

# Ancient and Modern: **THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE**



Edited by

Ogechi E. Anyanwu, Lisa Day, Daniel Joseph,  
Iddah Otieno & Joshua D. Farrington

# Ancient and Modern

## The African Experience

**Edited by**

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## PREFACE

African and African American Studies (AFA) at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) offers students an intellectual space to enhance their understanding of continental Africa and the African diaspora. Achieving this goal requires providing students with high-quality resources that address multiple educational objectives that offer interdisciplinarity and critical thinking skills. While many scholars in various disciplines have contributed to this ambitious goal through their numerous works, a growing need remains for additional scholarly sources to prepare students to become better informed about the ever-changing Black world. The AFA faculty at EKU sought to meet that need with the 2019 publication of the edited book *Slavery to Liberation: The African American Experience*. They have answered another call to provide our students and the world with an open-access textbook on the historical and contemporary transformation of the African experience.

*Ancient and Modern: The African Experience* consists of twenty-one chapters written in clear, accessible language by accomplished and emerging Africanists in diverse fields and offers students wide-ranging voices spanning generations of experts living in Africa and across the Diaspora. It presents the dynamic physical, human, historical, economic, political, social, and cultural developments shaping the present and future of Africa and Africans in the Diaspora—a significant focus of the African Experience curriculum at EKU. As the different chapters attest, this book uses an interdisciplinary approach that helps students think critically beyond the boundaries of specific disciplines and broaden their perspective of the African world and its complexity. It describes the continent's inner realities, African people's everyday experiences, and their relations to the increasingly globalized world. It is a narrative of past and present Africa that lays the foundation for a better projection into the future of Africans, their resilience, agency, and actions. Many authors included in this volume have lived, schooled, and worked in their respective African countries of origin and abroad.

A project of this magnitude takes the passion and dedication of many individuals, and the editors thank all those who have generously helped this project come to fruition.



The AFA faculty at ECU worked tirelessly to ensure this dream's fruition. ECU students have been a constant source of inspiration for making this work possible. From their insightful class discussions to exceptional projects showcasing Africa, ECU students have been eager to advance their knowledge and debunk the common stereotypes about Africa's peoples and cultures. Special thanks to Julie George, Dean of Libraries; Kelly Smith, University Librarian and Director of Collections and Discovery; Bailey Lake, Assistant University Librarian; and other Eastern Kentucky Libraries faculty for supporting this project with their resources and time. Special thanks go to Dr. Mercy Cannon, Dean of the College of Letters, Arts, and Social Sciences (CLASS), and Dr. John Bowes, Associate Dean of CLASS, for their unwavering support and encouragement. Most of all, AFA appreciates the constant support from the ECU Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Sara Zeigler, and President Dr. David T. McFaddin.

The editors are also indebted to the contributors to this book, affiliated with various institutions and departments of higher education in Africa and the United States, for sharing their stories and research with students in African studies and reader communities worldwide. They have been patient during the lengthy review process and have generously invested their time to edit and revise their chapters based on editors' feedback. Their unique positionality and perspective have given important credibility to this book, enriched its content, and made it an excellent tool for students in African studies and other related academic fields.

Suitable for undergraduate and graduate students, including general readers seeking to expand their knowledge of the African experience, this book will help African studies students residing in the United States and abroad develop their critical thinking ability by emphasizing the comprehension of key developments on the African continent in their proper human, historical, and international contexts. Students will benefit from the contributors' diverse academic horizons, socio-cultural backgrounds in Africa, and transnational experiences, which will equip them with both inside and outside perspectives when revisiting and interpreting narratives about continental Africa, its people, and the African diaspora.

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## CHAPTER 1

# The Dual Image of the Aro in Igbo Development History: An Aftermath of their Role in the Slave Trade

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## INTRODUCTION

The Arochukwu people, popularly known as the Aro, are the most debated sub-cultural group in Igboland. The Aro, whose ancestral home is near the Cross River, and their co-Igbo neighbors were an integral part of the early history of the hinterland of the southeastern region of Nigeria. The Aro dominated commerce, politics, and religion in the region in pre-colonial times. With the introduction of the Atlantic slave trade in the 15th century, they emerged as significant players. The Aro's role in the region in both precolonial and colonial times has shaped the way they are perceived in contemporary Igbo society. This chapter examines two sides of the image of the Aro people in contemporary Igbo society and argues that the negative and positive experiences of neighboring Igbo communities with the Aro since the 15th century helped to evoke hatred, fear, and horror on the one hand, and wonder, awe, and admiration on the other. The chapter traces the origins of this dual perception of the Aro and analyzes the reasons why it persists.

The scholarly work on inter-group relations in pre-colonial southeastern Nigeria acknowledges the influence of the Aro in the region.<sup>1</sup> The Aro dominated their

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<sup>1</sup> K. O. Dike and F. Ekejiuba, *The Aro of Southeastern Nigeria, 1650-1980: A Study of Socio-economic Formation and Transformation in Nigeria* (Ibadan: University Press Ltd., 1990), 223-226.

neighbors inland, especially during the era of the Atlantic slave trade. The leading role of the Aro in the slave trade led to their dominance and resulted in what came to be “the fear of the Aro” by neighboring communities, villages, and towns. This fear has in turn led to the generally held view that the overall positive influence of the Aro also had a “dark side.”<sup>2</sup> The fear of the Aro was so strong that in the early years of colonial rule, a British official observed that Igbo and non-Igbo groups in the hinterland still dreaded their Aro neighbors.<sup>3</sup> Inya Eteng argues that the slave trade “left enduring hatred between the Aro and their war mercenaries, on one hand, and community-casualties of their slave raids, on the other.”<sup>4</sup> Apollos Nwauwa insists that the Aro owe “their notoriety” not only to what they did with their famous religious deity, Ibini Ukpabi, but also to their skill in the formation and operation of a network of trading oligarchy, mainly in human cargoes, especially in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>5</sup>

From the era of the slave trade in Igboland there remains “an ambivalent social

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<sup>2</sup> Kate Meagher, *Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 2010), 34.

<sup>3</sup> G. Ugo Nwokeji, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Population Density: A Historical Demography of the Biafran Hinterland,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2000): 633.

<sup>4</sup> Inya Eteng, *Onye Ajuru Aju Anaghi Aju Onwe Ya: Ndi Igbo in Post-Civil War Crisis of Disunity*, 2004 Ahiajoku Lecture (Owerri: Ministry of Information, 2004), 46.

<sup>5</sup> Apollos Nwauwa, “State Formation and Evolution of Kingship Revisited: A Case Study of the Origin of the Aro Kingdom,” in *Between Tradition and Change: Sociopolitical and Economic Transformation among the Igbo of Nigeria*, ed. Apollos Nwauwa and Ebere Onwudiwe (Glassboro: Goldline & Jacobs Publishing, 2012), 41.

attitude of most people of various Igbo sub-groups toward their Aro neighbors.”<sup>6</sup> This chapter discusses some of the factors that shaped this attitude toward the Aro within Igboland, and how in modern times a “dual image” of the Aro exists.<sup>7</sup> It attempts to establish the veracity and nature of this dual image as well as its ethno-historical underpinnings. Aro participation in the Atlantic slave trade is an especially important point of reference particularly because the scale of their activities and involvement in the trade constituted a critical turning point in their relations with their neighbors.

## **ARO RELATIONS WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS**

Decades before and after the 15th century, the southeastern region of Nigeria was characterized by great population movements, human settlements, and demographic changes resulting from migrations, raids, intra/inter-ethnic squabbles, and various socio-economic tensions and challenges. Aro relations with the rest of their Igbo neighbors within this region can be interrogated in five important historical stages. The first was the pre-Atlantic stage. In this stage, which began before 1400, the forces which led to the basic formation of the Aro demographic composition, their fascinating state or kingdom, and their economy were systematically coming into fruition through an elaborate network based on a combination of the various institutions of trans-local connections.<sup>8</sup> As K.O Dike and F. Ekejiuba note, early Aro demographic configuration

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<sup>6</sup> Ndu Life Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade, Environmental Changes, and Human Migrations in West Africa: the Case of the Aro of Southeastern Nigeria,” *Igbo Studies Review* 1 (2013): 32.

<sup>7</sup> This is similar to the dual image of the Jews in English and American literature. See Jay L. Halio, ed., *The Merchant of Venice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4-5.

<sup>8</sup> Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 20-23; Nigerian National Archives, Enugu (hereafter, NNAE.) H. F. Mathews, ARODIV 20/1/15: Being the various accounts of Intelligence Reports on the Aro Clan, Arochukwu District, Calabar, 1927; A. Harneit-Sievers, *Constructions of*

and development economy derived, on the one hand, from an internal source—that is, from a series of small-scale migrations from the savanna fringes of the central plateau of the region, only to converge in the rainforests of the Cross River.<sup>9</sup> No doubt, this migration laid the foundation for the transformation of the Aro economy through the intensification of agriculture, competition for productive resources, and the growth of commerce. On the other hand, an external source of change derived mainly from the Atlantic slave trade also increased the momentum of internal migrations.

The second stage, which dates from about 1500, was that of the Atlantic slave trade. The Aro economy had developed before the Atlantic slave trade began, but the Atlantic trade was an important agent of change that contributed to developing the perceptions of the Aro by their neighbors. The slave trade era witnessed the emergence of the three-part Aro trading oligarchy: the commercial, the diplomatic, and the cosmological/oracular. Positioned as the middleman in the Euro-African trade, and eager to meet the demand for captives by rising to the challenge of tapping the thickly populated Igbo hinterland, the Aro entered various alliances with neighboring communities, availing them to the sought-after European trade goods in exchange for enslaved people. They not only used their dreaded oracle, the Ibini Ukpabi, to achieve their commercial goals, but also hired people of neighboring Igbo war-like clans of Abam, Edda, Nike, and Ohafia to assist them with captive-catching, expeditions, or raids, and to generally protect Aro interests and enforce their will whenever it was necessary to do so. The United States of America's domination of the modern world is similar to the Aro influence in the area. R. C. Njoku succinctly captures this similarity:

As the US today controls the world with superior technology and military muscle, the Aro employed the use of their all-powerful oracle, known as the

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Belonging: Igbo Communities and the Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006), 18-20.

<sup>9</sup> For details, see Dike and Ekejiuba, 31.

Ibinukpabia (Long Juju), and their military alliance with the Ohafia, Abam and Eda as instruments of fear and domination. The Aro-Ohafia-Abam-Edda military alliance, like the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), accorded the Aro the military muscle to threaten and often raid other communities who were opposed to their commercial and religious interests.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the Aro emerged as the leading captive-recruiting merchant class of the region.<sup>11</sup> With their clear advantage over their neighbors, Aro traders seized and enslaved populations, growing wealthy by selling many enslaved people and retaining some for domestic use. By doing so, they were able to maintain and sustain a complex network of client-patron relationships across Igboland and beyond, with their Arochukwu homeland as the metropolis.

For most people in the Igbo hinterland, the rise of the Atlantic slave trade led to high-level feelings of insecurity.<sup>12</sup> As a result of Aro-instigated raids, many villages either had their community life disrupted or simply ceased to exist. That European officers in latter-day colonial Nigeria filed reports about villages that had been “exterminated” or “almost exterminated”<sup>13</sup> suggests the prevalence of high incidences of raids to meet the demands of the trade, especially from the 18th century onward when the increasing demand in the Americas for African captives provoked changes in the interior of the Bight

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<sup>10</sup> R. C. Njoku, “Neoliberal Globalism in Microcosm: A Study of the Precolonial Igbo of Eastern Nigeria,” *Mbari: The International Journal of Igbo Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008): 59

<sup>11</sup> Martin Klein, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and Decentralized societies in West Africa,” Public Lecture, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria, January 22, 2000, 11.

<sup>12</sup> For details, see Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 26-28.

<sup>13</sup> NNAE., F. A. Goodlife, “Intelligence Report on the Otanzu, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, 28935 CSE 1/1/5, 1933 & 1952; NNAE., I.R.P. Heslop, “Intelligence Report on the Nkalu Clan, Orlu District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, CSE 1/85/6197A, 1936.

of Biafra.<sup>14</sup> At the end of such raids, Udochukwu E. Akukwe explains that “the practice then was for majority of survivors to seek refuge, for instance, in nearby hilly or forested locations, where, in some cases, they might try to set up brand new communities; it was also not unusual for some survivors to escape to their maternal home, that is, the land of birth of their mothers.<sup>15</sup> Available evidence indicates that during this period when the business of slaving was the most lucrative business available, households across Igboland became prepared to migrate at a moment’s notice, to change occupation, residences, and social networks with little apparent<sup>16</sup> [OBI]. The incessant sense of helpless preparedness and readiness to switch gears, in some cases, made it difficult to maintain recognizable and usable forms of collective solidarity and collaboration. In the economic realm, the crisis which came in the wake of the Atlantic slave trade created major challenges related to maintaining the level of well-being for people of the non-exploiting classes at the lower ends of the slave market economy. Socially, the arrival of immigrants, European goods, and images that were perceived as “strange” created feelings of anxiety. Along with these were stories about cannibalism associated with the export trade, which created an atmosphere of fear and hatred for stranger elements, including the Aro.<sup>17</sup> these developments posed,

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<sup>14</sup> Njoku, “The Atlantic Slave Trade,” 27-29; see, also, Ndu Life Njoku, “Women’s Resistance against the Slave Trade in Igboland, Southeastern Nigeria,” *Ofo: Journal of Trans-Atlantic Studies* 2, no. 1 (June, 2012): 34.

<sup>15</sup> Udochukwu E. Akukwe (retired teacher, now trader, age 81), interview with author, Umuejechi, Nekede, Owerri, Imo State, December 15, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Chief Anthony Ogu, (trader, age 80), interview with author, Afor-Eziama Market, Eziama, Ikeduru, Imo State, November 28, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> The initial story then was that those enslaved were taken to the coast for sale to *ndi Potokiri*, that is, people of Portugal, who would eat them up. Pa Nduka Clifford



however, the Aro still triumphed. Over time they established settlements in parts of non-Aro Igboland and beyond, with invitation in some cases, along with large quantities <sup>1819</sup>

The third historical stage is legitimate trade, which began around the last decade of the 18th century. For the generality of the people of southeastern Nigeria, this stage was a critical period of commercial transition from “human cargo” to trade mainly in palm oil products. Particularly for the Aro, the picture and challenge this new stage presented, as Chima Korieh points out, were such that “they were unable to monopolize the palm oil trade in the same way they had monopolized the slave trade. Unlike the slave trade, the production and marketing of palm oil were readily open to local competition since the oil could be produced by anyone who had access to the trees.”<sup>20</sup>

During this period of legitimate commerce, the Aro struggled to smoothly transition to agricultural production, thus threatening their control of the better part of the southeastern regional market. The difficulties in making this shift, coupled with the threat to their regional dominance, underscores the viewpoint that in the period before the legitimate trade, the Aro economy was indeed driven by the slave trade.

It also gives credence to the “crisis of adaptation” view expressed by A. G. Hopkins and others in reference to the legitimate trade that opened a new market economy for

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<sup>18</sup> Opara (village elder, age: 85+), interview with author, Umuokoro, Achi Mbieri, Mbaitoli, Imo State, December 18, 2013; and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

<sup>19</sup> Uche Ohia, *Patriotism and Community Development: A History of Arondizuogu Patriotic Union* (Aba: Silverduck, 2007), 6-7.

<sup>20</sup> Chima Korieh, “The Nineteenth Century Commercial Transition in West Africa: The Case of the Biafran Hinterland,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 34, no. 3 (2000): 597.

the Aro.<sup>21</sup> Even though the transition diminished Aro control of trade, it did not mean a total collapse of their trading system. On the contrary, Aro hegemony did not end as they became active to some extent in the new palm produce trade in parts of the region by using old trading contacts, organizational skills, and capital accumulated during the slave trade. The stage of colonial rule saw a change in the Aro regional position of dominance, with the British proclamation of a Protectorate over the whole of southern Nigeria in 1900. This political action automatically brought the Arochukwu district within the Old Calabar Administrative Province. The British understood clearly that to consolidate power in the conquered areas, they had to undermine the Aro influence. As the British colonial officer Colonel Moorhouse put it, "It was inevitable, in my opinion, that in the extension of the [British] Administration, there should be a conflict between the Government and the Aros in the conditions that existed at the time." He insisted that "It was in order to break down the trade monopoly of the Aros far more than any missionary influence" that the decision to open the country was made.<sup>22</sup>

With colonial rule in place, the British embarked on an anti-Aro expedition between 1901 and 1902 during which they defeated the Aro. This defeat culminated in the destruction of their major source of influence—the Ibini Ukpabi.<sup>23</sup> The defeat of the Aro and the destruction of their oracle paved the way for the gradual introduction of Christianity and Western culture into Arochukwu and the rest of the Igbo territory.<sup>24</sup> Aro power in the region, the pre-conquest, Aro-inspired migrations and intermingling yielded

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<sup>21</sup> See, for example, the arguments of A. G. Hopkins as captured in Korieh, 597-598.

<sup>22</sup> Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna (NNAK), Minute dated 28/9/1920 attached to letter No. 2532 of 17/12/21 in the file Conf. NO.80/1920.

<sup>23</sup> The oracle, associated with immense religious and judicial powers, was the instrument of Aro commercial dominance in the Igbo country (and beyond): NNAE, ABADIST 20/1/3— Long Juju of Aro Report on, 1909-1923.

<sup>24</sup> NNAE, ARODIV, 20/1/15, 13; NNAE., ARODIV, 31/1/55, 15.

various forms of inter-group relationships between the Aro and their neighbors in the Igbo and even non-Igbo areas. Although Aro migrations and settlements had various long-lasting effects, the most prominent result is the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of Igboland and beyond, encapsulated in what is popularly referred to as the "Aro Diaspora."<sup>25</sup> Despite the many challenges that the Aro in the homeland and those "in Diaspora" had to face especially during the colonial era, quite a good number of them still distinguished themselves in different ways, often taking advantage of Western education to enhance their prestige. Such Aro sons as Mbonu Ojike, Alvan Ikoku, K.O. Mbadiwe, S.G. Ikoku, and Reverend Inyama felt the impact of their achievements in the post-colonial period in the fields of politics, education, and religion, among others.<sup>26</sup>

## **DOMAINS OF ARO INFLUENCE AND CAPABILITIES IN IGBOLAND**

Aro traders were inarguably the driving force behind Aro success and ascendancy in Igboland. The traders owed their reputation, influence, and dominance more to an accident of geographical location than to anything else. Arochukwu was strategically located around the Enyong Creek, which links it to the main artery of the Cross River system—"the highway by which 'light and civilization' would penetrate the remotest recesses of the *terra incognita* inhabited by the Ibo, the Ibibio and the Ogoja peoples."<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it had the advantage of commanding the gateway into the densely peopled Igbo hinterland, apart from being within easy reach of the main

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<sup>25</sup> Njoku, "The Atlantic," 31-32; see Ohia, 6-8.

<sup>26</sup> Dike and Ekejiuba, 325-329.

<sup>27</sup> A. E. Afigbo, "Trade and Politics on the Cross River Basin, 1895-1905," *Journal of the Historical Society of Ghana* xiii, no. 1 (1972): 21.

southeastern Nigerian coastal ports. Thus, with a location that was favorable, the Aro naturally manipulated their geographical advantage to gain high economic status.

Aside from a favorable geographical location, the Aro had the advantageous influence of the authority of the widely famed Ibini Ukpabi oracle. The oracle conferred on the Aro the appellation *Umu Chukwu* ("Children of the high God"), making them almost untouchable as they traversed the length and breadth of the Igbo territory.<sup>28</sup> In addition, they relied on the Aro military alliance system to protect their interests. They made use of the services of war-like neighboring Igbo clans who, even on short notice, served to ensure the protection of Aro interests in the region. Any analysis of the factors and strategies behind Aro success and dominant influence in Igboland is incomplete without recognizing the remarkable Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure, and their flexible social system embodied in the trinity of the trader, the diplomat, and the oracular agent. With their array of exotic wares, wherever the itinerant Aro trader paused, prominent men literally fell over each other to host him and even tried to lure him to establish a resting place of sorts. Then, the readily available agent of the Aro oracle would act as a guide for consulting the oracle and also serve as a guarantee for security along hazardous routes. Finally, the presence of the Aro diplomat was necessary for ending those inter-community feuds, which were adjudged unprofitable to Aro interest because of the challenges of insecurity they posed to travelers. Additionally, the presence of the diplomat was a known deterrent to attack from potential invaders because of the fear of real or imaginary repercussion from the dreaded Aro oracle as well as the fear of the inevitable military reprisal that would certainly follow such action.<sup>29</sup>

The image of the Aro in Igbo development history hinged essentially on what

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<sup>28</sup> Pa Michael Abiakam, (retired trader/village council elder, age 90+), interview with author, Ogonaluma, Umuoziri, Inyishi, Ikeduru, December 23, 2013; and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

<sup>29</sup> Ohia, 6.

constituted Aro sources of influence and capabilities, especially in the slave trade era. It is possible to present these in five distinct domains. The first is “the domain of human social capabilities.” This area embodies the Aro ability to apply common-sense psychology in controlling the land and peoples of their homeland region. After mastering the regional land and river transportation network systems, Aro traders and diplomats divided the environment into two parts: the abode of “bush people,” whom they called *ndu mba ohia*, and the abode of “littoral people,” or *ndu mba mmiri*. While the littoral people consisted of all those who lived close to the coast, such as the Efiks and the Ijaws, bush people referred to those who lived in the hinterlands.<sup>30</sup>

Being in direct contact with the coast-based Europeans, the littoral communities were better armed and also largely organized under centralized political structures. Additionally, their men of authority occupied a strategic middle position in the slave trade. By virtue of the geographic location of such communities, the Aro avoided raiding them for captives. Rather, exchange of trade goods, which included human cargo, and diplomatic cooperation with the leaders of these communities, mainly through the instrumentality of the Ibini Ukpabi, were the defining characteristics of the relationship between these communities and the Aro. On the other hand, seeing the bush people of the decentralized Igbo hinterland largely as people of “primitive tribes” that were very uninformed about the goings-on in the coast-based Euro-African relations at the time, the Aro designated their abode as the main source of captive extraction. The abode of the littoral people was the main destination point of captives before shipment across the Atlantic. Little wonder then that the catchphrase for punishing a recalcitrant fellow in the Igbo hinterland during that period of insecurity was simply *iresi ya ndi mba mmiri*,<sup>31</sup> that is, “to sell the fellow off to the littoral people” or people of the coast. Furthermore, the Aro, not insensitive to local cultural forms, were thoughtful and smart

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<sup>30</sup> Pa Abiakam and Pa Opara.

<sup>31</sup> Udochukwu E. Akukwe and Pa Opara.

to appropriate and put to use the important element of trust, building it into their unequal social relations with their neighbors. To facilitate this connection, they dutifully adopted the dialect of their host. Moreover, in recruiting professional load carriers from host communities, the Aro relied on the advice of local men of authority, whose trust and confidence they earned and to whom they gave material presents and also a promise to provide for the load carriers' security/protection. In addition, they re-invented the institution of *Igbandu* ("blood pact") to service their trade relations. Whereas *Igbandu* was originally used, for instance, to re-establish confidence between disputants, especially in kinship relationships, the itinerant Aro trader used it in forming friendships and alliances with alien groups.<sup>32</sup> In other words, they adapted the institution to establish strong links with non-Aro Igbo sub-groups, thereby making it possible for them to gain access to areas where a forcible entry would disrupt trade by generating hostility or resistance. Thus, *Igbandu* removed the element of mutual suspicion, established confidence in the contracting parties, and made it obligatory for local chiefs and men of authority to keep trade routes open and secure for Aro traders to ply their business without hindrance.

Next is "the domain of economic capabilities" under which the Aro became the major purveyors of European trade goods, including the exotic/luxury ones, such as gun and gunpowder, obtained from within the abode of the littoral people. With such goods, they endeared themselves to the elites in the bush community, and stimulated differences in wealth and social status in these communities. For instance, the possession of a gun by an individual and the firing of guns during ceremonies, such as funerals, soon became indicators of a high-level social status.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the Aro depended

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<sup>32</sup> For details, see, F. I. Ekejiuba, "Igba-Ndu: An Igbo Mechanism of Social Control and Adjustment," *African Notes* VIII, no. 2 (1972): 9-24.

<sup>33</sup> Chief Joseph Ndubuisi, (retired teacher, aged 75 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2013; and Mazi Sunday Okoro, (retired teacher,

on the coast-bound export trade to generate luxury goods with which they increased their power and prestige with their neighbors. As a result of exposure to what was perceived by the standards of the time as “better things of life,” expectations rose, creating “a new class of men anxious to acquire wealth and titles—a class with whom the Aro also allied to extract captives through kidnapping and occasional raids.”<sup>34</sup> Therefore, Aro dominance was based on wealth accumulation through trade and military power, as is evident in the politico-legal domain.

With the influence and authority conferred on them by their oracle, the Aro became key negotiators in local socio-political disputes, enthroning the justice system of their oracle in the abode of the so-called “bush people.” With time, the Aro justice system became fundamental to the social organization of people in various parts of the Igbo hinterland.<sup>35</sup> For instance, as an integral part of the traditional Igbo judicial system, consulting with the Ibini Ukpabi oracle at Arochukwu became an effective means of achieving genuine reconciliation and of re-establishing confidence between disputants whose relationship was so strained that normalcy was impaired. With their justice system installed, even without having to push ultimately for the acceptance of their political lordship, the Aro used the services of fighting allies to assert some quasi-political supremacy whenever the need arose. By the same token, however, the allies were also used to raid for captives in the bush community.

The importance of the Ibini Ukpabi in Aro ascendancy should not be overstressed. As much as the oracle was paramount in the imposition of Aro hegemony, it operated

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aged 65 years), interview with author, Obinkita, Arochukwu, Abia State, December 18, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

<sup>35</sup> See, for instance, NNAE, J.G.G. Allen, *Intelligence Report on the Ngwa Clan*, Vol. 1, 1933, 41; see, also Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 105; Pa Opara and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.

in perfect symbiosis with the great Aro commercial acumen: the utilization of contacts made in the course of promoting it to advance Aro commercial interests, and vice versa. As pointed out earlier, the ability of the Aro to impose their authority in Igboland also rested on their military prowess. The exercise of the ability to implement this policy was, however, guided by tact because, as Alan Burns explains, the Aro were not a military people but owed their power to their relatively great intelligence when compared with the neighboring groups.<sup>36</sup>

Under the "domain of culture and cosmology," the Aro advertised their oracular power and propagated the *Ekpe/Okonko* society in many parts of Igboland,<sup>37</sup> using the cult members to further expand their commercial interests. Remarkably with time, the Aro greatly used their oracle to influence or change Igbo cosmology, impacting the Igbo worldview, as Aro agents were often invited to different parts of Igboland to help to establish local shrines, or *Ihu Chukwu*, of the great *Chukwu*, the high God of the Igbo pantheon. For the Aro, the spirito-psychic field involving occultism and the use of charms was useful in the dangerous business of slaving. Though risky, under the effective protection of their dreaded oracle and distinguished as "children of the high God," the Aro confidently strutted from one community to the other, directing the procurement and movement of captives.

Finally, there was "the domain of the physical environment." With no encumbrances, the Aro travelled and traded extensively, building a sequence of resting places stretched out as a trade diaspora along the trade routes. The

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<sup>36</sup> Sir Alan Burns, *A History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 215.

<sup>37</sup> For information about the power of the *Ekpe* society, see NNAE File No. B 1680/15 J. N. Cheetam, "Report on Secret Societies," 1915; see, also, John N. Oriji, "Transformations in Igbo Cosmology during the Slave Trade: A Study of the Genesis of Place-Names, Totems and Taboos," in Nwauwa and Onwudiwe, eds., 106; and, F. Ekejiuba, "Aro Worldview: An Analysis of the Cosmological Ideas of Arochukwu People of Eastern Nigeria," *West African Religion*, 8 (1970): 1-11.



subsequent proliferation of Aro settlements in pre-colonial Igboland was a corollary of these resting-places. According to David Northrup, the more important resting places gradually became trading centers and finally Aro settlements.<sup>38</sup> From these trading centers, new settlements were, in turn, founded due to Aro initiative or the initiative of a local man of authority. This was the genesis of "Aro imperialism," which became the foundation of effective Aro hegemony. Once a settlement was formed, as Uche Ohia notes, the Aro acquired landed property and took wives from among their host communities. Such affinities served both to ensure peaceful co-existence and to increase the size of Aro groups since, while freely marrying non-Aro women, the Aro men at the time never permitted their daughters to marry a non-Aro.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, the Aro migrated and settled permanently in choice or strategic parts of Igboland either to enable them to advertise and promote the powers of their oracle, or simply to be better able, among other things, to tap captives from even the most isolated but well-populated hinterland communities. This strategy produced two types of Aro: "the *Aro-uno*," the home-based Aro or those Aro who remained at home in Arochukwu, and "the *Aro-mba'*" or "*Aro-Uzo*," the Aro abroad or the Aro living outside the homeland.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the strategy led to the formation of Arochukwu confederacies, which maintained direct links with the Atlantic market even though they were not under any central authority.<sup>41</sup>

With the inception of colonial rule in Nigeria, most non-Aro Igbo, for fear of domination, became determined to halt Aro expansion into neighboring territories that

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<sup>38</sup> David Northrup, *Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1978): 126.

<sup>39</sup> Ohia, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> G. Ugo Nwokeji's *The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra: An African Society in the Atlantic World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

had been going on for hundreds of years. In many cases, the Diaspora Aro soon began to be treated as "aliens," especially under the Native Lands Acquisition ordinances of the British colonial state, notwithstanding the number of generations for which they had been settled in non-Aro areas, or the means through which they acquired titles to land. In some cases, they were made not to acquire land, or alienate it, without the permission of their indigenous landlords.<sup>42</sup> In the final analysis, commercial reasons connected to the Atlantic trade were certainly not the exclusive motive for Aro migrations/settlement outside their immediate homeland, but they were, indeed, a powerful incentive for temporary or permanent movement of the Aro across the Arochukwu borders. They moved across their home borders in order to bridge different contexts in the commerce of the time, or they just left Arochukwu as fortune hunters in search of greener pastures elsewhere. Accordingly, Aro migrants can best be described as entrepreneurial pioneers, as bricoleurs making the best out of the changes associated with the trade of the Atlantic community. So, even though it is valid to say that the Atlantic trade did not shape or initiate Aro responses to changes in the region, it did set the parameters for the forms of change that took place in the area. For the Igbo hinterland area of southeastern Nigeria, migrations by a predatory group like the Aro were undertaken to cope with environmental and demographic changes and demands occasioned by the slave trade and resistance to it. Thus, trade and environmentally instigated migrations resulted in the permanent geographical dispersal of the Aro in various parts of the Igbo territory and even beyond; for the same reason, they also form the background factors of what later led to their dual image.

## **ARO DUAL IMAGE**

In the context of ethno-history, the dual image of a people rests upon their achievements, exploits, and performance recognized as impacting favorably or

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<sup>42</sup> Njoku, "The Atlantic," 31-32.

profitably and otherwise on some other people or groups. The dual image of the Aro is a function of the level of their overall attainment rooted at all levels of their material, psychic, and spiritual being. At the exoteric level, it derives from a people's ethno-history and culture; that is, from the level of their material and non-material achievements, modes and methods of living, and the story that is told, or history that is written, about them.<sup>43</sup> Each group of people is a product of history. Their past has brought them to where they are today.

A dual image can be the attribute of an individual person or a group. An individual can obtain this image either because of what they have achieved as a person or by belonging to a group that has made a particular mark in human history because of its placement on the ladder of culture and civilization. Thus, a Mazi Nwachukwu Okoroafor of Arochukwu, even if he is weak, will attract—at least outside his Arochukwu homeland—the same dual image associated with an average Aro man because of Aro exploits in the past. An individual achievement can be a freak occurrence, but a group's achievement can, and usually does, gel<sup>44</sup> into a system or what historians may call "culture and civilization." Thus, for emphasis, the achievements and exploits of an individual cannot confer a dual image on a group, though a group's achievement/exploits can confer a dual image on a person who belongs to it, even if they are an outright failure. That an individual's exploits or achievements cannot give a group a dual image is like the old story or adage that a tree cannot make a forest.

The exploits or achievements from which a dual image derives can fall into any of the following three fields of activity: i) mentifacts, or mental constructs; ii) socio-facts or social institutions and usages; and iii) artifacts or tools for doing work. In the

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<sup>43</sup> A. I. Nwabughuogu, "Ugwu Ndi Igbo in the Nigerian Nation State," *Ugwu Abia* (Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 33-34.

<sup>44</sup> A. E. Afigbo, "Ugwu Isi Oji or the Blackman in the Context of Global Civilization," *Ugwu Abia*, (Umuahia: Ministry of Information, 2000): 59.

field of mentifacts are areas such as philosophy and ethics; in socio-facts things like religious, political, economic and legal systems, social life and values, and language count; and artifacts are such things as material tools for getting things done. Put in simpler terms, human social achievements and exploits can be compartmentalized into two large fields, the spirito-psychic and the mental-material fields. For pre-colonial Igboland, especially in the heyday of the Atlantic slave trade, the spirito-psychic field, which includes occult and oracular powers, was, in a sense, almost the exclusive arena of the Aro through the instrumentality of their Ibini Ukpabi oracle. With this oracle, Aro cosmological influence in the context of their relations with communities in the Igbo hinterland, for example, spread out to take Igboland (the southeastern region) by storm.

Even though the mental-material field—in this case, Western science and technology—was the private domain of the West, the Aro were at least among the first of the hinterland southeastern Nigerian peoples to have a toehold claim in this field through their middle position in the trans-Atlantic trade. Through trade with Europeans at the coast, Aro acquisition of items such as guns and gunpowder among other products at a fairly early historical point paid off for them as it constituted part of the secret of the dazzling successes they recorded in their many-sided relations with the rest of the Igbo. This trade, indeed, set the foundation for their early superior positive and popular image in Igboland, which became an important basis of their domination of the region. It is possible now to highlight some crucial aspects of this domination, which are germane to the issue of an Aro dual image in the area.

Igboland was predominantly a decentralized society whose growth and development, given the overall impact of the slave trade, was not in any way promoted by internal Aro exploitation for captives. Decentralized societies were victims rather than predators within the Atlantic slave system. There were two kinds of decentralized societies in the context of the slave trade: those raided by outsiders and those internally exploited for captives. Igboland fell into the second category. At no time did any

neighboring non-Igbo group directly raid the Igbo for captives.<sup>45</sup> Together with their allies, the Aro did. They masterminded the raiding of communities and sub-groups, especially in the Igbo hinterland, but were themselves never raided. To fall into the hands of an internal group of predators was, for all intents and purposes, worse than to be raided by outsiders. Aro-led internal exploitation of their own ethnic group proved quite disastrous for Igboland. Thus, by the middle of the 18th century, the area had become one of the most important sources of enslaved people for the Euro-African trade.<sup>46</sup>

Further, it may well be that the internal Aro predatory role was mainly responsible for the existence of the village-type political structure in most parts of Igboland, such as outside Oguta, Onitsha, and parts of western Igboland. The Aro strategy of internally exploiting and tapping Igboland inch by inch weakened societal solidarity and undermined any successful anti-slavery resistance. With the Aro strategy of instigating inter- and intra-group squabbles, resistance could not be possible in the absence of a centralized authority.<sup>47</sup> The strategy may have exposed the Aro to the generally advantageous small-scale political organization of non-Aro Igbo communities, which, at the time, they may have found suitable, at least in the short run, for their captive extraction business. But, in the long run, such a strategy discouraged the game-changing move toward political centralization. Kate Meagher rightly avers that Aro “predatory relationship with the Igbo hinterland, which involved the encouragement of slave raiding and other institutions of slave procurement, may have contributed to

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<sup>45</sup> Njoku, “Women’s Resistance,” 33.

<sup>46</sup> Northrup, chapters 1-3.

<sup>47</sup> It is obvious that the Aro preferred that the fragmented polities of Igboland remained decentralized and bound together by social and economic institutions, which Elizabeth Isichei in *A History of the Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976) describes as “a dense network of tiny capillary veins,” 67.

their inability to consolidate their extensive coordinating role into the formation of a centralized state."<sup>48</sup> In any case, the fact remains that tapping one village after another was *par excellence*, the Aro "divide and rule" policy, or a "divide and *enslave*" tactic, suitable to their slaving business since it kept local units fragmented and therefore vulnerable.

The Aro, whose own built-in and self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through slaving activities was to see it more as a means of exchange than as means of production, contributed in building the foundations of a spineless feudalism in pre-colonial Igboland. They first led the way in inoculating the Igbo with the virus of a new appetite for European trade goods, leading, in the end, to the "de-industrialization" of the indigenous economy.<sup>49</sup> Next, they stimulated differences in wealth among the Igbo in a manner that paved the way for a rabid acquisitive propensity and instigated the commoditization of "everything around them and the commercialization of life," leading to "the rise of mercenary instinct in a good number of the people."<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Meagher, 32.

<sup>49</sup> For details on some local industries that were affected, see NNAE, ABADIST 9/1/1303–Akwete Cloth Weaving, Aba Division, D.O. Aba to the Resident, Owerri Province, Umuahia, 18 June, 1947; NNAE OP. 1760 Vol. 1, Local Industries Ondist 12/1/1224; and NNAE Memo No. NS. 810/16 of May 31, 1938, from D.O. Nsukka to Senior Resident, Onitsha Province; according to P. A. Talbot, the "export trade in (local) cloth flourished until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, whence it gradually declined owing to great expansion in the import of Manchester goods." P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their History, Ethnology and Languages with an Abstract of the 1921 Census* Vol. 3 (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 941.

<sup>50</sup> Victor Ukaogo, "Clapping with One Hand, Sleeping with One Eye: Repositioning the Igbo Agenda in a Competitive and Globalizing World," *Igbo Studies Review*, 1 (2013): 111.

Under the influence of the Aro, accumulating captives and selling them off into slavery became the much sought-after occupation in order to “get-rich quick” and as a means to provide revenue to purchase European goods. Domestically, it even became a class status symbol to acquire captives and use them as slaves. In fact, the growth of the local Aro-driven slave trade created sinister opportunities for capital accumulation by the elite but also imposed burdens on the agricultural economy because of undue emphasis on the enslavement process, the institutionalization of slavery, and the neglect of the subsistence sector due to the heightened commoditization of human beings.<sup>51</sup> Thus, the Aro may be the precursors of “the negative entrepreneurial spirit that is today legendary and proverbial in Igboland.”<sup>52</sup>

In the area of cosmology, the proliferation of oracular deities in pre-colonial Igboland is traceable to the Aro. Monday Noah’s research shows that “the Long Juju,” as visiting Europeans nicknamed the Aro oracle, was specifically designed or re-designed for the commoditization of human beings and might have been the largest single vault in the region “where human beings were held awaiting shipment.”<sup>53</sup> Dike also considers the Aro oracle as the medium through which the captives exported from the ports of the Niger Delta were largely recruited and estimates that half or more of the enslaved people exported from this region had passed through its mysterious portals.<sup>54</sup> As noted earlier, the influence of the Ibini Ukpabi contributed to changing Igbo cosmology, with deities and shrines mushrooming in different parts of Igboland

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<sup>51</sup> Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 28-29; this was in spite of the fact that the Aro brought new crops, such as *Ede Aru* – a special type of cocoyam allegedly introduced in Igboland by them (the Aro), as its name suggests. Pa Opara.

<sup>52</sup> Ukaogo, 111.

<sup>53</sup> Monday Noah, *Old Calabar: The City-States and the Europeans* (Uyo: Scholars Press, 1980), 75.

<sup>54</sup> K. O. Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 40-41.

as if in emulation of the Aro. Yet, the influence of the Aro oracle continued to outshine other oracles such as the Igwekala of Umunoha, the Ogbunorie of Ifakala, the Amadioha of Ezianya, the Agbala of Awka, and the Kamalu of Ozuzu.<sup>55</sup> Given the foregoing, it may be difficult to rule out that, considering the extent of their cosmological impact on the rest of Igboland, the Aro may also have laid the institutional foundations of ritual slavery, or the Osu caste system, in parts of the Igbo hinterland.<sup>56</sup>

The Aro art of long-distance trading, as well as their habit of migrating, settling, and integrating into host societies have had a demographical impact on the greater part of non-Aro Igboland, resulting in high population densities, population re-configuration, the fear of domination on the part of host communities, and land disputes. The ripples of some of these may have exacerbated the negative image of the Aro. But the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure which manifested in their art of long-distance trading also manifested in the Diaspora Aro's habit to contribute meaningfully to the development of host society, while not forgetting their homeland. On another front, the Igbo, now well-known for their presence in virtually all parts of the civilized world, would appear to have emulated or copied the Aro spirit of enterprise and adventure. Shrewd and resourceful, the pre-colonial Aro had led the way in introducing local institutional mechanisms, such as armed convoys, organized rest houses, marital alliances, fictive kinship, and indigenous credit system, for overcoming the risks and lightening the burden of long-distance trade in the then fragmented and insecure pre-European political environment of Igboland and environs. It has therefore been rightly

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<sup>55</sup> For the role of the oracles in integrating Igboland, see Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Oracles and Inter- group Relations," *South-western Journal of Anthropology*, xiv (1958): 295-317; Interview with Mr. Harrison Nwachukwu, aged 78 years, retired civil servant, Umunah, Orlu Local Government Area, Imo State, 21/12/2013.

<sup>56</sup> The evidence on the institution of Osu "suggests that it is of relatively recent origin, and adopted its present form in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade;" see, Isichei, 6.



argued that the rapid expansion of the Igbo diasporas was a product not only of population pressure at home, but of the prior development of social “blueprints for migration” in pre-colonial Igbo social organization.<sup>57</sup> The organization of traders and fortune hunters into itinerant groups created a framework for migration that did not rupture linkages between migrants and their home areas. Pre-colonial institutions requiring the annual return of migrants to their hometown for festivals were well established among the Aro and spread to other Igbo groups with the passage of time.<sup>58</sup> According to a study on entrepreneurs in the commercial Igbo town of Nnewi, “systems of apprenticeship also followed a diasporic pattern, in which masters settled apprentices in other parts of Nigeria in order to widen their networks and avoid problems of oversupply in a given area.”<sup>59</sup>

Thus, what is now the Igbo diaspora began, in a very real sense, in the pre-colonial era as the Aro trade diaspora in order to benefit maximally from the slave trade. The Aro successfully colonized strategic trade routes and places in non-Aro Igboland and beyond in their own form of Aro *lebensraum*, if you will.<sup>60</sup> Clearly, the Aro were successful, in part, because their trade diaspora was not tied to the apron strings of the political agenda of an expansionist state. To some extent, therefore, they were the precursors of what constitutes the modern globalization of the Igbo, continuing, as it were, from where it stood following the abolition of the slave trade.

Finally, the character of Anglo-Aro relations during the period of colonial conquest and the nature of Aro resistance influenced Anglo-Igbo relations for the better part of the colonial period. Unlike much of the rest of the Igbo sub-groups, the Aro perceived rather quickly that the presence of the British posed a great threat to their economic

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<sup>57</sup> Meagher, 41.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Njoku, “The Atlantic,” 28-32; Ohia, 4-8.

interests.<sup>61</sup> Although they realized the military superiority of the British, the Aro believed that they were clever enough to outwit them:

They decided therefore to engage in endless negotiations while, at the same time, determined not to yield an inch of territory to the British. Employing to the fullest that Aro capacity for sweet but tortuous double-talk, they got the British bogged down in fruitless negotiations for five years. It was not until 1899 that the British were able to see through the Aro game and decided on military conquest. The experience left a decided impression on the British about the Igbo.<sup>62</sup>

Because of the nature of Anglo-Aro relations, the British and the Igbo never really came to love each other, even if there existed until the end of colonial rule a certain uneasy type of admiration between them. Aro predatory relationships with the

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<sup>61</sup> A British colonial officer captured an important part of the Aro economic interest during this period as the phenomenon of "clandestine slave dealing, especially in small children," being an internal trade which the British needed to get "automatically and completely suppressed." For details see NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, vol. 1 Williams, acting Secretary, Southern Provinces, to Governor, December 13, 1939; and, NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, Vol. 1 Chief Secretary for the government, February 5, 1924.

