Where commitment rules dominate a decision-making situation, the agent’s principal interests are wealth. Wealth as an interest not only gives agents access to money or property, but also includes other items of value such as health, education, human rights, and more.

The three categories of rules also foster three distinct forms of rule, or methods that govern states and societies. While all three rule categories exist in every society, those societies with a higher proportion of instruction rules are ruled by hegemony. The concept of hegemony used here follows the analysis of Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci,⁹ who argues a governing class has to persuade other classes in society to accept its moral, political, and cultural values, making a society’s ideology central to the characteristics of its governing system. As Onuf describes:

Hegemony refers to the promulgation and manipulation of principles and instructions by which superordinate powers monopolize meaning which is then passively absorbed by the subordinate actors. These activities constitute an arrangement of rule because the ruled are rendered incapable of comprehending their subordinate role. They cannot formulate alternative programs of action because they are inculcated with the self-serving ideology of the rulers who monopolize the production and dissemination of statements through which meaning is constituted.¹⁰

Societies with a higher proportion of directive rules are ruled by hierarchy.

Onuf offers:

Hierarchy is the paradigm of rule most closely associated…as an arrangement of directive rules, it is instantly recognizable as bureaucracy. The relations of bureaux, or offices, form the typical pattern of super- and subordination, but always in ranks, such that each office is both subordinate to the one(s) above it and superordinate to the ones below…. The visualization of this arrangement of ranks linked by directives is the familiar pyramid of organization charts.¹¹

Finally, societies with a higher proportion of commitment rules are ruled by heteronomy. The use of this term is traced to German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, who refers to heteronomy as a condition of not having autonomy. Onuf summarizes:

Kant posited heteronomy as an objective principle or command of reason, which constitutes the imperative guide for moral conduct in a situation. Here the individual faces a world of contingency and thus of uncertainty with respect to the consequences of any willful action. Morally speaking, we can do no better.¹²

Heteronomy defines a condition where leaders are never fully autonomous and whose decisions toward particular ends are bounded both by societal rules and their material means. Commitment rules stipulate promises by some agents, promises that become the rights (i.e., promises kept) of other agents. Conditions of formal and strong commitment rules massively restrict actor autonomy.¹³

A society’s goals correlate with their rule-based institutions as defined by the three categories of rules and forms of rule. A society dominated by instructional rules and governed by hegemony possesses goals related primarily to the good of the leaders and elites and focus less on the good of the masses. A society dominated by directive rules and governed by hierarchy demonstrates goals defining the good of specific individuals and groups, either members of or associated with the governing hierarchy, which includes a variety of political and corporate interest groups. A society dominated by commitment rules and governed by heteronomy creates goals related to the good of the entire society. Thus the structure of the Theory of Political Culture corresponds with Onuf’s rule- oriented constructivist framework and is further supported by societal empirical conditions discussed next.

Empirical Conditions

Based on a state or societal group’s rule-based theoretical foundations, correlations are possible with empirical conditions. These empirical conditions emerge over decades, if not centuries, as states and societal groups develop their rule-based institutions.

Governing ideologies and systems.14 Classifying governing ideologies resulting from the social rules structure in Figure III.1 is a challenging and complex task because hybrid ideologies combine aspects of different mainstream ideologies. This complexity contributes to a number of hybrid governing systems. This section discusses mainstream governing ideologies and systems found in the world today. The international governmental organization World Bank authors an annual report on World Governance Indicators.¹⁵ The report’s authors assess several indicators of the political outputs of various world states. For this appendix, the World Bank’s assessment of government effectiveness assists in evaluating how different governing ideologies correlate with societal outputs (empirical conditions). Government effectiveness indicates perceptions of the quality of a state’s public services, quality of the civil service, degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.¹⁶

Most social science textbooks classify the mainstream governing ideologies or theories into three main approaches. These approaches, and their synonymous names in parentheses, include Marxism (radicalism, globalism, critical theory), liberalism (idealism, neoliberalism, pluralism), and realism (neorealism). These three approaches generally postulate that physical or natural science methods may be applied to the study of human behavior and; therefore, social science (i.e., the combining of rationalism and empiricism) is possible. Marxism, liberalism, and realism can all be considered part of the positivist approach to social science. These theoretical approaches differ; however, in their ontologies, or views of how the world works. Because of differing ontologies, these three theoretical approaches have widely differing assumptions. Each of these approaches has its own lineage of philosophical literature dating back hundreds, if not thousands, of years and can be attributed to the likes of Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and many more. The below discussion summarizes each of the three mainstream social science ideological approaches and provides their central assumptions. Note: more recent post-positivist or post- modernist approaches to social theory are not included here because they are not the governing ideologies found in existing states and societal groups.

Marxism: the layer cake approach. Marxists see economics as the key causal mechanism for explaining social behavior. German philosopher Karl Marx is the primary author of this approach, with much of his material building on the work of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. To Marxists, the base, or larger bottom layer of a round cake, consists of a societies’ economic institutions and resources. The superstructure, or smaller second layer of a round cake, constitutes a society’s political, cultural, religious, and other non-economic institutions. Marxists believe the base, or economics, conditions all of the societies’ other institutions in the superstructure. Marxism’s central assumptions include:

1. To assess political, economic, and social behavior, the structure (base) of the society’s economic system must first be understood.
2. Social behavior must be viewed from a historical perspective. Marx’s analytic methodology was historical materialism.
3. Mechanisms of domination (exploitation) in a societal system must be identified.
4. Economics are recognized as the driving force of the non-economic institutions (superstructure) of the social system.

Marxist analyses focus on class conflict and economic exploitation. In domestic analyses of capitalist states the principal class conflict is between the owners of the means of production (bourgeoisie) and the workers (proletariat), who sell their labor to the bourgeoisie. By not paying the proletariat a fair market price for their labor, the bourgeoisie generate “excess (surplus) value” from their enterprises, which generates their profits and sources of wealth. The bourgeoisie exploit the proletariat under the capitalist system.