<sup>62</sup> G. N. Uzoigwe, "Ndi-Igbo in Modern Nigerian History," unpublished manuscript. The slave trade and the Aro oracular practices persisted for more than a decade after their formal elimination, leading to a second destruction in 1912. In fact, it took several decades of repression and punitive sanctions to dismantle the economic systems and sanctioning powers of Aro-centered commercial organization. See A. E. Afigbo, *Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981). On the doggedness with which the British colonial administration hunted down the agents of the Aro see, also, A. E. Afigbo, "The Eclipse of the Aro Slaving Oligarchy 1901-1927," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 6, no. 1 (Dec. 1971): 3-24.

rest of the Igbo, which involved the encouragement of raiding and other institutions of captive procurement, impacted Igboland. However adventurous, enterprising, and materially successful the Aro were through their key role in the slave trade in Igboland, the flipside is that their ascendancy and influence are irrevocably tied to the unpleasant memory of a remarkable aspect of brutal Igbo history.

## **CONCLUSION**

The dual image of the Aro is traceable to the central role they played in the slave trade in Igboland, the memory of which lingers in the consciousness of many Igbo people in southeastern Nigeria. The Aro dominance of pre-colonial Igboland was notoriously based on the cold logic of their self-perpetuating rationale for acquiring wealth through infamous slaving activities. That the slave trade could and did develop in the context of the southeastern Nigerian hinterland despite the absence of a strong centralized power was largely because of the Aro factor. Within the context of the Atlantic economy, it is to their credit that the lack of a central government in Igboland during this period did not prevent the formation of a complex commercial network, one that remarkably was, in part, supported by private enterprise dominated by the Aro people. Aro trade merchants were successful as cultural brokers who connected small Igbo communities to the wider world. With great wealth amassed in the process, the Aro were emboldened by their achievements and came to refer to themselves as “Aro *oke-Igbo*” (“Aro, the great Igbo” or “Aro, the male Igbo”); and they were reverentially regarded throughout the precolonial period as “the government” of that period.<sup>63</sup> The respect accorded to the Igbo by their neighbors was due in part to Aro economic, religious, and military power. The Aro oracle commanded respect that extended to Idah, Idoma, Isoko, and Urhobo.<sup>64</sup> A German doctor, Hermann Koler, reported in 1840 that

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<sup>63</sup> Ohia, 5 and 7.

<sup>64</sup> Nwabughuogu, 35.

the dominance of the Igbo language in the southeastern region and the respect of neighboring societies for the Igbo had to do with the Aro-driven trade of the Igbo and their warlike nature.<sup>65</sup>

Yet, the many-sided setback of Igboland because of the slave trade carries with it the unsavory realization of the predatory role of one of its very own sub-groups. The Aro remain a critical aspect of the unpleasant memories of inter-group relations in pre-colonial Igboland. The place of the Aro in the pre-colonial history of Igboland can be better explained in the context of the successful creation of a network of exploited people connected to the Atlantic economy. This is so because the Atlantic Ocean, and with it the Atlantic economy, redefined Igboland, and on this ocean a trauma is inscribed.

One aspect of the aftermath of pre-colonial Aro activities in Igboland is that many Igbo sub-cultural groups tend to loathe the Aro presence to the extent of abhorring relating closely with them and even forbidding marital ties with them. One oral informant cynically reflected, "Even if we now have started trusting the Aro, the demon in them we do not trust!"<sup>66</sup> Those who refuse to trust the Aro have continued to harbor anti-Aro sentiments; they continue to view their presence with suspicion, easily justifying their attitude by evoking memories of "what they regard as the treacherous Aro activities in the age of the Atlantic trade of the not-too-distant past."<sup>67</sup> Nonetheless, some people across Igboland still remain convinced that Aro socio-economic ascendancy in the area, far from constituting a disaster, was an unmitigated blessing. To this group, the Diaspora Aro have been wholeheartedly accepted in their

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<sup>65</sup> Hermann Koler, "Bonny and Igboland in 1840," reproduced in Elizabeth Isichei, *Igbo Worlds* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 14-17.

<sup>66</sup> Anonymous informant. One, however, thinks that the so-called "demon in the Aro" is all about their shrewdness and ability to succeed against all odds.

<sup>67</sup> Njoku, "The Atlantic," 32.

midst as their kith and kin, having lived in their host communities for decades, if not centuries. This has often been portrayed by statements such as: “*Ndi Aru bu Bekee mbu anyi ma; ha weteere anyi ihie,*”<sup>68</sup> which translates to “The Aro were the first Europeans/white men we knew; they brought us civilization.”

The introduction of the slave trade marked a great turning point in the history of Igboland. The Aro participation in the trade had some positive, though mainly negative, repercussions for the Igbo people, who still evoke memories of its impact. Studying the Aro-Igbo aspect of the long history of the trade and its repercussions advances a better understanding of the interplay of international and local socio-economic dynamics in intra/inter-group relations. In Igboland, inter-group relations over these centuries were not overtly guided by the alliance of coercion and capital.<sup>69</sup> Overall, the study analyzes the role of the Aro in the slave trade in Igboland and the reason for the kind of memory it evokes in contemporary social relations among groups in the area. Additionally, it reveals how a particular understanding of the tensions and complexities of a critical aspect of the Igbo present is embedded in the past.

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<sup>68</sup> Pa Opara.

<sup>69</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1982* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).

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  11. Martin Klein, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and Decentralized societies in West Africa," Public Lecture, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria, January 22, 2000, 11.
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  13. NNAE., F. A. Goodlife, "Intelligence Report on the Otanzu, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, 28935 CSE 1/1/5, 1933 & 1952; NNAE., I.R.P. Heslop, "Intelligence Report on the Nkalu Clan, Orlu District, Okigwe Division, Owerri Province, CSE 1/85/6197A, 1936.
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  15. Udochukwu E. Akukwe, (retired teacher, now trader, age 81), interview with author, Umuejechi, Nekede, Owerri, Imo State, December 15, 2013.
  16. Chief Anthony Ogu, (trader, age 80), interview with author, Afor-Eziama Market, Eziama, Ikeduru, Imo State, November 28, 2014
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  31. For details, see, F. I. Ekejiuba, "Igba-Ndu: An Igbo Mechanism of Social Control and Adjustment," *African Notes* VIII, no. 2 (1972): 9-24
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  33. Udochukwu E. Akukwe
  34. See, for instance, NNAE, J.G.G. Allen, Intelligence Report on the Ngwa Clan, Vol. 1, 1933, 41; see, also Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 105; Pa Opara and Udochukwu E. Akukwe.
  35. Sir Alan Burns, *A History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 215
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41. Njoku, "The Atlantic," 31-32.
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44. Njoku, "Women's Resistance," 33.
45. Northrup, chapters 1-3
46. It is obvious that the Aro preferred that the fragmented polities of Igboland remained decentralized and bound together by social and economic institutions, which Elizabeth Isichei in *A History of the Igbo People* (London: Macmillan, 1976) describes as "a dense network of tiny capillary veins," 67.
47. Meagher, 32
48. For details on some local industries that were affected, see NNAE, ABADIST 9/1/1303– Akwete Cloth Weaving, Aba Division, D.O. Aba to the Resident, Owerri Province, Umuahia, 18 June, 1947; NNAE OP. 1760 Vol. 1, Local Industries Ondist 12/1/1224; and NNAE Memo No. NS. 810/16 of May 31, 1938, from D.O. Nsukka to Senior Resident, Onitsha Province; according to P. A. Talbot, the "export trade in (local) cloth flourished until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, whence it gradually declined owing to great expansion in the import of Manchester goods." P. A. Talbot, *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria: A Sketch of their History, Ethnology and Languages with an Abstract of the 1921 Census* Vol. 3 (London: Frank Cass, 1969), 941.
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55. The evidence on the institution of Osu "suggests that it is of relatively recent origin, and adopted its present form in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade;" see, Isichei, 6.
  56. Meagher, 41
  57. Ibid.
  58. Ibid.
  59. Njoku, "The Atlantic," 28-32; Ohia, 4-8
  60. A British colonial officer captured an important part of the Aro economic interest during this period as the phenomenon of "clandestine slave dealing, especially in small children," being an internal trade which the British needed to get "automatically and completely suppressed." For details see NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, vol. 1 Williams, acting Secretary, Southern Provinces, to Governor, December 13, 1939; and, NNAE., CSE 1/85/2924, EP 5279, Vol. 1 Chief Secretary for the government, February 5, 1924.
  61. G. N. Uzoigwe, "Ndi-Igbo in Modern Nigerian History," unpublished manuscript. The slave trade and the Aro oracular practices persisted for more than a decade after their formal elimination, leading to a second destruction in 1912. In fact, it took several decades of repression and punitive sanctions to dismantle the economic systems and sanctioning powers of Aro-centered commercial organization. See A. E. Afigbo, *Ropes of Sand: Studies in Igbo History and Culture* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981). On the doggedness with which the British colonial administration hunted down the agents of the Aro see, also, A. E. Afigbo, "The Eclipse of the Aro Slaving Oligarchy 1901-1927," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 6, no. 1 (Dec. 1971): 3-24.
  62. Ohia, 5 and 7.
  63. Nwabughuogu, 35.
  64. Hermann Koler, "Bonny and Igboland in 1840," reproduced in Elizabeth Isichei, *Igbo Worlds* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 14-17.
  65. Anonymous informant. One, however, thinks that the so-called "demon in the Aro" is all about their shrewdness and ability to succeed against all odds.
  66. Njoku, "The Atlantic," 32
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  68. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1982* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **FROM MANY KINGDOMS, WE BECAME ONE:**

#### **THE HISTORY OF GHANA**

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#### **INTRODUCTION**


This chapter presents a chronological examination of Ghana's history, highlighting the many kingdoms during the pre-colonial era of Ghana's history, which laid the foundation for present-day Ghana. The chapter includes discussions on pre-colonial Ghana, particularly during the height of the Asante Kingdom. The chapter also addresses the economic system during pre-colonial Ghana, which was based on trade and primarily suited for an agrarian lifestyle. The discovery of gold changed the history and economy of the nation, and the land became known as the Gold Coast. The chapter illustrates how the discovery of gold led to the colonization of Ghana by the British. In 1957, Ghana gained independence from the British and, in the process, gave colonized African nations hope for freedom. The history of Ghana neither began with colonialism nor ended with independence. Ghana has become a beacon of hope for African countries and Africans living on the continent and in the diaspora. In the 21st century, Ghana has become the focus for millions of African descendants tracing their ancestry and identity. Current policies in Ghana have informed the development of programs, including "Year of Return," to extend a hand of welcome back home to Africans in the diaspora. The authors of this

chapter believe that the continuous strand, from pre-colonial, colonial, to post-colonial, is essential not only to understand the history of Ghana but perhaps of Africa.

Ghana evolved from many kingdoms to become one nation, currently known as the Republic of Ghana. The country is located on the southern coastline of Western Africa, along the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. Burkina Faso borders Ghana to the north, Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) to the west, and Togo to the east<sup>1</sup>. Ghana presently has sixteen regions, with Accra as its capital city, which holds the residence and seat of the President (see Figure 1). The country operates as a unitary presidential constitutional democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> The History Files. "African Kingdoms." N.d. (August 22, 2020).  
<https://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsAfrica/AfricaGhana.htm>



**Figure 1: Map of Ghana.** The map illustrates Ghana's capital city; the sixteen regions and their capitals; the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo; and the Gulf of Guinea.

The name Ghana was adopted from the title of the emperor, who ruled the medieval West African Ghana Empire. The Ghana Empire (see Figure 2) was one of the three most organized empires in the Sudan region. The other two empires were Songhai and Mali, located in Western Sudan.<sup>2</sup> The Ghana Empire's wealth in gold gave the state a reputation and connection to the world through trade, first with North African merchants

<sup>2</sup> Bennette Laverle, "Federal Research Division. Ghana: A Country Study," (June 14, 1995). <https://www.loc.gov/item/95018891/>

and later with Western Europe.<sup>3</sup> In 1957, the leaders of the newly independent state, formerly known as the British colony of the Gold Coast, decided Ghana was an appropriate name for the first Black African nation to gain independence from colonial rule. Another reason for the leaders' decision on the name was that the new country held a reputation for being wealthy and trading in gold, just like the ancient Ghana Empire.<sup>4</sup>

Before independence, Ghana was known as the Gold Coast because of its enormous wealth in minerals, especially gold.<sup>5</sup> All European traders involved with the Gold Coast were primarily interested in the gold.<sup>6</sup> During the 18th century, the Gold Coast became a source of rivalry among the Europeans, including the French, English, Swedes, Danes, and Dutch, all of whom sought control of the land. However, the British succeeded in ruling over the Gold Coast in 1901 after almost a century of resistance from the Asante Kingdom.<sup>7</sup>

This chapter presents a review of the literature on the history of Ghana. It begins by highlighting the many kingdoms that formed the country during the pre-colonial era, followed by a chronological discussion of Ghana's history from a colonial to post-colonial and post-independence society. These discussions lay the foundation for the last section of the chapter, which focuses on 21st century Ghana and the strides the country has made in becoming a beacon of hope for African countries and African diaspora.

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<sup>3</sup> Stephen Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana," *The Journal of Economic History* 30, no. 1 (1970): 33-50.

<sup>4</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," N.d. (September 15, 2020).

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<sup>5</sup> Gavin Hilson, "Small-Scale Mining and its Socio-Economic Impact in Developing Countries," *Natural Resources Forum* 26, no. 1 (2002): 3-13.


<sup>6</sup> KY Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5, no. 2 (1972): 235-247.

<sup>7</sup> Laverle, "Federal Research Division. Ghana: A Country Study," 3.

# PRE-COLONIAL GHANA

## THE MANY KINGDOMS

Ghana was divided into many kingdoms before British rule. The people from these kingdoms had immigrated to the land from the north, northwest, east, and northeast of the African region. Before the people migrated to modern-day Ghana, western African history has it that the area, for many centuries, was a meeting place for two rivers, the Black Volta and the White Volta. The meeting place of the two rivers forms the Volta River, which is Ghana's main river system. The inhabitants of modern Ghana were influenced by the wealth and the traditions of the three great empires of Western Sudan, the Ghana Empire, the Mali Empire, and the Songhai Empire (see Figure 2). The empires gained greatness from the trade of gold, kola nuts, ivory, and enslaved people with Northern African and European merchants.



**Figure 2: Map of Empires and Rivers.** The map illustrates the Volta rivers and the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires.

The origins of the kingdoms in many parts of modern Ghana can be traced to migrants from the trading empires who arrived in Ghana to maintain their gold trade and keep trade routes open.<sup>8</sup> In the 14th century, traders from the great Mande kingdoms, particularly the Ghana Empire and the Mali Empire, who came in search of gold dust, reached parts of the area that is now modern Ghana, mainly north of the forest. In the 16th century, merchants from the Hausa states, around the Niger Bend and the Benue River, seeking kola nuts, also reached parts of modern Ghana. The growth of these trades led to the development of many of the kingdoms by the end of the 16th century. The kingdoms included the northern states of Dagomba, Gonja, and Mamprusi, the Akan states in the forest zones, and the coastal states of Ewe, Fante, Ga-Adangbe.<sup>9</sup>

Out of the many states and ethnic groups that formed present-day Ghana, the Asante had the most influence on its history. The Asante belong to the Twi-speaking branch of the Akan people. The Asante confederacy constituted the groups that settled around Lake Bosumtwi (sometimes spelled Bosomtwe). Under the rule of strong militant leaders such as Chief Oti Akenten and King Osei Tutu I, the Asante expanded their territories after successful military operations against neighboring Akan states. Thus, by the mid-17th century, the Asante dominated the surrounding peoples and formed the most powerful states, transforming into an empire with Kumasi as its capital.<sup>10</sup>

Under the rule of Osei Tutu I as King of the Asante Empire, there was a political and military consolidation, which resulted in established centralized authority. Osei Tutu retained the customs and chieftaincy of newly dominated territories. Again, the chiefs were given seats on the Asante state council. Compared to other Akan peoples'

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<sup>8</sup> Stephen Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana," Discussion Papers. 87 (1969), <https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/87>

<sup>9</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 5.

<sup>10</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 5.

subjugation by the earlier conquests, Osei Tutu's methods were relatively easy and non-disruptive because the minor states continued to exercise internal self-rule. Osei Tutu developed a strong unity within the confederation. Therefore, in matters of national concern, member states prioritized the interests of the central authority.<sup>11</sup>

By the mid-18th century, the Asante Empire was highly organized under the rule of King Opoku Ware I, the successor to Osei Tutu, and had the northern states of Dagomba, Gonja, and Mamprusi under Asante influence. By the 1820s, successive Asante rulers extended boundaries southward, bringing the Asante Empire into contact with the coastal states such as the Ewe, Fante, and Ga-Adangbee and the various European merchants that traded with the Gold Coast.<sup>12</sup>

## **THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN PRE-COLONIAL GHANA**

Agriculture formed a significant part of Ghana's economy.<sup>13</sup> Similar to many agrarian economies, land ownership was an essential element in determining the economic structure. The available lands were shared among the community members, and products from each land belonged to the family that cultivated them. The land tenure system of West African societies protected the people against the accumulation of land by the privileged few. Thus, every member of the community had the right to own and work on their own land, except for a few who did not belong to a community and therefore had to work for others. Farmers cultivated commodities such as cocoa, coffee, kola nuts, palm oil, and rubber. Every household owned the products from their lands, which they

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<sup>11</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 6.

<sup>12</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 6.

<sup>13</sup> Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," 6



traded on a voluntary basis.<sup>14/15</sup> A large part of the economy was characterized by a subsistence form of economic organization with a minimum specialization in material product.<sup>16</sup>

Ghana had a well-established economic system before the first Western European traders arrived at its shores.<sup>17</sup> Ghana participated in the northern trade with other parts of Africa. Ghana was involved in diverse trades, including the slave trade.<sup>18</sup> Although slavery existed during that period, the use of enslaved laborers was more temperate, and “their standards of living were well above the minimum for bare subsistence.”<sup>19</sup> However, the trade focus shifted to forest products when the slave trade was abolished in the early 19th century. Salt manufacturing became a lucrative business among the coastal peoples, allowing them to exchange salt and dried fish for cloth, food, and other forest products. Because the people already participated in the trading system of Western Africa, it was easier for them to forge a European trade alliance.<sup>20</sup>

In 1471, the Portuguese traders were the first Western Europeans to trade with Ghana, where they found a stable economic system.<sup>21</sup> The Portuguese soon learned these trading practices and perfected the existing economic system for specialized trading.<sup>22</sup> By the end of the 16th century, Ghana’s economic production had grown exponentially both regionally and locally. Ghana had developed about twenty European forts and castles to

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<sup>14</sup> KB Dickson, “A Historical Geography of Ghana,” In *Transactions of the Gold Coast and Togoland Historical Society*, edited by H. J. Bevin Vol 2 of *Gold Coast Economy*. London, 1969.

<sup>15</sup> Daaku, “Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy,” 6.

<sup>16</sup> Hymer, “Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana,” 6.

<sup>17</sup> Laverle, “Federal Research Division. Ghana: A Country Study,” 6.

<sup>18</sup> Hymer, “Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana,” 7.

<sup>19</sup> Hymer, “Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana,” 7.

<sup>20</sup> Daaku, “Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy,” 7.

<sup>21</sup> Laverle, “Federal Research Division. Ghana: A Country Study,” 7.

<sup>22</sup> JD Fage, *Ghana, A Historical Interpretation* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), 42.

facilitate the trade business. While the forts and castles were set up in the coastal regions, other trading centers were established in the north to promote trading in the northern markets.<sup>23/24</sup>

Until the early 17th century, all of the markets involved in the trade business were primarily interested in the gold trade.<sup>25</sup> Thus, demand increased for gold, leading to a need to solve the problem of inadequate labor and the lack of sophisticated equipment for mining. To solve the labor problem, the Portuguese initiated the practice of selling captives from Benin in modern-day Nigeria to the local miners. Like many West African societies, the local people quickly absorbed and integrated these formerly enslaved individuals into society. Since most of these captives were women, they helped increase the population through voluntary unions with local miners, thereby eventually solving the problem of inadequate labor. The population increase sustained a high level of gold production to maintain the northern trade with other parts of Africa and the southern coastal or trans-Atlantic trade with Europe.<sup>26</sup>

By the end of the 16th century, the Portuguese were carrying one-tenth of the world's gold supply from Ghana. Because the Portuguese gold export was critical to their economy, they attempted to monopolize the trade by building a fort on Ghana's mainland. The Portuguese also introduced new crops, such as cassava and maize, which became staple crops.<sup>27</sup> The Portuguese maintained the gold trade monopoly until the 1530s when the French and the English challenged their position.

The Dutch were the second European traders to arrive in Ghana toward the end of the 16th century.<sup>28</sup> The Dutch also established many forts to sustain their trade with Ghana. By the early 17th century, Holland had become dependent solely on the gold from

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<sup>23</sup> Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," 7.

<sup>24</sup> Fage, *Ghana, A Historical Interpretation*, 7.

<sup>25</sup> Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," 7.

<sup>26</sup> Dickson, "A Historical Geography of Ghana," 8.

<sup>27</sup> Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana," 8.

<sup>28</sup> Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana," 8.

Ghana for its coinage. The increase in the trans-Atlantic slave trade did not deter the high production of gold. Thus, by the end of the 17th century, the Brandenburgs, Danes, Dutch, English, and Portuguese were actively involved in the gold and slave trade with the Gold Coast.<sup>29/30</sup>

Ghana became a source of rivalry among the Europeans, all of whom sought control of the land. Thus, the Danes, Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Swedes, among others, settled in Ghana at different times. Most of these Europeans built trading forts and castles along the coast of Ghana, numbering about twenty.<sup>31/32</sup> The British succeeded in ruling over Ghana from 1820; however, the rule became firmly entrenched only in 1901 after years of resistance from the Asante Kingdom.<sup>33</sup>

## **COLONIAL GHANA**

### **THE GOLD COAST**

The entire region of Gold Coast was officially annexed as a colony to the British Crown on January 1, 1902.<sup>34/35</sup> The colony was made up of the coastal regions and extended inland that established the initial Gold Coast Colony on July 24, 1874, including the Northern Territories, the Asante Kingdom, and the Trans-Volta Togoland<sup>36</sup> (Figure 3).

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<sup>29</sup> Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," 8.

<sup>30</sup> Dickson, "A Historical Geography of Ghana," 8.

<sup>31</sup> Daaku, "Aspects of Precolonial Akan Economy," 8.

<sup>32</sup> Hymer, "Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana," 8.

<sup>33</sup> Laverle, "Federal Research Division. Ghana: A Country Study," 8.

<sup>34</sup> Abayomi Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," *Modern Ghana* (February 18, 2015). <https://www.modernghana.com/news/599511/on-the-rise-of-colonialism-in-ghana.html#>

<sup>35</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 2012. <http://www.ghanaschoolsnet.com/page/gold-coast-under-colonial-rule>

<sup>36</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 9

The coastal regions were the first to form an alliance with the British and become a protectorate because of the military confrontations between them and the Asante Kingdom. The British fought the Asante peoples in 1874 and managed to extend their territories inland toward the borders of the Asante Kingdom. Following this victory over the Asante peoples, the British proclaimed the former coastal protectorate and the extended inland territories a crown colony. The Asante Kingdom became a British protectorate after almost a century of Anglo-Ashanti wars. The British conquered the Asante Kingdom following the Yaa Asantewaa War of 1900–1901 and consequently gained economic and political control over the Asante Kingdom.<sup>37</sup>

The Northern Territories were initially a district of the British colony in 1889 after agreements between the Northern chiefs of Bona, Dagarti, Mamprusi, and Wa and the British.<sup>38</sup> The territories were formally established as a British protectorate in 1901. The British concluded treaties for control over the Northern Territories with the assistance of the Fante Surveyor George Ekem Ferguson. The Northern protectorate comprised the Gonja, Mamprugu, and Wala states, and groups of people, such as the Frafra, Kokomba, and Sisala, who were once conquered by the Asante kingdom.<sup>39</sup> Because the Northern protectorate did not possess minerals, rubber, or timber like other Gold Coast areas, the British did not invest much in this region. Therefore, the protectorate remained impoverished economically and underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure.

Trans-Volta Togoland, or British Togoland, was the final addition to the Gold Coast colony.<sup>40</sup> This protectorate joined the Gold Coast colony in 1916. British Togoland was created after World War I when occupied German Togoland was separated into British and French territories. The French division eventually became Togo, and the British half

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
<sup>37</sup> Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," 9.

<sup>38</sup> Nana James K Brukum, "Studied Neglect or Lack of Resources?" *The Socio-Economic Historical Society of Ghana* 2, (1998): 117-131.

<sup>39</sup> Brukum, "Studied Neglect or Lack of Resources?" 9.

<sup>40</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 10.

was elected in 1956 to join the Gold Coast and form Ghana through a referendum that was pushed by the United Nations.<sup>41</sup>



**Figure 3: The 1902 Map of the Gold Coast Colony.** The map illustrates the areas of the Northern Territories, the Trans-Volta Togoland, the Asante Kingdom, and the initial Gold Coast Colony established in 1874.

<sup>41</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 10.

## BRITISH COLONIAL RULE

British colonialism in the Gold Coast colony was holistic, ranging from economic to social and political to infrastructural development.<sup>42</sup> The colony had great economic potential with cash crop farming and the mining of natural minerals. Cocoa, palm oil, and palm kernels were among the products that raised substantial export revenue for the colony. Prior to the abolition of the slave trade, the Europeans were already conversant with the use of these products. Palm oil, for instance, was used by the Europeans to support the industrial revolutions in the sustainable production of tin plates, streetlights, candles, and soap.<sup>43</sup> By 1911, the Gold Coast had become the world's number one producer of cocoa, with an output of 88.9 million pounds, generating about £6 million, equivalent to over 700 million dollars in the 21st century.<sup>44</sup> In that same year, cocoa accounted for 46 percent of the colony's total value of exports.<sup>45/46</sup>

The mining of minerals, such as gold and diamonds, became another primary source of revenue. In 1901, the Gold Coast had an estimated three thousand concessions of gold mining sites.<sup>47</sup> The British saw the need for convenient transportation of cocoa and minerals, which led to the construction of railways and roads. In 1901, a 41-mile railroad was completed, linking the mining town of Tarkwa to Sekondi. In 1902, the line was extended 124 miles to Obuasi and was further extended 168 miles to Kumasi in

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<sup>42</sup> Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," 11.

<sup>43</sup> Pauline Von Hellermann, "Red gold: a history of palm oil in West Africa," China Dialogue (January 18, 2021). <https://chinadialogue.net/en/food/red-gold-a-history-of-palm-oil-in-west-africa/>

<sup>44</sup> Stephen Hymer, *The Political Economy of the Gold Coast and Ghana*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Economic Growth Center, 1968.

<sup>45</sup> Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," 11.

<sup>46</sup> (Hymer, 1968), 11.

<sup>47</sup> Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," 11.

1903.<sup>48</sup> The Accra-Kumasi railway was also completed in 1923, and in 1926 a branch railway was built to link Kade, a diamond mining center, and Huni Valley in the western part of the Gold Coast.

The British invested extensive resources in developing the Asante and Fante states due to their wealth in cash crops and natural minerals and neglected the other protectorates. The expenditure on the northern protectorate, for instance, was abysmally minimal, owing to the perception that the protectorate was not economically viable.<sup>49</sup> The British later discovered that the northern protectorate had cotton and established the British Cotton Growers Association in 1906 to promote cotton cultivation. However, the British terminated this initiative since the labor was needed in other parts of the colony to work on palm oil and cocoa plantations.<sup>50</sup> Some of these policies rendered areas in the colony impoverished economically.

## **PRE-INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLES**

The roots of Ghanaian nationalism date to the early decades of the 20th century, with significant inspiration from the likes of Edward Blyden, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Sylvester Williams.<sup>51</sup> These people were pioneers of Pan-Africanism, a movement propagating the unified interests of all indigenous and diaspora peoples of African descent. These Pan-Africanists, as well as the United Kingdom-based West African Students Union, instigated the fight for freedom and nationalism. Du Bois's first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919, for instance, influenced liberation activists in the Gold Coast.

A year after the first Pan-African Congress in Paris, Joseph Casely Hayford, a Gold Coast lawyer, organized the inaugural meeting of the National Congress of British West

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<sup>48</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 11.

<sup>49</sup> Brukum, "Studied Neglect or Lack of Resources?" 11.

<sup>50</sup> Brukum, "Studied Neglect or Lack of Resources?" 12.

<sup>51</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 12.

Africa (NCBWA) in London, England.<sup>52</sup> The organization sought to forge an alliance among the various African nations under British colonial rule in the region. The NCBWA meeting attracted delegates from several British territories such as The Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. Although the NCBWA started as a platform for the intelligentsia of British West Africa, the organization later aimed at attaining self-governance for British West Africans by constitutional means.<sup>53</sup> Some of the demands the NCBWA fought for included the election of African representation to both the Legislative and Municipal Councils, the termination of untrained public servants exercising judicial functions, the participation of Africans in the civil service, the establishment of a British West African University in the colony, as well as compulsory education. The efforts of the NCBWA yielded minimum results from the British Crown. In 1930, the death of Casely Hayford caused the wane of the organization, resulting in the suspension of fights for liberation.<sup>54</sup> However, in October 1945, during the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who later became the first president of Ghana, returned to the Gold Coast to fan the flame of liberation efforts, upon the invitation of the members of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). The UGCC was, however, not officially formed until August 4, 1947.

Nkrumah returned to Ghana to serve as the General Secretary of the UGCC. The UGCC was the first independence movement political party founded in the Gold Coast. Its founding members were made up of lawyers and academics, including Ebenezer Ako-Adjei, Edward Akufo-Addo, William Ofori Atta, Joseph Boakye Danquah, and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lampsey. Ako-Adjei was a statesman, politician, lawyer, and journalist. Akufo-Addo was a politician and lawyer. Ofori Atta was a politician and lawyer. Boakye Danquah was a scholar, politician, and lawyer. Obetsebi-Lampsey was a political activist and lawyer. Nkrumah joined the five founding members to form the Big Six, who accelerated the fight for independence through a series of boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins, and publications.

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<sup>52</sup> Azikiwe, "On the Rise of Colonialism in Ghana," 12.

<sup>53</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 12.

<sup>54</sup> Ghana Schools Net, "Gold Coast Under Colonial Rule 1902-1951," 13.



The UGCC advocated for independence from the British and had the slogan "Full self-government within the shortest possible time."<sup>55/56/57</sup>

Several incidents marked the pre-independence struggle period. For example, in January 1948, the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) boycotted European goods due to high prices, an action that ended in February of the same year.<sup>58</sup> Nkrumah and the five other members of the UGCC were arrested, imprisoned, and blamed for the riots associated with the AWAM boycott. The 1948 riots led to the shooting of three former service members, Sergeant Adjetey, Corporal Attipoe, and Private Odartey Lamptey, who flouted the order to stop while proceeding toward the Osu Castle.

Upon the release of the six leaders of the UGCC in 1948, Nkrumah established the Committee on Youth Organization and a newspaper publication called *The Evening News* to further the course of the UGCC.<sup>59</sup> The other five members of the UGCC were invited to make recommendations to the 1949 Coussey Committee, advising the governor on the path to independence. Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC party on the grounds of dissonance in strategy, feelings of impatience, and social frustration. In June 1949, Nkrumah formed the Convention People's Party (CPP) along with Kojo Botsio, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, and other young men he had recruited from the UGCC. The CPP became a competitor to the UGCC and had the slogan "Full self-government now."<sup>60</sup> The

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<sup>55</sup> Solace E Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957," (2018). <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/features/2888-political-party-activity-in-ghana-1947-to-1957>

<sup>56</sup> C Arden-Clarke, "Eight Years of Transition in Ghana," *African Affairs* 57, no. 226, (1958): 29-37. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a094525>

<sup>57</sup> E. Smith-Asante, "Biography of Ghana's first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah," *Graphic Online* (March 8, 2016). <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/biography-of-ghana-s-first-president-dr-kwame-nkrumah.html>

<sup>58</sup> Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957" 13.

<sup>59</sup> Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957" 14.

<sup>60</sup> Arden-Clarke, "Eight Years of Transition in Ghana," 14.

two parties continued to work for the same cause, even though they had differences in tactics for the self-governance agenda.<sup>61</sup>

Nkrumah rose in popularity as his methods of non-violent protests and grassroots advocacy appealed to the masses. Nkrumah's demands for Positive Action resulted in a series of violent protests leading to the arrest of Nkrumah and other CPP leaders on January 22, 1950. Nkrumah secured a seat in government for his party while in prison, winning a two-thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly under the new Constitution in 1951.<sup>62</sup> On February 12, 1951, Nkrumah was released from prison to become the leader of Government Business.<sup>63</sup> The CPP won the June 1954 elections, and Nkrumah was re-elected as the leader of Government Business. The British were uncertain about how the country would be governed in their absence. Therefore, in 1956, the Colonial Secretary announced another general election, after which the British would set a date for independence. The July 1956 election was identical to the previous elections, with Nkrumah and the CPP winning the vote by a majority. On August 3, the assembly voted for independence and accepted Nkrumah's proposed name, Ghana. In September 1956, the Colonial Office announced March 6, 1957, to be Ghana's Independence Day.

The aftermath of the 1956 elections involved several deliberations in the Gold Coast Assembly that partly contributed to attaining Ghana's independence.<sup>64</sup> The National Liberation Movement, with the support of some religious and regionally based parties such as the Muslim Association Party, the Northern People's Party, and the Anlo Youth Organization, strongly opposed Kwame Nkrumah's centralization ideology and plan for independence. The National Liberation Movement's opposition to centralization and support for a continuing role for traditional leaders threatened to destabilize the independence agenda and led to debates in Parliament.<sup>65</sup> The United Nations, however,

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<sup>61</sup> Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957" 14.

<sup>62</sup> Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957" 14.

<sup>63</sup> GhanaWeb, "Pre-Colonial Period," 14.

<sup>64</sup> Eric Mensah, "Pan Africanism and Civil Religious Performance: Kwame Nkrumah and the Independence of Ghana," *Journal of Pan African Studies* 9, no. 4, (2016): 47-65.

<sup>65</sup> Amankwa, "Political Party Activity in Ghana—1947 to 1957" 15.

supported the 1956 referendum for Ghana to become the first sub-Saharan African nation to obtain independence from colonial rule.

## **POST-COLONIAL GHANA**

### **GHANA'S INDEPENDENCE**

With its independence on March 6, 1957, Ghana earned the whole world's attention because it was the first of Britain's African colonies to gain majority-rule independence. Several dignitaries, including Vice President of the United States Richard Nixon; United Nations representative Ralph Bunche; and Queen Elizabeth's representative, the Duchess of Kent, graced the celebration.

The first government after independence was patterned after the United Kingdom, with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of the CPP serving as the Prime Minister. On July 1, 1960, Ghana transitioned to become a republic with Nkrumah as the President. Although it started as a parliament, the style of governance later became a one-party state by 1964. Despite Ghana's efforts to become an independent and democratic nation, the country struggled to maintain the tenets of democracy. For almost three decades, Ghana experienced several military interventions due to controversial leadership practices, economic mismanagement, and corruption.

On February 24, 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown through a coup d'état. Ghana experienced the first military intervention from February 24, 1966, to April 3, 1969, under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Joseph Arthur Ankrah, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka, and Major (later Major Gen.) Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa of the National Liberation Council. Nkrumah had jailed his political opponents and had passed controversial laws that gave him a stronghold on power. There was also an ongoing bitter rivalry with the Asantes and other groups, which made Nkrumah an easy target for violence. Before the 1966 coup, there were several attempts on his life. In August 1962, there was a grenade attack on Nkrumah, which he claimed was orchestrated by leading police officers and

some leaders of the UGCC. On January 1, 1964, a police officer stationed at Flagstaff House fired four shots at Nkrumah but missed. The coup by the National Liberation Council, with the code name "Operation Cold Chop," was the icing on the cake. The National Liberation Council succeeded in the coup because they promised elections and had active support from the Ghana Police. A new constitution was drafted for the Second Republic, after which elections were held in 1969.<sup>66</sup>

The Second Republic began on October 1, 1969, with Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia of the Progress Party as the Prime Minister and Chief Justice Edward Akufo-Addo as the President. There were continuous economic difficulties in the country, and Busia was accused of economic mismanagement. Busia's economic structural adjustment programs resulted in high taxes, currency devaluation, and rising import prices. The economic difficulties instigated protests from the Trade Union Congress, which led to arbitrary arrest. Also, the budget adjustments affected all salaried workers, including the army troops and officers who supported Busia. Busia's authoritarian measures alienated the officers, and the change in the army's leadership was viewed as the last straw. Serving less than three years, Busia was overthrown on January 13, 1972, through a coup.

Ghana's second military intervention saw two leaderships: first, under Gen. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong from January 13, 1972, to October 9, 1975, and second, under Lt. Gen. Fred William Kwasi Akuffo from July 5, 1978, to June 4, 1979. Gen. Akuffo overthrew and imprisoned Gen. Acheampong for corruption and despotism. The two heads of state were members of the National Redemption Council, which later became the Supreme Military Council.<sup>67</sup>

Ghana experienced the third military intervention on June 4, 1979, under the leadership of Ft. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Inept, corrupt policies in the government inspired this coup. Rawlings accused the ruling government of reckless disbursement of state funds to amass wealth. Rawlings and junior

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<sup>66</sup> Angella Thompsell, "A Brief History of Ghana Since Independence," ThoughtCo. (October 14, 2019). <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-ghana-3996070>

<sup>67</sup> Thompsell, "A Brief History of Ghana Since Independence," 17.

ranks in the Ghana Armed Forces succeeded after failing the first attempt at a military revolt on May 15, 1979. However, this military intervention was short-lived, as it ushered in Ghana's third republic the same year, beginning on September 24, 1979, with Dr. Hilla Limann of the People's National Party serving as the President. Limann was overthrown on December 31, 1981, through Rawlings' second coup. Rawlings accused Limann of mismanaging the country's economy. The fourth military intervention Ghana experienced was in 1981 under Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council. Rawlings resigned from the military in 1992 and founded the National Democratic Congress to contest the presidential elections. Rawlings was elected in the 1992 elections to become the first President of the Fourth Republic.<sup>68</sup>

Ghana is currently in its Fourth Republic, which started on January 7, 1993. Ghana has experienced five governments under the Fourth Republic. Rawlings served two terms from 1993 to 2001. Ghana witnessed the first change of government through elections on January 7, 2001, with John Agyekum Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party as president. Kufuor also served two terms in office, which is the limit according to the Ghanaian Constitution and handed the presidency over to John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress in January 2009. On July 24, 2012, Mills' vice president, John Dramani Mahama, assumed the presidency after Mills' death during his first term. Mahama was elected for his first term and for a second term in the National Democratic Congress in 2012. Mahama lost the 2016 elections and ceded the presidency to Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party on January 7, 2017. Akufo-Addo is the first opposition leader in the history of Ghana to win elections against an incumbent government. Ghana's ability to return to democratic governance and successfully change several governments through elections has built a reputation for other African countries to emulate.

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<sup>68</sup> Thompsell, "A Brief History of Ghana Since Independence," 18

## POST-INDEPENDENCE GHANA

### THE BEACON OF HOPE FOR AFRICAN NATIONS AND AFRICANS IN THE DIASPORA

The period between the 1950s and 1960s is recorded as one of the most significant periods in Africa's history because several African states attained freedom from colonial rule.<sup>69</sup> The independence of Ghana served as a crack in the armor of imperialism in Africa, and Ghana became a platform on which a broader scope of freedom for the African continent could be achieved.<sup>70</sup> Many colonized African countries still fighting for liberation saw Ghana's achievement as a beacon of hope for the future.

Political figures, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and Sekou Touré, formed Pan-African movements that played a significant role in the development of cultural and political systems necessary for the independence of other African nations. Particularly, Nkrumah's Western education and cultural experiences with freedom and the rule of law kindled his desire to unify and fight for the liberation of the African peoples.<sup>71</sup> After Ghana's independence, seventeen other states had gained independence by 1960. Similarly, Ghana's independence made an impact in the African diaspora, with visits from African American civil rights activists such as Martin Luther King Jr in 1957 and Malcolm X in 1964 to join in the celebration.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Vanessa van den Boogaard, "Modern Post-Colonial Approaches to Citizenship: Kwame Nkrumah's Political Thought on Pan-Africanism," *Citizenship Studies* 21, no. 1, (2017): 44-67.

<sup>70</sup> Thompsell, "A Brief History of Ghana Since Independence," 18.

<sup>71</sup> Felix Kumah-Abiwu and James Ochwa-Echel, "Rethinking the Ideas of Pan-Africanism and African Unity: A Theoretical Perspective of Kwame Nkrumah's Leadership Traits and Decision Making," *Journal of Pan African Studies* 6, no. 6 (2013): 122-142.

<sup>72</sup> Hilmi Yousuf, "Framework of Analysis for Administrative Leadership in African States: Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Uganda," *Economics and Administration* 3, no. 1 (1990): 49-62.

The Civil Rights Movement was pronounced during this same period in Black American history. The ideas and strategies of the two movements were not completely disparate; both groups promoted the global spread of equality and human rights and opposed segregation and racism.<sup>73</sup> During the incipient stages of the Civil Rights Movement, many Africans had traveled to the United States to study. Due to the intensity of racism during that era, many African students attended Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). One of these HBCUs, Lincoln University, boasts of two former African presidents (Azikiwe of Nigeria and Nkrumah of Ghana) as alumni. African leaders and peoples were influenced by their experiences in America during their studies. For instance, Nkrumah was so immersed in the ideologies of civil rights activists that he named Ghana's soccer team, the Black Stars, after Marcus Garvey's shipping line company. Early civil rights activists Crummell, Delany, and Turner pushed Black Americans toward Africa to help combat Western nationalism and imperialism.

The groundwork by these early activists paved the way for Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and other civil rights activists to raise awareness about the importance of a global fight for equal civil rights, especially in African countries. The civil rights leaders in the United States, realizing Black Africans were going through similar struggles, held several meetings to share tactics and ideas with African anti-colonialist leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, Seretse Khama, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere. These meetings contributed to the liberation of African countries from colonialism. During this same period, several civil rights protests and demonstrations were ongoing across the United States against racism and oppression, forcing President Dwight Eisenhower to reform American foreign policies that affected the promotion of universal human rights.<sup>74</sup> Eisenhower instituted anti-discrimination legislation that affected peoples of African descent. During the 1950s and 1960s, African diplomats were confronted with racial segregation in the United States. While the events of the Cold War were ongoing, the

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<sup>73</sup> Michael Williams, "The Pan-African Movement," In *Africana studies: A survey of Africa and the African diaspora*, edited by Mario Azevedo, 169-181 (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005).

<sup>74</sup> Williams, "The Pan-African Movement," 19.

United States still paid utmost attention to the continued racial slights toward African diplomats. For instance, on October 10, 1957, President Eisenhower apologized to the Ghanaian Finance Minister, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, who had been refused service at a restaurant in Dover, Delaware.

Ghana continues to serve as a beacon of hope for African peoples living on the continent and throughout the diaspora. The country has maintained this status through conscious efforts of validating the strengths, struggles, and linkages between African descendants at the Pan-African level. In the 21st century, Ghana has become the destination for millions of African descendants tracing their ancestry and identity in reaction to their marginalization. Ghana is in a unique position of being the location of about 75 percent of the slave dungeons built on Africa's west coast. Several centuries later, many European forts and castles still stand on the land, reminding people of the intense and complex history of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.<sup>75</sup>

Ghana's fifth president of the Fourth Republic, Akufo-Addo, has established a policy to make it a national priority to extend a hand of welcome back home to Africans in the diaspora. Current policies in Ghana have informed the development of programs, including the "Year of Return, Ghana 2019." This project was an initiative of the Ghana Tourism Authority under the patronage of the Ministry of Tourism, Arts, and Culture. The Ghana Tourism Authority implemented this year-long event in collaboration with the Office of Diaspora Affairs at the Office of the President, the Panafest Foundation, and the Adinkra Group. According to the Ghana Tourism Authority, about 237,000 peoples of African descent visited Ghana between January and September 2019, with most visitors coming from the United States.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Danielle Paquette, "Ghana to Black Americans: Come Home. We'll Help you Build a Life Here," (July 4, 2020). [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ghana-to-black-americans-come-home-well-help-you-build-a-life-here/2020/07/03/1b11a914-b4e3-11ea-9a1d-d3db1cbe07ce\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ghana-to-black-americans-come-home-well-help-you-build-a-life-here/2020/07/03/1b11a914-b4e3-11ea-9a1d-d3db1cbe07ce_story.html)

<sup>76</sup> Paquette, "Ghana to Black Americans: Come Home. We'll Help you Build a Life Here," 20.



## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter provides a vivid description of Ghana's economic and political past from pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, and post-independence. Ghana's economic and political history presented is an indication that things did not manifest as many had hoped for at the time of independence. Like all the emerging countries during the Cold War, Ghana faced its fair share of economic and political challenges. Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, was overthrown nine years after independence. In the next 25 years after Nkrumah's government, Ghana was governed by a series of military rulers, which immensely impacted the nation politically and economically. Ghana returned to democratic rule in 1992 and has built a reputation as a stable, liberal economy. Ghana, in the 21st century, continues to offer hope for all peoples of African descent.

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## **CHAPTER 3**

# **Diplomacy and War in Pre-Colonial Eggon Land of Central Nigeria, C. 1640-1945**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The marriage between diplomacy and war has long been established both practically and theoretically. The close link between these two practices is apparent in the manner in which groups of people deploy either war or diplomacy to settle their differences with each other. Consequently, the study of war is inevitably also the study of diplomacy. On the surface, war may seem to be a contradiction of diplomacy because diplomacy is often associated with peace. No doubt diplomacy has been used to avert the outbreak of war and even to stop war altogether. However, diplomacy has also been used to cause war as exemplified by the role played by secret diplomacy in precipitating the First World War. In Eggon Land, which is located today in Nasarawa State of Nigeria, the relationship between diplomacy and war in the pre-colonial period was intimate because the ethnic group contained three autonomous clans living side by side. The clans—namely, Eggon Eholo, Eggon Anzo, and Eggon Enro—spoke the same language, with minor dialectical variations, and shared the same socio-cultural values but were independent of each other. Although they lived together in Eggon Land, they occupied clearly separate geographical areas. The existence of clearly marked territories necessitated the existence of some form of diplomacy to maintain the socio-political order. Diplomacy contributed to the maintenance of the territorial autonomy of the clans even though war was a regular feature of the relations between these clans. This chapter will examine the nature of war and diplomacy in Eggon Land from around 1640 to 1945. It will begin by providing a brief conceptual clarification of diplomacy and war as used in the chapter, followed by a discussion of the socio-political system in Eggon Land. The nature of diplomacy and war as practiced within

Eggon Land will be discussed after which the chapter will focus on diplomacy and war between the Eggon people and external groups.

## **CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION**

One of the major areas of debate in African military historiography, in relation to that of the West, concerns the use of concepts. There are scholars who doubt whether Western concepts such as "war" and "diplomacy" apply to pre-colonial Africa, but this chapter attempts to clarify potential ambiguities because the understanding of war is as diverse as the practice of war across the world both spatially and temporally. That is why scholars, such as John Keegan, could declare that war was impossible in the interior of Africa at the same time as the area is being reshaped by a series of hostilities.<sup>1</sup> Keegan was not unaware of these hostilities but did not recognize them as war based on his own understanding of what qualified as war and what did not. Of course, there are Western scholars who offer some sort of generic definitions of war that could apply to pre-colonial Africa; Carl von Clausewitz (a Prussian general and military theorist), for instance, defines war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."<sup>2</sup> Yet another theorist, Jeremy Black, sees war as "organized conflict between sovereign states, begun deliberately by a specific act of policy."<sup>3</sup> State and policy are two concepts that are often linked to the understanding of war in Western military historiography. However, in pre-colonial Africa, many polities, such as that of the Eggon, were non-centralized, had no standing army, and yet practiced war. War, in the context of the Eggon and indeed that of many small autonomous groups in pre-colonial Africa, is captured more suitably in the definition offered by Johan van der Dennen, who posits that war is:

- (1) The sanctioned (or legalized) use of violence or mandatory resort to violence, (2) by at least some members of a community..., (3) organized

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<sup>1</sup> John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 69.

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham, Vol. 1 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1918), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Jeremy Black, *Why Wars Happen* (London: Reaktion Books, 1998), 15.

for that purpose, however informally and temporarily..., (4) against multiple, unspecified members of another community..., (5) aimed either at killing or inflicting serious injury on, or otherwise incapacitating, members of the other community, or aimed at some goal, or conducted for some purpose, that makes it likely that they have to be killed or incapacitated in accomplishing it.<sup>4</sup>

This type of war neither required a centralized State status nor a standing army in order to happen. Although it has often been the subject of dismissal by some as merely “tribal” or “primitive” wars that are less worthy of studying than “civilized” wars, it is war nonetheless from the context of the people prosecuting it.<sup>5</sup>

Diplomacy is equally a concept that is understood in many different ways. As Harold Nicolson points out, diplomacy in popular usage can mean foreign policy, it can be used to mean negotiation, it can mean the process of negotiation, it can mean a branch of Foreign Service, and it can mean the skill in international negotiations.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, diplomacy enjoys such a wide context of usage that it can sometimes be confusing. Nonetheless, efforts have been made to clearly define diplomacy by various scholars. For instance, Sir Ernest Satow, a British diplomat, sees diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states.”<sup>7</sup> This definition is quite adequate depending on the context. However, for the purpose of this chapter, the definition by Adam Watson addresses the issue more appropriately: the states which recognize that their domestic policies are affected by external events, deliberately engage in dialogue with one another. This dialogue—the way it is conducted, the resulting promises and agreements reached, the institutions which conduct it, and the rules guiding its

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<sup>4</sup> Johan M. G. van der Dennen, *The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male Coalitional Reproductive Strategy* (Groningen: University of Groningen, 1995), 93.

<sup>5</sup> John K. Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500 – 1800* (London: UCL Press, 1999), 4.

<sup>6</sup> Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 13-14.

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 12.

conduct—is<sup>8</sup>up diplomacy.<sup>[66]</sup> This captures closely what was being practiced in Eggon Land, although the term “state” does not apply to the political divisions existing then. However, these polities were clearly autonomous and sovereign.

## **SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EGGON LAND**

The geographical area referred to as Eggon Land is located within latitude 8.45<sup>0</sup> N and longitude 8.30<sup>0</sup> E in Nassarawa Eggon LGA of Nasarawa State, Nigeria. The area is characterised by hills, called Eggon Hills, and drained by the Arikya and Mada rivers situated at its east and west respectively. The term “Eggon” is a generic name for several peoples speaking the same language, with slight dialectical variations, and sharing the same cultural and religious belief systems.<sup>9</sup> It refers to both the people and the language they speak. Eggon people are divided into three clans: Eggon Eholo, Eggon Anzo, and Eggon Enro. Although David C. Dorward argues that Eggon is divided into two clans and that Eggon Enro is merely a subgroup of the Eggon Anzo with a slight dialectical variation, this view is not accurate. Among the Eggon people, Eggon Enro is a distinct clan and not a subgroup of the Eggon Anzo.<sup>10</sup> While Eggon Eholo and Anzo speak nearly an identical dialect and have traditionally practiced the same kind of facial markings, the Eggon Enro people have a distinct dialectical variation from the other two clans and have nine vertical facial marks as opposed to the unspecified number of vertical facial marks preferred by the others. These three clans are further divided into several kindred groups called *Igu*. The land area occupied by each clan was further divided according to the kindred groups who lived in it, and in turn the land occupied by each kindred was again divided according to the social units in it.

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<sup>8</sup> Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London: Routledge, 2005), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Elias D. Anzaku, Dauda M. Enna, Victor S. Dugga, Kasimu A. Kigbu, *The Eggon of Central Nigeria* (Jos: Centre for Research on Eggon Culture and Development, 1996), 1, 10.

<sup>10</sup> David C. Dorward, “Ritual Warfare and the Colonial Conquest of the Eggon,” *History in Africa*, 11, (1984), 84.



Thus, a village was typically inhabited by a kindred group or its unit. For example, the term *Wakama* referred to both kindred of the Eggon Anzo and the geographical area in which they occupied. In turn, *Wakama* was divided into five separate settlements with names indicating both the land and the people.<sup>11</sup> In other words, every clan, kindred, and unit had their clearly defined land, which defined both their habitats and their identities. At present, the origin of Eggon people or their settlement of their present homeland is not entirely known. However, some evidence points to their possible emigration from the confederacy of Kwararafa, in the Benue River valley, during the series of emigrations that followed the collapse of the multi-ethnic confederacy from around 1550 to 1640.<sup>12</sup>

Eggon people practiced their own religious belief, called *Ashim*, which influenced their worldview. This form of ancestral worship based on the belief in the existence of one supreme deity called *Ahogbre*, who, the people believed, created heaven, earth, and other deities.<sup>13</sup> The earth, referred to as *Ubin*, was believed to be the most prominent among all the deities created. Except in very extreme cases, *Ahogbre* was normally not approached directly, but through lesser deities called *Abibli* (spirits) and *Angbashum* (ancestors), who possessed trees, rocks, and other objects. The lesser deities on earth served as mediators and so sacrifices meant for *Ahogbre* needed to be channeled through them.<sup>14</sup>

The *Ashim* worship system served as the pivot around which the entire society of the Eggon was organized. Therefore, it was more of an institution than a religious system. It embodied all the political and social authorities in the land. Thus, as observed by Enna, "there was no hiatus between the religious and the political; this is important as... religious authority was an essential tool for the acquisition of political

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<sup>11</sup> Esson Alumbuğu, "Warfare in Eggon Land of Central Nigeria, 1820 – 1942", *MA Thesis, Department of History and War Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria*, March 2019, 52.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 49 – 50.

<sup>13</sup> A. U. David, "Traditional Concept of the Supreme Being, Arts of Worship, the Ancestors and Magic," *Ayimom*, 1, 3, 1986, 32.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

legitimacy and the exercise of political power.”<sup>15</sup> The *Mo’andakpo Ashim* (elders) who served as the political leaders in Eggon society were seen as the representatives of the ancestors, forming the basis of their legitimacy.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the elders were required to possess ritual knowledge, not open to the general population, as proof of their qualification to lead. As pointed out by Enna, the *Ashim* institution gained its power and legitimacy from the monopoly of spiritual and curative powers. The strong belief of the people in the supernatural meant that good fortunes such as longevity, good health, good harvests, and fertility were linked directly to the rainmaking, propitiation, and curative rituals of the *Ashim*.<sup>17</sup> The implication of this belief was that this institution defined the character of the major aspects of the Eggon people in times of peace and war.

The social organization of Eggon people was characterized by autonomous settlements, each of which had its *Anva Ashim* (sacred grove) used for rituals by the people within the territorial unit.<sup>18</sup> Eggon society is patrilineal in nature, and the household was the smallest unit of organization. Related households clustered together to form the extended family, which was headed by a patriarch who was usually the eldest male. The patriarch, called *andakpo* (elder), served as the political, economic, as well as religious head of each cluster of related households. The patriarchs of households in each community formed the council of elders, called

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<sup>15</sup> Dauda Musa Enna, “Resurgence of Ethnic Minority Identity through Performance: The Case of the Eggon,” *International Journal of African Society, Cultures and Tradition*, 2, 3, (2015), 18.

<sup>16</sup> Jonathan Mamu Ayuba, *Economy and Society in Colonial North-Central Nigeria: The History of Akwanga Region 1911-1960*, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2008), 27.

<sup>17</sup> Enna, “Resurgence of Ethnic,” 19.

<sup>18</sup> David C. Dorward. “The impact of Colonialism on a Nigeria Hill-Farming Society: A Case Study of Innovation among the Eggon,” *The International Journal of African Historical*, 20, 2, (1987), 205.

*Mo'andakpo*, who provided leadership and served as the custodians of the religious customs, mysteries, rituals, and traditions guiding the people.<sup>19</sup>

The Eggon people had a common political system in the pre-colonial period that independently existed in every settlement. Political authority intertwined with religious authority. The *Ashim* institution provided the platform upon which the elders derived the authority to exercise political power over the people.<sup>20</sup> The patriarchs of households within a settlement combined their individual authorities into a religious-political unit. Being the religious and political authorities in their respective households, the elders as a unit exercised complete control over all members of the settlement. The *Adan Ashim* (high priest) presided over this council of elders as the religious head.<sup>21</sup> The council of elders constituted the administrative mechanism, possessing the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, in addition to religious leadership. While this council made all decisions concerning the community, all council meetings were open and all adult males in the community had the right to attend and speak.<sup>22</sup> Thus, major opinions were largely public opinions. The elders interpreted the customs and traditions as laws for the people, and at the same time, they ensured compliance to these laws and carried out judgments and punishments for non-compliance. This court entertained both civil and criminal cases, and the *Adan Ashim* passed judgment in council with the elders. Punishments usually ranged from public disgrace and fines for light offences to banishment for repeated offences like theft. Capital punishment occurred in extreme cases of crime such as murder.<sup>23</sup> There was no central political unit shared by all the people of Eggon Land. The clan served as the highest political unit within which several autonomous kindred groups co-existed. The clan was governed by a council made up of the *Adan Ashim* of each kindred group within the clan and headed by the *Adan Ashim* of the senior kindred in the clan. The highest

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<sup>19</sup>Ayuba, *Economy and Society*, 22-23.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>21</sup> Anzaku *et al*, *The Eggon of Central*, 27.

<sup>22</sup> J. Hunter Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on," NAK/SNP/144/1926.

<sup>23</sup> Anzaku, *et al*, *The Eggon of Central*, pp. 33-34.

authority within a clan was the *Adan Ubin* (father of the land), who had the final say in the clan; however, the office of the *Adan Ubin* was more religious than political. Thus, the necessity for a council to oversee the issues of everyday governance became apparent.<sup>24</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, some of the kindred groups under the Eggon Eholo clan include Alushi, Lambuga, Wana, and Wangibi. Some kindred groups under Eggon Anzo include Agunji, Arikpa, Ogba, and Wakama. Similarly, some of the kindred groups within the Eggon Enro clan include Alizaga, Arugwadu, Bacheno, and Umme.<sup>25</sup>

## **DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN EGGON LAND**

The rivalry between the Anzo, Eholo, and Enro clans of Eggon Land caused them to maintain a state of war with each other for a very long period. Evidence of the reasons why the Eggon clans went to war with each other is quite scant, but oral history holds that the Eholo attempted to establish hegemony, which the Anzo resisted, ultimately leading to a state of war between them.<sup>26</sup> This may have been derived from the oral tradition of the Eggon which has it that Abro, the founder of the Eggon people, found a lost boy by the river and took him home and named him Eholo. Eholo grew up with the children of Abro, but later he wanted to dominate Abro's children; when Abro became very old and almost blind, he warned his children not to allow Eholo to take their sacred objects, including Abro's bow and Hungary rice seed. Eholo, who happened to overhear this conversation, later attempted to deceive the old man into giving him the sacred objects by pretending to be one of his children but failed. In anger, he shot the old man with an arrow, stole the sacred objects, and fled with his wife to a place called Lizi, where he founded the Eggon Eholo clan.<sup>27</sup> This legend, however, does not explain the wars between the Anzo and Enro clans as

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<sup>24</sup> Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 4.

<sup>25</sup> These are but a few examples of kindred in each clan and not a comprehensive list. For additional information see J. H. Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal Area, Summary of Intelligence Report on," NAK/SNP/144/1926, 4.

<sup>26</sup> Alumbugu, "Warfare in Eggon Land," 81.

<sup>27</sup> Anzaku *et al*, *The Eggon of Central*, pp. 12-13.

exemplified by the protracted hostilities between Alogani and Lezi people. British Colonial records attribute the war to a great tribal disagreement that may have taken place in their early history, but this explanation provides no information regarding the cause or nature of the disagreement.<sup>28</sup> While unsatisfactory, this theory tends to suggest that the state of war between the Anzo, Eholo, and Enro clans had been going on for such a very long time that knowledge of the root cause has been lost over time.

The state of war in Eggon Land was a protracted situation of hostility maintained by the Anzo, Eholo, and Enro clans that oscillated continuously in a cycle of war and uneasy peace. Notably, in most cases the hostilities were maintained by local rivalries and disputes that arose from villages of the rival clans sharing common territorial borders. This state of war was quite complex because in spite of their enmity, members of rival clans still married each other. However, outside of formal situations, any person who ventured into the territory of rival clans was likely to be killed on sight. While men were killed, women were abducted and taken as wives by the rival clansmen. As a result, individuals avoided venturing far from their villages unless in the company of armed warriors. Men from one clan who married from the other clan had to be protected by their brothers-in-law whenever they visited and were escorted to safety when leaving, otherwise they would be killed.<sup>29</sup>

Several wars were fought by rival kindred groups from the opposing clans. Yet throughout this period, no clan dominated another, displaced another from its territories, or destroyed another. In other words, war was frequent among Eggon clans but highly restricted through a combination of customary laws and diplomacy. The need for diplomacy in the relations between Eggon clans arose from the understanding that they shared the same cultural heritage, language, and religious institution. Not only did they intermarry, they also carried out exchanges and attended each other's festivals. A cycle of negotiation and warfare was forced upon them because they refused to discard what bound them together as an ethnic system as

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<sup>28</sup> "Wana District Administration Report," NAK/SNP144/1926, 6.

<sup>29</sup> Alumbu, "Warfare in Eggon Land," 83.

well as their specific differences as clans.<sup>30</sup> What bound Eggon clans together was the *Ashim* institution and a shared language. The *Ashim* institution provided a platform upon which customary laws effectively guided the relations of the clans. It was powerful enough to ensure that these laws were binding across clans. Thus, as rightly observed by Robert Smith, the customary laws derived from the *Ashim* institution provided some kind of bond between the Anzo, Eholo<sup>31</sup>. Despite this legal bond, the clans' refusal to discard their autonomy made war and diplomacy intimately related practices in Eggon Land.

The clan council of elders, which was the custodian of the *Ashim* institution, was responsible for diplomatic relations with other clans. This council had a tradition of meeting with their counterparts from other clans for the purpose of settling disputes that arose between them.<sup>32</sup> The same council was responsible for deliberating on war and its declaration when they found sufficient reason to fight another clan. The major cause of war in Eggon Land during the period from around 1640 to 1945 related to disputes over women. Men had a practice of kidnapping or eloping with women from neighboring communities to make them their wives. Thus, when a woman was kidnapped from a village, the affected people demanded her release, and when this demand was not reciprocated, the village declared war. Dispute over farmland also caused war among the Eggon people mainly because of the limited availability of arable land on the Eggon hills. Notably, clan, kindred groups, and houses determined the settlement pattern on the hills; thus, Wane people had their own territory, Wakama had theirs, Ende had theirs, and all clans recognized and respected the boundaries. However, individuals tended to encroach on farmlands that belonged to

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<sup>30</sup> Robert Weiner and Paul Sharp, "Diplomacy and War," *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies*, (2010). Available at <http://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-156>

<sup>31</sup> Robert Smith. "Peace and Palaver: International Relations in Pre-colonial West Africa," *Journal of African History*, 14, 4, (1973), 600.

<sup>32</sup> Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 8.

the other clans or kindred groups, causing disputes that sometimes escalated to war.<sup>33</sup> The existence of strong customary laws protecting territories of clans based on the *Ashim* institution made disputes over land less frequent. The hatred between the Anzo and Eholo clans has also been identified by some oral sources as a cause of war among the Eggon people. The sight of an Eholo man by an Anzo man, or vice versa, was enough to spark violence, which might result in death. This situation, however, may be a consequence of the many years of war between the Anzo and Eholo clans rather than a cause of war. In addition, this vendetta may have served to prolong the cycle of violence further.

The declaration of war against another clan was done by the *Adan Ashim* after the council of elders arrived at a decision to do so, and the war was announced through the blowing of the buffalo horn called *Ekū*. The two opposing sides would then prepare and face each other on the battlefield, usually the bush between the two belligerent communities, where the battle was fought. Warriors attacked each other with bows and poisoned arrows while protecting themselves with a shield. Battle usually commenced in a dispersed order, and close combat was fought with swords and daggers. The warriors also believed in metaphysical weapons thought to either deflect arrows or prevent their penetration.<sup>34</sup> While there was no standing army in Eggon Land, every able-bodied male between the ages of approximately 18 and 40 belonged to a warrior class that was regularly replenished through an age-grade system. Warfare between Eggon clans was strictly regulated by the *Ashim* institution. Consequently, the *Adan Ubin* and *Adan Ashim* of the warring clans supervised battles and held the power to halt them at any moment they saw fit. David C. Dorward points out:

The death or wounding of a few individuals appears to have been sufficient for both sides to withdraw to mourn their losses or parade their trophies. This was because ritual warfare was to a greater extent under the control of the *Adang Ubben* and *Adang Ashim* of each community, who could intervene to halt hostilities by walking among the warriors with the magical

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<sup>33</sup> Alumbugu, "Warfare in Eggon Land," 78.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-74.

*Kujeme* (Lophira alata) leaves, accompanied by the blare of the sacred *Ashim* horns.<sup>35</sup>

The halting of war was followed immediately by a process of diplomatic treaty, which involved taking an *Ashim* oath by both parties, to keep the peace. This oath was powerful enough to ensure compliance by both warring clans. To settle the disputed issues, *Adan Ubin* of both sides would then preside over a diplomatic process, which involved the payment of reparations and reaffirmation of the socio-political divisions and territorial boundaries in Eggon Land.<sup>36</sup>

Diplomacy became impossible in situations where the actors involved in it refused to operate in relative security because, as Harold Nicolson explains, "negotiations would be severely hampered if the emissary from one side were killed... by the other side before he had had time to deliver his message."<sup>37</sup> Therefore, in Eggon Land the issue of diplomatic immunity was clearly understood and practiced. Both the *Adan Ashim* and *Adan Ubin* enjoyed exemption and immunity on the battlefield, which enabled them to observe battles and walk among combatants to halt battle without any risks. These same figures enjoyed full immunity during the negotiations that took place after the war ended. Their important roles as the sacred leaders of *Ashim* ensured their protection and recognition even across clan divides. The male children of any women married from a different clan were exempted from combat when their clan was at war with their mothers' clan. Consequently, these men enjoyed full immunity from both parties and were used as middlemen between the two clans because they could move from one clan to the other at any time without being attacked. In other words, they enjoyed the protection of both clans and as such were instrumental to the diplomacy between them. David C. Dorward states, "Sister's sons were not expected to take up arms against their own maternal kin and, by extension, acted as peacemakers and go-betweens."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> David C. Dorward, "Ritual Warfare and the Colonial Conquest of the Eggon," *History in Africa*, 11, (1984), 88.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*; See also Anzaku et al, *The Eggon of*, 53; Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 51.

<sup>37</sup> Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 17.

<sup>38</sup> Dorward, "Ritual Warfare and," 88.



The push and pull of diplomacy and war in Eggon Land created some form of stalemate in the political evolution of the clans. Diplomacy prevented war from being total, which would have meant the emergence of a dominant clan through destruction, displacement, or subjugation of other clans. Conversely, war prevented diplomacy from being total, which would have created a more powerful group either through alliance or centralization of the three clans. Thus, in spite of a situation where war was very frequent between the clans of Eggon Land, the three clans retained their customary autonomy, territories, and identities throughout this period.

## **DIPLOMACY AND WAR WITH EXTERNAL GROUPS**

Eggon people did not live in isolation during the pre-colonial period. Their immediate neighbors to the north were the Mada people, to the east were the Rindre people, and to the south were the Gwandara people. While evidence concerning the specificity of relations with their neighbors is scant, available evidence points to the absence of any major hostility between Eggon and Mada people. The existence of diplomatic relations between these two groups shows in the attendance of the Eggon annual Likiya festival by Mada people. There was also intermarriage between Eggon and Mada people.<sup>39</sup> Trade was also an important aspect of relations between these two groups because Eggon people attended the Andaha market of Mada people. In addition, Hausa-speaking Mada traders were important agents in the trade of palm oil between the peoples of the Akwanga area and Keffi.<sup>40</sup>

Relations between Eggon people and Rindre people were also characterized by the absence of any war, as far as available evidence shows. The two groups share a common tradition of origin, which claims the two groups were founded by three brothers. Rindre, like the Mada, also attended Eggon annual festivals. They also traded with the Eggon people. The market at Wamba was attended by the Eggon, the Mada,

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<sup>39</sup> Ayuba, *Economy and Society*, 7-8.

<sup>40</sup> H. F. Matthew, "Assessment Report of the Mada District, Jemaa Division Nasarawa Province," NAK/SNP 10/572p/1913, 3.

the Alago, and others.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the people reported having such a good relationship with the Eggon in the past that they served as mediators who were regularly called upon to settle disputes between Eggon clans.<sup>42</sup> According to available oral evidence, there is also no evidence of war between Eggon and Gwandara people. However, evidence holds that the Gwandara people had conquered and annexed a number of Eggon camps in the 18th century when they took control of the town of Shabu, which shares the border with the Eggon Land.<sup>43</sup>

The existence of intermarriages, formal visitations, and trade between Eggon people and Mada, Rindre, and Gwandara people suggests the existence of diplomatic relations between them. Otherwise, movement across the territories of these groups would not have been possible. Some form of immunity must have existed to allow these neighboring groups safe passage through Eggon Land and to avail Eggon people safe passage across neighboring lands. The absence of war between Eggon groups and their neighbors also suggests that diplomatic relations were successful. It should be noted that these neighboring groups had different socio-cultural frameworks that would make adherence to common customary laws with the Eggon people quite challenging. Nonetheless, these laws must have existed, and were respected by the parties involved, to allow the kind of relations that existed between the peoples in this area.

The major external group that the Eggon made war with was the slave raiders, mainly of Fulani origin, who attacked them from the second decade of the 19th century. These slave raiders came from Keffi, Jema'a, and Lafia emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, which were located close to Eggon Land. The Sokoto Caliphate emerged in 1820 after Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani Islamic scholar, conquered Hausaland in the

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<sup>41</sup> J. Y. Dogara, "Pre-colonial Political and Socio-economic History of the Rindre," *International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research*, 64, 7, (2013), 35.

<sup>42</sup> "Wana District Administration," NAK/SNP144/1926.

<sup>43</sup> A. C. Unomah, "The Gwandara Settlements of Lafia to 1900," in *Studies in the History of Plateau State, Nigeria*, ed. Elizabeth Isichei (London: Macmillan, 1982), 129.

northern Nigeria area. The economy of the new Caliphate was driven by enslaved labor and so the Fulani raided neighboring areas to capture people as slaves. This slave raiding was so intense that it forced most Eggon people to abandon the plains for the safety of the Eggon Hills. The few groups that were left on the plains took shelter in forests and evolved defensive measures such as siting their settlements behind thorn bushes and trenches. The period of slave raiding forced the Eggon people to adopt the use of sentries posted on high peaks of rock, for those on the hills, and in tall trees, for those in the forests, to alert others of the approach of slave raiders. When slave raiders were sighted, a sentry blew the buffalo horn to signal their arrival, and the men would take up defensive positions while the women and children ran into hiding. These encounters with slave raiders prevented them from penetrating the Eggon Hills, but those in the forests, such as Alushi, Bakyano, Ginda, and Ubbe, suffered substantial losses of population. The slave-raiding brought with it serious economic hardship in Eggon Land as the insecurity made farming on the plains challenging.<sup>44</sup>

There appears to be more war than diplomacy between Eggon people and the slave raiders during the early period of the 19th century. However, the presence of a serious external threat compelled the Eggon clans to come into brief diplomatic alliances for the purpose of fighting the slave raiders. These alliances were held together through oaths of amity, which were necessary to enable them to put aside their mutual hatred. These alliances were dissolved probably as soon as the immediate threat ended because each clan was jealous of its autonomy.<sup>45</sup> The purpose of these alliances was the recognition by both clans that their coming together improved their collective ability to repel the slave raiders because "diplomacy may be used to create alliances and build coalitions for wars to maintain the balance of power, for example, or, more controversially, to create a situation in which a war in favorable terms

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<sup>44</sup> Ayuba, *Economy and Society*, 9-21; Dorward, "Ritual Warfare and," 87; Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 15; "Nassarawa Province. Keffi Mada District Assessment Report," NAK/SNP10/572p/1913.

<sup>45</sup> Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 3, 14-15.

becomes more likely."<sup>46</sup> Notably, however, even the threat of the slave raiders was not enough to end the state of war in Eggon Land. These brief alliances against slave raiders were most likely spontaneous actions of a few settlements of rival clans rather than a diplomatic treaty involving the entire membership of the Anzo, Eholo, and Enro clans.

Over time, the pressure of the incessant Fulani slave raiding in Eggon Land forced the roots of diplomacy to spring between Eggon people and the slave raiders. Evidence shows that a few Eggon villages on the borders and those on the plains, such as Alushi, Ginda, and Ubbe, made valuable contributions, called "tributes," to the slave raiders to avoid being raided.<sup>47</sup> This practice did not guarantee safety as the tribute was not always honored by the slave raiders and so peace failed. In addition, paying tribute to the raiders from Keffi did nothing to stop the raiders from Jema'a and Lafia from raiding or vice versa. However, there is a record that some Eggon people sent a diplomatic delegation to Emir Kwassau (1897-1902) of Zaria with a tribute of three slaves and six bags of cowries in order to seek his protection. Ungwaseru people, who were responsible for this process, listed the villages behind this diplomatic delegation to include Agwagi, Alushi, Arukpa, Ekkar, Endehu, Ezene, Lambuga, Ogba, Wakam, Wane, and <sup>48</sup> .OBJ. There is little evidence to show that the people of Ungwaseru, who provided this information to colonial officials, acted on their own or truly represented the interests of the listed groups because no other group made reference to this event to colonial officials. Nonetheless, the mention of Emir Kwassau by Ungwaseru people would not have been possible if the event did not take place. Significantly, the above-listed villages came from both Eholo and Anzo clans, which points to some kind of diplomatic alliance on this issue. Ultimately, this delegation did not amount to anything because the British conquered the Sokoto Caliphate shortly after and largely brought an end to slave raiding.

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<sup>46</sup> Weiner and Sharp, "Diplomacy and War".

<sup>47</sup> Shaw, "The Eggon Tribal," 15; Ayuba, *Economy and Society*, 17.

<sup>48</sup> "Report (Memo) by A. D. O. to D. O. Akwanga Division," NAK/SNP 144/1926, 8; M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau 1800-1950*, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, 202.

The arrival of British colonialism in northern Nigeria in the early 20th century gradually ended the slave-raiding faced by the Eggon people. However, the British soon became a threat to the Eggon people who did not approve of colonial domination and policies. The first confrontation between the British and Eggon people took place in 1903 when a small patrol was sent against the Eggon for attacking the traders of Jema'a Emirate. These were followed by a series of patrols from 1907 sent to forcefully collect taxes from the Eggon people. These patrols were mostly met with resistance in each village they visited, which made them kill some of the people and confiscate their grains and animals. Tension was so high in the area that some Eggon groups attacked others simply for being friendly with the British.<sup>49</sup> In 1912 the killing of a British minerals prospector by some Eggon villagers brought about a serious punitive expedition where the colonial army killed hundreds of Eggon people, including women and children.<sup>50</sup> What followed was a refusal of Eggon people to pay their taxes along with general disorderliness. Again, the British sent army patrols in 1914, 1915, and 1916, but all failed to bring Eggon Land under colonial control.

In 1917, the British sent a larger patrol to collect taxes and restore colonial control in Eggon Land. This patrol arrived at the Eggon Hills to find a large assembly of armed warriors ready to fight them. For the first time, Eggon clans came temporarily together in large numbers against an external enemy. An estimate of over 2,000 warriors came from several villages. The groups that earlier began resettlement on the plains, such as Ezene, Wakama, and Wangibi, returned to the Eggon Hills to join the resistance against the British.<sup>51</sup> Having suffered casualties resisting the British patrols as individual villages, Eggon people took advantage of diplomacy to build a temporary alliance that tilted the impending battle with the British to their advantage. This unity forced the British to withdraw and camp for a few months while waiting for reinforcements and artillery to counter the military advantage of the Eggon people. Despite heavy shelling by the British when the battle began, Eggon warriors kept

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<sup>49</sup> "Patrol to Rifi – Mada Patrol, Report on," NAK/SNP 5449/1908; Ayuba, *Economy and Society*, 52.

<sup>50</sup> Dorward, "Ritual Warfare and," 90-92.

<sup>51</sup> "Nasarawa Province, Mada District, Military patrol," NAK/SNP/30p/1917.

fighting until the *Adan Ashim* leading them was killed, breaking their spirit and bringing an end to their resistance.<sup>52</sup> This battle marked the end of major resistance against British subjugation in Eggon Land and with it the decline of the *Ashim* institution and the autonomy of Anzo, Eholo, and Enro clans of Eggon.

## CONCLUSION

This work examined diplomacy and war in Eggon Land in the pre-colonial period. It began by providing a conceptual clarification of war and diplomacy. This was followed by a discussion of the socio-political system in Eggon Land. The work then focused on diplomacy and war as practiced by the clans of Eggon Land. The last section of the work looked at war and diplomacy between Eggon people and their immediate neighbors, slave raiders, and British colonialists. In conclusion, the practices of diplomacy and war were closely related and interdependent in Eggon Land. This is because diplomacy had been used to avoid war when the clans were able to resolve their disputes in council meetings, it was used to stop war through the taking of oaths and post-war negotiations, and it was used to create a balance of power during some of the wars with slave raiders and the British colonial forces.

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## **CHAPTER 4**

### **“God Was With Us”:**

### **Child Labor in Colonial Kenya, 1922-1950s**

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

Contentious debates about the allowable minimum age of child laborers informed the discourse of child labor in colonial Kenya between 1922 and the 1950s. Beginning with the Harry Thuku Uprising of 1922 that instigated the discussion over labor policy concerning juvenile wage laborers and heightened the tension between the British colonial administration and African adult workers, the British government in Kenya struggled to forge coherent labor policies concerning the ages of African child workers. Frequent changes in labor laws made it easier for labor recruiters and employers to manipulate the system by recruiting younger children for work, thus drawing them into the orbit of an alien labor force that often interfered with their childhood. The uncertainty surrounding the minimum age engendered acrimonious debate between White employers and anti-child labor advocates over who among them had the moral authority to speak for the children and act as their moral guardians and avuncular figures. Focusing almost exclusively on African boys as actors in child labor in colonial Kenya, this chapter analyzes labor history that highlights changes in the meaning of minimum age in an economic system that promised prosperity to African children. It frames age as a category of analysis that explains the intersection of colonial labor laws and juvenile workers. The close analysis of African children and their labor situation also reveals a mosaic of everyday life in colonial Kenya that brings children into an acknowledged circulation of imperial ideas and imagination.

“What do you advise me to fix as the minimum monthly rate of pay (in addition to rations and housing) for [juveniles between twelve and eighteen years]?,” wrote the District Commissioner (DC), Turkana, to J. Ian Husband, the Labor Commissioner (LC) in Kenya, in September 1955.<sup>1</sup> In his response, Husband advised the DC to pay children between twelve and fourteen years old a minimum monthly rate of ten shillings, fourteen shillings to children between fourteen and sixteen years, and sixteen shillings to children between sixteen and eighteen years.<sup>2</sup> “Totos [children] of good physique,” Husband added, “often do quite as much manual work as an adult, when the work is not sustained for long hours.”<sup>3</sup> Confident of the “precocious strength” of an African child to perform manual labor and aware of the loafing behaviors African adult workers exhibited, Husband urged the DC to raise these rates by ten percent in case adults refused to work more than six hours per day. Hoping that children would work on average between four and six hours per day, Husband wished they would surpass this mark,<sup>4</sup> a rather misguided wish that would have violated the law that required “no person” to “employ

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<sup>1</sup> DC, Turkana, to J. Ian Husband, “Minimum Wages,” 7 Sep. 1955, Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 Kenya National Archives (KNA), Nairobi (NRB).

<sup>2</sup> Husband to DC, Turkana, “Juvenile Wages,” 20th Oct. 1955. Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Husband to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education Labor and Lands, “Employment of African Women and Children on European Farms,” May 22, 1958, Minimum Wages ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. But Archdeacon W.E. Owen of Kavirondo pointed out that children were expected to work “for a seven-to-eight-hour day.” Owen, “Child Labor in East Africa,” *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939.

or require to work any juvenile for a total period of more than six hours in any one day."<sup>5</sup>

Based on the logic of precocious strength, Husband expressed the view that minor workers consumed more food than their adult counterparts, and he suggested that if the rations were such that a laborer needed to buy supplementary items, "then the youth wages must be sufficient to ensure that extra food is bought."<sup>6</sup> He hoped that DCs in the colony would ensure the recruitment and retention of minor workers, payment of children on time, protection of children from unscrupulous employers who delayed their wages, and discouragement of children from emulating their parents' loafing behaviors. As this chapter demonstrates, the reality of the matter made Husband's view look like a complete joke. Two concerns arise in the conversation between Husband and the DC. First, the conversation reveals the colonialists' official thinking about wage labor and child laborers, three decades after Harry Thuku (discussed below) complained against the tendency to exploit juveniles for economic gains. Second, it suggests that child labor informed the colonial officials' everyday discourse; however, extant scholarship on labor during the period tends to focus on the labor relations between African adult workers and European employers.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> C.H Hartwell, Member for Labor, "The Employment of Juveniles (Hours of Work and Welfare Rules, 1952)," June 4, 1952, Employment of women and children- Kenya CO859/302, TNA.

<sup>6</sup> Husband to DC. Turkana, Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB.

<sup>7</sup> Examples include Frederick Cooper's *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, a comparative study that focuses on "working class" and "African workers"; Kaletso E. Atkins's *The Moon is Dead! Give us our Money!: The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843-1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993), which highlights the plight of "black working [Zulu] men" who forged "African work ethic" in nineteenth-century South Africa; and Iris Berger's *Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 1900-1980*

Several writers have proposed competing definitions of what constituted a “child” in colonial Africa. Luis F. López-Calva writes that the term “child” is easy to recognize, but it holds “varying definitions.”<sup>8</sup> This concept does not render itself to cavalier definition, particularly during the colonialists’ heyday in the mid-20th century. In *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe* and “Child Labor and Africanist Scholarship: A Critical Overview,” Beverly Grier defines “child” as a prepubescent boy or girl. Grier is aware that this definition is problematic and is “not without its fault,”<sup>9</sup> but she quickly adds that the stages of puberty vary and are not uniformly attained. Wiseman Chijere Chirwa expands this definition to include three broad criteria: chronological age as outlined by law, institutional affiliation and collective behavioral pattern, and social and cultural factors.<sup>10</sup> Even then, Chirwa confines his study to unmarried persons below the age of fourteen and between fourteen and eighteen, but still part of their parents’ or guardians’ family units. This definition is consistent with the views expressed in Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van’s oft-quoted study, “The Economics of Child Labor,” in which child workers appear to be “persons below the age of 15 years.”<sup>11</sup> According to Basu and Van, historically,

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(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), which focuses on white and black working-class women “hidden from [labor] history” in South Africa between 1900 and 1980.

<sup>8</sup>Luis F. López-Calva, “Child Labor: Myths, Theories and Facts,” *Journal of International Affairs* 55, no.1 (2001): 60

<sup>9</sup> Beverly Grier, *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006), 26.

<sup>10</sup> Wiseman Chijere Chirwa, “Child and Youth Labour on the Nyasaland Plantations, 1890-1953,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, no. 4 (1993): 662-680.

<sup>11</sup> Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van, “The Economics of Child Labor,” *The American Economic Review* 88, no. 3 (1998):414.

child labor was not the preserve of developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but the “bulk of child laborers” found on these continents “belong to the 10- to 14-year age category.”<sup>12</sup> Whereas Basu and Van suggest ten years as the minimum age, Sudharshan Canagarajah and Helena Skyt Nielsen have lowered that age to include persons between “age 7 to 14.”<sup>13</sup>

The extant scholarship has tended to assume the standard Western definition of child, which defines children rather narrowly. For the most part, European colonialists in Africa considered a child as any person between seven and eighteen years old. This definition excludes from consideration the labor contribution of five- and six-year-old workers, who often worked in settlers’ plantations and homes and on factory floors. Other studies have pointed out that the “universal agreement” puts the “legal age of maturity [at] 18,”<sup>14</sup> but these so-called universal agreements often exclude the opinions of the Africans, South Americans, and Asians; such agreements tend to be Western constructs that consider nineteen-year-old African workers as adult laborers. It is precisely for these reasons that Osita Agbu argues that the “legal definition of the child as seen from [international] legal documents is not wholly acceptable in the African context, even in today’s world.”<sup>15</sup>

Building on the views of scholars who suggest that “it’s not certain who should

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 414.

<sup>13</sup> Sudharshan Canagarajah and Helena Skyt Nielsen, “Child Labor in Africa: A Comparative Study,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 575 (2001): 73.

<sup>14</sup> Anne Kielland and Maurizia Tovo, *Children at Work: Child Labor Practices in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 1.

<sup>15</sup> Osita Agbu, “Child Labor in Contemporary Africa: Issues and Challenges,” in *Children and Youth in the Labor Process in Africa*, ed. Osita Agbu (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 2009), 12

really be considered a child,"<sup>16</sup> this chapter broadens the working definition of a child to include unmarried persons with mental or physical disability requiring parental or guardians' consent in matters that effectively altered the trajectories of their lives, such as initiation or wage labor. The expanded definition considers children who might have depended on their parents or guardians long after their eighteenth birthdays. As archival sources at the Kenya National Archives reveal, children with disability in Kenya also worked for wages and were taken to jobs miles away from their homes. In any case, in most African societies, until marriage, children remained dependents of their parents, who exercised authority and control over them in many ways.<sup>17</sup> The unstable definition of childhood age in colonial Africa was related to capital accumulation in the form of wage labor, where colonial governments in Africa responded at some level to the 19th- and 20th-century economic changes taking place in Western Europe. As European colonialists in Africa increasingly drew African children into the labor market, evidence suggests that in Britain and the United States, child labor declined in the second half of the 19th century.<sup>18</sup> As it turned out, Black bodies were to be used for labor. Prior to the concept of Western wage labor in Africa, African children engaged in domestic labor (e.g., household chores, tilling, and herding), much like what they did in European households and farms; the only difference is that work in the pre-colonial era was light and had no monetary reward.<sup>19</sup> Employing African children in

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<sup>16</sup> Kielland and Tovo, 1.

<sup>17</sup> Hamilton Siphon Simelane, "Landlords, The State, and Child Labor in Colonial Swaziland, 1914- 1947," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): 575.

<sup>18</sup> López-Calva, 64.

<sup>19</sup> Kevin Shillington, *History of Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 14-15; Atkins informs us that "very commonly youngsters were kept busy every day with light work around the homestead. Little boys from about the age of five or seven, would go out to herd small livestock such as goats, calves, and sheep." See Atkins, 58. She also adds that

agriculture and domestic chores was not a creation of the colonial economy, but it gained notoriety during the colonial era.<sup>20</sup> Child labor in colonial Africa drew children into the ambit of capitalism with a promise of material gains and upward mobility as long as they exchanged their labor for wages on factory floors and in settlers' farms and households.

## THE HARRY THUKU FACTOR

Ian Husband's vision of African child workers was logical in theory but unattainable in practice. The subject of child labor in colonial Kenya involved more than simplistic expressions of "good physique" and "precocious strength," phrases that informed the thinking of most officials in the colony,<sup>21</sup> especially after 1922, when Harry Thuku, commonly regarded as the doyen of African nationalism, prodded the government to reform repressive labor laws that "forced" women and children to work for free.<sup>22</sup> "I

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children who were hired for paid labor received their payment in the form of cloths, blankets, knives, hatchets or a lump of iron currency; see page 95.

<sup>20</sup> Chirwa, 664.