Beginning with Vladimir Lenin, one of the founders of the Soviet Union, international Marxists applied the Marxist framework of class conflict and economic exploitation to the world system. The international bourgeoisie are considered the developed states (core), and the international proletariats are considered the developing states (periphery). International Marxists offer that the core has constructed a world economic structure (capitalism) that extracts labor and natural resources from the periphery. The core generates its excess value by exploiting the periphery, as it does not pay the periphery a fair market price for its labor and natural resources. The core is facilitated in its exploitation of the periphery by key core agents (developing state ruling elite; multi-national corporations; and IGOs such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.), which assist the core in building and strengthening the world system of economic exploitation. International Marxists argue that as long as this dependent core-periphery economic structure exists, the developing states will continue to experience widespread poverty and underdevelopment.

Marx predicted capitalism would eventually give way to a new economic structure he labeled socialism. He viewed the core of socialism as state vice private ownership of the means of production, where the workers themselves both manage and work in production and equally distribute the output of production to the population. Marx also theorized that democracy would eventually give way to a governing structure of full communism; i.e., the creation of a perfect, classless, minimalist governing system, with a horizontal vice vertical structure where governing actions would be coordinated by committees of citizens (workers). Under full communism, international borders would disappear as the entire world would become a classless society. Beyond that, Marx was vague about additional details of his vision of full communism.

Marx wrote little about interstate conflict because he focused more on the internal struggle of the proletariat against the oppressive bourgeoisie owners of the means of production. As Lenin took the basic tenets of Marxism and applied them to the international arena, he offered that the world would be in a constant state of conflict as long as there was uneven international development (rich and poor states). The causes of this uneven development were that the rich states— especially the imperialistic colonial powers—were exploiting the poor developing states by not paying them enough for their labor or raw materials. Lenin called for an international brotherhood, known as the Communist International, of the developing states to throw off the yoke of the oppressive capitalist developed states, with an end goal of all world states uniting in one socialist/communist system. Interstate conflicts started or supported by Marxist states were thus justified as both a struggle against the capitalists and as movement toward establishing the world state of socialism/communism.

Many thought Marxism disappeared with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union—this is not the case. China, Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea still practice self-designed forms of Marxism. The Soviets took the basic ideas of Marx’s socialism and molded them into a state-owned patrimonial (command) economic system directed by an authoritarian governing elite. Under the Soviets the workers never managed their own production--which is not what Marx theorized. While many states still give lip service to Marxism-Leninism, socialism, and communism, in fact no state has created economic or governing systems even close to the original ideas of Marx. A large majority of developing-state scholars, politicians, and populaces still embrace a Marxist-Leninist view of the world structure, which strongly conditions their thinking and behavior. Scholars and policy makers outside the United States or other developed states think, write, and behave from a Marxist point of view. Many developed states (Western Europe, Scandinavia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) have adopted some socialist tenets as they created democratic-socialist systems. These developed states do not embrace state ownership of the means of production, except when vital citizen services are not being provided by the private sector; but, they do deliver strong citizen social programs (health care, education, retirement programs, etc.). Overall, Marxist ideas, as developed by Marx and not as manipulated by the Soviets and other authoritarian regimes, is far from gone. Marx theorized a normative future ideal condition for the world. To true Marxists the world will reach this ideal condition with the rise of socialist economies and eventual attainment of a stateless world political system of full communism.

Liberalism: the cobweb approach. Liberals see the world as a mass of interlocking webs (similar to cobwebs or spider webs), where the nodes of the webs (where strands cross) are both state and non-state actors. The web strands indicate the nature of the relationships or interactions between the various nodes. The denser the web, the more constrained state and non-state actors find themselves. Liberalism traces its roots to the writings of Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. Liberal central assumptions include:

1. Non-state actors; i.e., IGOs, NGOs, multi-national corporations, terrorist groups, etc., are important actors in the international arena and cannot be ignored.
2. States are not unitary actors; i.e., states are made up of many actors and/or institutions that do not necessarily pursue the same policy goals on key issues.
3. States are not rational actors; i.e., state decision making is really a complex mix of coalition and counter-coalition building, bargaining, and compromise, which might not lead to optimal decisions.
4. Agendas of politicians are extensive and complex; i.e., not dominated by military-security concerns.

States adopting liberal governing ideologies tend to be democracies, a system where citizens elect their government. Democracy is largely informed by the works of the 17^th-century English physician and philosopher John Locke. While Locke’s ideas were considered radical in his era ruled by authoritarian monarchs and senior religious officials, today his ideas are considered the foundation of political liberalism. Locke’s tenets included the sharing of government power between an executive and legislature, governance by consent of the people, citizen rights and the responsibility of the government to protect those rights, religious toleration, and separation of church and state.¹⁷ Several different forms of democracy have emerged (presidential, parliamentary, mixed presidential- parliamentary, and constitutional-monarchies). All democracies are not alike; some are new, transitional, or weak, while others entail mature, strong governing systems.

Liberals do not see the world as in a constant state of war. They recognize the international system is based on an anarchic structure, where there is no single all-powerful governing authority above the states. Liberals see the international system of anarchy as being regulated by international law and cooperation fostered by international institutions arrayed in ever-denser webs. They realize; however, that international law does not guarantee justice or prevent all interstate conflict. Liberals argue states have the right to make war when they have been injured in interstate disputes, and international negotiations or legal proceedings do not provide satisfaction. Instead of focusing on war, liberals place more effort in explaining and seeking peace. A key component in the liberal approach to peace is Democratic-Peace Theory. This theory offers that democracies do not go to war with each other (an empirical fact) because democratic values on both sides of a conflict will lead to cooperation and compromise to avoid armed conflict. However, it is also empirically supported how democracies will go to war with non-democracies, who do not share their same values. Democratic-Peace Theory also demonstrates democracies will be internally more peaceful than other political systems. The liberal approach offers that, as democracy becomes more widespread, the world will become more peaceful, and other world problems (e.g., poverty, human rights violations, environmental degradation, etc.) eventually will be resolved. To liberals, a condition of total world peace is possible at some point in the future. The tenets of Democratic-Peace Theory have been a driving force of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II.

Realism: the billiard ball approach. Realists see the world as an array of self-contained states covered by hard outer shells (i.e., as billiard balls). The balls roll around the billiard table (world), frequently interacting and sometimes forming alliances with other balls (states), but also frequently colliding (in conflict) with other states. Realism traces its philosophical roots to the writings of Thucydides, Nicollò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. Realist central assumptions include:

1. States are the principal and most important actors in the world system; i.e., state institutions and non-state actors are of secondary importance.
2. States are unitary actors; i.e., the state has one consistent policy on key issues.
3. States are rational actors; i.e., states make decisions based on their goals and cost-benefit analyses.
4. National security tops the list of state international issues; i.e., military- security issues are considered high politics, while all other issues such as economics and the environment, etc., are considered low politics.

State power is the most important concept to realists. While there is no one agreed-upon definition of power, it is generally based on the amount of military and economic power a state possesses that can be used to influence the behavior of other states. States with more power have larger billiard balls (i.e., the United States is really a bowling ball in comparison to Barbados’ tiny marble). Balance-of-power is also an important realist concept, whereby several states will create an alliance to thwart the threat from other states. Rational Choice Theory, and its sub-fields of Game Theory and Public Choice Theory, are used widely by realists (Chapter 7).

While there are democracies and democratic leaders who govern from a realist world view, most realist states are authoritarian non-democracies. States employing an authoritarian approach tend to adopt governing systems that are autocratic, dictatorial, fascist, absolute-monarchical, oligarchical, sultanistic, or totalitarian. Authoritarian states usually lack citizen participation in government and place severe restrictions on citizens’ political rights and civil liberties, as discussed below.

Realists see the world as a “nasty and brutish” place. To realists, there is no ideal end-state for humans, just a continuing cycle of human conflict. Realists take a pragmatic approach to world problems and believe interstate conflict can best be reduced, for at least short periods of time, by good diplomacy including a combination of alliance formation and proper application of power. Realists see the causes of wars as human nature (rage, pride, reputation, etc.), in addition to differences in the nature of states and societies (governing approaches, economic structures, and cultures) and the nature of the interstate system (shifts in relative power, capability imbalances, alliances, etc.). The security dilemma is a realist concept for explaining outbreaks of war. This concept offers that as one state improves its security by building a larger military, it may instead find it has actually decreased its security as its neighbors get worried and start building their militaries too (i.e., a perpetual arms race). A security dilemma is usually caused by perceptions or misperceptions of state leaders.

Religion. A state or society’s points of view affecting its decisions and behaviors often are strongly influenced by religion. The rules, institutions, and structures of religions can influence how a state or society is organized and run. It is important that political-military security analysts understand the religious influences that affect their research subjects. This requires an in-depth search for information on how religion affects the leaders and societies under study, including how it affects political cultures.

The foundation of a religion consists of its sacred texts and supporting materials defining the myths, rituals, ethics, and rules/institutions of the religion.¹⁸ There are numerous world religions, but the majority of the world lives in states under what scholars usually consider the five great religions (listed by their dates of emergence): Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Each of the great religions are further divided into denominations or sects, which interpret the sacred texts of the religion in different ways. There are often radical sects whose interpretations of the sacred texts are well outside the mainstream. For example, Islamic Middle Eastern terrorist groups employ a radical interpretation of the Quran to justify jihad—armed struggle against non-believers. Several U.S. white-supremacist hate groups use a radical interpretation of The Bible to support their racist ideologies and violent activities.¹⁹

Political leaders benefit from a supportive majority religion because it offers “…divine sanction to their governance, legitimizes the social order, and can be used to establish boundaries to keep apart or establish links among peoples.”²⁰ Most religions prescribe a framework of social ethics, including helping the poor, caring for others, and proscribing murder and stealing. If mixed with political nationalism and the two become indistinguishable, religion can have extremely strong influences on a society. This may even result in religious leaders assuming direct or indirect roles as governing officials. Political leaders who claim the sanction of religion may bestow favors on its institutions and leaders. The state may pay the salaries of religious leaders and in return they rarely criticize a political leader. Subsidies for religious institutions, either indirectly through exemption from taxation, as in the United States, or direct subsidies for their institutions, often facilitate religious leader silence.²¹ This could be seen as part of the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the Americas beginning around 1494. Along with Spanish and Portuguese military and political leaders, Roman Catholic missionaries were dispatched to spread their religion in the Americas. The Roman Catholic Church allied with and were supported by the military and political leaders and failed to speak up about Spanish and Portuguese abuses. It was not until 1552, when Roman Catholic priest Bartolomé de las Casas published his A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies that a church official spoke out about the Spanish atrocities committed against the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Even after de la Casas, the Roman Catholic Church continued to ally closely with the oppressive ruling of Spanish and Portuguese elites, eventually leading to the emergence in the 1960s of Liberation Theology. This movement saw Catholic priests turn against the church in order to place greater emphasis on tending to the poor vice doing the bidding of the ruling elite.

The great religions, and others, have doctrines defining “just” war,²² which describe both the reasons a society may go to war (jus ad bellum) and the right ways to conduct the war (jus in bello). Just-war doctrines are only one factor a leader may consider before engaging in war. Analysts should understand there are few cases where just-war doctrines have stopped wars from occurring. There is evidence; however, that just-war doctrines have imposed restraints on professional military officials in the conduct of a war. Security analysts researching armed conflict should make it a point to know the just-war doctrines of their research subjects.

Figure III.1 lists different religions by political culture based mainly on correlations of majority religions to corresponding world states. These ratings; however, are not “set in stone” and will often differ based on a combination of (1) the differing interpretations of the sacred religious texts in a society, and (2) the percentage of the main and/or different religions in a society. Most majority Orthodox Christian and Islamic states have authoritarian political cultures; however, there has been democratization in some states with these majority religions. Over the past few decades, the Orthodox Christian state of Georgia displays an individualistic political culture, while Orthodox Christian Greece displays a mixed individualistic-egalitarian political culture. Among Islamic states, Tunisia has moved away from a strong authoritarian political culture and now displays a mixed authoritarian-individualistic political culture. Majority Buddhist states tend to be developing states and have authoritarian political cultures as they are still in the early phases of modernization and maintain “strongman” rule. India is the most populated majority Hindu state with an individualistic political culture. Protestant Christian developed states tend to be a mix of political cultures as either individualistic (Episcopalian sects) or egalitarian (Presbyterian sects)—see their descriptions below. It is difficult to assess the place Judaism falls in Figure III.1 as there is only one world Jewish state—Israel, which has an individualistic political culture.