<sup>21</sup> P.B.E. Thompson, Divisional Engineer's Office, Coast Province, to Fred, "Wages-Male Employee Under 21 Years of Age," April 12, 1961, Minimum Wages ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. Referring to the output of African casual laborers between the ages of 18–20, Thompson informed Fred that "in fact, their youth and strength ensures that their output is as high."

<sup>22</sup> Before Thuku's Uprising, however, in 1914 and 1915 the Giriama people of coastal hinterland, under the charismatic leadership of Mekatilili, a woman, rose up in arms against taxations, wage-labor, and land alienation. Mekatilili hoped to prevent Giriama men from laboring for the British and to support the revival of traditional Giriama way of life. See Cynthia Brantley's *The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 1800-1920* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981). Today the Giriama's participation in wage-labor is minimal. The community relies on agriculture and grain production. Critics

saw a large number of young girls and women cutting reeds under the supervision of tribal police," Thuku complained in March 1922 while on a political tour in Central Kenya to popularize the East African Association (EAA), a political association he and his "friends" from other "tribes" founded the previous year.<sup>23</sup> Thuku insisted that the colonial administration forced women and young girls to cut enough reeds to thatch the police station in Nyeri, the administrative seat of the colonial government in Central Province. Citing Winston Churchill's order of 1921 to the governor of Kenya to stop coercive labor, Thuku asked the tribal police officer supervising the women to dismiss them, and he vowed to stick around until everyone "had gone back home."<sup>24</sup> By forcing women and young girls to work for free, the tribal policeman was, in Thuku's mind, "acting illegally." Thuku's roadside drama in Nyeri angered the government. Eager to stop him from "poisoning" other Africans, on March 14<sup>th</sup>, officials arrested him in a pre-dawn police raid at a friend's house in Nairobi. Concerned that detaining him for long in Nairobi would exacerbate tension and further promote disturbances, officials deported Thuku to Kismayu in the Jubaland Province later in March 1922 without the benefit of a trial. Three years later, Thuku was transferred to Marsabit in the Northern

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of early resistances in Africa dismissed them as "romantic reactionaries" and "premature nationalists." See Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). For counter-argument, see Terrence O. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," *The Journal of African History* 9, no. 3 (1968): 437-453.

<sup>23</sup> Harry Thuku, *An Autobiography* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), 32.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*



Frontier Province.<sup>25</sup> In 1929, Thuku was still languishing in detention.<sup>26</sup> It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the merits of Thuku's lengthy deportation, but two

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<sup>25</sup> The circumstances in which Thuku was deported from the Kikuyu Reserve to the coast are set out fully in the Command Paper 1691 published in May 1922.

<sup>26</sup> Thuku's prolonged detention without trial embarrassed officials in Britain, who often bragged about the superiority of the British judicial system known for its fairness. Incensed Labor Members in the House asked the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies to try or forthwith release Thuku. The House heard from the Secretary that the Colonial Office was in consultation with the Governor of Kenya on the subject of the arrest and deportation. Calls to release or try him intensified in 1930. Unable to justify the lengthy detention without trial, the Colonial Office in London, which had previously insisted that only three African protestors died in March 1922, asked Henry Monck-Mason Moore, the acting Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, to allow Thuku to leave Marsabit to reside within his reserve on condition that he maintain peace and order. Moore released Thuku, but warned him of re-arrest and re-deportation to Marsabit if he violated the terms of his release, which included, among other things, displaying good behavior and loyalty to the government. Judging from Thuku's retreat from active politics soon after his release—for instance, he opposed the Mau Mau war, refused to support African nationalists, and boycotted Independence Day celebrations in 1963—one must ask whether Moore's threats disrupted his inner foundation, or whether the British system of penal transportation and detention without trial worked as an effective instrument against African agitators. See The Command Paper 1691 published in May 1922. *The Nation* newspaper put the number of dead Africans at twenty-five. See *The East African Standard*, "Colonial Office Dispatch to Kenya Governor," December 21, 1929; *The Nation*, "The Man They Call A 'Black European,'" January 31, 1960; Henry Monck-Mason Moore to the District Commissioner, Marsabit, December 4, 1930, Political Prisoner—Harry Thuku DC/MBT/7/8/1 KNA, NRB. Also see "Precis of Interview given by His Excellency the

notable aspects of his short political life are worth considering. First, Thuku was a polarizing individual in colonial Kenya. People who admired him did so with passion, so much so that they believed in his causes and risked their lives to defend them. His detractors, however, loathed him and conspired for his downfall. “Chiefs and missionaries,” Thuku wrote in his oft-quoted autobiography, “had been collecting affidavits against me.”<sup>27</sup> Secondly, whether Thuku was an agitator or champion, he set in motion the processes that led to labor reforms in Kenya, especially reforms involving child labor in the 1920s and thereafter.

Neither Thuku nor those who agitated against juvenile labor (e.g., Jomo Kenyatta writing from Britain)<sup>28</sup> disclosed the children’s ages, but their persistent agitation

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Governor to Harry Thuku at Marsabit on March 11, 1928 in a “Confidential” dispatch, Political Prisoner—Harry Thuku DC/MBT/7/8/1 KNA, NRB.

<sup>27</sup> Thuku, *An Autobiography*, 32.

<sup>28</sup> Jomo Kenyatta, the future president of post-colonial Kenya, was one of the many voices that campaigned against child labor. While in London to complain about the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, which nullified the right of native ownership of land and made the Kikuyu mere tenants of the Crown, Kenyatta submitted short protest articles to the press in Britain simplifying the on-going labor dispute in Kenya to the British public. Kenyatta linked Thuku’s arrest to his opposition of “forced labor and other repressive measures.” He reminded the readers of *Times and Tide* that the lengthy detention without trial defied the British system of “fair play and justice.” To the readers of the *Daily Worker*, Kenyatta assured them that Thuku was not a monster. “All the people followed Thuku and saw that what he said was right,” Kenyatta wrote, and maintained that Thuku agitated “against the forced labor of girls and also against the taxes.” Because of Thuku’s efforts, Kenyatta concluded: the Government had *to abolish the forced labor of girls*, and to reduce the poll and hut taxes again from sixteen shillings to twelve. Therefore, Thuku was still more popular, and the *girls and young men* made songs about him and sang them in the villages [emphasis added]. See, Jomo

brought the subject of child labor to the public's attention in Kenya and Britain. In 1924, for example, the government, in a letter circulated to provincial and district heads, stated that laws and regulations governing the compulsion of native labor were "imperfectly understood." To put the matter straight, the government outlined that the compulsion of labor was restricted to able-bodied African men. Women and children, the circular read, "must not be ordered or compelled" to work on public roads and government stations.<sup>29</sup> Although by 1927 women and children were unpaid and unfed by their employers, the government attempted to end forced labor.<sup>30</sup> Moving expeditiously to reassure their critics at home and in London, officials in Nairobi defended themselves by pointing out that the government did "not countenance" the employment of women and children for work on public roads and did not call out such labor at any time.<sup>31</sup>

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Kenyatta, "East Africa," *Times and Tide*, December 13, 1929; Kenyatta, "An African People Rise in Revolt," *Daily Worker*, January, 20, 1930.

<sup>29</sup> G.V. Maxwell, Chief Native Commissioner, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Native Affairs Department, "Compulsory Labor," Circular No. 33, September 4, 1924.

Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA.

<sup>30</sup> Female Labor in Kenya, November 15, 1927 Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA. In 1927, an unidentified settler who planned to start a campaign against forced and unpaid labor in colonial Kenya wrote to the colonial office in London to complain about compulsory labor practices. According to the settler, "about 80 women [and children]" worked in Government stations under the supervision of Tribal Retainers. "These women," the settler added, "were neither paid nor fed." See Settler Comment Upon Native Labor Conditions in Kenya—in 1927 (July 5, 1927), Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA.

<sup>31</sup> Acting Governor to Secretary of States for the Colonies, July 31, 1927, Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA.

## MINIMUM AGE

Long before Harry Thuku exposed “problems” in the child labor policy, the colonial government in Kenya was content with exploiting African children. An examination of labor ordinances before 1922 suggests that the government hardly considered child labor an immediate problem worthy of consideration.<sup>32</sup> But things changed after the consequential confrontation. Beginning with the Master and Servant (Amendment) Ordinance of 1924, the government outlined its labor policies and guidelines. Although this particular Ordinance ignored children and child labor, children worked on colonial farms and in homes as domestic servants. In 1926, the government, for the first time, in The Custody of Children Ordinance, defined “child” as a person appearing to be under the age of sixteen years.<sup>33</sup> But this definition would not be the last; it changed in subsequent years. For example, in 1934, the Juvenile Ordinance defined a child as anyone under fourteen years, a change in policy that allowed employers to recruit younger children without the fear of repercussions.<sup>34</sup> Much to dissenters’ objections, four years later the government revised the minimum age. Under Section 28 (3) (b) of Ordinance No. II of 1938, the minimum age was reduced to ten years. “No juvenile who appears to be below the age of ten years,” the Ordinance declared, “shall be allowed to enter into a contract of service.”<sup>35</sup> It was clear that in 1938 and beyond there had been very considerable progress in discussing the practicability of fixing a minimum age for industrial and non-industrial employment involving children. A generation later,

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<sup>32</sup> The first ordinance to address labor related concerns in colonial Kenya was the East African Protectorate: Ordinances and Regulations, Vol. IV. January 1st to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1902, which only considered “employer” and “servant.”

<sup>33</sup> The Custody of Children Ordinance, 1926, KNA, NRB; The Custody of Children Ordinance, 1926, CO533/700, TNA.

<sup>34</sup> The Juveniles Ordinance, 1934, KNA, NRB.

<sup>35</sup> The Employment of Servants Ordinance, 1938, KNA, NRB.

the Prevention of Cruelty to and Neglect of Children Ordinance of 1955, left the definition of “actual or apparent age” to the courts, but it defined a child as a person under the age of sixteen years.<sup>36</sup>

The failure to definitively set a minimal age for wage work persisted throughout the colonial period. In 1956, less than seven years before the end of colonialism, a company manager responsible for recruiting was unaware of any ordinance that prevented his company from recruiting juveniles.<sup>37</sup> Frequent changes in labor policy created such unnecessary confusion and made the work of labor officers who tried to enforce the law difficult,<sup>38</sup> yet the government expected them to “thoroughly understand the Labor Laws and have a good working knowledge of criminal law.”<sup>39</sup> As the conversation between the DC, Turkana, and Husband reveals, officials lagged behind and expected the labor commissioner in Nairobi to guide them.

The prohibition against employing children came into sharp focus in 1938. As outlined in the Employment of Servants Ordinance of 1938, no juveniles were to be employed as porters, fuel cutters, trolley or rickshaw boys, or in any other class of labor for which, in the opinion of a government medical officer, they were physically

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<sup>36</sup> Children and Young Person Legislation in Kenya CO859/574, TNA.

<sup>37</sup> K. Archer, Manager, Eastern Produce & Estates, to DC, Kakamega (August 18, 1956) Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB.

<sup>38</sup> For instance, Ordinance No. 35 of 1950 amended the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Ordinance. Without defining “young person” or setting the minimum age, the new law prohibited labor officers from employing them as trimmers or stokers in any ship. See The Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children (Amendment) Ordinances, 1950.

<sup>39</sup> Memorandum for Guidance of Officers of the Labor Department, Prosecution by Labor Officers Under Various Ordinances ABK/1/4, KNA, NRB.

unsuitable.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the ordinance forbade professional recruiters from recruiting juveniles under sixteen years of age. According to official thinking, the forms of employment normally open to juveniles were domestic service, commerce and offices, institutions, local authority, grass-cutting, cleaning or gardening, and agriculture.<sup>41</sup> Contrary to these provisions, as figure 1 illustrates, children worked odd jobs.




Fig. 1. Three African children at work on one of the oscillating tables from which the alluvial concentrates passed to a smaller table. Although we cannot independently verify their ages, the children's tiny bodies suggest that they were too young for this kind of physical labor. Source: *East African Standard*, "Alluvial Working in Kakamega," March 2, 1935. Photo: L Pemberton.

The child labor law of 1938 underscored the significance of recruitment certificates, and it forbade labor agents and professional recruiters from recruiting juveniles without

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, "Memorandum on the Employment of Juveniles," Employment of Juvenile Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.

first obtaining a certificate from a District Officer stating that “the permission of the father or guardian of such juvenile has been obtained.”<sup>42</sup> Children who obtained certificates of employment were permitted to enter into a contract of service, but it was up to them to comprehend the contract’s terms. In other words, the law did not completely forbid children from entering the labor force. Rather, it encouraged unscrupulous recruiters to take advantage of the “permission” loophole to beat the system. Most recruiters and employers ignored the section of the law that required them to appear in person with the juvenile and the juvenile’s father (or if his father was dead, his legal guardian) before a District Officer prior to obtaining a permit to recruit.<sup>43</sup>

The manipulation of employment loopholes by recruiters and employers came to light in the case involving Suleiman Said, a recruiter and employer. On July 8, 1945, Said recruited fifteen boys for work in the Manoni Sugar Factory (Eastern Province). According to one of Said’s recruits, Said promised to pay “each of us Shs. 6/- per month, plus posho. Nothing was said about housing.”<sup>44</sup> Together with his Swahili driver, Said “put” the boys in a lorry and left Kitui that morning. Along the way, the two pulled over at a house in Mazi, where they consumed alcohol and *nyama choma* (grilled goat meat). The boys were not fed. After four hours, Said and his driver emerged from the house “very drunk.” One boy’s words, on their way to Kibwezi, describe the children’s distress:

The lorry was swerving all over the road because the driver was drunk. We cried out and were very afraid. The lorry was driven so badly that the lorry left the road and crashed through some sisal and finally turned over on its side throwing us out. Two persons were killed when the lorry overturned. One was a man to

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<sup>42</sup> Employment of Servants Ordinance, 1938, KNA, NRB.

<sup>43</sup> H. de Warrenne Waller, DC, Kitui, to Township Plottolders and all employees of labor, July 17, 1953, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.

<sup>44</sup> Recorded Statement of Kilanda Kiondu, July 16, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.

whom we had given a lift from Hawi and the other was a juvenile aged about 8 or 9 years. His name was Kilanyi Njeru of Kitui. We seven were all hurt slightly and suffered from shock. Seven others were injured and taken to hospital at Voi. The driver was not hurt. Suleiman was injured slightly.<sup>45</sup>

The matter came to the attention of colonial officials because the lorry carrying the children was involved in an accident. According to the government's version of the incident, all the children escaped with their lives.<sup>46</sup> Said was charged on fifteen counts, one of which was later withdrawn. Citing Section 28 (1) of Ordinance II of 1938, which forbade private and professional recruiters from recruiting children unless such juveniles had obtained a certificate from a DO, the magistrate fined Said twenty shillings, "I.D. three days imprisonment," and ordered him to pay to the Labor Department the cost incurred in repatriating the recruited juveniles.<sup>47</sup>

The incident involving Said was not an isolated one. In South Kavirondo, a clerk in the Labor Office stopped five "children all under 10 years old on the Railway Station . . . when they were about to embark for Taveta,"<sup>48</sup> about 675 miles away. One boy,

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> DC, Voi, to Labor Commissioner, Nairobi, July 14, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.

<sup>47</sup> 1st Class Magistrate, November 24, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.

<sup>48</sup> DC, South Kavirondo, "Child Labor," June 30, 1938, Labor Agents Permits DC/KSM/1/17/66 KNA, NRB. It was not uncommon for children to walk long distances away from home. Archdeacon noted in 1939 that "some children may have to go as far as 500 miles from home" for work. Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939. Also see Owen "Child Labor in East Africa," *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939; Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939. In 1947, "four totos [children]" were said to have walked "from Taveta to Voi [sixty-eight miles] having been



Mlando, was “deaf and dumb,” and it is unclear whether the recruiter explained to him the object of the trip and the nature of the work. What was clear, though, was that the DC repatriated the boys and vowed to act against the recruiter who had already left for Taveta with other children.

In another incidence, Lokonyi Asala, a recruiter in Bushimuli, Idakho, recruited Romanus Okal, a juvenile under twelve years of age and a pupil of Standard Four at Eregi Primary School, for labor on the estate of the Septum Tea Company of Songhor (Kisumu) without his parents’ knowledge and against their wishes.<sup>49</sup> Unlike the recruits involved in Said and Matonye’s botched missions, Okal arrived at Septum Tea Company and reported for duty before his mother asked “that her son be returned to her as soon as possible.”<sup>50</sup> Company officials agreed to repatriate Okal after the DC of North Nyanza intervened.

Such incidences occurred frequently, and the three examples illustrate in the words of Sir Granville Orde Browne that “the provision of the law which insist[ed] upon the children being accompanied by a parent or guardian [was] too often observed with a

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recruited by an Assistant Recruiter. The DC, Voi, gave them subsistence allowance and repatriated them under escort. DC, Voi, to DC, Kitui, “Juveniles—Labor,” June 20, 1947. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB. In addition, C. Campbell, DC, Machakos, complained to the PC (3), Southern Area about the view that children Machakos who go to Nairobi (forty miles) were not “young criminals.” Campbell to PC, “Wakamba Juveniles,” February 9, 1956. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB. Leeds, Labor Officer, Thika, complained to DC, Kitui that children were leaving Kitui for Thika (eighty-one miles) to work at Messrs Bobs Narries Ltd. Leeds to DC, “Employment of Children,” December 20, 1958. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB.

<sup>49</sup> L.T. Ross, Principal, St. Augustine’s T.T. Centre, to DO, Kakamega, “Tea Estate Labor: Romanus Okal s/o Bukachi,” May 28, 1957, Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NBR.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

considerable measure of laxity.”<sup>51</sup> Despite Browne’s observation, the government did not act quickly to punish offenders. Its rate of prosecution was dismal. For example, in 1955 and 1956 only 48 and 46 employers, respectively, were prosecuted for the illegal employment of juveniles.<sup>52</sup> The dismal figures emboldened recruiters to break the law with impunity. Moreover, they treated official complaints with contempt. Henry Oyuwa, a driver/recruiter for Chemoni Tea Estate, told off the DC after the latter inspected his bus and discovered that a minor worker was inside. Appearing to be “under the influence of drink,” Oyuwa dismissed the DC and told him “that this was no concern of his as the fellow was an employee of long standing.”<sup>53</sup>

The drama surrounding the ages of child workers vexed officials throughout the colonial period in Kenya. Key actors in the labor industry such as DOs, employers, and recruiters hardly understood what constituted minor workers or their minimum ages. Indeed, Husband seemed confused on this subject. Three years after he instructed the DC in Turkana that the child workers’ ages should be between twelve and eighteen years, Husband advised the Permanent Secretary (PS) in the Ministry of Education, Labor, and Lands to consider juveniles as “males and females under the age of 16

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<sup>51</sup> Sir Granville Orde Browne’s Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Labor Conditions in East Africa. November 22, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles, MV/10/16/ KNA, NRB.

<sup>52</sup> Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, June 21, 1958, “Memorandum on the Employment of Juveniles,” Employment of Juveniles Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.

<sup>53</sup> District Commissioner, North Nyanza, to Messrs. Chemoni Tea Estate, “Recruiting of Labor,” May 11, 1957, Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB.

years."<sup>54</sup> In other words, those between sixteen and eighteen were to be considered adults. Yet, in making this critical guideline, Husband did not refer to any ordinance, an oversight suggesting that the recommendation was his personal view.

The inability to resolve the question of minimum age engendered serious problems throughout the colony. First, most company managers ignored age and turned to height as the criteria for recruitment. Writing to the DC in Kakamega to ask him to issue recruitment permits to his company recruiters, K. Archer, Manager, Eastern Produce & Estates, requested he be "allowed to recruit juveniles over 4'11 high."<sup>55</sup> By turning to height, Archer probably thought that tall boys, although young, were physically ready for manual labor. Secondly, unwilling to go through the tedious process of applying for recruitment permits for their recruiters, some company managers kidnapped children and forced them to work on their estates. In 1952, for example, the Mombasa branch of the Kikuyu General Union (KGU) wrote to Fenner Brockway, a British Member of Parliament and member of the League against Imperialism, to complain about Major C.E.V. Buxton, a European farmer in Limuru, who kidnapped fourteen juveniles and took them to Vipingoni Estates in Kilifi District (about 346 miles away).<sup>56</sup> Led by Wilson Maina Macharia, KGU officials informed Brockway that Buxton treated the children "as slaves." They accused him of compelling the children to work "from 6 a.m. until 6 p.m. without giving them food for [the] whole day."<sup>57</sup> Pointing out that the Criminal

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<sup>54</sup> Husband to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education Labor and Lands, "Employment of African Women and Children on European Farms," May 22, 1958, Minimum Wages, ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB.

<sup>55</sup> K. Archer to DC, Kakamega, June 30, 1965 Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB.

<sup>56</sup> Letter from Kikuyu General Union (Mombasa Branch) to Hon. F. Brockway, November 4, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB.

<sup>57</sup> The Kikuyu General Union, Mombasa Branch, to Attorney General, "Complaint Against Major C.E.V. Buxton For Kidnapping," July 18, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB.

Investigation Department (CID) and the Attorney's General Office were aware of the matter but had so far failed to act, KGU members observed that Britain had outlawed the slave trade, yet the practice was "still going on in Kenya by underground movements, and this [was] carried on by settlers."<sup>58</sup> Macharia stated that KGU's members "rescued" the fourteen boys and brought them back to Nairobi before sending them to their respective homes in Kiabu, Muranga, Machakos, and Kitui districts. On the boy's behalf, KGU sued Buxton, and the court fined him Ksh. 600.<sup>59</sup>

Increased incidences of mistreatment of children, especially minor workers, prompted the passage of the "Prevention of Cruelty to and Neglect of Children Ordinance 1955," popularly known as "The Children's Charter," which was based largely on the United Kingdom's principles and practices. This Ordinance was ineffective due to staffing problems that undermined its execution. Seeking to strengthen the Ordinance and perhaps lessen cruelty to children, the Cabinet Office proposed the appointment of Probation Officers in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru. If the proposal proved impossible to implement, the Office advised the Treasury to set aside finances to enable the hiring of civilian employees.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Letter from Kikuyu General Union to Hon. F. Brockway, November 4, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB. For a similar discussion about the kidnap of children in South Africa for slave-like labor, see Atkins, 16.

<sup>59</sup> Wilson Maina Macharia interview with Samson K. Ndanyi, June 22, 2016, at KNA. Kidnapping in colonial Africa occurred frequently. See for example Beverly Grier, "Child Labor and Africanist Scholarship: A Critical Overview," *African Studies Review* 47, no. 2 (Sep., 2004): 5-6

<sup>60</sup> Cabinet Office, Nairobi, March 27, 1956 Children and Young Person Legislation in Kenya CO859/574, TNA.

## SELF-APPOINTED UNCLES

The “large and increasing number of boys under Registration age employed in towns in Kenya” caught the attention of the Church of Scotland Mission in the country.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, the employment of young boys was a subject of discussion during the Annual General Meeting of the Kenya Missionary Council, an arm of the Church of Scotland Mission, in February 1927. The Council deplored child labor and asked the government to stop the practice as it contributed to the degradation of a minor’s moral and physical well-being.<sup>62</sup> What bothered Council members the most was the section of the law that required children who sought employment, but did not reside with their parents, only to acquire permits from Labor Officers. According to Council members, the prevailing conditions in the Native quarters in big towns threatened to erode the moral behaviors of unaccompanied minors. “When children under Registration age are employed away from home,” the Council informed the Chief Native Commissioner in Nairobi, “special arrangements should be made to conserve their moral and physical well-being.”<sup>63</sup>

Council members neither revealed the “special arrangements” they had in mind, nor did they provide the data that supported the argument of moral decline. Quietly, though, the Council’s executive committee asked its secretary for missionary “friends” to monitor “the possible deleterious effect of the employment of young African children

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<sup>61</sup> A.R. Barlow, Hon. Secretary, Church of Scotland Mission, Kikuyu, to Chief Native Commissioner, March 29, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.

<sup>62</sup> Barlow to Chief Native Commissioner, March 29, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

on farms and in towns."<sup>64</sup> The Council hoped that missionaries would "observe" the effects of employment on young children "during the period of their employment or subsequent to their return to the Reserve" and report their "opinions" to the secretary. The secretary wrote to a "dear friend" (perhaps a missionary) asking for the missionary's testimony "as to whether employment of young children away from home ha[d] any obvious evil effects or not."<sup>65</sup>

Archdeacon W. E. Owen of Kavirondo was perhaps the sharpest critic of underage labor. In 1939, Owen questioned the existing policy on child labor by pointing out that the "exploitation of child labor [was] probably the meanest policy in our African Empire."<sup>66</sup> He began by censuring Section 28 of the Employment of Servants Ordinance of 1938 (discussed above), which exempted children under ten years old from employment. Owen turned to the dismal pay and the "cheap food" given to the children and then questioned the lack of workers compensation legislation to protect the children except in the mining industry. Pointing out that employers took no responsibility for the children's safety and failed to pay those who became sick,<sup>67</sup> Owen blamed them for failing to ensure that "children reach[ed] home after their term of employment."<sup>68</sup> Short on evidential data, Owen complained that the employers' lack of

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<sup>64</sup> Barlow to "Dear Friend," January 17, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Archdeacon Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939.

<sup>67</sup> Archdeacon Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa," *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939; Owen, "Child Labor."

<sup>68</sup> Owen, "Child Labor."

responsibility resulted in “lost” children who “wander[ed] from employment to employment.”<sup>69</sup>

Owen was not done. More than anyone else, the venerable Archdeacon linked child labor to the “heavy taxation” the government imposed. He characterized the tactics used to collect taxes as “harsh” and argued that these were the “forces” that compelled many African parents to allow their children to go into wage labor. Regarding moral problems, Owen, like the Missionary Council before him, argued that labor centers were dens of “sexual immorality,” where Europeans cohabited with African women. As was often the case, Owen, without revealing the source of his evidence, claimed that sexually transmitted diseases were on the rise in labor lines, where “many children [found] themselves employed.”<sup>70</sup> But Owen did not disclose whether children in these centers carried venereal diseases, which would have meant that children’s bodies were diseased instruments of colonial labor. According to Owen, children working away from parental supervision were often found “to be rolling about drunk.”<sup>71</sup> Owen characterized the recruitment of children as a “scandal,” and he added that “there was not the care for the welfare of the child outside of working hours which was necessary if the child’s character were not to be exposed unnecessary to moral perils beyond its power to resist [sic].”<sup>72</sup> He concluded by reminding the British public that the responsibility for colonial policies rested with them. In a tone bordering on paternalism, Owen insisted that “the very least *we* can do to protect those who cannot protect themselves is to see to it that no children under 14 years be taken to employment distant from their

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Owen, “Child Labor in East Africa”.

<sup>71</sup> *The Chicago Defender*, “Churchman Exposes Child Labor in British Colony,” January 11, 1938.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

homes."<sup>73</sup> Because of Britain's self-appointment as trustee of African children, Owen urged his fellow countrymen to "be worthy of [their] trust."<sup>74</sup>

Owen's criticism echoed throughout the world and in the settler community in Kenya, where it unnerved White employers.<sup>75</sup> To Denis N. Neylan, a settler in Nakuru, Owen was nothing but an "old crank" who made "libelous statements."<sup>76</sup> Neylan dismissed Owen's views and questioned the silence of "his brother clergy, who [were] supposed to stand for absolute truth and honesty. . . in respect of juvenile labor."<sup>77</sup> Explaining the "absolute truth" from a settler's frame of reference, Neylan argued that juvenile labor was "entirely voluntary," and that minor laborers came and went "at their own sweet will." Neylan concluded by stating that White employers "cared for juveniles."<sup>78</sup>

Similarly, M. Mallet, a settler from Ruaraka, rebuked Owen for most of his concerns. With a certain bravado, Mallet waxed enthusiastically about the "12 and 14 juveniles" who worked for him. At the end of his five-year farming career in Kenya, Mallet boasted how he had between "50 and 60 happy totos [children]."<sup>79</sup> He also boasted of his care, even suggesting that it was far better than what the children received from their parents. To Mallet, Owen was a "pet theorist" who held on to a "frail" straw so long as it helped him advance his pet theory. Against Owen's view that

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<sup>73</sup> Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa."

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> The criticism also drew the attention of *The Chicago Defender's* editors, who wrote about it under the banner of "Churchman Exposes Child Labor in British Colony" on June 11, 1938.

<sup>76</sup> Denis N. Neylan, "Juvenile Labor," *East African Standard*, January 6, 1939.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> M. Mallet, "Child Labor in Kenya," *East African Standard*, January 13, 1939.



heavy taxation compelled parents to allow their children to engage in wage labor, Mallet agreed with Neylan's view of voluntary labor, and added that parents were "very pleased" to see their children employed. "There was no need of coercion," he wrote, adding that "they came in little flocks and for everyone I took on I refused three, much to their disappointment."<sup>80</sup> Echoing Neylan's view, Mallet noted that his juvenile workers—mostly males whose paternalistic job titles included kitchen boy, chicken boy, horse boy, farm boy, dog boy, errand boy, and numerous other occupations that he could not recall—came and went "as they pleased."<sup>81</sup> He did not disclose how he arranged for their housing, but he insisted that he fed them "plenty of food," provided them with "good housing," and attended to "even the smallest scratch."<sup>82</sup>

Colonial settlers and missionaries held themselves as altruistic, avuncular figures and moral guardians of African children. They argued that they stood on the side of the African child, but as an informant suggested, "God," not missionaries or settlers, "was with us."<sup>83</sup> Throughout the colonial period in Africa, missionaries and settlers constituted the thread that held together the rugged fabric of colonialism. As part of the colonial apparatus, they promoted an alien culture, patriotic motivations, and

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Mallet, "Child Labor in Kenya."

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. Caroline Allan, another settler from Kericho, invited Owen to meet settlers who harbored the welfare of Kenya at heart. In Allan's view, Owen grossly "underestimated" Kenya's settlers," but the community had forgiven him for the "folly he no doubt unwittingly committed." Unlike Neylan and Mallet, who countered Owen on the merits of his arguments, Allan's letter to the editors of the *East African Standard* missed the gist of Owen's main concerns. Instead, Allan focused on the willingness of the settler community to invite Owen to "a debate" that would "guide" and "put him right" so that he might not be "a waste of good material." See *East African Standard*, January 6, 1939.

<sup>83</sup> J.K. Mũtua, personal interview, June 28, 2016, Nairobi, Kenya.

commercial interests.<sup>84</sup> Although they tended to claim that their core mission in Africa was to “cultivate” Africans to embrace new forms of physical hygiene, moral soundness, and spiritual attainment,<sup>85</sup> for the most part, missionaries often sided with secular governments to effect the colonial administrators’ policies. As John and Jean Comaroff put it, the two entities worked together to colonize the “consciousness” of the African people and to institute and enforce the “consciousness of colonization” in Africa.<sup>86</sup>

As the debate between the church and colonial settlers over who was qualified to speak for African children played out in public, the government created a committee to study the controversial issue and offer recommendations in 1939. In particular, the committee focused on Section 28 of the Employment of Servants Ordinance of 1938, with the goal of establishing whether the child workers’ minimum age should be raised from ten years. To the delight of the law’s critics, the committee recommended that the “age for agricultural and domestic employment be raised from ten to twelve [and] in industrial occupations from twelve to fourteen.”<sup>87</sup> Although frequent changes in minimum age created anxiety in the colony, the government propagated the notion that “the African youth is the future laborer and that, unless adequate steps are taken to integrate him into the economy . . . , his own future, as well as that of the Colony

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<sup>84</sup> V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 45.

<sup>85</sup> Timothy Burke, *Lifebouy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); John and Jean Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* vol. 1 & 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991& 1997).

<sup>86</sup> Comaroff, 309–314.

<sup>87</sup> Owen, “Child Labor.”

itself will be imperiled."<sup>88</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that juvenile wage labor interlaced African children into the fabric of a Western form of capitalism in Africa. Although the process was not an easy undertaking, the challenges exposed the colonizers' inability to harmonize their conceptual view of an African child, and the frequent definitions and shifts in the meaning of age often undermined the harmonization process. Consequently, key labor actors employed multiple criteria (e.g., height, sturdiness, and age) through which they imagined African children. By all measures, colonialists failed to grasp the logic of separating children and wage labor. By 1919, children and wage labor hardly proceeded in tandem and were never considered in the international arena as two sides of the same coin. This universally recognized logic is enshrined in the International Labor Organization's constitution (1919), but it meant little to Britain's "men on the spot," even when the evidence suggests that they understood ILO's spirit.<sup>89</sup> Contrary to ILO's Convention, which Kenya observed, and contrary to Kenya's own law, children worked without prior parental consent. As such, the disconnection between government and international and domestic laws complicated the definition of an African child throughout the colonial era.

This chapter challenges the theory that links child labor to poverty in African households. At its core, the theory postulates that African families, poor in material wealth, willingly sent their children to work. This theory shifts the blame to African

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<sup>88</sup> Report of the Labor Department of Kenya, April 6, 1950. Employment of Children, Women and Young Persons, in Industry and Other Occupations—Kenya, CO859/191/10, TNA.

<sup>89</sup> S.A. Ogilvie's letter, January 24, 1952, Employment of women and children- Kenya CO859/302, TNA.

parents and excuses labor recruiters and employers who forced children into the labor industry. Ignoring multiple incidences of kidnapping African children for labor, the theory fails to hold accountable the kidnapers, mainly labor recruiters acting on the behest of colonial settlers and employers. Two incidents discussed in this chapter are of particular interest. First, the forceful employment of Okal at the Septum Tea Company against his mother's knowledge and objection, who asked for his immediate return. Secondly, the KGU's agitation against Buxton's kidnap of fourteen children from Limuru to Vipingoni Estates in Kilifi District. These incidents illustrate the African opposition to the colonial labor recruitment regime.

Finally, this chapter has implicitly exposed a gender binary that informed labor practices in colonial Kenya. Officials often employed child labor as a means to construct masculinity and separate genders. By recruiting mostly boys in large numbers to work on settler farms and in homes, factories, and mining, they created a gender binary and defined masculinity based on the boys' physical stature and ability to work. The "reconstruction of African childhood was and is a gendered process."<sup>90</sup> Girls in colonial Zimbabwe, Nyasaland, and Swaziland, for example, had less freedom of mobility and very limited employment prospects in sprawling towns across the country.<sup>91</sup> For the most part during the period under review, women generally had less access than men to the colonial economy and labor. Frederick Cooper sums up the disparity this way: "industrial man, in officials' eyes, was indeed a male."<sup>92</sup>

The constructed categories were key to controlling Black male bodies at critical stages of growth. As Dior Konate explains in reference to the control of young female delinquents in colonial Senegal, "the definition of a legal age for children reveals the

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<sup>90</sup> Grier, 17.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.; Chirwa, 665; Simelane, 572.

<sup>92</sup> Cooper, 2; Also see López-Calva, 66.

colonial authorities' willingness to take on a greater role in the control of African youth.<sup>93</sup> For the control to take hold, however, public institutions supporting this idealized thinking were established. Throughout colonial Africa, Approved Schools and Juvenile Courts suddenly emerged to institutionalize the control and make it permanent. In Kenya, with regard to the age group thought to be most prone to delinquency (fourteen to sixteen years of age), a figure from the Juvenile Court in Nairobi shows that between 1954 and 1957, "1579 children under 13 years, 4273 children between 14 and 16, and 792 children between 16 and 18 appeared before the Court" charged with multiple juvenile offenses that included withholding their labor by evading responsibilities, loitering at street corners, and exhibiting truancy.<sup>94</sup> Generally, Approved Schools admitted those children the administrations believed could easily be rehabilitated before rejoining the labor force. Therefore, individuals and private and public institutions—like Owen, White employers, and the Church of Scotland Mission—that pretended to speak on behalf of African children while condoning colonialism in all its manifestation were more interested in taking part in the already elaborate control system.

## END NOTES

1. DC, Turkana, to J. Ian Husband, "Minimum Wages," 7 Sep. 1955, Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 Kenya National Archives (KNA), Nairobi (NRB). [↑](#)
2. Husband to DC, Turkana, "Juvenile Wages," 20th Oct. 1955. Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. [↑](#)

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<sup>93</sup> Dior Konate, "On Colonial Laws and the Treatment of Young Female Delinquents in Senegal: The Case of Léonie Guèye," *Stichproben Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 7, no. 12 (2007): 39.

<sup>94</sup> Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, "Central Probation Committee: Employment of Juveniles Sub-Committee's Report," (August 3, 1957). Employment of Juveniles Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.

3. Ibid. [↑](#)
4. Husband to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education Labor and Lands, "Employment of African Women and Children on European Farms," May 22, 1958, Minimum Wages ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. But Archdeacon W.E. Owen of Kavirondo pointed out that children were expected to work "for a seven-to-eight-hour day." Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa," *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939. [↑](#)
5. C.H Hartwell, Member for Labor, "The Employment of Juveniles (Hours of Work and Welfare Rules, 1952)," June 4, 1952, Employment of women and children-Kenya CO859/302, TNA. [↑](#)
6. Husband to DC. Turkana, Minimum Wages-General ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. [↑](#)
7. Examples include Frederick Cooper's *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, a comparative study that focuses on "working class" and "African workers"; Kaletso E. Atkins's *The Moon is Dead! Give us our Money!: The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993), which highlights the plight of "black working [Zulu] men" who forged "African work ethic" in nineteenth-century South Africa; and Iris Berger's *Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 1900–1980* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), which focuses on white and black working-class women "hidden from [labor] history" in South Africa between 1900 and 1980. [↑](#)
8. Luis F. López-Calva, "Child Labor: Myths, Theories and Facts," *Journal of International Affairs* 55, no.1 (2001): 60 [↑](#)
9. Beverly Grier, *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth, NH. Heinemann, 2006), 26. [↑](#)
10. Wiseman Chijere Chirwa, "Child and Youth Labour on the Nyasaland Plantations, 1890-1953," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, no. 4 (1993): 662-680. [↑](#)
11. Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van, "The Economics of Child Labor," *The American Economic Review* 88, no. 3 (1998):414. [↑](#)
12. Ibid., 414. [↑](#)

13. Sudharshan Canagarajah and Helena Skyt Nielsen, "Child Labor in Africa: A Comparative Study," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 575 (2001): 73. [↑](#)
14. Anne Kielland and Maurizia Tovo, *Children at Work: Child Labor Practices in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 1. [↑](#)
15. Osita Agbu, "Child Labor in Contemporary Africa: Issues and Challenges," in *Children and Youth in the Labor Process in Africa*, ed. Osita Agbu (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 2009), 12 [↑](#)
16. Kielland and Tovo, 1. [↑](#)
17. Hamilton Siphon Simelane, "Landlords, The State, and Child Labor in Colonial Swaziland, 1914- 1947," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): 575. [↑](#)
18. López-Calva, 64. [↑](#)
19. Kevin Shillington, *History of Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 14-15; Atkins informs us that "very commonly youngsters were kept busy every day with light work around the homestead. Little boys from about the age of five or seven, would go out to herd small livestock such as goats, calves, and sheep." See Atkins, 58. She also adds that children who were hired for paid labor received their payment in the form of cloths, blankets, knives, hatchets or a lump of iron currency; see page 95. [↑](#)
20. Chirwa, 664. [↑](#)
21. P.B.E. Thompson, Divisional Engineer's Office, Coast Province, to Fred, "Wages-Male Employee Under 21 Years of Age," April 12, 1961, Minimum Wages ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB. Referring to the output of African casual laborers between the ages of 18–20, Thompson informed Fred that "in fact, their youth and strength ensures that their output is as high." [↑](#)
22. Before Thuku's Uprising, however, in 1914 and 1915 the Giriama people of coastal hinterland, under the charismatic leadership of Mekatilili, a woman, rose up in arms against taxations, wage- labor, and land alienation. Mekatilili hoped to prevent Giriama men from laboring for the British and to support the revival of

traditional Giriama way of life. See Cynthia Brantley's *The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 1800-1920* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981). Today the Giriama's participation in wage-labor is minimal. The community relies on agriculture and grain production. Critics of early resistances in Africa dismissed them as "romantic reactionaries" and "premature nationalists." See Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998). For counter-argument, see Terrence O. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," *The Journal of African History* 9, no. 3 (1968): 437-453. ↑

23. Harry Thuku, *An Autobiography* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), 32. ↑

24. Ibid. ↑

25. The circumstances in which Thuku was deported from the Kikuyu Reserve to the coast are set out fully in the Command Paper 1691 published in May 1922. ↑

26. Thuku's prolonged detention without trial embarrassed officials in Britain, who often bragged about the superiority of the British judicial system known for its fairness. Incensed Labor Members in the House asked the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies to try or forthwith release Thuku. The House heard from the Secretary that the Colonial Office was in consultation with the Governor of Kenya on the subject of the arrest and deportation. Calls to release or try him intensified in 1930. Unable to justify the lengthy detention without trial, the Colonial Office in London, which had previously insisted that only three African protestors died in March 1922, asked Henry Monck-Mason Moore, the acting Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, to allow Thuku to leave Marsabit to reside within his reserve on condition that he maintain peace and order. Moore released Thuku, but warned him of re-arrest and re-deportation to Marsabit if he violated the terms of his release, which included, among other things, displaying good behavior and loyalty to the government. Judging from Thuku's retreat from active politics soon after his release—for instance, he opposed the Mau Mau war, refused to support African



nationalists, and boycotted Independence Day celebrations in 1963—one must ask whether Moore’s threats disrupted his inner foundation, or whether the British system of penal transportation and detention without trial worked as an effective instrument against African agitators. See The Command Paper 1691 published in May 1922. *The Nation* newspaper put the number of dead Africans at twenty-five. See *The East African Standard*, “Colonial Office Dispatch to Kenya Governor,” December 21, 1929; *The Nation*, “The Man They Call A ‘Black European,’” January 31, 1960; Henry Monck-Mason Moore to the District Commissioner, Marsabit, December 4, 1930, Political Prisoner—Harry Thuku DC/MBT/7/8/1 KNA, NRB. Also see “Precis of Interview given by His Excellency the Governor to Harry Thuku at Marsabit on March 11, 1928 in a “Confidential” dispatch, Political Prisoner—Harry Thuku DC/MBT/7/8/1 KNA, NRB. [↑](#)

27. Thuku, *An Autobiography*, 32. [↑](#)

28. Jomo Kenyatta, the future president of post-colonial Kenya, was one of the many voices that campaigned against child labor. While in London to complain about the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915, which nullified the right of native ownership of land and made the Kikuyu mere tenants of the Crown, Kenyatta submitted short protest articles to the press in Britain simplifying the on-going labor dispute in Kenya to the British public. Kenyatta linked Thuku’s arrest to his opposition of “forced labor and other repressive measures.” He reminded the readers of *Times and Tide* that the lengthy detention without trial defied the British system of “fair play and justice.” To the readers of the *Daily Worker*, Kenyatta assured them that Thuku was not a monster. “All the people followed Thuku and saw that what he said was right,” Kenyatta wrote, and maintained that Thuku agitated “against the forced labor of girls and also against the taxes.” Because of Thuku’s efforts, Kenyatta concluded: the Government had *to abolish the forced labor of girls*, and to reduce the poll and hut taxes again from sixteen shillings to twelve. Therefore, Thuku was still more popular, and the *girls* and *young men* made songs about him and sang them in the villages [emphasis added]. See, Jomo Kenyatta, “East

- Africa," *Times and Tide*, December 13, 1929; Kenyatta, "An African People Rise in Revolt," *Daily Worker*, January, 20, 1930. [↑](#)
29. G.V. Maxwell, Chief Native Commissioner, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Native Affairs Department, "Compulsory Labor," Circular No. 33, September 4, 1924. Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA. [↑](#)
  30. Female Labor in Kenya, November 15, 1927 Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA. In 1927, an unidentified settler who planned to start a campaign against forced and unpaid labor in colonial Kenya wrote to the colonial office in London to complain about compulsory labor practices. According to the settler, "about 80 women [and children]" worked in Government stations under the supervision of Tribal Retainers. "These women," the settler added, "were neither paid nor fed." See Settler Comment Upon Native Labor Conditions in Kenya—in 1927 (July 5, 1927), Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA. [↑](#)
  31. Acting Governor to Secretary of States for the Colonies, July 31, 1927, Employment of Natives on Roads, CO533/748, TNA. [↑](#)
  32. The first ordinance to address labor related concerns in colonial Kenya was the East African Protectorate: Ordinances and Regulations, Vol. IV. January 1st to December 31<sup>st</sup>, 1902, which only considered "employer" and "servant." [↑](#)
  33. The Custody of Children Ordinance, 1926, KNA, NRB; The Custody of Children Ordinance, 1926, CO533/700, TNA. [↑](#)
  34. The Juveniles Ordinance, 1934, KNA, NRB. [↑](#)
  35. The Employment of Servants Ordinance, 1938, KNA, NRB. [↑](#)
  36. Children and Young Person Legislation in Kenya CO859/574, TNA. [↑](#)
  37. K. Archer, Manager, Eastern Produce & Estates, to DC, Kakamega (August 18, 1956) Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB. [↑](#)
  38. For instance, Ordinance No. 35 of 1950 amended the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Ordinance. Without defining "young person" or setting the minimum age, the new law prohibited labor officers from employing