Not all states have a majority religion. States with mixed religions, or those significantly secular (large percentages of the population report no religious affiliation), tend toward egalitarian cultures. For example, mixed religions in Asian states Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan contributed to these states’ modernization after World War II resulting in mixed individualistic-egalitarian political cultures. All three of these Asian states embrace combinations of Buddhism and Taoism (Confucianism), plus Shintoism (in Japan), and Christianity (in South Korea). Analysts may be challenged in uncovering exactly how religion influences a state or society’s empirical conditions, but must still try to understand religion’s role in creating political cultures.

In understanding the inclusion of Christianity in Figure III.1, it is useful to understand the differences in the Presbyterian and Episcopalian approaches to church-governance. The Presbyterian form asserts church authority (doctrines, etc.), and the ability to interpret church teachings resides in a bottom-up structure starting with the people of the congregations. The congregations elect a council of elders to oversee local church activities, and a hierarchy above individual churches may exist primarily for administrative purposes. The ideological roots of the Presbyterian form of church-government are found in Calvinism and the writings of other 16^th-century Swiss and German Protestant reformers. The Presbyterian form offers checks and balances in church activities, while ensuring local church autonomy. Today the Presbyterian approach is embraced by Protestant sects to include Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Christians, and many more. The Presbyterian approach correlates best with egalitarian political cultures. This differs from the Episcopalian form of Christian church-government, which asserts church authority and interpretation of church teachings should flow top-down within a strict hierarchy, with the archbishops, bishops, or senior church leaders interpreting sacred texts and directing church activities, allowing limited local church autonomy. Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Church of England, early Church of Scotland, and some Evangelical churches prescribe to the Episcopalian form of church-government. The Episcopalian approach correlates best with individualistic (hierarchical) and authoritarian (mainly Orthodox Christian) political cultures. For example, Roman Catholicism employs a strict hierarchical structure with the Pope at the top; this hierarchy appears to influence and limit state development, restricting developing states to individualistic political cultures and retarding their movement toward egalitarian political cultures. Millions of lives were lost in European conflicts during the 16^th and 17^th centuries over differences in church-governance pitting the Episcopalians against the Presbyterians.

In assessing the influence of religion on government actions the analyst should be aware of situations of counterfeit traditions.²³ These are situations where a leader’s speeches and writings foster lies and misinformation based in religious or other ideological tenets. However, the leader really has a hidden tradition, whereby there are other goals or motives driving their decisions and actions. Leaders involved in counterfeit traditions have no intention of acting within their publically offered beliefs or intentions. For example, Myanmar (formerly Burma) has a majority Buddhist population. Of the great religions, Buddhism is the most pacifist and peaceful. Siddhartha Gautama, Buddhism’s founder, taught societal leaders should not resort to violence or harm others, but preserve the peace. Myanmar’s military and political leaders embrace the Buddhist religious teachings publically. This did not keep the Myanmar government from conducting a genocide in the 21^st-century against the approximately 1.3 million Islamic and Hindu people (known as Rohingyas) living in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The Myanmar government classifies the Rohingyas as illegal immigrants, even though they have lived in the state for generations. Thousands of Rohingyas were brutalized, raped, or killed by the Myanmar military, causing tens of thousands to flee to refugee camps in Bangladesh or other nearby states. In this case, the peacefulness of the Buddhist-influenced government—their counterfeit tradition—gave way to their hidden tradition of persecuting the historically hated Islamic and Hindu peoples within their borders. The employment of counterfeit and hidden traditions highlights the analytic rule- of-thumb “watch what they do and not what they say.”

Economic and resource management. Economic and resource management refers to the freedom of citizens to control their own labor and property and the efficient use of public resources. In an economically free society, individuals and businesses are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please (provided they follow the state or society’s laws). In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital, and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraints beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. The conservative Heritage Foundation provides an annual Index of Economic Freedom.²⁴ It assesses a state’s economic legal structure and implementation, size of government, regulatory efficiency, and open market conditions. Then on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best), each state’s level of economic freedom is rated ranging from repressed to free. The characteristics of state economic and resource management systems are described below based on economic conditions as market (free), statist (mostly free), and patrimonial (mostly unfree or repressed).

Market economic and resource management systems are normally associated with egalitarian political cultures. Current states with market economies employ free-market capitalism. Marxist socialist economic and resource management systems would also be egalitarian—in theory—but no such states have ever truly existed. Thus, this discussion focuses on market-based systems presenting the neoliberal ideal of free and open economies and efficient state-owned resource management. Taking their lead from the works of Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith²⁵ and British economist David Ricardo,²⁶ market systems view the main role for the state in the economy is to provide public goods the market is unable to provide (monetary systems, public transportation infrastructure, etc.). State ownership of enterprises is contemplated only if the enterprise has no competition, and state-ownership is in the public’s best interest (airlines, power plants, etc.). Market systems enjoy maximum economic transparency and openness. State-owned resource management in market systems is efficient and transparent. Overall, market- based systems present the fewest opportunities for government rent seeking (corruption).

Statist economic and resource management systems are normally associated with individualistic political cultures. They are characterized as regulated capitalism. Statist systems experience moderate government control of a state’s economy and state-owned resources. These systems often utilize a mix of patrimonial and free-market mechanisms to manage their economies, while still providing the governing elite ample opportunities for rent seeking. Knowing their opportunities to accumulate capital are dependent upon their control of the state’s resources and economic processes, governing and corporate elite in statist systems strive to ensure they play key decision-making roles in economic and state resource management. Statist systems include some protectionism of foreign trade, some government ownership of key enterprises and infrastructure, and a strong emphasis on regulations (licensing, contracting procedures, etc.) allowing substantial rent seeking by government officials. In effect, governing elite in statist systems see the state’s economy and state-owned resources as their own private business resources and regulate them in a manner providing ample opportunity for illicit capital accumulation.²⁷

Patrimonial economic and resource management systems are normally associated with authoritarian political cultures. They are characterized by repressed economic systems. Patrimonial systems foster maximum government control by limiting which classes of citizens (normally only the governing elite) have access to material resources. In these systems the small governing elite tightly control the economy and decide, often capriciously, how state-owned resources are distributed. Patrimonial systems are usually not transparent and provide almost unlimited opportunities for rent seeking. The governing elite are given the opportunity to use the national treasury and state-owned resources as if they were their own personal property, and decide what, if any, resources may be distributed for the public good. To maximize their access to societal resources, governments with patrimonial systems maintain strict control over their economies, usually including high levels of protectionism of foreign trade (high tariffs, etc.), high personal and corporate taxes, government ownership of major enterprises (public utilities, basic foodstuff production, etc.) and infrastructure (ports, airports, railroads, etc.), strict wage and price controls, and a variety of strict regulations (licensing, contracting, customs procedures, etc.) allowing maximum rent seeking by government officials. One analysis of underdeveloped societies found where extensive patrimonialism existed, “the majority of the population are more or less permanently excluded” from the benefits of state resources.²⁸

Political rights and civil liberties. How a state treats its people can be a major indicator of the effectiveness of its system of government. This is captured in the political rights and civil liberties a state allows its people. Political rights refer to the peoples’ rights to be involved in the establishment and administration of a governing system, including the right to vote, hold public office, and participate in other political activities (attending government meetings, peaceful protesting, etc.). Ideally, these political rights allow participation in political life without discrimination or repression. Civil liberties allow for freedom of thought, expression, and peaceful action. Civil liberties are usually established in a state or society’s laws that are enacted for the good of the community. In the United States, the Constitution and Bill of Rights provided the foundation for political rights and civil liberties. Former U.S. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt championed the establishment of international standards for political rights and civil liberties as she led efforts to establish the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

NGO Freedom House publishes an annual report on Freedom in the World²⁹ assessing the levels of political rights and civil liberties in world states and selected territories. Freedom House offers their assessment captures the real- world situation concerning implementation of political rights and civil liberties and not just what may be found in laws and regulations passed in states and selected territories. Freedom House bases their assessments on the standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Political rights are assessed for electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. For civil liberties they assess freedoms of expression and beliefs, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. The Freedom House assessments result in an index rating world states and selected territories as either free, partly free, or not free. Many scholars consider Freedom House’s combined index ratings of political rights and civil liberties provide the best rating of a state’s level of democracy.

Rule of Law. At its core, rule of law refers to conditions where people and institutions, both in the public and private sectors, are subject and accountable to law, regulations, and rules; these are applied fairly to both the elite and masses. In a nutshell, it means the laws of a state or society are obeyed by everyone. This assumes there is a process to enact laws that are fair to all individuals and institutions and prevents the abuse of power. It also assumes there are systems to interpret the law, enforce the law, adjudicate individuals and organizations found violating the law, and to intervene when there are civil disputes.

There is no single definition or measurement of rule of law. The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, both discussed above, include differing rule of law evaluation factors in their research. One of the more comprehensive measurements of rule of law is found in the NGO World Justice Project’s annual Rule of Law Index.30 The World Justice Project’s annual index focus on two main principles. First, whether the law constrains the exercise of power by the state, individuals, and private organizations. Second, does the law serve the public’s interests, protect people from violence, and ensure methods to mediate disputes and grievances. To measure these principles the Rule of Law Index includes assessments of constraints on government power, absence of corruption, openness of government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. The Rule of Law Index is designed to be applicable to any governing ideology or governing system. Within the Figure III.1 Theory of Political Culture, two aspects of rule of law are especially important—levels of elite accountability and corruption.

Elite Accountability. Of particular concern to measures of rule of law is how a state or society’s elite are held accountable. Ideally, leaders and elites, both those politically connected and the wealthy, should be treated equally under the law as do other members of the state or society. This means leaders and elites should be accountable to the same laws and should not be immune to legal sanctions. No one should be “above the law.” Unfortunately, this is often not the case in many states or societies, especially in authoritarian political cultures.

Corruption. The World Bank defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain.” Corruption is limited to relationships between politics and government-owned resources (money, property, etc.). In the private sector, the illegal abuse of office for private gain is considered fraud. When corrupt political leaders or elites enrich themselves through the abuse of public resources, it diverts these resources away from serving public interests. One of the main corrupt behaviors is when unregulated sources of money in politics unduly influence public policy in favor of the interests of the money’s sources. Unregulated campaign donations, with future direct or implied expectations of reciprocity for the donor, are one of the main causes of corruption in democratic governing systems.

The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, and World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index research address state corruption levels. The most in-depth measure of corruption in individual states is produced by the NGO Transparency International in their annual Corruption Perceptions Index.³¹ Transparency International research has found states tend to have less corruption when political campaign financing is regulated, policymakers receive societal input from other than the politically connected and wealthy, and concentration of political power by the wealthy is limited.

Civic engagement and social capital. Individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern is a definition of civic engagement.³² Found in many forms, civic engagement fosters electoral participation, organizational involvement, volunteer work, and a myriad of other civic activities.³³ Further, civic engagement is the ability of individuals and societal groups to jointly solve problems and achieve community political, economic, and social goals. Community engagement generates norms (rules) of reciprocity. At the individual level, it creates reciprocity conditions of “if I do something for you, then I expect you will do something for me.” At the larger societal level, it generates a broader general reciprocity of “if I do things for others, then at some time in the future others will do things for me.” Civic engagement activities are what U.S. political scientist Robert Putnam dubbed the “WD 40” that lubricates social interactions and builds trustworthiness throughout a society.³⁴ The strength of civic engagement directly cultivates levels of a “sense of community,” speaks to the “social fabric” of a society, and is a significant factor in building social capital discussed below.

Putnam identified several categories of civic engagement and participation.³⁵ First, political participation includes not only voting, but also volunteering to promote political candidates, and working in polling stations. It also includes engaging political leaders and government agencies at all levels through letter writing, personal meetings with office holders, political meeting attendance, and even political protest participation. Second, civic participation entails membership and engagement with NGOs. This may include anything from Girl Scout and Boy Scout troops and food banks to professional and social organizations, among thousands of NGOs. Third, religious participation through membership in a religious group and engagement with other religious groups at the local, state, and national levels. Fourth, participation both in the individual’s specific workplace, with outside workplaces providing materials or other support to the individual’s workplace, and in unions representing workers. And fifth, informal social participation with family and friends. Except for the rare individual isolated from the larger society, every individual will be members and participate at different levels with a variety of political, civic, religious, workplace, and informal groups.