- them as trimmers or stokers in any ship. See The Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children (Amendment) Ordinances, 1950.<sup>↑</sup>
39. Memorandum for Guidance of Officers of the Labor Department, Prosecution by Labor Officers Under Various Ordinances ABK/1/4, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
40. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
41. Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, "Memorandum on the Employment of Juveniles," Employment of Juvenile Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
42. Employment of Servants Ordinance, 1938, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
43. H. de Warrenne Waller, DC, Kitui, to Township Plottolders and all employees of labor, July 17, 1953, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
44. Recorded Statement of Kilanda Kiondu, July 16, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
45. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
46. DC, Voi, to Labor Commissioner, Nairobi, July 14, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
47. 1st Class Magistrate, November 24, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16, KNA, NRB.<sup>↑</sup>
48. DC, South Kavirondo, "Child Labor," June 30, 1938, Labor Agents Permits DC/KSM/1/17/66 KNA, NRB. It was not uncommon for children to walk long distances away from home. Archdeacon noted in 1939 that "some children may have to go as far as 500 miles from home" for work. Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939. Also see Owen "Child Labor in East Africa," *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939; Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939. In 1947, "four totos [children]" were said to have walked "from Taveta to Voi [sixty-eight miles] having been recruited by an Assistant Recruiter. The DC, Voi, gave them subsistence allowance and repatriated them under escort. DC, Voi, to DC, Kitui, "Juveniles—Labor," June 20, 1947. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB. In addition, C. Campbell, DC, Machakos, complained to the PC (3), Southern Area about the view that children

Machakos who go to Nairobi (forty miles) were not “young criminals.” Campbell to PC, “Wakamba Juveniles,” February 9, 1956. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB. Leeds, Labor Officer, Thika, complained to DC, Kitui that children were leaving Kitui for Thika (eighty-one miles) to work at Messrs Bobs Narries Ltd. Leeds to DC, “Employment of Children,” December 20, 1958. Labor Employment of Juveniles MV/10/16 KNA, NRB.↑

49. L.T. Ross, Principal, St. Augustine’s T.T. Centre, to DO, Kakamega, “Tea Estate Labor: Romanus Okal s/o Bukachi,” May 28, 1957, Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NBR.↑

50. Ibid.↑

51. Sir Granville Orde Browne’s Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Labor Conditions in East Africa. November 22, 1945, Labor Employment of Juveniles, MV/10/16/ KNA, NRB.↑

52. Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, June 21, 1958, “Memorandum on the Employment of Juveniles,” Employment of Juveniles Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.↑

53. District Commissioner, North Nyanza, to Messrs. Chemoni Tea Estate, “Recruiting of Labor,” May 11, 1957, Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB.↑

54. Husband to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education Labor and Lands, “Employment of African Women and Children on European Farms,” May 22, 1958, Minimum Wages, ABK/1/36 KNA, NRB.↑

55. K. Archer to DC, Kakamega, June 30, 1965 Labor Policy DC/KMG/2/12/13 KNA, NRB.↑

56. Kate Gilbert Phifer, *Tall and Small: A Book About Height* (New York, NY: Walker and Co. 1987).↑

57. Letter from Kikuyu General Union (Mombasa Branch) to Hon. F. Brockway, November 4, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB.↑

58. The Kikuyu General Union, Mombasa Branch, to Attorney General, “Complaint Against Major C.E.V. Buxton For Kidnapping,” July 18, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB.↑

59. Letter from Kikuyu General Union to Hon. F. Brockway, November 4, 1952 (Lord Leslie Hale Papers) Reel LLH/1/81 KNA, NRB. For a similar discussion about the kidnap of children in South Africa for slave-like labor, see Atkins, 16.↑
60. Wilson Maina Macharia interview with Samson K. Ndanyi, June 22, 2016, at KNA. Kidnapping in colonial Africa occurred frequently. See for example Beverly Grier, "Child Labor and Africanist Scholarship: A Critical Overview," *African Studies Review* 47, no. 2 (Sep., 2004): 5-6↑
61. Cabinet Office, Nairobi, March 27, 1956 Children and Young Person Legislation in Kenya CO859/574, TNA.↑
62. A.R. Barlow, Hon. Secretary, Church of Scotland Mission, Kikuyu, to Chief Native Commissioner, March 29, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.↑
63. Barlow to Chief Native Commissioner, March 29, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.↑
64. Ibid.↑
65. Barlow to "Dear Friend," January 17, 1927, Alliance High School, 1923–1930 MSS/3/619 KNA, NRB.↑
66. Ibid.↑
67. Archdeacon Owen, "Child Labor," *East African Standard*, January 20, 1939.↑
68. Archdeacon Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa," *The Spectator*, January 6, 1939; Owen, "Child Labor."↑
69. Owen, "Child Labor."↑
70. Ibid.↑
71. Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa."↑
72. *The Chicago Defender*, "Churchman Exposes Child Labor in British Colony," January 11, 1938.↑
73. Ibid.↑
74. Owen, "Child Labor in East Africa."↑
75. Ibid.↑

76. The criticism also drew the attention of *The Chicago Defender's* editors, who wrote about it under the banner of "Churchman Exposes Child Labor in British Colony" on June 11, 1938.<sup>↑</sup>
77. Denis N. Neylan, "Juvenile Labor," *East African Standard*, January 6, 1939.<sup>↑</sup>
78. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
79. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
80. M. Mallet, "Child Labor in Kenya," *East African Standard*, January 13, 1939.<sup>↑</sup>
81. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
82. Mallet, "Child Labor in Kenya."<sup>↑</sup>
83. Ibid. Caroline Allan, another settler from Kericho, invited Owen to meet settlers who harbored the welfare of Kenya at heart. In Allan's view, Owen grossly "underestimated" Kenya's settlers," but the community had forgiven him for the "folly he no doubt unwittingly committed." Unlike Neylan and Mallet, who countered Owen on the merits of his arguments, Allan's letter to the editors of the *East African Standard* missed the gist of Owen's main concerns. Instead, Allan focused on the willingness of the settler community to invite Owen to "a debate" that would "guide" and "put him right" so that he might not be "a waste of good material." See *East African Standard*, January 6, 1939.<sup>↑</sup>
84. J.K. Mũtua, personal interview, June 28, 2016, Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>↑</sup>
85. V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 45.<sup>↑</sup>
86. Timothy Burke, *Lifebouy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); John and Jean Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution* vol. 1 & 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991& 1997).<sup>↑</sup>
87. Comaroff, 309–314.<sup>↑</sup>
88. Owen, "Child Labor."<sup>↑</sup>
89. Report of the Labor Department of Kenya, April 6, 1950. Employment of Children, Women and Young Persons, in Industry and Other Occupations—Kenya, CO859/191/10, TNA.<sup>↑</sup>

90. S.A. Ogilvie's letter, January 24, 1952, Employment of women and children-Kenya CO859/302, TNA.[↑](#)
91. Grier, 17.[↑](#)
92. Ibid.; Chirwa, 665; Simelane, 572.[↑](#)
93. Cooper, 2; Also see López-Calva, 66.[↑](#)
94. Dior Konate, "On Colonial Laws and the Treatment of Young Female Delinquents in Senegal: The Case of Léonie Guèye," *Stichproben Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 7, no. 12 (2007): 39.[↑](#)
95. Colin S. Owen, Principal Probation Officer and Chief Inspector of Approved Schools, "Central Probation Committee: Employment of Juveniles Sub-Committee's Report," (August 3, 1957). Employment of Juveniles Africans and Others BZ/14/1 KNA, NRB.[↑](#)

## CHAPTER 5

# Prelude to the Establishment of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1949-1955

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## INTRODUCTION

Making use of previously unused Colonial Office records at the National Archives in Kew, including newspaper reports, interviews with staff of the Nigerian Railway, and debates in the Federal House of Representatives, this study examines the forces that dictated the establishment of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. It argues that the primary reason why the British colonial government established the corporation was to assist foreign interests in Nigeria by distancing itself from the direct management of labor relations between the Nigerian colonial state and the militant trade unions in the Nigerian Railway and other commercially oriented government departments. By placing the day-to-day management of these departments beyond the immediate reach of ambitious Nigerian nationalists who were eager to quickly take over the control of the colonial state, the colonial government undermined the ability of local elite to build their weak economic base.



During and after the Second World War, Britain, holder of many colonies in Africa, was in a serious economic crisis.<sup>1</sup> In the last quarter of 1945, it owed more than £18,000 million,<sup>2</sup> and from 1947 to the early 1950s, it experienced a deteriorating financial crisis.<sup>3</sup> To solve these problems, Britain introduced a tight regime of import restrictions and a stringent dollar conversion program at home and in its colonies. Consequently, Britain's multi-dimensional socio-economic problems would later determine imperial and colonial economic policies from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s.<sup>4</sup> Within this period, the consensus in Whitehall was that the resources of British colonies should be exploited to their maximum potential for the benefit of the empire. The tone of the new imperial economic policy was set by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Minister for Economic Affairs. Addressing the African Governors' Conference in November 1947, he stated:

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<sup>1</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extreme, 1914-1991* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1994), 169-170.

<sup>2</sup> William. Roger Louis and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22, no. 3 (September 1994): 464-465; Alan Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-45* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 71.

<sup>3</sup> Asher E. Hinds, "Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* XV, no. 2 (Jan. 1987): 148-149.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Havinden and David Meredith, eds., *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London: Routledge, 1993), 228.

The whole future of sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my view, on a quick and extensive development of our African resources. It is the urgency of the present situation and the need for sterling group...to maintain their economic independence that makes it so essential that we should increase...the tempo of African economic development and force the pace so that within the next 2-5 years we can get a really marked increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, raw materials of all kinds and foodstuffs and anything else that will save dollars or we will sell in a dollar market.<sup>5</sup>

One particularly important commodity Britain desired was groundnuts (peanuts), which was an important source of oils and fats for post-war Britain.<sup>6</sup> However, by early 1946, the world supply of oil and fats had become dangerously low, especially for Britain. In response, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee was forced to set up

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<sup>5</sup> See National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter NA) CO852/989/3 Speech by the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Cripps, KC, MP, Minister for Economic Affairs to the African Governors' Conference on 12 November 1947.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, its production in Nigeria increased from the pre-war figure of 200,000 tons to more than 322,000 tons in 1946. See NA Prem 8/733 "Economic development in the colonies:" note by Mr. Creech Jones for Mr. Atlee Appendix I, February 5. 1948.

a ministerial committee on World Food Supply (WFS) under his chairmanship.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, due to food and raw materials shortages, Britain was plunged into a crisis of convertibility of currency to dollars in August 1947. Consequently, Cripps formulated the above-mentioned policy. And to implement it, the government established two corporations: the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC).<sup>8</sup> Whereas the CDC was "to promote schemes either to earn dollars through exports to the United States or to save dollars by producing raw materials for Britain," the OFC was to coordinate food production and increase supplies to consumers in Britain.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile Britain had not only suffered as a result of the war, but its colonies had as well. Most of their socioeconomic infrastructure was neglected during the conflict and was in need of restoration and modernization. Furthermore, there were shortages of essential capital goods. Yet, to provide the necessary raw materials for Britain, the infrastructure of the colonies required serious rehabilitation. In the case of Nigeria, there were still delays in the transportation of goods even when railway operations had been fully

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<sup>7</sup> NA Prem. 8/202 "WFS Lord President Mission to United States and Canada."

<sup>8</sup> See the Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948.

<sup>9</sup> NA CO 852/867/1: CEDC (47)7 "Note by the Chairman on the formation of a Colonial Development Corporation."

restored, especially the transportation of peanuts from Northern Nigeria to the southern ports. This development prompted the Colonial Office (CO) officials to wonder if Nigerian Railway's (NR) problems were not far more fundamental than the lack of essential equipment. This dilemma in turn caused officials to begin toying with the idea of the complete reorganization of NR.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The construction, development, and the management of the Nigerian Railway (NR), which was started in 1895, constituted one of the cornerstones of British imperialism in Africa and in colonial Nigeria's political economy. Starting from that time and well into the postcolonial period, the NR was the largest employer of labor in the colony, and by the mid-1970s it had more than 30,000 staff.<sup>10</sup> But for the construction and development of the NR system, it would have been virtually impossible to bring together the many different ethnic groups that now constitute Nigeria. Thus, the story of the NR is also that of Nigeria; without one, the other would not have been possible.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation, *Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st March 1965* (EbuteMetta: Nigerian Railway Corporation), 35.

<sup>11</sup> Tekena N. Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," *Nigeria Magazine* 84 (1965), 84; Francis. G. I. Omiunu, "The Role of

In view of these crucial roles of the NR in the development of Nigeria and the expansion of the British Empire, there is a considerable volume of historical literature on its pre-war and post-war periods. Completely missing from this literature, however, is the analysis of the background to the transformation of the NR into a public corporation. There is, therefore, a gap in the existing literature on the NR and Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC). This present study therefore seeks to fill this gap. First, it is appropriate to review the extant literature on the NR and NRC to contextualize the study. To date, the two most prolific historians of the NR and NRC are Olasiji Oshin<sup>12</sup> and Wale Oyemakinde.<sup>12</sup> Whereas Oshin has focused primarily on the political history of the railway institution, Oyemakinde has concentrated on its labor history. Other prominent historians of the organization include Tekena Tamuno,<sup>13</sup> Olufemi

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Transport in Nation Building: The Case of Nigerian Railways," *Nigeria Magazine* 137 (1981), 7.

<sup>12</sup> See J. O. Oyemakinde, "A History of Indigenous Labour on the Nigerian Railway, 1895-1945," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ibadan, 1970; "Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism in Nigeria, 1940-1942," *JHSN [Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria]* 7(1974): 541-561; "The Nigerian General Strike of 1945," *JHSN* 7 (1975): 693-710; and "The Railway Workers and Modernization in Colonial Nigeria," *JHSN* 10 (1979): 113-124.

<sup>13</sup> Tekena N. Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I," *Nigeria Magazine* 83, December 1964, 279-292; "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," *Nigeria Magazine* 84, March 1965, 31-43.

Omosini,<sup>14</sup> John M. Carland,<sup>15</sup> Lisa Lindsay,<sup>16</sup> and Francis Jaekel.<sup>17</sup> The first set of historical narratives on the NR was undertaken by the organization's officials. The first historical analysis was published in 1951 by J. Stocker, an official in the NR's publicity department, and it provided an overview of the development, achievements, and failures of the organization in its first fifty years of existence.<sup>18</sup> The next was also by the NR itself and was published in 1960, the year of Nigeria's independence. It was also a general overview of the historical development of the NR and its major milestones.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Olufemi Omosini, "Railway Projects and British Attitude towards the Development of West Africa, 1872-1903," *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria* V, no. 4 (June, 1971): 491-507.

<sup>15</sup> John. M. Carland, *Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1985), especially 13-14, 135-165, and 166-183.

<sup>16</sup> Lisa Lindsay, "Putting the Family on Track: Gender and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian Railway" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); "Domesticity and Difference: Male Breadwinners, Working Women, and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian General Strike," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999): 783-812; and "'No Need...to Think of Home'? Masculinity and Domestic Life on the Nigerian Railway, c.1940-61," *Journal of African History* 39 (1998): 439-466.

<sup>17</sup> Francis. Jaekel, *The History of the Nigerian Railway*, 3 Volumes (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> John Stocker, *Nigerian Railway Jubilee, 1901-51* (Ebute-Metta: Nigerian Railway Printer, 1951).

<sup>19</sup> *The Nigerian Railway Corporation, A Brief History of the Nigerian Railway Corporation* (EbuteMetta: Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1960).

The first broad and academic study of the NR, however, is the two-part article by Tekena Tamuno,<sup>20</sup> who traced the “genesis” of the NR and identified the major epochs in its development from the late 19th century to the 1960s. Tamuno’s analysis, though academic, was in line with the official accounts of the NR and<sup>21</sup> even those by Omosini, Carland, and Jaekel.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, Omosini disagrees with Tamuno’s analysis that had traced the origins of railway developments in Nigeria to the time between 1889 and 1890. To Omosini, the origins of railway developments in West Africa should start from the 1870s, when many interest groups in West Africa and Britain began to lobby the imperial government to grant them investment and loan guarantees as well as approval to construct railway lines in the British West African colonies.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Tamuno N. Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II,” *Nigeria Magazine* 84 (1965), 84.

<sup>21</sup> See Victor. O. Oshin, “The Development of Railway Transport in Nigeria, 1880-1945,” (Ph.D. Thesis, Obafemi Awolowo University, 1987); “Nigerian Railway under Stress, 1912-1945: A study in Colonial Planning and Management,” *Odu: a Journal of West African Studies* (1990): 11-36; and “Road Transport and the Declining Fortunes of the Nigerian Railway, 1901-1950,” *Journal of Transport History* 12, no.1 (March, 1991): 11-36.

<sup>22</sup> See Carland, 13-14, 135-165, and 166-183; Lisa Lindsay, “Putting the Family on Track: Gender and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian Railway” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); Omosini, 146 and 491 <sup>23</sup>Omosini, 146 and 491.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

Also writing on the political history of the NR, Carland discusses the crucial role played by the officials of the Colonial Office in London, particularly that of the Secretary of State for Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, in formulating and implementing policies and programs for the NR; and factors – financial and bureaucratic – that facilitated or constrained the construction and development of the first railway lines in Nigeria.<sup>24</sup> In later studies, Oshin and Jaekel extended the discourse on the political history of the NR much further. Whereas Oshin's studies on the planning, development, and the management of the NR focus on the period 1880 to the early 1950s, Jaekel's is a comprehensive survey of the first one hundred years of the institution; from 1899 to 1999. Jaekel's three-volume book is a disjointed discussion by a former colonial railway employee reminiscing on the "good old days" of colonial and postcolonial railway development and management in Nigeria.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to the studies on the political history of the NR are those on its social and labor history, including those by Oyemakinde, Freund, and Lindsay.<sup>26</sup> Oyemakinde focuses primarily on the many related aspects of the history of indigenous labor throughout the NR

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<sup>24</sup> Carland, 166-183.

<sup>25</sup> Jaekel,

<sup>26</sup> See Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I" 279-292; Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," 31-43; Omosini, 146 and 491; Elizabeth Wrangham, "An African Road Revolution: the Gold Coast in the Period of the Great War," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. 32, no. 1 (January 2004): 1-5.



system from 1895 to the late 1945. He argues that the recruitment and management of indigenous Nigerian laborers were very crucial to the development of the NR and that due to their discipline, skills, experience, organizational ability, and location in the economy, they were able to mobilize themselves and other workers in other sectors of the economy, challenging the colonial authorities on many labor issues. On the other hand, Freund analyzes the related issue of labor migration from the railway construction projects in Northern Nigeria into the tin mines of the Plateau area of Jos.<sup>27</sup> Lindsay has complemented the works of other labor historians by specifically studying “the varying and contested masculinity and domesticity...within workers’ communities [and] between family life and industrial relations” in the south-western part of Nigeria.<sup>28</sup>

As can be detected from the literature reviewed above, none of them has discussed the background and formation of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, a very critical development, which since 1955 has come to define the character, nature, and trajectory of post-war railway industry in Nigeria. This chapter argues that the main reasons for the conversion of the NR into a public statutory corporation was to provide self-serving economic benefits of British imperialism and Western merchant capital in Nigeria, to enable British merchants with some control and influence over the management of the NR in the

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<sup>27</sup> William. M. Freund, “Labour Migration to the Northern Nigeria Tin Mines, 1903-1945,” *Journal of African History* 22 (1981): 73-84.

<sup>28</sup> Lindsay, “No need ... to think of home?” 439.

postcolonial period, and to ensure that the colonial government would be far removed from direct negotiations with the stubborn post-war railway workers.

The chapter is divided into the following parts: development of the NR from the late 19th century to 1945; examination of the role of the NR in the management of Nigerian ports up to the early 1950s; identification and critical examination of the various interest groups arranged against the NR through its management of the ports and the factors responsible for the removal of them from the NR's control; and the discussion of the important role played by European merchant capital, railway workers, British colonial and imperial officials, and Nigerian politicians in the creation of the (NRC).

## **DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIAN RAILWAY**

In 1898, the British and Nigerian colonial governments began construction of Nigeria's rail transport network. This was part and parcel of European "railway imperialism" of late 19th century Africa.<sup>29</sup>

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
<sup>29</sup> Daniel. R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); C. B. Davis and K. E. Wilburn Jnr, eds. *Railway Imperialism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and Colin Divall, "Railway Imperialisms, Railway Nationalisms" in M. Burri, K. T. Elsasser and D. Gugerli, eds. *Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn 1850 - 1970*, (Zurich: Chronos, 2003), 195-209.

The first phase of Nigeria's railway network, the Lagos Railway, started in 1898. The railway extended from Lagos (Iddo) on the south coast to Abeokuta and later Ibadan in 1901, a distance of about 120 miles.<sup>30</sup> From Ibadan, the line was extended to Jebba. In 1911, the Baro-Kano line in the northern part of the colony was completed and a year later joined with the Lagos Railway line at Minna. In 1915, the construction of Jebba Bridge across the River Niger was completed and necessitated the extension of the southern railway to Kano in the north. In eastern Nigeria, the Port Harcourt line was constructed to Enugu in 1916 to assist in the transportation of coal from the Udi Hills, near Enugu, to other parts of the country.

Due to the completion of the Markudi Bridge, the Eastern Line finally reached Kaduna in 1932, which facilitated the crossing of the River Benue. Further railway constructions were undertaken in phases, and by 1945 the rapidly developing rail network had reached Kaura Namoda in northwest Nigeria, and to Nguru, near Bornu, in the northeast (see Figure 1).

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<sup>30</sup> Tokunbo A. Ayoola, "Political Economy of Rail Transportation in Nigeria, 1945-1985" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2004), 47.



*Figure 1: Map of Nigerian Railway network.*

From the late 19th century to 1955, the NR was owned and managed by the Nigerian colonial government, and its day-to-day affairs were managed by the Nigerian Railway Department. Originally designed to carry up to 1.5 million tons of goods annually, on the eve of the Second World War, it was carrying a little more than 1.2 million tons, and by late 1945, it was carrying more than its installed capacity. For example, in the 1944-45 financial year, it carried a total of about 1.7 million tons of goods.<sup>31</sup> From the first decade of the 20th

<sup>31</sup> *Report of Mission Appointed to Enquire into Production and Transport of Vegetable Oils and Oil Seeds Produced in West Africa Colonies*, Colonial No 211 of 1947.

century to the early 1960s, when road transport overtook its rail counterpart in importance in Nigeria, railway was the backbone of the British colonial government-run economy, which was primarily based on import and export trade. In fact, rail routes were first constructed and well developed before modern road networks in West Africa.<sup>32</sup>

Although the operation and management of the NR industry from 1901 to 1960, when Nigeria gained its independence, was certainly not a great commercial success, the Nigerian Railway Department nonetheless recorded modest operating surpluses for several years. The highest of these before 1960 was in the 1958-59 financial year, when revenue reached £15.75 million, and a working surplus of £2,030,606 was achieved.<sup>33</sup> This good performance was followed a year later in 1960-61, by poor financial results with a net operating deficit of £988,000.<sup>34</sup> However, in 1963-64 the Corporation achieved its best financial performance to date: revenue of about £16.30 million and a working surplus of about £2 million. Thereafter

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<sup>32</sup> Wrangham, 1 - 5.

<sup>33</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation, *Annual Report 1964/1965*. The amounts were in British pounds sterling.

<sup>34</sup>

Ibid.

the NRC's fortune began to decline rapidly, from which it never recovered.<sup>35</sup>

## **CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN AND NR**

Coupled with the poor state of railway fixed assets, NR's problems included a lack of locomotives, coaches, rolling stock, spare parts, and skilled and experienced European supervisory staff. Other thorny issues included ill-equipped workshops and poor management of labor relations.<sup>36</sup> All these problems, which were not hidden from the Nigerian colonial government and its imperial counterpart in London, proved insurmountable to the British Labour government in power from 1945 to 1951.<sup>37</sup>

This set of obstacles was not the case with the Conservative Government elected in October 1951. The regime was determined to proffer solutions to the "poor planning and bad management"<sup>38</sup> in the NR. Its resolve further solidified when it discovered that at the

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<sup>35</sup> I. Ifedi, "Development Strategies for Nigerian Railway" <http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/06/21/20020621let01.html>

<sup>36</sup> For detailed discussions of these issues, see Ayoola, "Political Economy of Rail Transportation," 64-101.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> NA CO 554/355 Movement of Nigerian Groundnut Crop. *Report for the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State*, 14 July 1952.

beginning of the 1952-53 harvest season, about 150,000 tons of peanuts could not be transported from Kano to the coast.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the Conservative Government began debating the idea of transforming NR into a commercially viable organization.

To fully comprehend the nature of NR's problems, Oliver Lyttleton, the new Secretary of State for Colonies, paid an official visit to Nigeria in May 1952. The degrading NR he discovered convinced him of the need for drastic steps.<sup>40</sup> Back in London, he convinced CO officials that two fundamental changes were necessary.<sup>41</sup> First, it was essential that NR's organizational structure should be changed from a department of Nigerian civil service to a public corporation. Secondly, there was an urgent need to replace the seemingly incompetent and sluggish general manager of NR, D.C. Woodward.<sup>42</sup>

However, the very idea of converting not only NR but also other commercially oriented government departments into public corporations did not originate from London. The idea was first suggested by the Fitzgerald Commission.<sup>43</sup> Following the massacre

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> David J. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development Vol.2 Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 201.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> NA CO 554/611 Secretary of State for Colonies to Lord Leathers (Secretary of State for the Coordination of Transport, Fuel and Power), 4 July 1952.

<sup>43</sup> NA CO 537/5796 *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November 1949*, 47

of 21 coal miners by the Nigerian colonial police at the Iva Valley coal mines of the Enugu Colliery, the commission was set up by the Colonial Office (CO) in conjunction with the Nigerian government and headed by Sir William J. Fitzgerald, a former Chief Justice of Palestine and the Attorney General of Northern Rhodesia. As part of its findings and recommendations, the commission blamed the management of the Colliery and the colonial state for the inefficient control of the labor disputes at Enugu. Foreseeing similar problems in other government departments, the Commission recommended that they also be converted into statutory public corporations.

## **MANAGEMENT OF NIGERIAN PORT BY NR BEFORE 1954**

The need to convert NR into a corporation was further underscored by two developments in the late 1940s. In 1949, another commission of enquiry was set up to investigate NR's operational problems.<sup>44</sup> Headed by H.F. Pallant, the assistant divisional superintendent of the British Railways in York, this commission painted a picture of Nigerian rail transport maladministration in its 64-page "meaty" report. Furthermore, it

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<sup>44</sup> *Report on the Operating Problems of the Nigerian Railway 1949* (Enugu: Government Printer 1950).



recommended that fundamental changes be made to NR's organizational structure and procedures.<sup>45</sup>

The second development was the formation of the Strong Commission, which was asked to look into the functions of the Marine Department and the management of harbors in Nigeria, sectors where NR was a major player. Also, the commission was mandated to make recommendations that would assist in setting up "a more or less autonomous body for example on the 'Port Trust'<sup>46</sup> model, which is found in the Port of London or Liverpool."<sup>47</sup> Prior to the setting up of the Strong Commission, the management and control of the two major ports of Lagos, Nigeria, and Port Harcourt, both of which handled more than fifty percent of Nigerian import and export trade, were without proper coordination.<sup>48</sup> For example, there were no less than five separate bodies in charge of the operational aspects of the Lagos port in 1941. These included NR, Customs Department, Marine

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 31-36.

<sup>46</sup> In practical term, this is a semi-autonomous port managed by a Board of Management, but whose overall control is under the central government.

<sup>47</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, *Report on Ports of Nigeria* (Lagos, 1949). A. N. Strong, the former chairman of the Colombo Port Commission and the Ragoon Port Trust, headed the commission.

<sup>48</sup> Ayodeji Olukoju, "Background to the Establishment of the Nigerian Ports Authority: the Politics of Port Administration in Nigeria, c.1920-1954," *International Journal of Maritime History*, IV, no. 1

Department, Port Department, and Public Works Department.<sup>49</sup> Each was not only involved in revenue collection, but port maintenance as well. In addition to these organizations, there were several foreign commercial and shipping interests operating at the ports. The implication of this development was that it bred petty jealousy and stiff competition among the various organizations, as they sought to outdo one another.

Although there were many bodies operating at the Lagos Port, the most powerful was NR, which foreign commercial and shipping groups believed was manipulating its management of Nigerian ports for its own selfish interests at the expense of "genuine" port interest.<sup>50</sup> Hence, foreign interests led by the United African Company (UAC) began criticizing NR's inefficiency at the ports.<sup>51</sup>

It was largely due to such criticisms and the apparent lack of direction at the two major ports that the government decided to set up the Strong Commission to examine the situation and offer solutions. The commission found that the administration of the port was indeed inefficient and criticized the NR for not making a sufficient

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 170-173.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 162.

<sup>51</sup> UAC was the largest European commercial conglomerate in West Africa at the time. A subsidiary of Lever Brothers Limited, it was established in 1929 after the amalgamation of many other European firms operating in West Africa.

number of railway wagons available to transport imported goods out of the ports into the hinterland.<sup>52</sup>

Based on these problems, the Strong Commission<sup>53</sup> recommended unified control of all port operations under a board of management, a port trust, whose executive functions should be carried out by the Nigerian Marine Department.<sup>54</sup> Following the recommendations of the Strong Report, four alternative proposals on NR and ports administration emerged:<sup>55</sup>

1. there should be a single corporation to manage the NR, and control all the ports in the colony, and carry out all the duties hitherto performed by the Marine Department;

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<sup>52</sup> NA CO583/301/8 *Report on Ports of Nigeria*, 2-3.

<sup>53</sup> NA CO583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, *Report on Ports of Nigeria* (London: HMSO, 1949) Section 27. Under the new arrangement, all ports in Nigeria, including the smaller ones like Forcados, Warri, Burutu, Koko, and Calabar, which the big British commercial businesses were using exclusively, were now to be unified under one single Board of Management.

<sup>54</sup> NA CO583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, *Report on Ports of Nigeria* (London: HMSO, 1949) Section 27. Under the new arrangement, all ports in Nigeria, including the smaller ones like Forcados, Warri, Burutu, Koko, and Calabar, which the big British commercial businesses were using exclusively, were now to be unified under one single Board of Management.

<sup>55</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary's Office on the 23rd of August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report" enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, Savingram No 2528 of 11 October 1950.

2. there should be a single corporation but made up of two statutory subcommittees, each of which would run Port Harcourt and the Lagos Port;
3. there should be separate port authorities for Lagos and Port Harcourt, and British companies in Nigeria should manage the smaller ports; and
4. there should be two separate corporations—one responsible for the ports and inland waterways, while the other would manage the NR. However, coordination between the two would be administered through cross membership of their boards of management.

The possibility of removing NR's hegemony at the Ports was too hard for Woodward to accept. He therefore sought to defend his organization's indictment by the Strong Report.<sup>56</sup> While not disagreeing with the recommendation that multiplicity of control at the ports should be removed, he was opposed to the establishment of a rival authority to NR to manage them. Thus, to prevent a drastic reduction in NR's influence, he put forward new proposals.<sup>57</sup> Since NR was desirous of controlling and managing Lagos Port and Port

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<sup>56</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report." Enclosed in Memorandum on *Report on Ports of Nigeria* by Strong and Flere' sent to the Colonial Office, 11 October 1950.

<sup>57</sup>Ibi

Harcourt, Woodward did not object to the recommendation that both ports should be merged with other minor ports and managed by a single port authority, provided NR would control the new authority. This position contradicted its original submission to the Strong Commission, which was that an autonomous Port Trust should not be established.<sup>58</sup>

On the other hand, expatriate European firms in Nigeria organized together as an interest and pressure group, the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM)<sup>59</sup> and opposed NR's proposal on the new port authority.<sup>60</sup> Consequently, the colonial government was caught in a dilemma and initially seemed unsure how to implement

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid

<sup>59</sup> AWAM was established during the First World War as a pressure group of British and French companies in West Africa. In its first incarnation, its main goal was to assist the European companies in coordinating policies and influencing colonial governments. This was for the purpose of gaining advantage over their African and Levantine competitors. Some of its members included United African Company (UAC), John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Ltd., Shell Company of West Africa, British Bata Shoe Company, Nigerian Hardwoods Ltd., Taylor Woodrow Ltd., Elder Dempester Lines, CFAO, and SCOA. See Anthony G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman Group Ltd), 259; David K. Fieldhouse, *Merchant Capital and Economic Decolonization: The United Africa Company 1929-1987* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 127, 236; Josephine F. Milburn, *British Business and Ghanaian Independence* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), 5.

<sup>60</sup> This was not a new objective of the European firms in 1950. From the late 1930s, they had wanted to achieve this, but the exigency of the war made such call a diversion.

the Strong Commission report's recommendations. Whatever course of action, both the Nigerian and British imperial governments were going to implement the report. They could not afford to ignore the interests and opinions of European merchant capital embodied in AWAM, which was certainly not a run-of-the-mill group of politically weak European firms in Africa.

During the post-war period, AWAM members were not only well entrenched in West African economy, but they were also well funded.<sup>61</sup> In fact, some half a dozen AWAM members controlled nearly 75 percent of the sub-region's imports and exports valued at between £300 to 400 million in the 1940s. Of this considerable volume of trade, UAC, a predominant player in Nigeria, had the largest share. Moreover, by the late 1940s, AWAM had invested about £4 million in the Nigerian trading sector. For most of AWAM, the total equity capital of its members operating in Nigeria was more than £20 million during the climax of the war.<sup>62</sup>

Economic muscle brought AWAM members many political privileges. For instance, they were represented on the executive and legislative councils in Nigeria and enjoyed tax exemptions that were not available to them in Europe and other colonies.<sup>63</sup> In addition,

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<sup>61</sup> Robert L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-63* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 199.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, 200.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*.

UAC's General Manager was not only a member of the Nigerian legislative council, but this person also had free access to the governor of Nigeria.<sup>64</sup> Patronage of railway services by AWAM members in Nigeria was also very crucial to the economic well-being of NR in the 1940s and 1950s.<sup>65</sup> The NR's freight services enabled the companies to transport agricultural and mineral goods to the coast for export to Europe and imported manufactured goods into Nigeria's hinterland. These transactions provided substantial profits for Western capital in Nigeria.<sup>66</sup>

Aware of the economic muscle and the strategic position of AWAM members, a meeting occurred on August 23, 1950, between Nigeria's Acting Development Secretary, H.R.E. Browne, and an AWAM delegation comprised of G. Cotgreave (John Holt & Company [Liverpool] Ltd.), N. Kay and L. Passage (United Africa Co., Ltd), G. H. Neville (Elder Dempster Lines Ltd.), and R.C. Irving (Lagos Chamber of Commerce) "in order to ascertain their views on the various alternatives which had been put forward" for the reorganization of NR and the ports.<sup>67</sup> No single indigenous Nigerian

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<sup>64</sup> Fieldhouse, 27.

<sup>65</sup> Lauren van de Laan, "Modern Inland Transport and the European Trading Firms in Colonial West Africa," *Cahiers d' etudes Africaines* 21, no 4 (1981): 566.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary's Office on the 23rd of August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of the

political leader was, however, invited to take part in this meeting at which the final decision on the conversion of the NR into a statutory corporation would take place. At the end of the meeting, the consensus was that the NR and the ports should be reorganized into two separate statutory public corporations.

## **CREATION OF THE NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY AND THE NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION**

Eventually, the four proposals on the management of Nigerian ports and NR were discussed in the Council of Ministers, and it was decided that two separate corporations should be established: one for managing all the ports, including the minor ports, and the second for NR. Although the decision to set up the two corporations occurred in 1950, the formal establishment of the Nigerian Ports Authority did not happen until 1954.<sup>68</sup> The restructure of the Nigerian Railway Corporation was completed in 1955.<sup>69</sup> On April 9, 1953, Ralf

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Strong Report." Enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, Savingram No 2528 of 11 October 1950.

<sup>68</sup> NA CO 554/468 "Nigeria: Creation of a Port Authority," 1951-53.

<sup>69</sup> NA CO 583/301/9 "Note on the Present Situation of the Nigerian Railway" prepared by the West African Department, Colonial Office, 2 February 1951.



Emerson, an experienced British engineer, was appointed the general manager/chair designated by the Board of Directors for the proposed Nigerian Railway Corporation.

On June 18, 1953, Emerson left the United Kingdom for Nigeria to assume his new position. Pending the formation of the corporation, his primary duty was to serve as the technical adviser to the Nigerian government on the establishment of the railway corporation in addition to serving as the general manager of the existing NR. In this capacity, Emerson developed the policy proposals which formed the basis of the Nigerian Railway Corporation parliamentary bill that subsequently became the Nigerian Railway Corporation Ordinance.<sup>70</sup>

In a twist of irony, Emerson had the unique fortune of writing his own job description while already in office. He did not shy away from fortifying the position of the executive chair with considerable powers. Shortly after the formation of NRC, he assumed the exalted position of executive chair of the board of the corporation, as well as its general manager. In fact, the Nigerian parliamentarians who debated and passed the NRC bill into law characterized the chair's role as a "railway dictator."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> *Statement of the Policy Proposed by the Government for the Establishment of a Nigerian Railway Corporation* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), 3.

<sup>71</sup> Federal House of Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 col. 864.

On October 1, 1955, the ownership of the Nigerian Railway was formally transferred from the Nigerian Government to the new Nigerian Railway Corporation.<sup>72</sup> Under the railway ordinance, NRC was given monopoly power and responsibility to carry out railway activities in Nigeria and to manage and provide reasonable facilities for the carriage of passengers and goods.<sup>73</sup> Furthermore, it was to control its expenditure in a practical manner where annual revenues would be sufficient to meet all expenditures properly chargeable to revenue and to direct the expansion of the railway system.<sup>74</sup>

## **JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A RAILWAY CORPORATION**

Although it was widely accepted from 1945 onward that NR was in urgent need of reorganization and modernization, Nigerian political leaders were not given the opportunity—as seen above by their non-participation in the meeting—to be part of this very important process. This disproves the argument by Nigerian Colonial government officials that public corporations set up in Nigeria beginning from early 1950s were solely for the economic well-being

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation Headquarters' Library Nigerian Railway Ordinance 1955 Section 15C.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

of Nigerians.<sup>75</sup> Rather, Britain's economic interests and those of Western capital were paramount in deciding the nature, character, and purpose of public corporations in Africa in the late colonial period. It was in view of this situation that Mofutou Laleye, a policy analyst, argued that public corporations in Africa were indeed children of political expediency and crisis of confidence between European colonialists and colonial peoples.<sup>76</sup> This was unlike the rationale behind the nationalization of major industries in Britain, from where the public enterprise management model was copied. There, in the late 1940s to the 1950s, the Labour Government used

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<sup>75</sup> See the Chief Secretary's address to the Legislative Council in March 1949, *Legislative Council Debates, March 1949*, 568. See also the speech of the Development Secretary when introducing the bill for the establishment of the first public corporation in Nigeria, the Electricity Corporation in Nigeria, *Legislative Council Debates, March-April 1950* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1950), 40. Some other writers also shared this view on the reasons for the setting up public corporations in Nigeria. For instance, A.H. Hanson, "Public Enterprise in Nigeria I Federal Utilities" *Public Administration*, 36 (Winter, 1958): 366-367; Ojetunji Aboyade, "Nigerian Public Enterprises as an Organizational Dilemma" in *Administration for Development in Nigeria*, ed. Paul Collins (Lagos: African Education, 1980), 83-98; and Sesan Ayodele, "Privatization of Public Utilities in Nigeria: an Economic Analysis of the Guided Privatization Policy," Nigerian Institute of Economic Research NISER Monograph Series No. 3, 2000 (Ibadan, 2000), 1-35.

<sup>76</sup> Mofutou Laleye, "Public Enterprises as an Instrument of Crisis Management: its Particular Relevance to Underdeveloped Countries" in *Public Administration in Periods of Uncertainty*, ed. A.O Sanda (Lagos: Fact Finders International, 1992), 145-147.

its nationalization programs to reformulate new industrial policies.<sup>77</sup> Eventually, Nigerian political leaders, who initially were not consulted on the matter and were opposed to the recruitment of Europeans to head the new organization, were won over by colonial officials. However, Nigerian support was predicated on the hope that the transformation of NR would curb its manifest inefficiency. To buttress this point, in April 1952, while NR annual financial estimates were being debated in the House of Representatives, the Minister of Transport, a Nigerian, Chief Bode Thomas of the Action Group Party not only informed members with new thinking on NR - that is to turn it into a public corporation - but also that it would be alive to its responsibilities from that point forward. Many legislators heartily welcomed the new development.<sup>78</sup>

At another meeting of the House of Representatives on August 21, 1952, the Minister of Transport, Thomas, while reacting to the various comments of House members that centered primarily on NR's inefficiency and shoddy services on one hand and the need to

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<sup>77</sup> Robert Millward, "State Enterprise in Britain in the 20th Century," 8 unpublished paper; R. KelfCohen, *Nationalisation in Britain The End of Dogma*, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1961), 14-24; N. Chester, *The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-1951* (London: HMSO, 1975), 1-8; and A. H. Hanson, ed., *Nationalisation: A Book of Readings* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 12, 22-63.

<sup>78</sup> This unqualified support cut across the three Nigerian regions and the three dominant political parties representing them in the Central Legislature. See Nigeria House of Representatives debates, First Sessions 14th-22nd August 1952, 336-340.

construct more railway lines to members' constituencies on the other, stated that the Central government had decided in principle to establish an autonomous statutory corporation in place of the NR.<sup>79</sup>

Thomas went further to state that:

I can assure Honourable Members... that the proposal [to set up a railway corporation] is already being fully examined by Government and is receiving serious considerations.<sup>80</sup>

Later he poignantly underscored the urgency and necessity of change in status for NR by arguing that "If Nigeria does not determine the fate of the railway [NR]... then the railway will determine the fate of Nigeria."<sup>81</sup> Thomas merely stated the obvious: NR was still the backbone of the Nigerian import and export economy at the time. The initial consensus achieved on the part of Nigerian leaders about the issue of a new railway corporation would later break down during the peak of the decolonization process from 1954 to 1960. This was followed by increasingly scathing criticisms against the colonial government and foreign commercial interests. The latter

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<sup>79</sup> For instance, Jaja Wachukwu, a member of the House of Representatives from the Eastern Region complained that only old and dilapidated coaches were being sent to his region. While supporting this assertion, other Eastern Regional members, including prominent politicians like E. Eyo, equally complained that food served to passengers on the eastern line was inferior. See *West Africa* of 12 April 1952. See also Nigeria House of Representatives Debates First Sessions 14th- 22nd August 1952, 336.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> *West Africa*, 4 October 1952, 913.

were referred to as “dictators and usurpers” and were advised to remove their stranglehold on the Nigerian economy and institutions, including the NR, so they could be managed by Nigerians.<sup>82</sup>

However, many factors in Nigeria were responsible for the transformation of the NR into a public enterprise. First, by the late 1940s, the colonial government was itself overburdened by its excessive centralization and bureaucratization of government service, of which the NR was an important component. Reflecting on the prospect of establishing a railway corporation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated, “it will also grant much needed relief to the Central Government machine in Nigeria from the great burden of work which is concentrated on it as present.”<sup>83</sup> Due to centralization and sluggishness of the civil service bureaucracy, it was often difficult to make quick decisions on the NR, especially in capital development. Thus, it was necessary to have a new organization that could operate outside the ambiance of the main civil service. Linked to this is that from the start of the Second World War to the mid-

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<sup>82</sup> Remi A. Fani-Kayode, Member of the House of Representatives representing Ife Division, during the debates on the Second Reading of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Ordinance, 1955, 4 April 1955. Federal House of Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 columns 873; and Tignor, 236239.