Liberal scholars have coined the term social capital to conceptualize civic engagement in order to allow its study. Social capital is normally thought to include three major components: social networks, social norms, and social trust.³⁶ Social networks include the many nodes and connections of political, economic, and social groups and their relationships with individuals and among each other. This is similar to the “liberal cobweb” metaphor discussed earlier. The strength of the social networks can be determined by the number and nature of interactions among the many nodes. Sociologists have created the methodological techniques of network analysis to study the size and strength of social networks. Social norms concern the laws, regulations, and both formal and informal rules that govern interactions for individuals and social groups. Of particular concern are the informal rules that help create general reciprocity. Social networks and social norms then contribute to the creation of social trust; i.e., the ability to trust conditions of general reciprocity among nodes. Since it cannot be directly measured with the human senses, social trust is an intersubjective variable measurable through observation of social interactions and by answers to survey questions about an individual’s feelings about social trust. The terms social capital and social trust often are used interchangeably, but social capital is actually a broader concept incorporating social networks, social norms, and social trust.

Putnam identified two different types of social capital to understand its effects in a society.³⁷ Bonding social capital is the level of trust generated within a social group (family, workplace, or societal group). An individual may belong to a number of social groups that build bonding social capital. Putnam offers that bonding social capital is the “superglue” holding individual social groups together and affecting their abilities to meet their goals.³⁸ Bridging social capital is the level of social trust generated among other groups outside of the bonded social group. Bonding social capital is actually the previously mentioned “WD 40,” which lubricates relationships in civil society. Scholars have identified social capital as a major factor in assessing societal conditions. Societies with higher levels of social capital have less crime and more secure neighborhoods; better health care, educational, and welfare systems; improved economies; and are overall happier. For the United States in 2000, Putnam identified the region with the highest social capital as the upper-Midwest (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Dakotas, and Iowa). He explains this region’s higher social capital results from its population streams that primarily originate in Scandinavia, Northern Europe, and West-Central Europe, states that have the highest social capital in the world and foster the formation of complex civil societies with strong bridging social capital. Putnam also identified the U.S. region with the lowest social capital as the deep-South (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee). He explains this region’s lower social capital results from the aftermath of slavery in the post-Civil War era where segregation and Jim Crow laws and policies kept these societies fractured along ethnic lines and retarded development of civil societies with strong bridging social capital.

Strong bonding social capital can have negative societal effects; for example, it may become so strong as to deny group entry and benefits to non- members. Strong bonding also may produce pressure toward social conformity, thus limiting personal freedoms. Strongly bonded groups also may restrict their ability to bridge with other outside groups and thus retard the bonded group’s ability to build bridging social capital by participating in the larger civic society. Mafia crime syndicates are examples of a strongly bonded social group with limited interactions with other groups. A Mafia group often is made up of family members and only the most loyal members from outside the family; they normally only trust members who are part of the group and distrust outsiders. Strict conformance with the group’s rules, usually established by a central leader or committee, is expected from all group members. Such conditions of strong bonding social capital also will be found in other organized crime groups (drug cartels, international and domestic gangs, etc.), in addition to centrally controlled terrorist and insurgency groups.

Recently scholars have devised a number of methods to measure social capital in states and other societal groups. The World Bank focuses on researching social capital in developing countries, as it has been shown that lower social capital retards sustainable development.³⁹ Several international governmental organizations, including the World Bank, and NGOs also conduct research and publish measurements of social capital for all world states.⁴⁰ While several researchers study social capital in the United States, the Pennsylvania State University Northeast Center for Rural Development (NECRD) developed social capital measures down to the county level in each U.S. state.⁴¹ Using a different measurement methodology than Putnam, NECRD county-level social capital measures from 1990 to 2014 corresponded closely to Putnam’s 2000 state-level assessments in terms of social capital levels in different U.S. states. The NECRD measures revealed two interesting insights. First, social capital levels do not change appreciably over time. And second, individual U.S. states are not homogenous when it comes to social capital levels, as some counties or cities within the same state have much higher levels of social capital than others.

Characterizing Political Cultures

The previous discussion covered the rule-based Theory of Political Culture theoretical foundations and empirical conditions of the three types of political cultures: egalitarian, individualistic, and authoritarian. Referring to Figure III.1, this section summarizes the characteristics of each type of political culture.

Egalitarian political cultures. Egalitarian (civic) political cultures are ruled by heteronomy. An indicator of heteronomous rule is a lack of leader autonomy; i.e., governing elite behaviors are severely restricted by societal institutions. It is found in mature, strong democracies where the governing elite voluntarily change often as the result of free and fair elections. Although full communism is theorized as falling within egalitarian political cultures, communism as conceptualized by Marx has never existed at the state level.

Egalitarian societies are highly integrated and complex. Social and economic transactions in egalitarian cultures are conducted widely among a variety of differentiated groups. Individuals may belong to several political, economic, and social groups and have a large array of interests. Because of the widespread horizontal interactions and communications across differentiated groups, high levels of social capital (trust) develop in egalitarian cultures.⁴² Economic and resource management in egalitarian cultures tend to be market- based with an emphasis on free trade and minimal economic regulation. Egalitarian cultures generally are found in developed states that receive their population stream and political ideology from Scandinavia, Northern Europe, and Western Europe; but, as seen at the bottom of Figure III.1, some smaller Asian states also have developed egalitarian characteristics.

Members of egalitarian political cultures see politics as a public activity centered on the idea of the public good and devoted to the advancement of the public interest. The search for the common good is the controlling rule of politics. These political cultures view politics as healthy and promote wide-scale involvement of civil society in political decision making. Egalitarian political officials vie for power just as those in other societies; however, their ultimate objective is less self-interested and more the search for the good of the society. Leaders of egalitarian political cultures reject the notion that politics is a legitimate realm for private economic enrichment. While political parties and interest groups exist in egalitarian political cultures, their influence on political decision making is weaker, and they have less impact on government policy than in individualistic societies. Political competition is focused on societal issues. Egalitarian government structures are organized hierarchically; however, their bureaucracies tend to be smaller than similarly sized individualistic societies. In egalitarian societies, political decision making processes and communications tend to be more horizontal, including inputs from a large array of public and private groups. The rule of law is strong in egalitarian political cultures and applies equally to the masses and governing elite.

Individualistic political cultures. Individualistic political cultures exist in hierarchical ruled states and societies. Organizational pyramids and military chains-of-command are typical structures associated with hierarchical rule, a situation where governing elites are changeable by regular elections—but not always free and fair ones—or by organizational appointments. Governing elites dominate the very top of the hierarchy in individualistic political cultures. Hierarchical forms of rule normally are found in new, transitional, or weak democracies.

Individualistic societies are more integrated and complex than authoritarian societies. Within individualistic cultures, social and economic transactions are conducted among people from different groups. Individuals frequently shift from one group to another and have a broader range of interests. Economic and resource management tends to be statist with significant government regulation to ensure elites benefit from the structure. Individual or group self-interest is the governing rule of this type of culture. The need to interact with persons from other groups in order to serve one’s own self-interest results in a moderate level of social trust.

Individualistic political cultures view government as strictly utilitarian—to provide those functions demanded by the citizens it serves.⁴³ People in this culture see politics as a business; i.e., another means by which individuals can improve themselves socially and economically. Political competition revolves around individual attempts to gain and maintain political or economic power. Politicians in individualistic societies are more interested in public office as a means for self-interested benefit than as a chance to build a better society. Political life in individualistic political cultures is based upon systems of mutual obligation that are rooted in personal relationships. These systems of mutual obligation usually are harnessed through the interactions of political parties, business elites, and interest groups. Citizen participation in political decision making is conducted through networks of political parties and interest groups that attempt to influence government policy. Patron-client relationships generated by the system of political parties, business elites, interest groups, and large government bureaucracies emerge in individualistic political cultures. Individualistic political cultures are extremely legalistic; however, the rule of law—while stronger than in authoritarian societies—remains focused primarily on controlling the masses and generates only limited accountability for the governing elite.

Authoritarian political cultures. Authoritarian (traditional) political cultures generally exist in states with hegemonic forms of rule. Hegemonic rule indicates a central single-ruler or small governing elite who monopolize and mandate the principles and beliefs (ideology) of the society; this is accomplished through either coercion or cooptation of the institutions of the society.

Authoritarian societies are simple and segregated. Social and economic transactions in these societies are organized around small groups defined by familial, kinship, tribal, political, ethnic, religious, class, linguistic, or other social relationships. Each group tends to have its own narrow base of interests. Paternalism is the main intra-group controlling concept in authoritarian cultures; i.e., the father or group leader decides what is best for the family or group. The best interests of the leaders and elites are the most important governing rule in authoritarian societies. Loyalty to the group and maintaining the traditional status quo are other important rules. Economic and resource management tend to be patrimonial with the leaders and elites controlling the structure and processes of the economy. With most social and economic transactions carried out within groups (intra-group), intergroup social trust (bonding social capital) in authoritarian cultures is extremely weak.

Authoritarian political cultures place power in the hands of a small and self- perpetuating governing elite who often inherit the right to govern through family ties or social position.⁴⁴ The hegemonic rule in authoritarian states is often personal, meaning loyalty to the leader(s) is foremost and not based in a particular ideology or governing system. The method of rule often relies on strong patron-client systems of informal reciprocity, where the clients (citizens or specific groups) pledge their economic and political support to patrons (governing elite) for access to government positions and resources.⁴⁵ Political competition in these societies is primarily among the small group of self-perpetuating governing elite. Politics is considered a privilege in authoritarian political cultures, and those active in politics are expected to benefit personally from their efforts. Authoritarian polities are centrally organized with the powerful governing elite constituting the central core of the most dominant societal group. The rule of law is weak in authoritarian political cultures, focused primarily on controlling the masses and offering little accountability for the governing elite.

Insights from Analyzing Political Culture

The Theory of Political Culture, Figure III.1, reveals the theoretical foundations and empirical conditions associated with different political cultures. In their research projects, political-military security analysts must conduct an in-depth investigation of the empirical conditions in their subject states or societal groups—in addition to understanding their own state or societal group’s empirical conditions. This information can then be used for two main purposes. First, by defining where a state or societal group falls within cells and along the bottom of the Figure III.1 matrix, the analyst can identify the expectations and structural constraints placed on leaders under study—allowing explanation and prediction of a state or society’s behavior. This is also important in assessing points of view when the analyst conducts the agency analysis in Chapter 6. Second, this analysis will highlight the differences in the subjects’ and analysts’ own political cultures and assist in avoiding the stereotyping bias where analysts think the subjects under study will act in the same ways as the analyst or their own state.

Figure III.1 displays relationships between various factors (variables). The analyst must be careful in prescribing causality to these relationships. The antecedent variables in Figure III.1 are the social rules listed at the top of the figure—the theoretical foundations. Social rules are fostered through a combination of speech acts (speeches, writings) and behaviors of a state or society’s elite and masses over time. The social rules then lead to (cause) the figure’s independent variables, which are the state or society’s empirical conditions. The dependent variable is the type of political culture created (caused) by the empirical conditions. In other words, the type of political culture is a product of the antecedent variables (social rules) causing the independent variables (empirical conditions), which create (cause) the type of political culture. There are numerous theoretical propositions to be gleaned from Figure III.1. It would be correct to state the theoretical proposition: A state dominated by commitment rules (antecedent variable) will likely have strong rule of law (independent variable) and will likely display an egalitarian political culture (dependent variable). It is equally correct to state: An egalitarian political culture will likely have a strong rule of law.

Figure III.1 is considered a comparative theory, meaning not all the independent variables (empirical conditions) must exist to create a particular political culture. Some states may have a combination of independent variables from all three of the types of political cultures; however, it is more common that one or two types of political cultures will dominate in any one state or societal group. As shown at the bottom of Figure III.1, some world states have a mix of two political cultures—meaning their empirical conditions may fall across more than one political culture.

Singapore is an example state with a wide diversity in empirical conditions found in all three types of political culture. As a whole, Singapore displays a mixed authoritarian-individualistic political culture, with some empirical conditions in the authoritarian cells and others in individualistic cells. Singapore has been ruled by a string of authoritarian prime ministers since its 1965 independence. At the same time, Singapore is a world leader in free-market economic measures, strong rule of law, and low corruption levels, which foster an open and competitive business environment. These conditions correlate with an egalitarian political culture—not the overall evaluated mixed authoritarian-individualistic culture. When the analyst encounters such a wide discrepancy in state conditions they must investigate and explain the causes. In Singapore’s case, it is a small island city-state whose economy and the welfare of its elites and people are reliant on international trade and financial services. To facilitate an efficient business environment, its authoritarian leaders (often called “benevolent dictators”) have opened the economy and implemented strong (harsh) rule of law and anti- corruption measures. This explains why Singapore has characteristics in all three types of political culture.