<sup>83</sup> NA CO583/301/8 Secretary of State for Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, Priority Saving No. 3815 of 24 November 1950.

1950s, despite carrying more freight than its installed capacity, NR was not recording adequate net surpluses as can be seen in Table 1.

*Table 1: Nigerian Railway: Financial Results, 1939-1946 (£ Sterling)*

| <b>Year</b> | <b>Gross Receipts</b> | <b>Total Working Expenditure</b> | <b>Operating Surplus</b> | <b>Interest on Capital</b> | <b>Renewals</b> | <b>Surplus</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1938-39     | 2,076,168             | 1,320,282                        | 756,914                  | 755,314                    | 430,000         | -473,875       |
| 1939-40     | 2,024,741             | 1,221,967                        | 806,572                  | 766,275                    | 430,000         | -326,471       |
| 1940-41     | 2,409,976             | 1,183,689                        | 1,234,613                | 721,273                    | 300,000         | +223,230       |
| 1941-42     | 3,145,915             | 1,368,796                        | 1,775,853                | 919,396                    | 300,000         | +774,750       |
| 1942-43     | 3,583,118             | 1,627,394                        | 1,960,183                | 945,520                    | 430,000         | +869,412       |

|             |               |           |               |             |         |                  |
|-------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|-------------|---------|------------------|
| 194<br>3-44 | 4,091,8<br>18 | 1,889,550 | 2,212,32<br>4 | 949,5<br>20 | 430,000 | +<br>147,65<br>0 |
| 194<br>4-45 | 3,961,4<br>05 | 2,042,422 | 1,919,67<br>0 | 949,5<br>47 | 430,000 | +<br>661,71<br>6 |
| 194<br>5-46 | 3,022,8<br>38 | 2,110,103 | 1,511,93<br>7 | 949,5<br>47 | 430,000 | +<br>409,97<br>3 |

Sources: *Nigeria Railway Annual Reports, 1939-1946.*

In fact, most of its operating surpluses were used in paying debts or put into the "Renewal Fund," which was set up for renewing the NR's fixed capital or assets. In view of this financial performance, there was a need to keep down operational costs, especially labor costs. As many strikes, negotiations, and concessions to workers were escalating, to understand the management's perspective, the NR's workforce was more than 30,000 by 1952.<sup>84</sup> Hence, a corporation model of management would cut unnecessary bureaucracy and ensure that NR was run on a strict commercial basis.

Second, corporation-type organization relieved the colonial state of the burden of being the direct employers of railway workers while escaping from direct conflicts with railway labor unions since the end

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<sup>84</sup> *Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1952-1953* (Ebute Metta, Lagos: Railway Printer, 1953), 36.



of the war. Such was the nature and frequencies of these industrial conflicts that the operations and survival of the NR as a corporate organization was adversely affected. For instance, in 1947 the Nigerian government was forced to concede in public that:

productive efficiency and power of movement of the Railway continues to be hampered by political and industrial unrest and much valuable time has had to be given to these matters by Administrative and Supervisory staff of employees when their attention was most desirable elsewhere; consequently, the services of employees have been diverted from the efficient performance of their tasks to the detriment of production.<sup>85</sup>

The workers' grievances included lack of promotion, the domination of NR's management by Europeans, racial discrimination, poor salaries and wages, non-implementation of agreements between railway unions and management, overwork, high-handedness by supervisors, and slow pace of the implementation of the "Nigerianization" policy on staffing of NR.<sup>86</sup>

As a result of incessant railway workers' strikes after 1945, the colonial government set up a commission of inquiry in 1949 to investigate and make recommendations on the labor situations in NR. Headed by retired British judge Neville John Brookes, the commission

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<sup>85</sup> *Nigeria: Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1946-1947* (EbuteMetta: Railway Press, 1947), 8.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

found both the management and workers were intransigent in their relationship with one another. It noted that several of those interviewed spoke of “deterioration in industrial relations is not recent [phenomenon] but has continued progressively over several years.”<sup>87</sup> In view of such revelations, the commission recommended a complete review of the existing machinery designed to resolve trade disputes and eliminate grievances.<sup>88</sup>

A few months after the commission submitted its report to the government, the workers again went on an organization-wide strike.<sup>89</sup> Against this backdrop, the government decided that the best way to solve the perennial NR’s labor crises “once and for all” was to turn it into a corporation. This way, the new body would be able to hire and fire its staff more easily than the civil service rules and regulations had allowed.

The Chief Secretary to the Nigerian government underscored this point when he stated, “There were strong political reasons for establishing corporations to take over Government’s quasi-commercial activities. It was easier for such Corporations to handle

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<sup>87</sup> See *Report of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to investigate and make recommendations regarding the labour situation on the Nigerian Railway* (Lagos: Government Press 1949); and *West Africa*, 25 November 1952, 1080-1082.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Annual Report of on the Nigerian Government Railway, 1950/1951*, (Lagos: Government Press), 36.

labour disputes than it was for Government.”<sup>90</sup> The labor unions accurately read the mind and Machiavellian disposition of both the NR management and government. The workers openly opposed the proposed conversion for two reasons. First, the workers were very reluctant to transfer their services from the Nigerian Railway Department to a new, autonomous organization that was an uncharted territory.<sup>91</sup> Secondly, they were apprehensive that the new corporation might not give them the same kind of privileges, stability of tenure, and perks they were enjoying in the current NR.<sup>92</sup> The workers’ open attacks to the government’s plan for the NR troubled the former. In fact, Thomas, the transport minister, characterized the workers’ criticisms as being “unfair” and their behavior as “exceedingly astounding.”<sup>93</sup>

However, realizing the need for the new corporation to have some stability and industrial peace in the transition period, the government entered into negotiations with the workers. The government conferred with the two largest unions, the Nigerian

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<sup>90</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 “Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up ... enclosed in ‘Memorandum on *Report on Ports of Nigeria* by Strong and Flere.’”

<sup>91</sup> See *Daily Times*, March 3, 1953 and March 19, 1953, 3.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Nigeria House of Representatives Debates Second Session 3rd to 31st March and 1st April 1953. See particularly the debates of 3rd to 18th March 1953, 18.

Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and the Railway and Port Workers Union (RPWU). The purpose of the arbitration was to assure the workers that they would not lose anything in the new corporation. After weeks of debate, both parties agreed that the conditions of service of the workers in the new corporation would not be less than what they had enjoyed in the Railway Department. Having been assured of their status, the workers agreed that the new corporation should be formed.<sup>94</sup>

Another reason why statutory corporations were established in West Africa, according to CO and Nigerian Secretariat officials, was to ensure that "trusted" Nigerians could be carefully recruited into and entrusted with the joint management of sensitive organs of the colonial state.<sup>95</sup> This had been the thinking of the government in 1950 when the Chief Secretary to the Nigerian government justified the need for establishing public corporations when he stated:

it also enabled Nigerians to share in the management. This was a consideration that would become even more important when the changes proposed under the New Constitution came into effect, because it would mean that

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<sup>94</sup> British Library - Nigerian Railway, *Report on the Government Railway for the Period 1st April- 30th September 1955* (Lagos: Government Press), 24.

<sup>95</sup> See NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st of September, 1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up."

Departments responsible for the Corporations would not be accountable to Ministers. <sup>96</sup>

In fact, a year earlier, in March 1949, while addressing the Legislative Council, the Chief Secretary articulated the need for public corporations by saying, "I myself feel that almost the greatest advantage to this country in this new conception of public corporation ... is the advantage of Nigerian participation."<sup>97</sup>

Finally, AWAM members specifically requested the Nigerian colonial government to develop social and economic infrastructure for the efficient exploitation of Nigerian resources. To achieve this goal, institutions, such as NR, should be reorganized into semi-autonomous corporate organizations. This call seems to have become imperative when Nigerians were demanding complete Nigerianization of government and public service. Within this context, AWAM members concluded that their interests would not be well represented if Nigerians controlled the entire service. Thus, the establishment of corporations would provide the right opportunities for their representatives to serve as board members of the proposed statutory corporations.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> British Library: Nigerian Legislative Council debates, March 1949, 568.

<sup>98</sup> The foreign business community stated this point when it was making its position known on the *Strong Report*. Suggesting how the boards of the transport corporations should be constituted, the shipping firms stated: "[t]he persons most concerned with the operation of the port are ship-owners. We proposed that there

## CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the crises that confronted the British economy at the end of the Second World War and the decision by Whitehall that Britain's economy would be rebuilt through the exploitation of the economic resources of its colonies. This policy defined post-war economic development of the metropolis and colonies. To give practical effects to it in the colonies, efforts were made to rebuild social and economic infrastructure damaged or neglected during the war. A case in point was the Nigerian Railway, which started receiving rolling stocks after the war but was still inefficient in the transportation of goods and passengers. Thus, it became imperative that the NR should be reorganized for efficiency and effectiveness.

After initial hesitations, all stakeholders involved with the NR—Nigerian political leaders, railway workers, colonial and imperial officials, and European merchants in West Africa—agreed that the organization should become a corporation. In the end, two crucial questions engaged the minds of the stakeholders: How would the NR

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should be 3 representatives of the ship owners, to be nominated by the West African Lines Conference. We further suggest that the Importers and Exporters and Traders should be represented by 4 members who should be nominated having regard to their business activities only." See NA CO 583/301/8 Memorandum on the *Strong's Report* on the Ports of Nigeria prepared by the Elder Dempster Lines Limited, John Holt Line Limited and Palm Limited, 22 February 1950.

be reorganized? Who would receive the benefit? In answering these questions, each of the actors was propelled by their own economic calculations. Although both the imperial and Nigerian colonial government officials openly declared that the transformation of the NR into a public corporation was mainly for the benefit of Nigerians, the truth is there were other self-serving reasons on the part of the colonial government and Western merchant capital. To begin with, the merchants wanted to exercise some direct control and influence over the management of these strategic organizations. Also, for the colonial government, the reorganization was not so much that the NRC would make profit, but as Cowen proves,<sup>99</sup> Thus, NR's transformation was geared toward serving Britain's overall economic interests. Furthermore, the government set up a corporation so that it would be able to distance itself from direct negotiation with "recalcitrant" railway workers and to simplify the hiring and firing process for railway workers in the colony. Thus, overall performance of the Nigerian Railway Corporation between 1955 and 1960, when Nigeria first gained its independence, was not different from the pre-1955 period. Additionally, rather than labor crises getting reduced in the NR, they increased in number and complexity in the late colonial period, a situation that eventually forced the "Railway Dictator," Sir

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<sup>99</sup> Mike Cowen, "Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise Overseas During Late Colonialism" *African Affairs* (1984): 64

Ralf Emerson, and other European officers out of the corporation in the first half of the 1960s.

## END NOTES

1. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extreme, 1914-1991* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1994), 169-170.
2. <sup>2</sup> William, Roger Louis, and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22, no. 3 (September 1994): 464-465; Alan Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-45* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 71.
3. <sup>3</sup> Asher E. Hinds, "Sterling and Imperial Policy, 1945-1951," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* XV, no. 2 (Jan. 1987): 148-149.
4. <sup>4</sup> Michael Havinden and David Meredith, eds., *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960* (London: Routledge, 1993), 228.
5. <sup>5</sup> See National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter NA) CO852/989/3 Speech by the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Cripps, KC, MP, Minister for Economic Affairs to the African Governors' Conference on 12 November 1947.
6. <sup>6</sup> For instance, its production in Nigeria increased from the pre-war figure of 200,000 tons to more than 322,000 tons in 1946. See NA Prem 8/733 "Economic development in the colonies:" note by Mr. Creech Jones for Mr. Atlee Appendix I, February 5. 1948.
7. <sup>7</sup> NA Prem. 8/202 "WFS Lord President Mission to United States and Canada."
8. <sup>8</sup> See the Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948.
9. <sup>9</sup> NA CO 852/867/1: CEDC (47)7 "Note by the Chairman on the formation of a Colonial Development Corporation.



- 10.<sup>10</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation, *Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st March 1965* (EbuteMetta: Nigerian Railway Corporation), 35.
- 11.<sup>11</sup> Tekena N. Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," *Nigeria Magazine* 84 (1965), 84; Francis. G. I. Omiunu, "The Role of Transport in Nation Building: the Case of Nigerian Railways," *Nigeria Magazine* 137 (1981), 7.
- 12.<sup>12</sup> See J. O. Oyemakinde, "A History of Indigenous Labour on the Nigerian Railway, 1895-1945," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Ibadan, 1970; "Michael Imoudu and the Emergence of Militant Trade Unionism in Nigeria, 1940-1942," *JHSN [Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria]* 7(1974): 541-561; "The Nigerian General Strike of 1945," *JHSN* 7 (1975): 693-710; and "The Railway Workers and Modernization in Colonial Nigeria," *JHSN* 10 (1979): 113-124.
- 13.<sup>13</sup> Tekena N. Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I," *Nigeria Magazine* 83, December 1964, 279-292; "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," *Nigeria Magazine* 84, March 1965, 31-43.
- 14.<sup>14</sup> Olufemi Omosini, "Railway Projects and British Attitude towards the Development of West Africa, 1872-1903," *Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria* V, no. 4 (June, 1971): 491-507.
- 15.<sup>15</sup> John. M. Carland, *Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1985), especially 13-14, 135-165, and 166-183.
- 16.<sup>16</sup> Lisa Lindsay, "Putting the Family on Track: Gender and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian Railway" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); "Domesticity and Difference: Male Breadwinners, Working Women, and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigerian General Strike," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999): 783-812; and "'No Need...to Think of Home'? Masculinity and Domestic Life on the Nigerian Railway, c.1940-61," *Journal of African History* 39 (1998): 439-466.
- 17.<sup>17</sup> Francis. Jaekel, *The History of the Nigerian Railway*, 3 Volumes (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1997).

- 18.<sup>18</sup> John Stocker, *Nigerian Railway Jubilee, 1901-51* (Ebute-Metta: Nigerian Railway Printer, 1951).
- 19.<sup>19</sup> *The Nigerian Railway Corporation, A Brief History of the Nigerian Railway Corporation* (EbuteMetta: Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1960).
- 20.<sup>20</sup> Tamuno N. Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," *Nigeria Magazine* 84 (1965), 84.
- 21.<sup>21</sup> See Carland, 13-14, 135-165, and 166-183; Lisa Lindsay, "Putting the Family on Track: Gender and Domestic Life on the Colonial Nigerian Railway" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1996); Omosini, 146 and 491 <sup>23</sup>Omosini, 146 and 491.
- 22.<sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- 23.<sup>23</sup> Carland, 166-183.
- 24.<sup>24</sup> Jaekel,
- 25.<sup>25</sup> See Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I" 279-292; Tamuno, "Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II," 31-43; Omosini, 146 and 491; Elizabeth Wrangham, "An African Road Revolution: the Gold Coast in the Period of the Great War," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. 32, no. 1 (January 2004): 1-5.
- 26.<sup>26</sup> William. M. Freund, "Labour Migration to the Northern Nigeria Tin Mines, 1903-1945," *Journal of African History* 22 (1981): 73-84.
- 27.<sup>27</sup> Lindsay, "'No need ... to think of home?'," 439.
- 28.<sup>28</sup> Daniel. R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); C. B. Davis and K. E. Wilburn Jnr, eds. *Railway Imperialism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and Colin Divall, "Railway Imperialisms, Railway Nationalisms" in M. Burri, K. T. Elsasser and D. Gugerli, eds. *Die Internationalitat der Eisenbahn 1850 - 1970*, (Zurich: Chronos, 2003), 195-209.

- 29.<sup>29</sup> Tokunbo A. Ayoola, "Political Economy of Rail Transportation in Nigeria, 1945-1985" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2004), 47.
- 30.<sup>30</sup> *Report of Mission Appointed to Enquire into Production and Transport of Vegetable Oils and Oil Seeds Produced in West Africa Colonies*, Colonial No 211 of 1947.
- 31.<sup>31</sup> Wrangham, 1 - 5.
- 32.<sup>32</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation, *Annual Report 1964/1965*. The amounts were in British pounds sterling.
33. 33. Ibid
34. 34. Ibid
- 35.<sup>35</sup> I. Ifedi, "Development Strategies for Nigerian Railway" <http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/06/21/20020621let01.html>
- 36.<sup>36</sup> For detailed discussions of these issues, see Ayoola, "Political Economy of Rail Transportation," 64-101.
- 37.<sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- 38.<sup>38</sup> NA CO 554/355 Movement of Nigerian Groundnut Crop. *Report for the Prime Minister by the Secretary of State*, 14 July 1952.
- 39.<sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- 40.<sup>40</sup> David J. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development Vol.2 Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 201.
- 41.<sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- 42.<sup>42</sup> NA CO 554/611 Secretary of State for Colonies to Lord Leathers (Secretary of State for the Coordination of Transport, Fuel and Power), 4 July 1952.
- 43.<sup>43</sup> NA CO 537/5796 *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November 1949*, 47
- 44.<sup>44</sup> *Report on the Operating Problems of the Nigerian Railway 1949* (Enugu: Government Printer 1950).

- 45.<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 31-36.
- 46.<sup>46</sup> In practical term, this is a semi-autonomous port managed by a Board of Management, but whose overall control is under the central government.
- 47.<sup>47</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, *Report on Ports of Nigeria* (Lagos, 1949). A. N. Strong, the former chairman of the Colombo Port Commission and the Ragoon Port Trust, headed the commission.
- 48.<sup>48</sup> Ayodeji Olukoju, "Background to the Establishment of the Nigerian Ports Authority: the Politics of Port Administration in Nigeria, c.1920-1954," *International Journal of Maritime History*, IV, no.
- 49.<sup>49</sup> (December 1992): 170-171.
- 50.<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 173.
- 51.<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 162.
- 52.<sup>52</sup> UAC was the largest European commercial conglomerate in West Africa at the time. A subsidiary of Lever Brothers Limited, it was established in 1929 after the amalgamation of many other European firms operating in West Africa.
- 53.<sup>53</sup> NA CO583/301/8 *Report on Ports of Nigeria*, 2-3.
- 54.<sup>54</sup> NA CO583/301/8 A.N. Strong assisted by A.W. Flere, *Report on Ports of Nigeria* (London: HMSO, 1949) Section 27. Under the new arrangement, all ports in Nigeria, including the smaller ones like Forcados, Warri, Burutu, Koko, and Calabar, which the big British commercial businesses were using exclusively, were now to be unified under one single Board of Management.
- 55.<sup>55</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary's Office on the 23rd of August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report" enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, Savingram No 2528 of 11 October 1950.
- 56.<sup>56</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, to discuss

the form of Port Authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report." Enclosed in Memorandum on *Report on Ports of Nigeria* by Strong and Flere' sent to the Colonial Office, 11 October 1950.

57. 57. Ibid

58. 58. Ibid

59.<sup>59</sup> AWAM was established during the First World War as a pressure group of British and French companies in West Africa. In its first incarnation, its main goal was to assist the European companies in coordinating policies and influencing colonial governments. This was for the purpose of gaining advantage over their African and Levantine competitors. Some of its members included United African Company (UAC), John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Ltd., Shell Company of West Africa, British Bata Shoe Company, Nigerian Hardwoods Ltd., Taylor Woodrow Ltd., Elder Dempster Lines, CFAO, and SCOA. See Anthony G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London: Longman Group Ltd), 259; David K. Fieldhouse, *Merchant Capital and Economic Decolonization: The United Africa Company 1929-1987* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 127, 236; Josephine F. Milburn, *British Business and Ghanaian Independence* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), 5.

60.<sup>60</sup> This was not a new objective of the European firms in 1950. From the late 1930s, they had wanted to achieve this, but the exigency of the war made such call a diversion.

61.<sup>61</sup> Robert L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-63* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 199.

62.<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 200.

63.<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

64.<sup>64</sup> Fieldhouse, 27.

65.<sup>65</sup> Lauren van de Laan, "Modern Inland Transport and the European Trading Firms in Colonial West Africa," *Cahiers d'études Africaines* 21, no 4 (1981): 566.

- 66.<sup>66</sup> Ibid.
- 67.<sup>67</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a meeting in the Development Secretary's Office on the 23rd of August 1950 to discuss the form of port authority to be set up following the recommendations of the Strong Report." Enclosed in Acting Governor of Nigeria to Secretary of State for Colonies, Savingram No 2528 of 11 October 1950.
- 68.<sup>68</sup> NA CO 554/468 "Nigeria: Creation of a Port Authority," 1951-53.
- 69.<sup>69</sup> NA CO 583/301/9 "Note on the Present Situation of the Nigerian Railway" prepared by the West African Department, Colonial Office, 2 February 1951.
- 70.<sup>70</sup> *Statement of the Policy Proposed by the Government for the Establishment of a Nigerian Railway Corporation* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), 3.
- 71.<sup>71</sup> Federal House of Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 col. 864.
- 72.<sup>72</sup> Ibid.
- 73.<sup>73</sup> Nigerian Railway Corporation Headquarters' Library Nigerian Railway Ordinance 1955 Section 15C.
- 74.<sup>74</sup> Ibid.
- 75.<sup>75</sup> See the Chief Secretary's address to the Legislative Council in March 1949, *Legislative Council Debates, March 1949*, 568. See also the speech of the Development Secretary when introducing the bill for the establishment of the first public corporation in Nigeria, the Electricity Corporation in Nigeria, *Legislative Council Debates, March-April 1950* (Lagos: Government Printer, 1950), 40. Some other writers also shared this view on the reasons for the setting up public corporations in Nigeria. For instance, A.H. Hanson, "Public Enterprise in Nigeria I Federal Utilities" *Public Administration*, 36 (Winter, 1958): 366-367; Ojetunji Aboyade, "Nigerian Public Enterprises as an Organizational Dilemma" in *Administration for Development in Nigeria*, ed. Paul Collins (Lagos: African Education, 1980), 83-98; and Sesan Ayodele,

- "Privatization of Public Utilities in Nigeria: an Economic Analysis of the Guided Privatization Policy," Nigerian Institute of Economic Research NISER Monograph Series No. 3, 2000 (Ibadan, 2000), 1-35.
- 76.<sup>76</sup> Moufoutau Laleye, "Public Enterprises as an Instrument of Crisis Management: its Particular Relevance to Underdeveloped Countries" in *Public Administration in Periods of Uncertainty*, ed. A.O Sanda (Lagos: Fact Finders International, 1992), 145-147.
- 77.<sup>77</sup> Robert Millward, "State Enterprise in Britain in the 20th Century," 8 unpublished paper; R. KelfCohen, *Nationalisation in Britain The End of Dogma*, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1961), 14-24; N. Chester, *The Nationalisation of British Industry, 1945-1951* (London: HMSO, 1975), 1-8; and A. H. Hanson, ed., *Nationalisation: A Book of Readings* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), 12, 22-63.
- 78.<sup>78</sup> This unqualified support cut across the three Nigerian regions and the three dominant political parties representing them in the Central Legislature. See Nigeria House of Representatives debates, First Sessions 14th-22nd August 1952, 336-340.
- 79.<sup>79</sup> For instance, Jaja Wachukwu, a member of the House of Representatives from the Eastern Region complained that only old and dilapidated coaches were being sent to his region. While supporting this assertion, other Eastern Regional members, including prominent politicians like E. Eyo, equally complained that food served to passengers on the eastern line was inferior. See *West Africa* of 12 April 1952. See also Nigeria House of Representatives Debates First Sessions 14th- 22nd August 1952, 336.
- 80.<sup>80</sup> Ibid.
- 81.<sup>81</sup> *West Africa*, 4 October 1952, 913.
- 82.<sup>82</sup> Remi A. Fani-Kayode, Member of the House of Representatives representing Ife Division, during the debates on the Second Reading of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Ordinance, 1955, 4 April 1955. Federal House of

Representatives Debates, Session 1954/55 columns 873; and Tignor, 236239.

- 83.<sup>83</sup> NA CO583/301/8 Secretary of State for Colonies to Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, Priority Saving No. 3815 of 24 November 1950.
- 84.<sup>84</sup> *Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1952-1953* (Ebute Metta, Lagos: Railway Printer, 1953), 36.
- 85.<sup>85</sup> *Nigeria: Annual Report on the Government Railway for the Financial Year 1946-1947* (Ebute Metta: Railway Press, 1947), 8.
- 86.<sup>86</sup> Ibid.
- 87.<sup>87</sup> See *Report of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to investigate and make recommendations regarding the labour situation on the Nigerian Railway* (Lagos: Government Press 1949); and *West Africa*, 25 November 1952, 1080-1082.
- 88.<sup>88</sup> Ibid.
- 89.<sup>89</sup> *Annual Report of on the Nigerian Government Railway, 1950/1951*, Lagos: Government Press), 36.
- 90.<sup>90</sup> NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st September, 1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up ... enclosed in 'Memorandum on *Report on Ports of Nigeria* by Strong and Flere.'"
- 91.<sup>91</sup> See *Daily Times*, March 3, 1953 and March 19, 1953, 3.
- 92.<sup>92</sup> Ibid.
- 93.<sup>93</sup> Nigeria House of Representatives Debates Second Session 3rd to 31st March and 1st April 1953. See particularly the debates of 3rd to 18th March 1953, 18.
- 94.<sup>94</sup> British Library - Nigerian Railway, *Report on the Government Railway for the Period 1st April- 30th September 1955* (Lagos: Government Press), 24.



- 95.<sup>95</sup> See NA CO 583/301/8 "Minutes of a Meeting held at Government House on the 1st of September, 1950, to discuss the form of Port Authority to be set up."
- 96.<sup>96</sup> Ibid.
- 97.<sup>97</sup> British Library: Nigerian Legislative Council debates, March 1949, 568.
- 98.<sup>98</sup> The foreign business community stated this point when it was making its position known on the *Strong Report*. Suggesting how the boards of the transport corporations should be constituted, the shipping firms stated: "[t]he persons most concerned with the operation of the port are ship-owners. We proposed that there should be 3 representatives of the ship owners, to be nominated by the West African Lines Conference. We further suggest that the Importers and Exporters and Traders should be represented by 4 members who should be nominated having regard to their business activities only." See NA CO 583/301/8 Memorandum on the *Strong's Report* on the Ports of Nigeria prepared by the Elder Dempster Lines Limited, John Holt Line Limited and Palm Limited, 22 February 1950.
- 99.<sup>99</sup> Mike Cowen, "Early Years of the Colonial Development Corporation: British State Enterprise Overseas During Late Colonialism" *African Affairs* (1984): 64.

## CHAPTER 6

### The Niamey Experience:

# OAU Peace Mediation and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the Nigerian Civil War

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## INTRODUCTION

Developing Africa is hinged on total emancipation of the continent from colonialism and neocolonialism. African countries felt a strong compulsion to build up their institutions and their constitutional arrangements in a manner that reflected African values and African imperatives. African leaders had also endeavored to build effective institutions of governance and formulate policies needed for sound economic and political developments. However, the process of nation-building was completely aborted as civil conflicts broke out in major parts of the continent. Toyin Falola and Emmanuel Mbah aptly argued that “the challenges are even tougher because personal differences and ethnic cleavages created during colonial rule have produced many disputes and stifled inter- and intra-state dialogue.”<sup>1</sup>

The Nigerian Civil War fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under Major-General Yakubu Gowon and the Republic of Biafra led by Lieutenant Colonel

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<sup>1</sup> Toyin Falola and Emmanuel Mbah, *Change and Continuity in Contemporary Africa* eds. Toyin Falola and Emmanuel M. Mbah *Contemporary Africa: Challenges and Opportunities* (African Histories and Modernities Series New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1.

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was one of the earliest postcolonial conflicts in Africa. Factors that led to the tragic war could be traced to the numerous political crises that erupted immediately after the country gained her independence from the British colonial rule.<sup>2</sup>

The *coup d'état* of 15 January 1966 which terminated the first democratic government in Nigeria, and ushered in the first military government headed by Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi and the 29 July 1966 counter-coup d'état, served as melting points for the spate of civil war in Nigeria. There followed a series of meetings and constitutional conferences that were held towards restoring public confidence in the country's governance system.<sup>3</sup>

The meeting of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Nigeria organized in Aburi Ghana on 4 and 5 January 1967 was expected to be a landmark in "resolving the Nigeria's political crises". Nonetheless, the parley ended up in a discordant accord.<sup>4</sup> The British Foreign Office on 25 January 1967 said that "the Accra setting was more of 'shot-in-the-arm' than a solution to all of Nigeria's problems. Tribal and personal rivalries ran very deep, especially between the North and East. Reorganization of the army, sharing of

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<sup>2</sup> Amuwo Kunle, "Historical Roots of the Nigerian Civil War: An Explanation", in *Perspectives on the Nigerian Civil War* ed, Siyan Oyeweso (Lagos: OAU Humanities Series and Campus Press Limited 1992), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Britain-Biafra Association, *Nigerian/Biafra Conflict: an International Commission of Jurists and Prima Facie Evidence of Genocide* (London: Grays Inn, 1968), 86.

<sup>4</sup> Audu, M.S., Osuala, S. Uzoma & Ibrahim I. Baba, "Contextualizing the International Dimensions of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970" *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance* 4, no.4.3 (2013):6.

revenue, and a system of government were major bone of contention after the Aburi gathering.”<sup>5</sup>

However, the endless negotiation over the Aburi Accord and the creation of twelve states structure by General Yakubu Gowon without the consent of the Eastern region developed serious tensions which resulted in the region’s move towards the declaration of the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967.<sup>6</sup> The refusal to recognize Biafra by the Nigerian government eventually led to the civil war. While the Federal Military Government of Nigeria called the conflict “a police action,” the Biafran government regarded it as a struggle for survival and freedom from all forms of domination in the Nigerian State.<sup>7</sup>

Peace mediation was taken seriously by African leaders due to the influx of external forces in the conflict and was driven by the spirit of solidarity and unity to find solutions

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<sup>5</sup> Confidential: Note of Record on Nigeria and Ghana utilized at the Meeting between US Senator Robert Kennedy and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Secretary Michael Stewart from P.H. Moberly to Niles and E.G. Norris in the Foreign Office London, Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Bilateral, Nigerian Political and Diplomatic Relations with United States of America during the Civil War Years, 25<sup>th</sup> January, 1967-31<sup>st</sup> December, 1968, File No. TX 3/3/6C/1066/Part A/ West and General African Dept. / FCO 38/236, TNA.

<sup>6</sup> Audu, Osuala, and Ibrahim, *International Dimensions*, 6.

<sup>7</sup> Confidential: Minute on War and Oil in Nigeria Despatch No. 9 from the British High Commissioner Sir David Hunt to Herbert Bowden MP and British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs in the Commonwealth Office, London, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1967, FCO 38/284, File No. TX 10/16/6C/10/66/Part A/West and General African Dept. / Title: Nigeria, Defence, Military Operations against Biafra, 8<sup>th</sup> July, 1967-31<sup>st</sup> December, 1968, TNA.

to the war under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Cardinal to this effort was the goal of attaining national conciliation and consensus.<sup>8</sup>

Venues were strategically selected for peace talks to settle the fighting. In each of the venues, African leaders were hopeful of achieving positive outcomes. However, each time they convened to discuss the matter the presence of the great powers was usually felt. Therefore, the overbearing influence of the great powers in the peace process made the civil war to be highly complex. Massive division of opinion took place among Africans and eventual breakdown of peace settlements.

This chapter discusses the Niamey peace initiative of the Nigerian Civil War. However, it implements specific focus on Anglo-American diplomacy to the activities of the OAU Consultative Committee at the gathering. The study is very significant because it shows that genuine desire for peace had been a major feature of African civil conflicts in the 1960s as a strategy to avoid too much loss of human lives. Hence, peace negotiations had been part of the international politics of Africa's civil wars with the great powers as the leading contenders in view of their vested interests on the continent. The study adopted a historical narrative approach and based its analysis on primary sources namely archival materials employed from the British National Archives Kew London and secondary sources obtained from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN) in Enugu State, Nigeria.

The author argued that a significant attribute of the Niamey assembly was an Anglo-American presence throughout the meeting, conceived and carried out as "a joint operation", thus, synchronized to avoid creating an impression of influencing the outcome of the summit. Anglo-American moves at the gathering hinged on strengthening their diplomatic investments in the war. Meanwhile, there developed a supremacy battle between certain African leaders which resulted in a quick decision of moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa, an action that reflected political rivalry

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<sup>8</sup>Statement on the Situation in Nigeria by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2<sup>nd</sup> before the Sub-committee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September, 1 FCO 38/237, TNA.

for primacy in talks or enhancement of personal prestige. While the situation indicated that agreement on substantive issues was not going to be achieved, it paved the way for diplomatic maneuvering to get the talks away from Niamey. The Niamey episode showed that while the OAU had attempted to patch up inter-African conflicts, foreign meddling into its affairs made it difficult for the organization to deal with the internal problems of the African states. While it was politically and diplomatically correct to ascribe the OAU as an undoubtedly intermediary in resolving the conflict, the tragedy was that the continental body was too unwieldy to enforce its decisions regarding the war.<sup>9</sup>

### **AFRICAN LEADERS GO TO NIAMEY**

The intensity of the military operations and the huge influx of external forces such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and France in support of either sides of the war prompted the OAU to open a frontier of diplomatic and peace interventions in the war. The Consultative Committee inaugurated at the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Kinshasa on September 11-14, 1967, was the first OAU peace initiative of the Nigerian Civil War. The members of the committee were the Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selassie, Chairman; President Williams Tubman of Liberia, Vice Chairman; General Ankrah, leader of the National Liberation Council (NLC) in Ghana; General Mobutu, President of Congo (Kinshasa); President Ahidjo of Cameroon; and President Hamani Diori of Niger. The first assignment carried out by the Committee was the visit to Lagos, where they held consultations with General Gowon in pursuit of the resolution on the Nigerian situation adopted by the OAU Conference in Kinshasa.<sup>10</sup>

After the meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee in Lagos, which did not yield much of a result, the head of the Committee Emperor Hailé Selassie continued series of

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<sup>10</sup> Confidential: Minute on OAU Mission to Nigeria from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 1967, FCO, 38/232, TNA.

consultations with other members of the committee on whether there was anything more they could do regarding the Nigerian situation. This was disclosed by the Ethiopian Ambassador Dawit Abdou, who had earlier received instructions to present a letter from the Emperor to Presidents Hamani Diori and Ahidjo. The letter consisted primarily of a report from General Ankrah to the Emperor that listed various ways by which the General had tried to contact Ojukwu to discuss with him the outcome of the OAU peace mission to Lagos and *communiqué* on the Nigerian Civil War. Ankrah reported to the Ethiopian Emperor that at the end of January 1968, all efforts had come to naught, and he regretted that the OAU Mission to Nigeria did not succeed. The emperor was unhappy about the lack of success of the OAU peace mission but did not describe it as a complete failure. In transmitting Ankrah's report and letter to Ojukwu to other members of the committee, Emperor asked for views on whether the OAU should try to do anything more about the Nigeria-Biafra conflict.<sup>11</sup>

The appealing condition of the civilian population in the war areas roused world-wide concern and made further African peace action inevitable. Humanitarian considerations were behind the initiative of Emperor Hailé Selaššié to revive the work of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria at Niamey.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Confidential: United States Embassy Report on Nigeria to the State Department from Lagos to Foreign Office Telegram No. 248, 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 1968, FCO 38/233, File No. TX 2/4/6C/1066/West and General African Depart/ Nigeria: Political Affairs, External, Multilateral, Nigerian Civil War and the OAU, 1<sup>st</sup> January, 1967-31<sup>st</sup> December, 1969, TNA.

<sup>12</sup> Confidential: Minute on OAU and Nigeria from Accra to Commonwealth Office Telegram No. 349, 5<sup>th</sup> June, 1968, FCO 38/233, TNA.

## THE NIAMEY MEETING

The first meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee in Niamey began on July 15 and ended on July 18, 1968. The following members of the OAU Consultative Committee were present at the Niamey meeting: Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selassié, Chairman; President Williams Tubman of Liberia, Member; President Diori Hamani of Niger Republic, Member; President Ahamdou Ahidjo of Cameroun, Member; General Ankrah, Chairman of National Liberation Council in Ghana (NLC), Member; Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Congo-Kinshasa, Member; and the OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli.<sup>13</sup> The Nigerian delegates in Niamey formed the Chargè d' Affaires to Niger, including Vice President of the Executive Council and Federal Commissioner of Finance and also Chief of Delegation, Obafemi Awolowo; Military Governor of Kano State Audu Bako; Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice T.O. Elias; Permanent Secretary for Ministry of External Affairs A.A. Baba Gana; Permanent Secretary for Economic Development Q. A. Ayida; Permanent Secretary for Information A. Joda; Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia Eme Sanu; Nigeria Chargè d'Affaires<sup>14</sup>

The Biafran delegates were Colonel Ojukwu, the Biafran leader; Nnamdi Azikiwe, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Biafra Commissioner of Information Ifeagwu Eke; Gabonese Minister of Information Pierre Rouley; and Chief of Cabinet of President Houphouet-Boigny.<sup>15</sup> Before the meeting began, President Diori requested the permission of the French, U.S., and the Soviet Union to make use of their telegraphic and

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<sup>13</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>14</sup> Confidential: Principal Nigerian Delegation Members at the OAU Consultative Niamey Meeting, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>15</sup> Confidential: Biafran Principal Members at the Consultative Committee Meeting, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/243, TNA.



telephonic facilities to speed up regional communications with principals and interested OAU parties in the talks.<sup>16</sup>

To keep Biafrans from contacting the media in Niamey, President Hamani Diori imposed tight security protection around Biafrans. They were housed in the military compounds across the street from the palace, and reporters found it impossible to penetrate the gate. An estimated 180 Igbo servants and laborers in Niamey were detained during the conference. One guard even threatened to shoot a photographer who had obtained advance permission to take a picture. Interestingly enough, Biafran delegates made very few attempts to contact the press in order to present their case to them.<sup>17</sup>

The meeting was opened at 3:15 p.m. by the Chairman, Ethiopian Emperor Hailé Selassié. In his opening address, the emperor stated that it was important for the committee to help the federal military government to ensure peace and stability in Nigeria. If peace was not obtained in Nigeria, it would be tragic not only for Nigeria but also for the whole of Africa, and therefore, everything possible should be done for Nigeria to achieve peace and tranquility. To stop the fighting in Nigeria, Selassié went on, it would be necessary for many sacrifices to be made; without these sacrifices, it would not be possible to achieve the OAU objective. He said that he was aware of the many good gestures which the Nigerian government had made, and he prayed to God to help the federal government and the committee to achieve success in their joint efforts.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Confidential: Telegram on Current Status OAU Talks on Nigeria from Niamey to Foreign Office, 23<sup>rd</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>17</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC , 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>18</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S.

After his brief opening statement, the emperor invited General Gowon, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Nigeria, at 12:30 p.m. to take the floor. The General delivered his opening speech, thanking the members of the Committee for listening to his statement and further assuring them that the federal government would do everything it could to bring peace and to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria.<sup>19</sup> According to the Ryan, the U.S. Ambassador in Niamey:

General Gowon's statement to the Committee was publicized by the Federal Government rather than the Consultative Committee. In it he warned Biafrans that if they did not return to the negotiating table the Federal Government would have no choice but to take over all the Biafra-held areas. The General strongly criticized the four governments who recognized Biafra namely Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zambia. He urged them to use their influence to prevail on Biafrans to resume negotiations.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Committee appreciated the General for his resounding speech and responded: "I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude to General Gowon for delivering such a lucid report to the Committee." He went on to say that as he had previously stated, continuation of the

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Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8, 19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>19</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S.

Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8, 19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>20</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC , 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

fighting in Nigeria would bring more problems and difficulties to the people of Nigeria as indeed General Gowon himself had stated in his speech on the question of the humanitarian problem. But everybody knew the OAU Consultative Committee was not sitting in judgment of the federal government on its internal problem, but rather, it was given the task to facilitate peace in Nigeria.<sup>21</sup>

The emperor then said that he would like the rest of the members of the Committee to either comment on the statement of General Gowon in his presence or ask for any clarification from him, but if there was nothing anybody would say, then the meeting could be adjourned for 10 minutes. Meanwhile, the head of the Ghanaian delegation, General Ankrah, after addressing the Chairman and the other members of the Committee, advised that as they had heard the statement of Gowon, he would suggest that the latter should take leave of them for a few minutes to enable them to decide on how best to consider the issue. The Chairman agreed with the suggestion, and since there was no other member of the Committee willing to make further statements, the meeting resumed at 1 p.m.<sup>22</sup>

Before the meeting reopened, the OAU Administrative Secretary-General Diallo Telli brought a resolution to Gowon for verification before publication, and its purpose was to invite Biafran leader Ojukwu or his representatives to come by Thursday, July 19, 1968, to Niamey or contact the committee at any time thereafter. The resolution was to be issued to the press and stipulated that no direct invitation would be sent to Biafrans

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<sup>21</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>22</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

according to the Secretary-General. Gowon, after consulting his entourage, argued for the resolution to be made public as in his view there would be no objection to Biafrans being heard by the Consultative Committee.<sup>23</sup>

On July 17, 1968, President Hamani Diori of Niger told the British Chargé d'Affaires in Addis Ababa, Mark McMullen, that he proposed to persuade the President of Ivory Coast, Houphouët-Boigny, to encourage Biafrans to attend the meeting. He had intended to propose to the Consultative Committee that he, President Williams Tubman of Liberia, and General Ankrah of Ghana should persuade Houphouët-Boigny and Ahidjo to influence Albert Bongo of Gabon, and the emperor to convince Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to pressure Ojukwu into making concessions. Diori thought that the Consultative Committee and General Gowon would agree to Biafran representations being available in Niamey for consultations. If they could be convinced to come, he suggested that they form part of a specially invited delegation from some African countries that recognized Biafra, such as Ivory Coast, to overcome fears and suspicions at the gathering.<sup>24</sup>

According to the *Evening Standard* on July 17, 1968, Biafra authorities accepted an invitation to send a top-level delegation to Niamey. An official broadcast by Radio Biafra welcomed the invitation but said that because of the transport difficulties in the blockaded war territory, a delegation would not be able to go before the weekend. The

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<sup>24</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA

statement did not indicate whether Ojukwu would go to Niamey personally but confirmed the return of General Gowon to Niamey for another round of peace talks.<sup>25</sup>

Consequently, the Committee continued its meeting at 5:30 p.m., yet it was not possible for them to produce any concrete proposals for discussions with Gowon. Gowon therefore gave an excuse and returned to Lagos. He promised to return the following morning and asked them to let his delegation have a copy of their proposed resolution so that they could examine and advise him when he returned the following morning to enable him to make a quick decision on it. This request was agreed to by the committee, but they were unable to come to any agreement on their proposed resolution that evening. Gowon returned the following morning and waited for the draft resolutions until in the afternoon when it was brought.<sup>26</sup>

The draft resolution, which was later discovered to have been produced by the Ghanaian delegation, contained the following basic points, which were all opposed by Nigeria: that the Ghana Government offered staging facilities for stockpiling, inspection, and airlifting direct into Biafra of relief supplies; that there should be a temporary truce and a temporary renunciation of secession; that there should be a demilitarized zone for disposal of relief supplies of 10 and 20 miles on either side; and that the demilitarized zone should be supervised by an observing peacekeeping force.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Biafra Says Yes to Peace Talks. *Evening Standard*. 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1968.

<sup>26</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>27</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

The Nigerian side commented on the points as follow: that this resolution involved an air corridor, which would not be acceptable because of the possibility of the illegal arms traffic through the corridor from other airports during times allowed for supplies from authorized airports; and there could not be a temporary ceasefire as it would not achieve the principal objective of the federal government and therefore the question of a demilitarized zone following the temporary cessation of hostilities would not arise nor should the question of an external observer force, as the foreign force would be admitted into Nigeria until after the renunciation of secession.<sup>28</sup>

The federal government assured the committee, however, that an external observer could be admitted after the end of the civil war to give a sense of security to Biafrans within a united Nigeria for a limited period. The committee was admonished not to forget and to show appreciation of the many good gestures which the federal government had made toward achieving a speedy and peaceful solution to the Nigerian crisis. In view of these remarks on the draft resolution, President of the Cameroun Republic Ahidjo suggested an amendment to the resolution, considering the last remark of Gowon. This amendment resulted in the exclusion of all four suggestions of Ghana's delegation, and when he read his amendment, all members of the Committee agreed to it. Gowon, on his own part when asked by the Chairman of the Committee to indicate whether he agreed to the amendment, replied, saying that "subject to any drafting modifications [he had] no objection to it."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>29</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

In his report on July 27, 1968, the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey on Nigeria submitted to the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C., and the British Embassy in Abidjan and sent to African capitals such as Addis Ababa, Dar-Es-Salam, Kinshasa, Lagos, Libreville, Monrovia, Yaoundé, and European capitals like London and Paris, the U.S. Ambassador in Niamey, Ryan, argued that the articles in the resolution on relief supplies were very different from the proposal discussed originally by the committee.

Gowon's subsequent success in convincing the committee to change the articles to something acceptable to the federal government was attributed partly to his playing on the fears of each committee member that they, too, have potential Igboland. This means that African leaders that attended the meeting equally have internal problems in their respective countries, so the earlier they could work together in solving the Nigerian crisis, the better for them in resisting anything capable of dividing their respective countries. In addition, the committee delegations were probably unprepared to argue too long with the highly competent, persuasive members of the Nigerian federal government delegation.<sup>30</sup>

The interesting point was General Ankrah's violent opposition to the amendment proposed by President Ahidjo after it had been incorporated into the draft resolution and submitted for final approval. The General attacked the resolution for lacking any concrete substance. He spoke emotionally, which, unfortunately for him, exposed his delegation as being solidly behind Biafra to the extent that almost all the other members of the Committee became disillusioned. The leader of the Congolese delegation even went to the extent of asking General Ankrah if he had any ulterior motives in taking such a strong stand against a resolution which had been previously approved by them in its draft form. General Ankrah's idea was that General Gowon should be shown the draft resolution only as a matter of courtesy and not for him to suggest his own amendments, and by

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<sup>30</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

implication he even accused President Ahidjo of having been influenced by General Gowon when he proposed his amendment.<sup>31</sup>

Apparently, General Ankrah was unhappy because all his proposals were left out of the resolution and went to the extent of suggesting that the committee should recommend an emergency session whereby they should ask for a fresh mandate, and this, by inference, meant that the committee should be given mandate to mediate in the Nigerian crisis rather than as at that time, to help the Nigerian federal government obtain a peaceful solution to the internal crisis and maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria. This suggestion was of course strongly opposed by President Ahidjo, who stated that the committee should wait and make its report to the OAU at its next scheduled conference in Algiers and that there was no need or reason for an emergency meeting.

Then, President Tubman of Liberia also made an intervention saying as the majority of the Committee membership was in favor of passing the resolution as amended, the resolution should be passed based on democratic practices. He expressed disappointment with the way General Ankrah addressed the committee and thought that the meeting was the worst of its kind he had ever attended, where he saw an African Head of State losing his temper.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, commenting on General Ankrah's attitude at the Niamey meeting, the British Charge d'Affaires in Abidjan Mark McMullen told the foreign office on September

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<sup>31</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>32</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.



25, 1968, that one could well understand that Ankrah's behavior at Niamey appeared to the Nigerians as entirely pro-Biafran. Ankrah seemed to have been upset about the rough reception of his draft, which he had not anticipated.<sup>33</sup>

At this time, as it was getting late, Gowon informed the chairman of the committee that he would like to return to Nigeria due to his other pressing engagements and the impossibility for him to return to Niamey. He assured the committee that he had given a broad mandate to his delegation, which remained behind to speak on behalf of the federal government with flexibility and understanding. Gowon then took leave of the members of the committee after expressing his gratitude to them and to all leaders of Africa in general for having shown such an understanding of the Nigerian conflict and for their continued cooperation and support. Gowon, accompanied by some members of his delegation, left the meeting for the airport from which he took off for Nigeria.<sup>34</sup>

On the following afternoon, the committee invited the Nigerian delegation, led by the Commissioner for Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, Obafemi Awolowo, to have a look at the amended draft resolution and comment on it. When it was read through, the Cameroonian Foreign Minister, who was the head of their delegation, suggested an amendment; President Ahidjo had travelled earlier in the morning back to his country to attend to most urgent state matters. The minister's amendment requested an addition to the resolution: "with the objective of preserving Nigeria's territorial integrity and of guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants." This

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<sup>33</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27<sup>th</sup> July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>34</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8, 19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA

amendment was acceptable to all members of the committee and again Ghana expressed surprise that the Cameroonian delegation should have brought an amendment at that late moment while the mover of the amendment himself was on the drafting committee, where he could have had his point considered sooner. The chairman then asked Awolowo whether he had any comments and Awolowo replied, saying that he "had none except that the amendment was acceptable to Nigeria."<sup>35</sup>

From the look of things, all was well and there was nothing left but to unanimously pass the resolution, which indeed was passed. But when Awolowo asked that the resolution should be immediately publicized, objections were raised. The chairman felt that as Biafran delegation was due to arrive that evening and Ojukwu himself might be coming the following day, it would be inadvisable to make the resolution public before the Committee had a chance to hear from the Biafran delegation. It was pointed out by President Tubman also that Biafra delegation might object to this resolution being released and might accuse the committee of having made up its mind before inviting them, and this point of view might have some sympathetic reception from outside world. He would, in the circumstances, therefore, suggest that publication of this resolution be deferred until mid-day the following day.<sup>36</sup>

Awolowo pointed out to the committee that the main and most important consideration was the question of how relief supplies could reach the civilians in Biafra and therefore he believed it was imperative to publish the resolution so that action on its

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<sup>36</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

recommendations, with regard to the delivery of relief supplies, become operative without undue delay. Awolowo further pointed out that Ojukwu would claim credit for the resolution once it was released, following his interview with the committee. Awolowo also asserted that Ojukwu would promote his usual propaganda, claiming that Nigeria refused to reach an agreement with the committee on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, and would portray himself as the one who cooperated with the committee, which made it possible for the resolution to be adopted."<sup>37</sup>

Awolowo further stated that the question of renunciation of secession and cessation of hostilities were two main final considerations, and the committee would like to have the views of both sides and agreement before making any statements on them, but certainly not on the question of definite recommendation, which the committee felt necessary to make regardless of the stand taken by either side. After an exchange of opinions, it was agreed that no matter what happened, the resolution should be publicized by 6 o'clock the following evening. Awolowo and some of the members of the Nigerian delegation left for Nigeria at about 4 p.m. Akilu, Ayida, Isa, and Shanu stayed behind so that they would be available for consultation with the members of the committee outside the conference rooms in the event of Biafran representatives turning up and potentially making difficult claims to the committee.<sup>38</sup>

The Biafra delegation, however, arrived on the same day, approximately at the time Awolowo's plane took off for Lagos, and Ojukwu himself turned up the following day

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<sup>38</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA

on July 19, 1968. Ojukwu addressed the committee for some 45 minutes, and finally before he left it was agreed that a special *communiqué* should be issued.<sup>39</sup>

Ambassador Ryan said that there was no press release of Colonel Ojukwu's statement to the Committee. In his interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Nigerian President was asked how he would describe Colonel Ojukwu's mood at the conference, and Diiori commented, "It is the first time I have an opportunity to meet Colonel Ojukwu. He delivered his report in a very slow voice and he is a man who has confidence of the right of his idea and of his feeling so that he delivered his speaking for more than an hour and I think his mood is like every African leader in the way committee defending his own position, his own report, and his own view and his problem that is the conflict with."<sup>40</sup>

The special or final *communiqué* of the Niamey meetings stated among other things that "the OAU urgently appealed to all member-states of the OAU to assist in the massive humanitarian relief efforts. It urgently invited both parties, as a matter of urgency to resume peace talks as soon as possible in order to achieve final solution of the crisis prevailing in this country, with the object of preserving Nigeria's territorial integrity and guarantee the security of all its inhabitants."<sup>41</sup> The OAU Consultative Committee also

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<sup>40</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27<sup>th</sup> July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>41</sup> Confidential: Communiqué Issued by Organization of African Unity Consultative Mission at Niamey. London: Press Release from Nigerian House, 9 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2, 22<sup>nd</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

announced that the federal military government of Nigeria and Biafran leader Colonel Ojukwu agreed to initiate preliminary talks at Niamey under the leadership of President Hamani Diori toward a rapid resumption of negotiations for peace in Nigeria, and both parties agreed to resume peace negotiations in Addis Ababa as soon as possible under the auspices of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria.<sup>4243</sup>

Ambassador Ryan, who was underground at the meeting with the British High Commissioner, Mark McMullen, said that Colonel Ojukwu came and left very quickly on July 19, 1968. Reportedly right up to the moment when Colonel Ojukwu departed Niamey on board the *Mystere 20*, a plane placed at his disposal by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny, committee members tried to persuade Ojukwu to stay the night while they attempted to persuade General Gowon to come back from Lagos. Considering Niamey "belligerent territory," Ojukwu refused. Before he returned to Biafra, Ojukwu stopped briefly in Abidjan and Libreville where he held conversations with Houphouet-Boigny and Gabonese President Albert Bongo.<sup>44"</sup>

It was understood that before Ojukwu left for Ivory Coast, the Secretary-General of the OAU showed him a copy of the amended version of the committee's resolution; he was furious about it conveyed his unhappiness with Diallo Telli about the resolution.

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<sup>42</sup> Confidential: Communiqué Issued by Organization of African Unity Consultative Mission at Niamey. London: Press Release from Nigerian House, 9 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2, 22<sup>nd</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>43</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>44</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA

Ojukwu was reported to have stated that he “would have nothing to do with the resolution and that [he] would withdraw the mandate which [he] had given to his delegation.”<sup>45</sup> Ojukwu’s stern reactions to the resolution appeared to be understandable given the revelation made by the U.S. Ambassador concerning the matter:

The Committee’s Resolution that requested a “mercy corridor” for relief supplies and a resumption of peace talks with the objective of preserving Nigeria’s territorial integrity was not accepted by Colonel Ojukwu. A question remained whether he actually saw the Resolution before it was released to the public or, if he did, if he was able to discuss its contents with the Committee during his short stay. In any case, it appeared that the Resolution was probably already drafted and approved by the Committee before Ojukwu arrived.<sup>46</sup>

When the news of Ojukwu’s reaction to the amended resolution reached the members of the Committee, Emperor Hailé Selassié asked President Hamani Diori to get in contact immediately with President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast to persuade Ojukwu to agree for his delegation to continue with the talks. The telephone line between Niamey and Ivory Coast was left open, according to reports, for nearly four hours during which intensive negotiations took place between the two presidents, and Ojukwu firstly

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<sup>45</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27<sup>th</sup> July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>46</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC to the British High Commissioner in Abidjan Mark McMullen, 27<sup>th</sup> July 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

agreed to allow his delegation to continue with the peace talks provided the special *communiqué* was amended to read "final communiqué."<sup>47</sup>

Preliminary peace talks were held in Niamey from July 20 to July 26, 1968, in accordance with the final communiqué released on July 19, 1968, by the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria. At these talks, the two sides adopted the following agenda for peace negotiations to be held in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the Committee: arrangements for a permanent settlement, terms for the cessation of hostilities, and proposals for the transport of relief supplies to the civilian population in the war areas.<sup>48</sup> African leaders who gathered in Niamey were determined to resolve the civil war peacefully and were cautious to recognize secession as the basis for a peaceful resolution of the fighting because such acknowledgement could lead to an automatic endorsement of a balkanized Africa along ethnic and tribal lines. Given the risk the war posed to the actualization of peace and stability of Africa, they shunned primordial interests in discussing the war and tried to find a common ground for the two factions in the fighting. Their deliberations strengthened the notion that "the war is an African affair" served as a mantra to justify non-involvement of other multilateral organizations such as the United Nations in the peace mediation of the conflict.

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<sup>47</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>48</sup> Secret: Record of Meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee on the 16<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, at Niamey, Niger Republic from the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa R.S. Swann to W. Wilson in the West and Central African Department at the Foreign Office, No. 1/8,19<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

## **NIAMEY GATHERING AND ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY**

The greatest feature of the Niamey peace talks was joint Anglo-American diplomatic surveillance mounted on the activities of the OAU Consultative Committee. Britain and the U.S., through their respective diplomatic missions in Niger and Ethiopia, worked tirelessly to know the outcome of the meeting. Both countries had designed their foreign policies regarding the civil war on the perception that it was an African affair to be resolved by Africans themselves, but in a manner suitable to their vested interests in the conflict.

Like the time when the Niamey conference began, British representatives experienced communication challenges. This difficulty prompted the British Charge d'Affaires in Abidjan, Mark McMullen, to inform the Foreign Office on July 27, 1968, about the need to exchange information with American officials<sup>49</sup>He said, "The Americans and myself were handicapped from the start of the conference by deciding to keep very much in the background, since Niamey was a very small fish-pool in which the two delegations were in any case mostly confined to the open-plan ground floor of the Palace in which everybody's movements could be observed, and to heavily guarded villas."<sup>50</sup>

The U.S. Ambassador could not have been more helpful. He set up a room, clerical help, and communications facilities freely for the disposal of the British Charge d'Affaires and all telegrams dispatched about the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey were discussed between the two of them. Indeed, a great number of these telegrams were results of drafting sessions involving the Ambassador, himself, and at least one other member of his staff, a technique which the Charge d'Affaires found very confusing as the

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<sup>50</sup> TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968.



American style and approach to reporting was different from the British method, and the diction of the telegrams seemed verbose by British standards.<sup>51</sup> In a letter sent to the Foreign Office upon his return to Abidjan, McMullen had paid a tribute to the help and cooperation he received from the US Ambassador, Ryan. Mark McMullen said:

Ambassador Ryan extended to me facilities and collaboration far beyond what could have been expected even from the representative of a friendly and allied country. Not only was I offered full office and communications facilities, but coverage of the meeting was conceived and carried out as a "joint operation," pleasantly reminiscent to me of wartime experience in the Mediterranean. Our visits to Diori was [sic] synchronized so as to avoid the impression of more than a minimum British and US presence at the Palace, information was pooled and telegrams reporting developments were drafted in common.<sup>52</sup>

The Anglo-American joint policy of ostentatiously keeping out of the way except when summoned by Diori meant that their own information about the conference proceedings had to be gathered from the often inaccurate gleanings of the press, corrected at regular intervals by accounts given to the US Ambassador and McMullen by Diori. Thus, the only inside information they received was filtered through the personality, changing moods, and sometimes hazy grasp of the finer points at issue of the president himself.<sup>53</sup>

McMullen suggested that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael

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<sup>51</sup> Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>52</sup> TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute one American Help at Niamey from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1968.

<sup>53</sup> TNA, FCO, 38/234, Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from D.C. Tebbit to E.G. Norris, 1<sup>st</sup> August, 1968.

Stewart should write a letter to Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, expressing his gratitude for the U.S. Ambassador's kind gesture. It was quite true that McMullen would have been ineffective in Niamey without the use of American communications facilities; at the same time, the cooperation was not entirely a one-way street because McMullen got to see President Diori more than the Americans did. For the assistance granted to the British Charge d'Affaires by the U.S. Ambassador, the Foreign Office accepted the proposal of sending a letter of appreciation to the American Ambassador in London. Incidentally, McMullen was commended for doing extremely well in very difficult circumstances in Niamey.<sup>54</sup>

While it was confirmed that a letter was sent to the American Ambassador in London asking him to convey appreciation to the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador Ryan, the Foreign Office staff members were afraid that the results of the Niamey conference were disappointingly meager. The fault of this outcome obviously did not lie with President Diori, but was due to primarily what they perceived as Ojukwu's intransigence on the central political issue. For this, they feared that President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast must bear his share of the blame although the announcement from Paris by the French government on the civil war indicated that the Ivorian President was not acting entirely on his own when he recognized Biafra.<sup>55</sup>

At the Niamey peace talks, an Anglo-American diplomatic watchdog discovered what appeared to be a supremacy battle between the OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli and Nigerien President Diori Hamani. Moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa might have reflected the rivalry between Diallo Telli and Diori for primacy in talks or enhancement of personal prestige or ascendancy of OAU Headquarters over

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<sup>54</sup> Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from D.C. Tebbit to E.G. Norris, 1<sup>st</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>55</sup> Confidential: Minute on American Help at Niamey from P.H. Moberly of West and General African Department to the British Charge d'Affaires British Embassy in Abidjan, 6<sup>th</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

Niger. On August 2, 1968 the British Charge d'Affaires in Abidjan informed the Foreign Office that one particular story covered during the talks was the imminent closure of the talks some days before it was ended. Diori was amazed when the Charge d'Affaires asked him about the incident and Diallo Telli's reactions when tackled by the press corps on the question of whether the purpose was for talks in Addis Ababa only or in Niamey also, the Charge d'Affaires had the idea that Telli had in fact engaged in diplomatic maneuvering to move the talks from Niamey. One had only to observe him approaching Diori to realize that he must have bitterly resented his role in the big palace.<sup>56</sup> According to Mullen:

I suspected Diallo Telli, who clearly on the occasions when I saw him with the President Diori did not relish his role of humble subordinate, may maneuver things with the delegations to transfer the talks transferred to his own hunting grounds, just when some progress appeared to be round the corner. And Diori, who became obviously tired and less buoyant at each successive audience the American Ambassador and myself had with him might have begun to find the personal strain too much and to lose heart. Probably both elements played their part; and possibly also a third in dislike of the delegate themselves of the prospect of an indefinite period of long hours of work and confinement to barracks.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d'Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA

<sup>57</sup> Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d'Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

The British Charge d’Affaires suggested that Diallo Telli wanted above all things to transfer the talks away from a place where he felt under surveillance of an absolute rule that treated Diori as one of his own civil servants. Certainly, Diori revealed that at the time an imminent change of venue was announced by the *Agence Francè Press* (AFP), his intention was to ensure that the talks at Niamey were at the point where all the principals could sign on a dotted line. Perhaps, a combination of factors might have contributed to the decision a few days later to call off the Niamey talks and adjourn to Addis Ababa; these were successful lobbies by Telli with the delegate, increasing exhaustion and depression on the part of Diori, as it became clear that agreement on any substantive issue was not going to be achieved—a very human and certainly African disinclination on the part of the delegations for an indefinite stretch of long hours of work.<sup>58</sup>

Altogether, the meeting in Niamey represented positive and serious efforts on the part of African leaders to come to grips with Africa’s most serious problems. As argued by the former Liberian President, Williams Tubman, “the meeting was a great success to the big surprise of everyone,” because the Committee succeeded in getting the two conflicting Nigerian sides to agree to resume peace negotiations at Addis Ababa. The foreign press corps chafed under the efforts of President Diori and OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli to restrict information on the content of the meetings.<sup>59</sup> The Anglo-American presence in

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<sup>58</sup> Confidential: Minute on the Experiences of the British Charge d’Affaires in Niamey Peace Talks from the British Embassy in Abidjan to Foreign Office, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 1968, FCO 38/234, TNA.

<sup>59</sup> Confidential: Report on the Niamey Peace Talks, July 15-26 from the United States Ambassador in Niamey Robert J. Ryan to the US Department of State in Washington DC, FCO 38/234, TNA.

the Niamey meetings mirrored the general context of diplomacy they instituted in the civil war. More importantly, Britain and the U.S. were in the Niamey meeting to monitor the proceedings to understand the minds of the African leaders and their approach toward resolving the conflict. This role was relevant in their foreign policy decisions and further approach to the dispute.

## **CONCLUSION**

African leaders under the auspices of the OAU tried every means possible to resolve the Nigerian problem in an African way without relying on external assistance. At the start of the OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey, there was reason to be cynical about positive results. At the end of the meeting, however, the committee could point with pride to having taken the initiative. The worldwide interest in the conflict gave the committee the needed excuse to invite Biafrans and to establish the OAU in the role of mediator between the sides. Moreover, the two sides seemed eager to resume talks, particularly Biafrans. Biafrans accepted the committee's invitation with alacrity and chose to ignore the committee's resolution, which was approved before they arrived, in which both in word and content favored the Lagos position. The preliminary talks appeared to have been only a partial success. Given that the meeting was held in a friendly, informal, and relaxed atmosphere, it was later referred to as "the spirit of Niamey." On the less positive side was the Anglo-American presence throughout the meeting, which was conceived and carried out as "a joint operation," synchronized to avoid creating an impression of influencing the outcome of the summit. Anglo-American moves at the gathering hinge on strengthening their diplomatic investments in the war. Meanwhile, a supremacy battle developed between certain African leaders, which resulted in a quick decision of moving the venue of the peace talks from Niamey to Addis Ababa, an action that reflected political rivalry for primacy in talks of enhancement of personal prestige. While the situation indicated that agreement on substantive issues was not going to be achieved, it paved the way for diplomatic maneuvering to get the talks away from Niamey. Thus, the Niamey episode showed that while the OAU had attempted to patch up inter-

African conflicts, foreign meddling into its affairs made it difficult for the organization to deal with the internal problems of the African states. Immediate economic interests hinged on the need to work toward the restoration of the Nigerian economy to a stable condition in which their substantial trade and investments in the country could be further developed and had underpinned the British and American support for the OAU. On the other hand, the fact that a break-up would weaken the political influence of Nigeria in Africa was weighty enough to drive British and U.S. support for the OAU on the assumption that Nigeria could be united as a genuine political whole. While it was politically and diplomatically correct to ascribe the OAU as an undoubtedly intermediary in resolving the conflict, the tragedy was that the continental body was too unwieldy to enforce its decisions regarding the war.

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## CHAPTER 7

# Historical Discourse of War and Peace in Post-Independence West Africa: An Analysis of Causes, Impact, and Peace Efforts

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## INTRODUCTION

In Africa, the 1960s ushered in a new era of freedom and development following the attainment of independence by several countries across the continent, though Ghana, Egypt, and Liberia had already achieved sovereign status. This notwithstanding, shortly after, the continent witnessed the first wave of wars (civil wars) in the form of violent conflicts in some of the newly independent states—namely, Angola, Nigeria, the Republic of Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire. These wars culminated in the death of millions of people, created refugee crises, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and ruined the economic development efforts of these states. Similarly, in the post-Cold War period, another wave of violent conflicts erupted in some parts of the continent such as Burundi, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Like the first wave of conflict, the second was not different in terms of its impact; also, there were extensive genocide and ethnic cleansing. In both waves of violent conflicts, preliminary findings reveal that the causes are similar—namely colonial legacy, uneven distribution of lands and mineral resources, political victimization, ethnic domination, the absence of internal democracy and good governance, rule of law, equity, and religious intolerance.

Likewise, efforts at restoring peace in the states engulfed in violent conflict have been herculean because of the diverse interests involved in the peace processes. West Africa shared a similar history in terms of war and peace since the 1960s. The outbreak of violent conflicts in the sub-region had stultified development, led to the killings of innocent children and women, and brought the destruction of infrastructural facilities. From the foregoing, this chapter investigates the historical trajectory of violent conflict patterns in West Africa since the 1960s. It not only historicizes the patterns of violent conflicts in West Africa but likewise interrogates the peace processes that were initiated to end the wars. The chapter employs secondary sources and utilizes the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) to provide insight into the root of conflicts in post-independent West Africa and how to resolve them.

## **WEST AFRICA AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

The second half of the 20th century marked a new phase in Africa's efforts toward self-actualization of innate and mineral resource potentials following the attainment of independence from European colonial rule. In Africa, colonialism stultified economic, political, and socio-cultural development across most of the countries under colonial rule except for Ethiopia, which was never colonized by any western power from Europe or North America.<sup>1</sup> In other words, Africa was exploited during the colonial era. Regarding French colonial enterprise in West Africa, B. Olatunji Oloruntimehin made the following submission:

France expected her colonies to provide what was needed to rebuild her economy: raw materials, food and labor which the war-afflicted population was short of. An examination of the pattern and content of

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1 A. Adu Boahen, "Africa and the Colonial Challenge" in *General History of Africa Vol. VII: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* edited by A. Adu Boahen (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1992), 1.

French policy and economic activities in West Africa shows the consistency with which they pursued this goal from the time the colonies were established to the outbreak of the Second World War.<sup>2</sup>

With independence attained, the new leaders of Africa began the process of addressing the challenges of underdevelopment inherited from colonialism and driving their respective states on the path of socio-economic and political development. They initiated various programs to stimulate and drive economic and infrastructural development across their respective states. Furthermore, efforts were geared toward improving the living standards of their people through aggressive job creation opportunities; providing qualitative education by building primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions; and creating regional blocs to promote economic integration and cooperation among the respective states across Africa.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately for the continent, the optimism that greeted the enthusiasm shown by the continent's leaders to chart the course of progress soon gave in to pessimism arising from various factors—namely, colonial legacies, bad governance, ethnic marginalization, and corruption<sup>4</sup>—and subsequently culminated in the outbreak of wars, particularly intra-state conflicts across the respective regions.<sup>5</sup>

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2 B. Olatunji Oloruntimehin, "The French Estate in West Africa, 1890-1918" *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1974): 448.

3 Olajide Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States" in *The Foreign Policies of African States* edited by Olajide Aluko (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 5 – 6.

4 Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2005), 13.

5 Errol A. Henderson, "When States Implode: Africa's Civil Wars" in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Cost* edited by Alfred Nhema & Tiyambe Zeleza (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 2008), 52; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Miall, Hugh (eds.).

The outbreak of wars in post-colonial Africa manifested in various forms such as inter-state wars, intra-state wars (civil war), liberation struggle, and insurgencies. These wars had enormous consequences on the new states. For instance, the first wave of civil wars in some newly independent states—namely, Angola, Nigeria, the Republic of Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo)—between the 1960s and the mid-1980s, resulted in the death of millions of lives, created a refugee crisis, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and ruined the economic development efforts of these states. Similarly, the outbreak of civil wars in these states polarized the states along ethnic and religious lines and created bitterness among the elites, political class, and the masses. In the same vein, in the post-Cold War period, another wave of violent conflicts erupted in some parts of the continent such as Burundi, Guinea, <sup>6</sup>Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. The second wave of conflicts in Africa was not different from the first in terms of its impact, as there were many instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing among the contending groups. West Africa was one of the major theatres of civil wars in Africa in the post-colonial period. The same factors that contributed to the outbreak of wars in the form of intra-state conflicts in other parts of the continent equally led to the outbreak of civil wars in some states in West Africa.

The countries of West Africa were colonized by different western powers, chiefly the British and the French; others were the Germans, Portuguese, Spanish, and the United States. Liberia was the first country in the sub-region to attain independence in 1847 from the United States, followed by Ghana in 1957, and by the 1960s, several other

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Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict (2nd ed.). (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 72.

<sup>6</sup> Alexandre Marc, Neelam Verjee, and Stephen Mogaka, *Responding to the Challenge of Fragility and Security in West Africa*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), 4; René Lemarchand, Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes Region. *Africa Spectrum* vol. 3 no.2 (1997): 173 – 193; René Lemarchand, Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide? *African Studies Review* vol. 41, no. 1 (1998): 3 –16.

countries had attained<sup>7</sup> West Africa comprised the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d' Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena<sup>8</sup> These countries consist of several ethnic groups, such as the Ashanti, Bambara, Edo, Fon, Fulani, Hausa, Ibo, Kpelle, Kru, Malinke, Memne, Mende, Mossi, Nupe, Kanuri, the Serer, Songhai, Soninke, Yoruba, and Wolof (Mabogunje, 1971: 15, 20, 26).<sup>9</sup> These ethnic groups were partitioned into the respective colonies of the contending colonial masters across the West Africa sub-region during the colonial era and endorsed through the Berlin Conference on Africa, 1884-85, and after.<sup>10</sup>

## CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

### WAR

For clarity and understanding of some concepts that will run through this chapter and the sense in which they will be used, it is imperative to explain and analyze such concepts. One such concept is war. The outbreak of war is as old as human history. Every human society has been involved in one form of warfare or the other. Similarly, literature on the causes, impact, and nature of warfare from different parts of the world dating back to several millenniums has revealed various dimensions of wars and their attendant

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7 Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, 13.

8 West African Countries – African Studies and African Countries University of Pittsburgh Resources [www.pit.libguides.com](http://www.pit.libguides.com) (accessed 28th August, 2020).

9 Akin Mabogunje, "The Land and Peoples of West Africa" in *History of West Africa Vol. I* edited by J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowther (London: Longman Group Ltd 1971), 15, 20, 26.

10 See J.C. Anene, *The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885 – 1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1970); see A.I. Asiwaju, *Artificial Boundaries*, An Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Lagos. (Lagos: University of Press, 1984)



consequences on human lives and society at large.<sup>11</sup> The conduct of war and warfare has been a major phenomenon in human history, largely due to its ugly nature and attendant consequences, which have resulted in the death of millions of people and the destruction of economic activities of warring nations. Scholars, from ancient to modern times, have viewed war from different perspectives; some have depicted war as state policy, while others considered it a paramount evil to be eliminated.<sup>12</sup> The nature of war, particularly the divergent views for and against war, has further complicated the definitions of war. Various scholars from different epochs have tried to define war and why nations go to war. However, German war tactician and writer Karl Von Clausewitz defines war as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.<sup>13</sup>

Clausewitz's definition of war reveals that war is an intended act of violence between two opposing groups, parties, or nations, whereby victory over the other is the goal. War from this perspective would be viewed as irreconcilable differences between two independent associations, groups, individuals, parties, and states that felt their national interest, existence, values, and ideologies have been threatened. Most wars before the second half of the 20th century were interstate wars, wars between two rival countries. This trend has changed significantly since the second half of the 14th century when most wars have been intrastate wars, also referred to as civil wars. The outbreak of civil wars in many countries in different parts of the world since the 1950s is the product of domestic upheavals caused by various factors, including secession agitations, ethnic

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<sup>11</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1972); Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981); Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* Second edition (London: Routledge, 1997), 86; Anthony Clayton *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950* (London: UCL Press 1999), 6.

<sup>12</sup> A. Levoy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* Sixth edition (New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1997), 12.

<sup>13</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), 101.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen E. Sachs, The Changing Definition of Security <http://www.stevesachs.com/pages/security.html> (accessed 22nd October 2020).

and communal differences, political marginalization, bad governance, corruption, and other causes.<sup>15</sup>

## PEACE

The concept of peace has attracted attention among scholars for centuries during which several scholars across disciplines have tried to define it. It is generally accepted among scholars that peace is the absence of war.<sup>16</sup> Johan Galtung sheds light on the nexus between peace and violence, defining peace as the absence of violence and as the social goal.<sup>17</sup> Both definitions conceive peace as the opposite of war; in other words, wherever there is war there cannot be peace. There are other definitions of peace that emphasize the relationship between peace and justice. For instance, according to Martin Luther King Jr., true peace is not merely the absence of tension: it is the presence of justice.<sup>18</sup> This notwithstanding, the absence of war gives room for peace. Developments across the world have revealed that war has stultified development and progress. Concerning West Africa, the outbreak of wars since the 1960s, especially civil wars, has contributed to the underdevelopment witnessed in some of the affected countries. However, various efforts have been made to promote peace and to end war as well as to chart the path to progress. Peace is essential if the sub-region will make any meaningful progress toward development and justice for its people. This work, therefore, conceives

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15 Jean-Paul Azam "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa" *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 38, no.4, (2001): 429 – 444; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: (2004): 563 – 594.

16 Chapter Two Concept of Peace [www.uop.edu.pk](http://www.uop.edu.pk) ((accessed January 24, 2022).

17 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" in *Essays on Peace: Paradigms for Global Order* edited by Michael Salla et al., (Central Queensland University Press,1995), 1.

18 Chapter Two Concept of Peace [www.uop.edu.pk](http://www.uop.edu.pk)

peace as not just the absence of war, but as instrumental to achieving political and socio-economic development in a state.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT (PSC)**

Theories are essential tools that enlighten and enrich our understanding of economic, political, and socio-cultural phenomena that shape world societies. Several scholars have propounded various theories to explain the causes of war and how to address some of the factors that have led nations and ethnic groups within a state to go to war or resort to violent conflict. One such theory is the Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), propounded by Edward Azar in the 1990s. PSC, according to Azar, provides insight into the root of conflicts during the Cold War period and how to resolve them.<sup>19</sup> Azar argues that critical factors responsible for PSC in some countries—such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka,<sup>20</sup> countries—was the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation. Moreover, the root of conflicts in some of the states Azar used as case studies has transcended the Cold War era, as events have shown in Africa and the Balkan region in Eastern Europe since the 1990s. Several domestic upheavals bordering on bad governance, ethnic marginalization, religious divides, corruption,<sup>21</sup> the form of civil wars,

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19 Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), 23.

20 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Miall, Hugh (eds.). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (2nd ed.). (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 84.

21 Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804 – 1999*, (New York; Viking Penguin Publishers 2000), 635; Jean-Paul Azam, "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa" *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 38, no.4, (2001): 429 – 444.

secession disputes, and insurgency. Furthermore, Azar argued that PSC emphasized that the sources of conflicts lay predominantly within (and across) rather than between states, with four clusters of variables identified as preconditions for transformation to high levels of intensity.

The four clusters are communal content, deprivation of human needs, authority to govern and use force, and international linkages. Azar concludes that the role of the state concerning PSC is to satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs, thus preventing or promoting conflict.<sup>22</sup> Azar's theory of PSC applies to the outbreak of violent conflicts in West Africa since the 1960s. A thorough analysis of violent conflicts in West Africa reveals that the causes of the conflicts or wars had emanated from within, fueled by the failure of the political class to address some fundamental issues that threaten the survival of their respective states.

## **CAUSES OF WAR IN POST-COLONIAL NIGERIA, LIBERIA, AND SIERRA LEONE**

Several factors were responsible for the outbreak of war in some states in West Africa in the post-colonial period—namely, the colonial legacy and bad governance. One of the causes of war in post-colonial Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone was their colonial legacy or experience. Colonial legacy refers to the long-lasting tradition of European colonial rule in Africa that has severely impacted<sup>23</sup> The effects of colonial legacy on Africa are encapsulated in, but not limited to, the effects of the scramble and partitioning of the continent, the divide and rule tactics of the colonial masters aimed at creating animosity

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22 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Miall, Hugh (eds.). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict*, 90.

23 A.B. Atkinson, "The Colonial legacy: Income Inequality in former British African Colonies" Research Brief, United Nations University, UNU-WIDER (2014), 1.

among the different ethnic groups, the exploitation of Africa's mineral resources, <sup>24</sup> Post-colonial Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were victims of some of these features of colonial legacy following their attainment of independence from their respective colonial masters. These features contributed to the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970); likewise, the same features <sup>25</sup> the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.<sup>26</sup>

The scramble and partitioning of West Africa during the colonial period contributed to the heterogeneous configuration of the states in their current form. The development laid the foundation of ethnic/religious and communal differences among the countries being examined. The process started in the second half of the 19th century through conquest and the signing of treaties between the Europeans and the rulers of West Africa and climaxed at the Berlin Conference in Germany in 1884-85.<sup>27</sup> The Berlin Conference not only carved the different ethnic groups in West Africa into different colonial territories

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24 Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson & Co (Publishers), Ltd, 1968), 223.

xxv James Olusegun Adeyeri and Jackson A. Aluede, "Ethnic Propaganda, Hate Speech and Mass Violence in Igbo-Hausa/Fulani Relations in Post-Colonial Nigeria" *The Thinker*, Vol. 89, (2021): 80; Jackson A. Aluede and Tokunbo A. Ayoola, "Ethnic and Boundary Conflict in Africa" in *Nation Building in Africa: Issues, Challenges and Emerging Trends* edited by Obi Iwuagwu (Lagos: University of Lagos and Bookshop Ltd., 2020) 351 – 352.

26 J.C. Anene, "Rationalizing African Borders: Focus on Nigeria" in *Borders in Africa: An Anthology of the Policy History* edited by A.I. Asiwaju (Addis Ababa: the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2015), 341.

27 Saadia Touval, "Partitioned Groups and Inter-State Relations" in *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 – 1984* edited A.I. Asiwaju (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1984), 224.

but also led to the separation of ethnic groups with a shared history and unified those without historical, cultural, and religious bonds.<sup>28</sup>

Owing to the scramble and partition of West Africa, the British colonial masters were able to unify the Edo, Fulani, Hausas, Ibos, Igala, Kalabari, Yoruba, and many other ethnic groups into one territory. The same was the case with Sierra Leone during the colonial period; the British colonial authorities fused the coastal ethnic groups dominated by the Creole with the Gola, the Limba, Mende, Sherbro, and Temne, among others.<sup>29</sup> In Liberia, the United States was responsible for the formation of the state during the colonial era. Unlike other territories' colonial masters in West Africa, the United States granted early independence to Liberia in 1847, having overseen the unification of Americo-Liberia (returning slaves) from the United States with Indigenous peoples—namely, the Krahn, Mandingo Gio, and the Mano<sup>30</sup>

Unfortunately, little or nothing was done by the colonial masters to promote unity in diversity between the amalgamated ethnic groups; instead, they exploited their differences through divide and rule tactics, and this development led to a gap in the socio-cultural and political relations among the diverse ethnic groups in post-colonial West Africa. This action, according to Afigbo, could be described as the process by which unsympathetic and uncomprehending imperialists shattered the idyllic world of colonial

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28 S. Ademola Ajayi, *From Amalgamation to the Quest for National Integration in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Prospects* The 40th Anniversary Lecture of the Department of History & International Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria (Book Wright Publishers, 2017), 8; Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 154 – 155.

29 Godwin Ndubisi. Onuoha, "Local and External Intersections in African Conflicts: Trends and Perspectives in the Liberian Experience" *Nigerian Journal of Policy and Development* vol. 3, (2004): 23 – 41.

30 A.E. Afigbo, "The Social Repercussions of Colonial Rule: The New Social Structures" in *General History of Africa- Vii: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* edited A. Adu Boahen (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1985), 487.

peoples, leaving in its place turmoil, instability, and uncertainty.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, the development sowed the seeds of rivalry, bitterness, and rancor among the ethnic groups who questioned the decision of their respective colonial masters to merge them, despite their differences in religion, ethnicity, and culture. Moreover, developments in some of these countries, such as Nigeria, revealed they were never ready to work together based on differences that manifested in the form of nepotism, ethnic/religious crisis, and census and election manipulations in favor of the ethnic group in power, culminating in political instability.<sup>32</sup> These developments contributed to the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, the first wave of civil wars in post-colonial West Africa in the 1960s. The same played out in the outbreak of the second wave of civil wars across West Africa in the 1990s, as shown by the Liberia and Sierra Leone cases.

Colonial legacy contributed to ethnic marginalization witnessed in several states of West Africa after independence, arising from the partitioning of West Africa. The dominant ethnic groups based on their numbers deliberately marginalized the minority ethnic groups, particularly in the political space and the distribution of wealth in their respective countries. In Nigeria, the dominant ethnic groups—namely the Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba—continue to dominate the other ethnic groups in the country. The dominance of the Hausa/Fulani to control the machinery of government based on their numbers not only contributed to the collapse of the first republic through a military coup in January 1966 but also set the stage for the country's civil war. Americo-Liberia dominated the political space of Liberia for over a century after independence in 1847. They denied the Ingenious Liberians—namely the Gio, Krahn, Loma, and Mano and Mandingo—access to power until 1980 when Sergeant Samuel Doe of the Krahn ethnic

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31 David Aworawo, "Nigeria from Independence to the Year 2000" in *History and Cultures of Nigeria up to AD 2000* edited by Akinjide Osuntokun et al. (Lagos: Frankad Publishers, 2003), 109.

32 T.N. Tamuno, "British Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century" in *Groundwork of Nigerian History* edited by Obaro Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, 1980), 400.

group ceased power from Americo-Liberia through a bloody coup. However, shortly after becoming the Head of State of Liberia, Samuel Doe not only was oppressive against the Americo-Liberians, but likewise, marginalized other ethnic groups in Liberia. The desire of President Samuel Doe to dominate other ethnic groups in Liberia and their determination to resist his rule plunged the country into the abyss of civil war. The situation was not different in Sierra Leone, where the Creoles dominated the smaller ethnic groups in the country. The failure of the post-colonial leaders of these countries to manage the ethnic majority/minority dichotomy fueled the outbreak of wars in their countries.

Similarly, the political system of administration introduced by the colonial masters in West Africa and their attempt to favor one group over another divided the ethnic groups. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the British indirect rule system resulted in contrasting ways influenced by the nature and patterns of the colonial authorities' relations with some of the ethnic groups. For instance, in colonial Nigeria, the indirect rule political system worked successfully in the northern part of the country compared to the south. In the same vein, the colonial authorities favored the Muslim north over Christian south. This created rift and suspicion between the southern and the northern parts of the country and accounted for the outbreak of several political upheavals that bedeviled the country, culminating in the untimely termination of the first republic and the outbreak of the country's civil war.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the Creole people partly because of their education were favored by the British colonial authorities compared to other Indigenous ethnic groups in Sierra Leone; the same can be said of Liberia, as the Americo-Liberians were favored compared to the Indigenous settlers, by the American colonizers.<sup>34</sup> For over a century, the Americo-Liberians dominated the politics of Liberia until 1980, when a military coup ended Americo-Liberian dominance.

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33 Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, 214; F.K. Buah, *West Africa Since A.D. 1000: The People and Outsider* (London: Macmillan Education Limited, 1977), 70.

34 What is Good Governance? [www.unescap.org/pdd](http://www.unescap.org/pdd) (accessed August 12 2021).



Apart from the effects of colonial legacy on Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the outbreak of wars, the entrenchment of bad governance by some of the leaders had equally created political instability that engulfed these states, resulting in the outbreak of civil wars and secession disputes. Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within modern societies.<sup>35</sup> The link between bad governance and the outbreak of violent conflicts in West Africa is corroborated by Abdel-Fatau Musah:

Empirical data from conflict zones in West Africa speak unequivocally to the correlation between bad governance and political instability. Prior to the end of the Cold War, governance in much of West Africa was the pastime of an elite civil-military diarchy. These regimes were maintained by clan allegiance, patronage, and repressive security rackets, which were sustained by criminal networks and illicit businesses. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, governance became synonymous with the imposition of a “violent peace” characterized by institutional corruption and greed, zero infrastructure development, hatred and discrimination along ethnic lines, as well as the alienation and consequent disillusionment of the youth.<sup>36</sup>

Simply put, bad governance indicates a failure in leadership and administration. In other words, it is the deliberate act of some leaders to manipulate the machinery of the state for self-actualization of their socio-economic and political ambition to the disadvantage of the generality of their citizens. Bad governance is the opposite of good governance that

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35 Abdel-Fatau Musah, “Governance and Security in a Changing Region” *International Peace Institute* (2009): 4.

36 Yu Keping, “Governance and Good Governance: A New Framework for Political Analysis”, *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 11 (2018): 2 – 3; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *What is Good Governance?* [www.unescap.org](http://www.unescap.org) (assessed June 29, 2020).

consists of eight major characteristics—namely, participation, consensus orientation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equity, inclusiveness, and rule of law. Good governance assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are considered, and<sup>37</sup> the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society. This, however, has not been the case for several countries in Africa and West Africa in particular. The seeds of bad governance in post-independence Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone by some of its leaders laid the foundations for political instability, office elongation, corruption, manipulation of election and census results, victimization and unlawful arrest of political opponents, abuse of the rule of law and the constitution, and the suppression of freedom of the press. Unfortunately, bad governance has equally threatened the democratization process in these states, raising some fundamental questions about whether they would be able to sustain the drive to democratic rule. Bad governance features prominently in the outbreak of wars in post-colonial Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone since independence.

Bad governance contributed to the remote causes of the Nigerian Civil War, after the collapse of the First Republic (1960-1966). The January military coup plotters led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu cited one of the reasons they struck as bad governance manifesting in corruption, census and election malpractices, suppression of the will of the people, and ethnic marginalization among others.<sup>38</sup> The fallout of the January military coup and that of July 1966 and the failure of the military hierarchy to find a lasting solution to the political impasse between the federal government and the Biafran secessionists made the country's civil war inevitable.