States and societies can change their political cultures, but changes are usually difficult to bring about. Political cultures can change gradually over time, or more suddenly due to a major societal event. During World War II, Axis powers Germany and Japan were ruled under authoritarian political cultures. As a result of their war losses, considered major societal failures, during the decades after the war, Japan modernized to the point today it has modern, mixed individualistic-egalitarian political culture. As a result of the end of the Cold War, a still-modernizing West Germany reunified with East Germany, an authoritarian political culture; but, within two decades the reunified Germany possessed today’s mixed individualistic-egalitarian political culture. States also can transition from individualistic or egalitarian political cultures toward more authoritarian political cultures. The 21^st-century saw the rise of conservative populist political movements in several states, including Hungary, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Over a five-year period (2016-2020), all of these states moved toward more authoritarian political cultures as they rejected market economies (free trade), restricted political rights and civil liberties, and fractured their publics reducing social capital. In the early 21^st - century a modernizing Turkey would have fallen more solidly under the individualistic political culture. However, with the election in 2014 of President Erdogan and his populist, authoritarian approach to governing, by 2020 Turkey had changed political cultures to mixed individualistic-authoritarian characteristics.

Figure III.1 further reveals empirical conditions associated with political cultures can restrict state modernization. This insight affects security policy analysis focusing on foreign aid programs, sometimes called “nation building.” Booth and Seligson argue some states may not be good candidates for political and economic modernization because the local empirical conditions are so antithetical to liberal-democratic values found in individualistic and egalitarian political cultures.⁴⁶ Figure III.1 supports this somewhat controversial assertion. In particular, it offers that strong empirical conditions associated with an authoritarian political culture could act as an anchor holding back a society in its attempts to develop the institutions needed to modernize and become liberal democratic states. This anchor also would restrict the development of free- market economies. The World Bank and other international development agencies have recognized the effects of empirical conditions associated with political culture on state modernization and have added “whole-of-nation” approaches to development programs. These approaches employ coordinated programs that address multiple political and economic institutions listed in Figure III.1 under empirical conditions.

Notes

¹ Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who gets what, when, and how (New York, NY: P. Smith, 1950).

² Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy,” in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing States, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1993), 1-27.

³ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963).

⁴ Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The Theory of Political Culture rule-based foundations are from Onuf’s, World of Our Making, Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. The theoretical linkage of political cultures with societal rules was developed in Michael W. Collier, Political Corruption in the Caribbean Basin, Constructing a Theory to Combat Corruption (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005).

⁷ Much of the constructivist literature references only two categories of rules, regulative and constitutive rules. In Onuf’s constructivism, all rules are deemed to have both regulative and constitutive properties. To Onuf, there are only three categories of rules that govern social action: instruction, directive, and commitment. The discussion under rules in social theory is a summary of Onuf’s and other works originally published in Collier, 26-29.

⁸ Onuf, 258.

⁹ Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971).

¹⁰ Onuf, 209-210.

¹¹ Ibid, 211.

¹²Ibid, 189.

¹³ Ibid, 212.

¹⁴ Material in this section summarized primarily from Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory 5^th ed. (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012).

¹⁵ World Bank, “World Governance Indicators,” https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed November 22, 2020).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Virginia Beach, VA: Create Space Independent Publishing, 2014—first published 1689).

¹⁸ J. William Frost, “Why Religions Facilitate War and How Religions Facilitate Peace,” https://www.swarthmore.edu/friends-historical-library/why-religions-facilitate-war-and-how- religions-facilitate-peace (accessed November 30, 2020).

¹⁹ Daryl Johnson, “Hate in God’s Name,” Southern Poverty Law Center (September 25, 2017) https://www.splcenter.org/20170925/hate-god%E2%80%99s-name (accessed November 30, 2020).

²⁰ Frost.

²¹ Ibid.

²² David W, Smith and Elizabeth G. Burr, Understanding World Religions, A Road Map for Justice and Peace 2^nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2015).

²³ Ibid, 2-4.

²⁴ Heritage Foundation, “Index of Economic Freedom,” https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking (accessed November 22, 2020).

²⁵ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1937—first published 1776).

²⁶ David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1960—first published 1817).

²⁷ Luigi Manzetti and Charles Blake, “Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways,” Review of International Political Economy, 3, no. 4 (winter, 1996): 662- 697.

²⁸ Robin Theobald, Corruption, Development and Underdevelopment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 91.

²⁹ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world (accessed November 22, 2020).

³⁰ World Justice Project, “Rule of Law Index,” https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp- rule-law-index (accessed November 25, 2020).

³¹ Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi (accessed November 25, 2020).

³² Michael Delli Carpini, “Definition of Civic Engagement,” The Pew Charitable Trusts, reprinted in https://www.apa.org/education/undergrad/civic-engagement (accessed November 27, 2020).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 23.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid, 19.

³⁷ Ibid, 22-24.

³⁸ Ibid, 23.

³⁹World Bank, “Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners,” https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14098 (accessed November 29, 2020).

⁴⁰ For examples see SolAbility, “Social Capital Index,” http://solability.com/the-global- sustainable-competitiveness-index/the-index/social-capital (accessed November 29, 2020); Basel Institute of Commons and Economics, “World Social Capital Monitor,” https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/commitments/6686_11706_com mitment_World%20Social%20Capital%20Monitor%202019.pdf (accessed November 29, 2020); and Social Capital Research and Training, “Social Capital: Benefits of Human Sociability,” https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/ (accessed November 29, 2020).

⁴¹ Pennsylvania State University Northeast Center for Rural Development, “Social Capital Maps,” https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-resources/us-maps-showing- county-social-capital-levels (accessed November 29, 2020).

⁴² Francis Fukuyama, Trust, The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1995).

⁴³ Daniel Elazar, The American Mosaic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 230-232.

⁴⁴ Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), 92-93.

⁴⁵ Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 69-74.

⁴⁶ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua,” in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing States, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1993), 99-130.