Like in Nigeria, bad governance was responsible for the Liberian (1989-1997 and 1997-2003) and Sierra Leonean (1991-2001) civil wars. In Liberia, the administrations of

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37 David Aworawo, "Nigeria from Independence to the Year 2000" in *History and Cultures of Nigeria up to AD 2000*, 212.

38 William R. Stanley, "Background to the Liberia and Sierra Leone Implosions" *GeoJournal* vol. 61, no.1 (2004): 69 - 78.

Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor plunged the country into civil war partly caused by bad governance. The Samuel Doe administration was characterized by all forms of bad governance, such as ethnic marginalization and victimization, corruption, manipulation of the constitution, among other features.<sup>39</sup> The dictatorial nature of the Samuel Doe administration led other ethnic groups to join forces with Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian financed by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya to oust Doe from power.<sup>40</sup> Samuel Doe was killed during the civil war. Charles Taylor succeeded Samuel Doe; his administration was characterized by oppressive rule and disregard for human rights, which unfortunately contributed to the Second Liberian Civil War.<sup>41</sup> The same can be said of Sierra Leone during the 1990s although the Sierra Leone conflict was a spill-over from Liberia, having been orchestrated by Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which supported Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group to oust the civilian administration of President Momoh in 1991.<sup>42</sup> From 1991 to 2000, Sierra Leone was engulfed in civil wars fuelled by power tussles among its military leaders and rebel groups struggling partly to control the country's diamond fields.<sup>43</sup>

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39 Amos Sawyer, "Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* vol, 42 no.3, (2004): 437 – 463.

40 Stephen Riley and Max Sesay, "Liberia: After Abuja" *Review of African Political Economy* vol. 23, no.69 (1996): 429–437.

41 William R. Stanley, "Background to the Liberia and Sierra Leone Implosions" *GeoJournal*, 69 - 78.

42 Paul Richards, "The Sierra Leone-Liberia Boundary Wilderness: Rain Forest, Diamond and War" in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities* edited by Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996).

## **IMPACT OF WAR IN POST-COLONIAL NIGERIA, LIBERIA, AND SIERRA LEONE**

The impact of war in the following countries being examined left an indelible imprint that has not been healed up to the present, despite efforts to right the errors among the belligerent groups. The war had socio-economic and political implications on the lives of the people, and it brought untold hardship, loss of lives, destruction of property, a refugee crisis, and suspicion and hatred among the different ethnic groups. One of the impacts of the outbreak of civil wars in post-colonial Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone was the loss of lives on both sides of the warring groups.

The Nigerian Civil War, for instance, led to the death of over one million Biafrans comprising of children, women, the elderly, and soldiers of war.<sup>44</sup> The number of deaths was different from those that sustained different forms of injuries. Similarly, the economic activities of the peoples of the eastern region were adversely affected by the war within and outside the region; likewise, the war led to the destruction of infrastructural facilities in the region. Unfortunately, after over 50 years of war, efforts to reconcile the people of eastern Nigeria have failed to yield the needed result; instead, they continued to demand separation from the federation through various agitations, partly because of the suffering they experienced during the war.<sup>45</sup>

The Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, like that of Nigeria, experienced loss of lives among the warring parties. In Liberia, over 250,000 persons died during the country's 14-year civil war between 1989 and 2003.<sup>46</sup> The same may also be said of Sierra Leone, where an estimated 200,000 people were killed during the nation's civil war

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44 Lawrence Njoku and Charles Ogugbuaja, "IPOB, MASSOB urge Igbo to sit at home" *The Guardian*, 03 May, 2021.

45 Jakkie Cilliers and Julia Chünemann, *The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa: More Violence or Greater Peace?* ISS Paper 246 (May 2013), 3 – 12.

46 Ibid.

between 1991 and 2001.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, injuries were sustained by the belligerents on both sides of the civil wars. One of the frightening dimensions of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars was the use of child soldiers by rebel groups.<sup>48</sup> The child soldiers were engaged in wanton killings of their rivals. Moreover, the unprecedented loss of lives during the civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone drained human resources available to the sub-region.

Another impact of the civil wars in the countries under consideration is that they created refugee crises in the sub-region. Many families were displaced, some were moved to internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, while those who could leave fled to neighboring countries for safety. Intra-state conflict in West Africa has indeed contributed to the sub-region refugee problem. For instance, in Liberia, the 2004 Report of the Global Coalition for Africa noted that an estimated 700,000 persons were internally displaced as of 2003.<sup>49</sup> The spill-over effects of the Liberian conflicts were felt in neighboring countries through increased refugee flows. About 3,000 Liberians were hosted by Nigeria at the height of the crisis while an appreciable number of them also became refugees in Guinea.<sup>50</sup> In the same vein, the Sierra Leone civil war resulted in many Sierra Leoneans scattered across the sub-region, especially in Gambia and its immediate neighbors. In the

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47 Romain Malejacq, "Looking at the Individual in Liberia and Sierra Leone: From a Regional Conflict to a "Human Insecurity Complex" *Revue de la Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal* vol. 3, (2007): 43–54.

48 Jakkie Cilliers and Julia Chünemann, *The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa: More Violence or Greater Peace?* 8.

49 Eduardo Cue, "Thousands of Sierra Leonean Refugees flee renewed Fighting in Liberia" The UN Refugee Agency (2002).

50 O.B.C Nwolise, "The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy" in *Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years* edited by A.B. Akinyemi et al. (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, 1989), 194.

case of Nigeria, during the country's civil war, many people from the eastern region of the country fled the region to Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire, only to return after the war.<sup>51</sup>

## **PEACE PROCESSES IN RESOLVING THE WARS**

Various peace initiatives were initiated to resolve the lingering civil wars in the countries being examined. At the international level, the structure of the international system influenced the extent to which the international community could intervene in restoring peace in the affected countries. Nigeria attained independence during the Cold War when the international system was polarized into two rival ideological blocs, the capitalist camp led by the United States and its Western European allies, and the communist camp led by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. However, there was a third bloc known as the Non-Aligned Movement, comprising of Africa and other developing countries that wished to remain neutral from the rivalry between the other contending blocs. Unfortunately, some of these countries maintained close ties with either of the blocs. Nigeria, for example, after independence maintained close ties with its former colonial master, Britain.<sup>52</sup>

Before the outbreak of Nigeria's civil war, the British government made efforts to restore peace and reconcile the warring camps without success. Similarly, the British government resisted any country, particularly from the communist bloc, to intervene in the war because Britain considered Nigeria in their sphere of interest and therefore would

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51 Kaye Whiteman, "The Switchback and the Fallback: Nigeria-Britain Relations" in *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy After the Cold War* edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (Natal: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 255-256.

52 Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relation" *African Affairs*, 75, no. 298 (1976): 14-32.

not tolerate any external powers meddling in the affairs of their former colony.<sup>53</sup> However, the British government made it known they would sell weapons to any of the warring camps, particularly the Nigerian government. This development to a large extent impacted the process of restoring peace among the warring parties before and during the Nigerian Civil War.

At the regional level, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963, could not intervene in the war, partly because one of the resolutions of the organization prevented external intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. Nonetheless, the regional body made attempts to intervene in the war but was prevented by the Nigerian government, stating that the war was a domestic affair.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, no external actor was allowed to intervene. The Nigerian Civil War eventually ended on January 1, 1970, following Biafra's surrender to the Nigerian government, after thirty months of bitter and bloody fighting.

The structure of the international system after the demise of the Cold War impacted significantly the nature of intervention and peace process before and during the outbreak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the 1990s.<sup>55</sup> The Liberian Civil War broke out during the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, which ended over forty years of ideological rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its western allies took every necessary effort

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53 Femi Otubanjo, "The Military and Nigeria's Foreign Policy" in *Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years* edited by A.B. Akinyemi et al. (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited, 1989), 237 – 238.

54 K. Subrahmanyam, "A Historical Overview of the Cold War" *Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the Twenty-First Century* edited by Chandra Chari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 15 – 34.

55 Ibid.

to absorb the breakaway states of Eastern Europe into the western orbit.<sup>56</sup> This development in the early 1990s made the United States and its allies pay little attention to what was happening in developing countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone engulfed in intra-state conflict in the form of civil wars. Similarly, the outbreak of the <sup>57</sup> Unfortunately, while the western allies led by the United States and backed by the UN engaged Iraq in the Gulf War over Kuwait, thousands were being killed in the Liberian Civil War.

In West Africa, some individual states such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, among others, made efforts to intervene and restore peace in Liberia as well as Sierra Leone, but the initiatives failed to achieve their purpose.<sup>58</sup> This notwithstanding, progress toward restoring peace and ending the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone was recorded following the creation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990.<sup>59</sup> The creation of ECOMOG was initiated at the 13th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government, in Banjul, Gambia, in May 1990, as a security architecture to intervene and restore peace and order in ECOWAS countries.<sup>60</sup> This ECOWAS interventionist and peace initiative is credited to Nigeria's Head of State at the time, General Ibrahim

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56 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2005), 15 – 18; Kurt M. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss "Superpowers and UN Peacekeeping" *Harvard International Review*, 12, no. 2 (1990): 22 – 26.

57 Romain Malejacq, "Looking at the Individual in Liberia and Sierra Leone: From a Regional Conflict to a "Human Insecurity Complex" 43–54.

58 Peter Arthur "ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa: Lessons for the Future" *Africa Today* 57, no. 2 (2010): 2 – 24.

59 Rasheed Draman and David Carment, "Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia" *The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs*, Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario, Occasional Paper No. 26, (2001), 12.

60 Ibid.



Babangida. He conceived the formation of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with a view to tackling any conflicts between “two or more member states.”<sup>61</sup> ECOWAS leaders at the 13th Summit of ECOWAS ratified the mandate of the SMC as well as saddled it with the task of intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts among ECOWAS member states.

As part of measures to restore peace in the Liberian Civil War, the SMC made efforts to reach out to some of the warring groups, particularly the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to agree to an immediate cease-fire and to end the armed conflict in their country.<sup>62</sup> SMC engaged in fast-track diplomacy and other traditional mediation approaches to find a lasting solution to the crisis.<sup>63</sup>

The ECOWAS Mandate was clearly stated in the ECOWAS Peace Plan to resolve the conflict and restore peace in Liberia in line with the provisions of the SMC established in Banjul in 1990. It is imperative to state that this ECOWAS Mandate has since remained a veritable instrument for resolving conflicts in the sub-region. Thus, the Mandate had been used by ECOWAS to intervene in member countries involved in civil war. Among the provisions or templates of the ECOMOG Mandate are the imposition of a cease-fire, disarmament of the warring parties, end of carnage against civilians, imposition of an embargo on the acquisition and import of arms, establishment of an interim government,

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61 Amos Sawyer, “Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area”, 450.

62 Gani J. Yoroms “ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective” *Journal of Opinion*, 21, no. 1/2 (1993): 89.

63 Adedoyin J. Omede “The Economic Community of West-African States’ Peace Agreements and Accord on Liberia: A Retrospective Analysis” *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance* 3, No. 3. (2012): 8 – 10.

preparation for elections, and the evacuation of foreign nationals.<sup>64</sup> ECOMOG was instrumental in ending the Liberian Civil Wars.

ECOMOG also played a key role in the restoration of peace in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG's intervention in Sierra Leone was again spearheaded by Nigeria, this time under the military regime of General Sani Abacha.<sup>65</sup> Ghana and Guinea also sent peacekeepers to maintain peace and ensure the return of the government of Ahmed Tejah Kabbah toppled in a military coup.<sup>66</sup> The Abacha-led military government committed Nigerian forces to ECOMOG to help restore peace in Sierra Leone, and in the process stationed a large contingent of Nigeria-led ECOMOG troops in the war-torn country.<sup>67</sup> The presence of Nigeria-led ECOMOG troops as well as those of Ghana and Guinea in Sierra Leone ensured that the Sierra Leonean conflict was eventually brought to an end.

## **CONCLUSION**

The chapter examined the causes and impact of wars in the form of civil wars in selected West African countries—namely, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—in the second half of the 20th century and shed light on efforts to restore peace in the countries. It identified and detailed colonial legacy and bad governance as partially key factors

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64 Rodrigo Tavares, *Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organisations* (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2010), 35 – 38.

65 Lansana Gberie, "Bringing Peace to West Africa: Liberia and Sierra Leone" *Africa Mediators' Retreat* (2010): 54 – 57.

66 Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966 – 1999* (West Port: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 148 – 149.

67 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Causes and Cost of War in Africa from Liberation Struggles to the War on Terror" in *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Cost* edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008).

responsible for the outbreak of civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The work revealed that very high human casualties were recorded during the civil wars, just as many people had to flee their homes because of the war. Furthermore, the civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone stultified any form of development during the period. The various peace processes to resolve the armed conflicts in the three countries as well as the role of the structure of the international system during and after the Cold War in these processes were also examined. The study affirms that war in whatever form distorts progress, as exemplified by the cases of Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and that warring parties should always consider the welfare and other interests of the generality of their people before going to war. The chapter recommends that the leaders of Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other West African states should seriously address the issues of colonial legacy in whatever form through the instrumentality of nation-building. Similarly, the leaders should promote the principles of good governance in their respective countries.

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## **CHAPTER 8**

# **War and Peace in Africa: A Case Study of the Nigerian-Biafran War, July 6, 1967-January 15, 1970**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from Britain. Six years later, the Muslim Hausas in northern Nigeria began massacring the Christian Igbos in the region, prompting tens of thousands of Igbos to flee to the east, where their people were the dominant ethnic group. The Igbos doubted that Nigeria's oppressive military government would allow them to develop or even survive; so, on May 30, 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu and other non-Igbo representatives of the area established the Republic of Biafra, comprising eastern and southern states of Nigeria.

After diplomatic efforts by Nigeria failed to reunite the country, war between Nigeria and Biafra broke out in July 1967. Ojukwu's forces made some initial advances, but Nigeria's superior military strength gradually reduced Biafran territory. The state lost its oil fields—its main source of revenue—and without the funds to import food, an estimated one million civilians died because of severe malnutrition. On January 11, 1970, Nigerian forces captured the provincial capital of Owerri, one of the last Biafran strongholds, and Ojukwu was forced to flee to the Ivory Coast. Four days later, Biafra surrendered to Nigeria.

The fighting occurred principally in the Biafra region, located in southeastern Nigeria. On May 30, 1967, Biafra declared itself an independent state. The federal government declared this act of secession illegal. On July 6, 1967, which marked the onset of the war, federal troops invaded the eastern region. The Northern armies of the ruling power advanced into Biafra and pushed the Biafrans into a small enclave where food inflows were cut off. The result was extensive famine among the Igbos and other minority Biafran ethnicities (Miller, 1970).

## **THE BIRTH OF NIGERIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE**

In 1885, the claim of the British to West African sphere of influence received international recognition, and in the following year, the Royal Niger Company was chartered under the leadership of Sir George Taubman Goldie. In 1900, the company's territory came under the control of the British government, which moved to consolidate its hold over the area of modern Nigeria. On January 1, 1901, Nigeria became a British protectorate, part of the British Empire, the foremost world power at the time. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the independent kingdoms (Edo, Hausa/Fulani, Oyo, among others) of what would become Nigeria fought a number of conflicts against the British Empire's efforts to expand its territory. By the time of the war, the British conquered Benin in 1897 and, in the Anglo-Aro War (1901-1902), defeated other opponents. The conquest of these states opened the Niger area to British rule.

The name Nigeria was taken from the Niger River running through the country. This name was coined in the late 19th century by a British journalist, Flora Shaw, who later married Lord Lugard, a British colonial administrator. The origin of the name Niger, which originally applied only to the middle reaches of the Niger River, is uncertain. Her advice was accepted, and the name Nigeria came into being. Despite of the name, Nigeria was not yet a political entity as the colony of Lagos and the Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria were still administered separately. In 1906, the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria merged to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was not until 1914 when Lord Lugard "amalgamated Protectorate of

Southern Nigeria” with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria into one political unit that Nigeria became a political entity (Etymonline.com, 2017). The major reason for the amalgamation was that the North was not administratively and economically viable while the South was generating surpluses. Following World War II, in response to the growth of Nigerian nationalism and demands for independence, successive constitutions legislated by the British government moved Nigeria toward self-government on a representative and increasingly federal basis. By the middle of the 20th century, a great wave of independence was sweeping across Africa. Nigeria attained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 and obtained a republican status in 1963 (Garba, 2012). However, after the above successes, on May 26, 1967, the Igbo-dominated Southeast declared that it had broken away from Nigeria to form the independent Republic of Biafra. This touched off a bloody civil war that lasted for two and a half years (July 1967-January 1970). In 1970, on the brink of widespread famine resulting from a Nigeria-imposed blockade, Biafra was forced to surrender.

## **RELIGION IN NIGERIA**

Many religions are practiced in Nigeria, and the constitution guarantees religious freedom. Christians predominantly live in the south of the country, whereas Muslims live predominantly in the north. In native religions people believe in deities, spirits, and ancestors; these groups are spread all over the country. Many Muslims and Christians also intertwine their beliefs with more unorthodox Indigenous ones. A minority of the population practice religions Indigenous to Nigeria, such as those native to the Igbo and Yoruba ethnicities. The major Christian celebrations of Christmas and Easter are recognized as national holidays. Muslims observe Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, and the two Eids. Working hours in the north often vary from those in the south so that Muslims do not work on their holy day, which is Friday.

## **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND PEACEFUL INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS**

In the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chapter IV, Sections 38: the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, enumerated the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens as follows: (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance; (2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or a religion not approved by his parents or guardian; (3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination; and (4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity, or be a member of a secret society.

### **NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (1967-1970): HOW IT STARTED**

In 1966, the disequilibrium and perceived corruption of the electoral and political process led to back-to-back military coups. The first coup in January 1966 was led by some middle-ranked soldiers under Majors Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The coup plotters succeeded in murdering Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Premier Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region, and Premier Ladoke Akintola of the Western Region. As the coup plotters struggled to form a central government, Senate President (Acting President) NwaforOrizu handed over government control to the army, then under the command of an Igbo officer, General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. The counter coup of 1966, supported primarily by Northern military officers, facilitated the rise

of Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon to Head of State. Tension rose between the North and South. Igbos in Northern cities suffered persecution and many fled to the Eastern Region.

In 1967, following two coups and turmoil that led to about a million Igbos returning to the south-east of Nigeria, the Republic of Biafra seceded with 33-year-old military officer Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu at the helm. The Nigerian government declared war, and after 30 months of fighting, Biafra surrendered. On January 15, 1970, the conflict officially ended. The government's policy of "no victor, no vanquished" may have led to a lack of official reflection, but many Nigerians of Igbo origin grew up on stories from people who lived through the war.

In May 1967, the Eastern Region declared independence as a state called the Republic of Biafra, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Emeka Ojukwu. The Nigerian Civil War began as the official Nigerian government side (predominated by soldiers from the North and West) attacked Biafra (South-East) on July 6, 1967, at Garkem. The 30-month war, with a long siege of Biafra and its isolation from trade and supplies, ended in January 1970. Estimates of the number of dead in the former Eastern Region are between 1 and 3 million people from warfare, disease, and starvation during the 30-month civil war (Metz, 1991).

There is correlation between Biafra war and genocide as asserted by the 2012 publication of Chinua Achebe's *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra* written a few months before he died in March 2013, two years after the death of the wartime Biafran leader, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. The famous novelist had worked for the Biafran cause during the war, and the genocide issue appears throughout the book. Commenting on Achebe's views, another famous Nigerian author, Wole Soyinka, whose imprisonment during the war by the FMG is recorded in *The Man Died* (1971), concurred that Biafrans had indeed been victims of genocide even though he did not support the Biafran secession (Achebe, 2012).

## **THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR**

Many of the published historical accounts of the active participants and observers of the war averred three main factors that ignited the war. The perceived Ibo coup of January 15, 1966, saw the death of prominent political and military leaders from the Northern, Western, and Midwestern regions of the country. The May civil riots in the North with the countercoup of July 1966 saw the killing of mainly military leaders from the Eastern region of the country by young officers from the Northern region, and the pogrom unleashed on the Igbo people living in the Northern part of the country led to the death of about 30,000 people.

The May 30, 1967, "declaration of Republic of Biafra" by Lieutenant Colonel (Later Gen.) Odumegwu Ojukwu offered a clear secession from Nigeria on the premise that people of the Eastern region no longer felt safe in other parts of the Federation (The Aburi Conference, 1967: 3). The conflict was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria. Like many other African nations, Nigeria was an artificial structure initiated by the British who had neglected to consider religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences. When Nigeria won independence from Britain in 1960, the population of 60 million people consisted of nearly 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups.

Blasphemy is another major factor, and most religions consider it a religious crime. Blasphemy is the act of insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence to a deity, or sacred objects, or toward something considered sacred. In a very broad sense, blasphemy is concerned with insults to god(s) and the sacred; more specifically, it constitutes "the use or abuse of language, or behavioral acts, that scorn the existence, nature or power of sacred beings, items, or texts" (Nash, 2007). Accordingly, not only god(s) but also other sacred beings and things can be the object of blasphemy—for example, the Virgin Mary or the prophet Muhammad, a crucifix, or Holy Scriptures. A further question that needs to be addressed for a sufficiently clear understanding of blasphemy and that can be used for the analysis of blasphemy as violence concerns the question of who can be injured and hence be the victim of blasphemy, which is not the

same as being an object of blasphemy. This is quite clear in the case of inanimate things such as crucifixes or icons (i.e., they cannot be injured since they do not have interests of their own), but even if a god is scorned, it does not go without saying that the deity is considered a victim in a sense that is relevant for the analysis of blasphemy as violence (Baumgartner, 2013).

The causes of the Nigerian civil war were exceedingly complex. More than fifty years ago, Great Britain carved an area out of West Africa containing hundreds of different groups and unified it, calling it Nigeria. Although the area contained many different groups, three were predominant: the Igbo, which formed between 60-70 percent of the population in the southeast; the Hausa-Fulani, which formed about 65 percent of the peoples in the northern part of the territory; and the Yoruba, which formed about 75 percent of the population in the southwestern part.

The semi-feudal and Islamic Hausa-Fulani in the North were traditionally ruled by an autocratic, conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of over 30 Emirs who, in turn, owed their allegiance to a supreme Sultan. This Sultan was regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority. The Yoruba political system in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, consisted of a series of monarchs (*Obas*). The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less autocratic than those in the North, and the political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater upward mobility based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title. The Igbo in the southeast, in contrast to the two other groups, lived in over 600 autonomous, democratically organized villages. Although there were monarchs in these villages (whether hereditary or elected), they were largely little more than figureheads. Unlike the other two regions, decisions among the Igbo were made by a general assembly in which every man could participate.

The different political systems among these three groups produced highly divergent sets of customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through their village head who was designated by the Emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political

decisions were to be obeyed without question. This highly centralized and authoritarian political system elevated to positions of leadership persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors, the same virtues required by Islam for eternal salvation. One of the chief functions of the traditional political system was to maintain the Islamic religion. Hostility to economic and social innovation was therefore deeply rooted. In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo often participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their own personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to arbitrate disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth. With their emphasis upon achievement, individual choice, and democratic decision-making, the challenges of modernization for the Igbo entailed responding to new opportunities in traditional ways.

These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and perhaps even enhanced by the British system of colonial rule in Nigeria. In the North, the British found it convenient to rule indirectly through the Emirs, thus continuing rather than changing the Indigenous authoritarian political system. As a concomitant of this system, Christian missionaries were excluded from the North, and the area thus remained virtually closed to Western education and influence, in contrast to the Igbo, the richest of whom sent many of their sons to British universities. During the ensuing years, the Northern Emirs thus were able to maintain traditional political and religious institutions, while limiting social change. As a result, the North, at the time of independence in 1960, was by far the most underdeveloped area in Nigeria with a literacy rate of 2 percent as compared to 19.2 percent in the East (literacy in Arabic script, learned in connection with religious education, was higher). The West enjoyed a much higher literacy level as the first part of the country to have contact with Western education in addition to the free primary education program of the pre-independence Western Regional Government.



## **CONFLICTS DURING THE COLONIAL ERA**

The British political ideology of dividing Nigeria during the colonial period into three regions of North, West, and East exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social competition among Nigeria's different ethnic groups. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. On this basis, the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the federal legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively, formed political parties that were largely regional and tribal in character: the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the North, the Action Group in the West (AG), and the National Conference of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East. Although these parties were not exclusively homogeneous in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up, the later disintegration of Nigeria results largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe. To simplify matters, these can be referred to as the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo-based; or Northern, Western, and Eastern parties.

During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the fight for independence from Britain. They also wanted an independent Nigeria to be organized into several small states so that the conservative and backward North could not dominate the country. Northern leaders, however, fearful that independence would mean political and economic domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the perpetuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, eager to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands (New World Encyclopedia).

## MILITARY COUP

Claims of electoral fraud were the ostensible reason for a military coup on January 15, 1966, led by Igbo junior Army officers, mostly majors and captains. This coup resulted in General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo and head of the Nigerian Army, taking power as President and becoming the first military head of state in Nigeria. The coup itself failed, as Ironsi rallied the military against the plotters. Ironsi then instituted military rule, alleging that the democratic institutions had failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed revision and clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule. The coup, despite its failure, was perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbos because all but one of the five coup plotters were Igbos, and Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have promoted many Igbos in the Army at the expense of Yoruba and Hausa officers (Akpan, 1972). On July 29, 1966, the Northerners executed a countercoup, led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. It placed Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (the most senior military officer from northern Nigeria) into power (Anwunah, 2007). Ethnic tensions due to the coup and countercoup increased and led, in September 1966, to the large-scale massacres of Christian Igbos living in the Muslim north.

The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Niger River delta, a sprawling network of rivers and swamps at the southernmost tip of the country, had tempted the southeast to annex the region in order to become economically self-sufficient. However, the exclusion of easterners from power made many fear that the oil revenues would be used to benefit areas in the north and west rather than their own. Prior to the discovery of oil, Nigeria's wealth derived from agricultural products from the south and minerals from the north. The north, until around 1965, had had low-level demands to secede from Nigeria and retain its wealth for northerners. These demands seemed to cease when it became clear that oil in the southeast would become a major revenue source. This further fueled Igbo fears that the northerners had plans to strip eastern oil to benefit the North.

## THE WAR

The Nigerian government launched a "police action" to retake the secessionist territory. The war began on July 6, 1967, when Nigerian federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. Nigeria's army offensive was through the north of Biafra led by Col. Shuwa and designated as one division. The division was made up of mostly northern officers. The right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on July 14, while the left-hand column headed for Garkem, which was captured on July 12. At this stage of the war, other regions of Nigeria (the West and Mid-West) still considered the war as a confrontation between the north (notable Hausas) and the east (notable Igbos).

However, the Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own when on July 9, the Biafran forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian region across the Niger River, passing through Benin City, until they were stopped on August 21 at Ore, just over the state boundary and 130 miles east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos. The Biafran attack was led by Lt. Col. Banjo. They met little resistance, and the Mid-West was easily taken over. This was due to the arrangement and agreement between the federal government and the East that all soldiers should be returned to their regions to stop the spate of killings in which Igbo soldiers had been major victims. The soldiers that were supposed to defend the Mid-West were mostly mid-west Igbos and were in touch with their eastern counterpart. Gen. Gowon responded by asking Col. Muritala to form another division (2 division) to expel Biafrans from the mid-west, defend Biafra's west, and attack Biafra from the west as well. Col. Muritala later became military head of state. As Nigerian forces were to retake the Mid-West, the Biafran military administrator declared the Republic of Benin on September 19.

Although Benin City was retaken by the Nigerians on September 20, the Biafrans succeeded in their primary objective by tying down as many Nigerian federal troops as they could. Gen. Gowon also launched an offensive from Biafra's south from the delta to

riverine area using the bulk of Lagos' Garrison command under Col. Adekunle (black scorpion) to form 3 division which later changed to the 3rd marine commandos. Recruitment into the Nigeria Army increased with Biafra's offensive to the west, mostly among other southern ethnic groups, especially Yoruba and Edo people. Four battalions of the Nigerian 2nd Infantry Division were needed to drive the Biafrans back and eliminate their territorial gains made during the offensive. But the Nigerians were repulsed three times and lost thousands of troops as they tried to cross the Niger during October. However, reorganization of the Nigerian forces, the reluctance of the Biafran army to attack again, and the effects of a naval, land, and air blockade of Biafra led to a change in the balance of forces. The Swedish eccentric Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen also led a flight of MiniCOINs in action; his BAF (Biafran Air Force) consisted of three Swedes and two Biafrans.

The Nigerians then settled into a period of siege by blockading Biafra. Amphibious landings by the Nigerian marines led by Major Isaac Adaka Boro captured the Niger Delta cities of Bonny, Okrika, and Port Harcourt on July 26, and the port of Calabar on October 18 by elements of the Nigerian 3rd Marine Commando Division. In the north, Biafran forces were pushed back into their core Igbo territory, and the capital of Biafra, the city of Enugu, was captured by Nigerian forces belonging to the 1st Infantry Division on October 4. The Biafrans continued to resist in their core Igbo heartlands, which were soon surrounded by Nigerian forces.

## **PICTORIAL ANALYSIS OF THE WAR**

The photos below depict symbols of resources to support the reviewed literature in this study and to draw up conclusive remarks based on the subject matter.



The picture shows the flag of the defunct Republic of Biafra



A severely malnourished child during the war. Images such as this of a starving child in the international media generated compassion for the plight of the Biafrans caused by the Nigerian blockade. Source: New World Encyclopedia



File photo of some starved children during the war. Read more: [Business of Photography](#)



Starving children pose in a refugee camp near Aba, on August 06, 1968, during the Biafran war. / AFP PHOTO Read more: [Legit](#)



In the photo, Biafran children can be seen sitting in a plane chartered by the International Red Cross (ICRC) and humanitarian organization Terre des Hommes. AFP PHOTO / Francois Mazure. Read more: [Legit](#)



In the photo, Biafrans can be seen migrating to unknown destinations





A Biafran soldier

## **STALEMATE**

From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate with Nigerian forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas of Biafran control. But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two northern fronts and the capture of Port Harcourt on May 19, 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas. The Biafran government claimed that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war and sought aid from the outside world. A Nigerian commission, including British doctors from the Liverpool University School of Tropical Medicine, visited Biafra after the war and concluded that the evidence of deliberate starvation was overplayed, caused by confusion between the symptoms of starvation and various tropical illnesses. While they did not doubt that starvation had occurred, it was less clear to what

extent it was a result of the Nigerian blockade or the Biafran government's restriction of food to the civilians in favor of the military.

Many volunteer bodies organized blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons. More common was the claim that the arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more difficult to distinguish between the two purposes of aircraft. It has been argued that by prolonging the war the Biafran relief effort (characterized by Canadian development consultant Ian Smillie as "an act of unfortunate and profound folly"), it contributed to the deaths of as many as 180,000 civilians (Bortolotti, 2004).

Bernard Kouchner was one of many French doctors who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding centers in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being like a gag order, designed to maintain the organization's neutrality, whatever the circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.

In June 1969, the Biafrans launched a desperate offensive against the Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance. They were supported by foreign mercenary pilots continuing to fly in food, medical supplies, and weapons. Most notable of the mercenaries was Swedish Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, who led five Malmö MFI-9 MiniCOIN small piston-engined aircraft, armed with rocket pods and machine guns. His force attacked Nigerian military airfields in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Benin City, and Ughelli, destroying or damaging a number of Nigerian Air Force jets used to attack relief flights, including a few Mig-17s and three out of Nigeria's six Ilyushin Il-28 bombers that were used to bomb Biafran villages and farms on a daily basis. Although taken off-guard by the surprise Biafran offensive, the Nigerians soon recovered and held off the Biafrans long enough for the offensive to stall out. The Biafran air attacks did disrupt the combat operations of the Nigerian Air Force, but only for a few months.

## **WAR'S END**

The Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans on December 23, 1969, with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division (commanded by Col. Obasanjo, who later became president twice), which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind," was launched on January 7, 1970, with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on January 9, and Uli fell on January 11. The war finally ended with the final surrender of the Biafran forces in the last Biafra-held town of Amichi on January 13, 1970. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying to the republic of Côte d'Ivoire, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to Yakubu Gowon of the federal army.

## **ATROCITIES AGAINST IGBO**

The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money, and infrastructure. Up to one million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease caused by Nigerian forces. More than half a million people died from the famine imposed deliberately through blockade throughout the war as well as lack of access to medicine. Thousands of people starved to death every day as the war progressed. The International Committee of the Red Cross in September 1968 estimated 8,000-10,000 deaths from starvation each day. The leader of a Nigerian peace conference delegation said in 1968 that "starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels." This stance is generally considered to reflect the policy of the Nigerian government. The federal Nigerian army is accused of further atrocities, including deliberate bombing of civilians, mass slaughter with machine guns, and rape.

## AFTERMATH AND LEGACY

During the war, there were 100,000 military casualties and between 500,000 and two million civilians' deaths. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease. Reconstruction, helped by oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues (Madiebo,1980). Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it was hard to make this work in practice.

The Igbos felt that they had been deliberately displaced from government positions because their pre-war posts were now occupied by other Nigerians (mostly Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani). When Igbo civil servants left to join similar posts in Biafra, their positions had been replaced, and when the war was over, the government did not feel that it should sack their replacements, preferring to regard the previous incumbents as having resigned. This, however, led to a feeling of injustice. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria changing its currency during the war so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honored and then, at the end of the war, offering only N£20 to easterners for exchange of their Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.

On May 29, 2000, *The Guardian of Lagos* reported that President Olusegun Obasanjo commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."

Speaking to the BBC 30 years after the war, Chief Emeka Ojukwu said that when the civil war ended, the government promised the Ibo people that there would be "no

victors and no vanquished." "The authorities," he continued, "were desperate to avoid a repetition of the ethnic tensions which preceded the war." With his own pardon in the mid-1980s, he remained concerned that since the war, "Igbos have been largely excluded from power," which "could cause instability in the future" (Momoh, 2000).

## **ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ORIENTATION AGENCY IN MANAGING NIGERIA'S PLURALISM AND ETHNO- RELIGIOUS CRISES**

Nigeria is no doubt a pluralistic society. The task of managing the country's pluralism and ethno-religious crises for peace and development is a collective responsibility of government, the citizens, and other stakeholders. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) is one of such stakeholders. Its primary role is to awaken the consciousness of Nigerians to their rights and obligations in bringing about a united and peaceful Nigeria and to appreciate that every conflict can always be resolved through peaceful means.

The agency's approach to dealing with the issues of pluralism and ethno-religious crises is mainly proactive because central to the mitigation of their negativity is the issue of attitude. In the agency, the motto "Attitude Matters" appears in every aspect of life. The NOA recognizes that in two similar situations, it is the attitude that makes the difference. For instance, both Nigeria and America are pluralistic states. However, the extent to which each has achieved national integration is determined essentially by the attitude of its government and citizens.

It is instructive to mention that while it is easy to destroy values and attitudes, building them is always an arduous task. Bearing this difficulty in mind, the NOA has ensured that the ultimate objective of every program designed aims to elicit some definite behavioral change. Moreover, the task of value re-orientation is a collective responsibility which must necessarily involve all social institutions. Therefore, while recognizing the agency's vanguard role, it also cultivates the partnership of other stakeholders to ensure

that everyone is moving in the same direction. Arising from the foregoing, the agency has been playing its role through the implementation of the following programs.

## **PROMOTING CITIZENS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION**

Given the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria about the subject under consideration, a good understanding and basic knowledge of these provisions is necessary. Apart from facilitating their participation in the political process, they are also empowered to demand their rights and hold leaders accountable. Some key issues such as rights and duties of Nigerians; the dangers of ethnic, religious, and sectional manipulations; patriotism and nationalism; the importance of popular participation; and other concerns have been articulated in simple language and packaged in a booklet titled *Political Education Manual*. This manual has been widely distributed. Currently, the NOA is revising the manual to update it and include new issues that have recently emerged in the polity. In addition to the above, the agency is also working on producing an abridged version of the Constitution in some Nigerian languages for massive distribution.

## **INTRODUCTION OF CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM PROGRAMME**

Civic education is about citizenship, including citizens' rights, duties, and obligations; patriotism and nationalism; loyalty to the state; respect for constituted authorities; respect for national symbols; and promoting the good image of Nigeria among others. Therefore, the objective of civic education is to produce an ideal citizen whose passion for Nigeria cannot be quenched by any sectional interest. The agency has over the years been promoting these ideals especially among the youth.

Through the efforts of the agency, the program received a boost with the establishment of the National Technical Committee on Civic Education in 2006. The efforts of this committee led to the production and publication of civic education textbooks for secondary schools in Nigeria. These books have been carefully written to provide comprehensive coverage of the secondary school curriculum as provided by the Nigeria Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC). The successful mainstreaming of civic education in the school curriculum remains one of its major contributions to this process. Civic education is now a compulsory subject in junior secondary schools.

## **PROMOTING NIGERIA'S CORE VALUES**

Whereas there are differences among us, there are equally values that have kept us together as Nigerians. The objective of this campaign is to de-emphasize vices that tend to divide us and emphasize values that bind us and promote our commonality. Under this campaign, the agency is implementing the following programs: nationwide survey on Nigeria's core values, promotion of the dignity of our national symbols, and the cultivation of a new crop of leadership. In 2008, the agency undertook this survey ostensibly to identify core values held by Nigerians and values peculiar to different sections of the country. The idea was to provide a comprehensive and documented database that would provide a guide for the agency's value re-orientation programs. The findings of this survey have been documented in a book which was launched in the National Institute in 2009.

## **PROMOTING THE DIGNITY OF OUR NATIONAL SYMBOLS**

Nigeria's national symbols include the national flag, the coat of arms, and currency (Naira). Closely associated with these symbols are the Nigerian national anthem and the pledge. The national flag is the symbol of authority and conveys the country's collective history and aspirations. The coat of arms portrays national strength and dignity as represented by the eagle and the horse. The national anthem and pledge command and redirect the loyalty of Nigerians to their country. The thrust of this program is to use the

ideals which these symbols represent to invoke and galvanize the deep-seated emotions of Nigerians for patriotic purposes, such as the kind that manifests when Nigeria is in a football competition with another country. When people appreciate the true meaning of these symbols, they respect them while receiving some inspiration. In summary, the symbols of Nigerian nationhood include:

- The National Anthem (1978);
- The National Flag (1960);
- The National Pledge (1976);
- The Nigeria Coat of Arms (1960);
- The Nigerian Currency (1973);
- The Nigerian Constitution (1999);
- The National Youth Service Corps Scheme (1973);
- The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (1991);
- Nigerian International Passport (electronic) (2007);
- National Identity Card (2005);
- Permanent Voters Card (PVC) (2015);
- National Policy on Education, NPE (2014).

## **CULTIVATING A NEW CROP OF LEADERSHIP**

Over time, there has been unanimity of public opinion on the dearth of credible and visionary leadership within the polity. The obvious consequence has been that the huge reservoir of Nigerian youths has been left with no dynamic and positive leadership role models to look up to for tutelage. Research has also shown steady deterioration in the constructive engagement of the latent energies and creative instinct of youths in the country's crucial development agenda.

To address this leadership challenge, the agency organized the first leadership reality program titled "Heir Apparent," as its creative response to cultivate a new crop of visionary, vibrant, dynamic, responsive, and responsible leadership that epitomizes the



core brand values of Nigeria. This program brought together 37 young Nigerians from different parts of Nigeria. After going through 40 days of intensive leadership and entrepreneurial training along with a historic visit and interaction with former President Shehu Shagari, the agency is proud to say that these young Nigerians are today ambassadors and advocates of Nigeria's unity, peace, and progress.

## **BUILDING CAPACITY FOR COMMUNITY PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

Conscious of the value and benefit of peace to national development, the agency has been involved in building the capacities of communities for the promotion of peace and conflict management. The agency has been able to train community leaders on how to identify early warning signs and how to use tools such as reconciliation, negotiation, and mediation. To give further support to this effort, Nigeria is currently setting up social justice centers nationwide to provide more access to people wishing to seek justice, including the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism. This is also supported by the production and distribution of the *Social Justice Manual*, meant to create awareness on the issues of social justice and to encourage redress through peaceful means.

**Source:** A NOA Publication, 2011.

## **THE WAY FORWARD**

- A clearer line between religion and politics should be drawn and enforced.
- Civic identity of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation should be promoted.
- The role of the government in dealing with intolerant groups should be appreciated and encouraged.
- Support for the civil society initiatives should continue and a timely response from them should be encouraged.
- Experiences and good practices of dealing with matters relating to religion and politics from other countries should be shared.

## **CONCLUSION**

Christians in general suffered discrimination, negligence, and occasional persecution amid militarization, irrespective of tribe. The deaths of more than a million people in Nigeria because of the brutal civil war which ended 50 years ago are a scar on the nation's history. For most Nigerians, the war over the breakaway state of Biafra is generally regarded as an unfortunate episode best forgotten, but for the Igbo people who fought for secession, it remains a life-defining event. Most importantly, the chapter examined the role of the state in averting reoccurrence of a second civil war in Nigeria through the instrumentality of the National Orientation Agency (NOA).

## CHAPTER 9

# The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970

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## INTRODUCTION

The Nigeria-Biafra War attracted enormous international attention not just for the brutal events of the period, but also because of how the conflict was interpreted, especially by foreigners. The ghastly images of victims of the war dominated the international media and roused the world's conscience. The conflict took a toll on human lives on both the Igbo and the ethnic minorities in Biafra. While the Igbo tragedy was largely perpetrated in Northern Nigeria, that of the Biafran minorities— Efik, Ibibio, Ijaw, and Ogoja—occurred mainly in their homelands. The gory experiences suffered by the Biafran minorities have largely been neglected in the historiography of the Biafra War. This chapter examines the experiences of the ethnic minorities in Biafra during the war between July 1967 and January 1970. It argues that minorities suffered a high degree of persecution, molestation, injustice, psychological torture, and other forms of suffering that have not been fully examined in existing literature. The war subjected them to layers of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority and the Biafran government. The paper asserts that these minority groups in Biafra were victims of the war as much as the Igbo. Hence, they should be accorded due recognition in the historiography of victimhood in the Nigeria-Biafra War.

The idea of "minority" is a concept that has posed some definitional problems among scholars. Owing to the fluidity of the concept, there has not been any internationally accepted definition. The earliest attempt to provide a definition for the

term was made in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, the former Special Rapporteur of the United Nations, who defined minority:

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.<sup>1</sup>

The problem with this definition is that it covers only persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities. There is no provision for other minority groups in terms of different social categories grounded in sexuality, gender, age, class, race, and other identities.

Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities adopted in 1992 recognizes minorities as a group of people with similar national or ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that states should protect their existence.<sup>2</sup> The article makes reference to the same groups already identified by Capotorti. But other groups such as sexual minorities, gender minorities, age minorities, and other minorities who also need rights are omitted and consequently appear voiceless and unprotected. With

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<sup>1</sup> Francesco Capotorti quoted in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation" HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf), 2.

<sup>2</sup> OHCHR, "Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992," accessed February 28, 2013, [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf).

the rapidity of socio-cultural, political, and economic changes taking place all over the world, the concept of minority continues to pose more questions than can easily be answered. A more workable definition of minority should thus be seen in terms of context. As such, I define minority quite broadly as any group of people that is disadvantaged when compared to the rest of the population. The "minoritization" of a group should therefore be seen in terms of the situation and not just numerical weakness. For instance, a group can be a majority in terms of numerical strength but a minority in terms of political representation. In this situation, the group sees itself as a political minority and agitates for equality and justice. The minorities referred to in this chapter are the ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and they are minorities because of both their numerical weakness and poor representation in the national politics.

## **THE IGBO VICTIMS**

The Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967, and ended on January 15, 1970. The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The federal government of Nigeria responded to the secession with "police action," that is, a partial military operation designed to crush what it perceived as a rebellion. These actions were the beginning of a war that lasted about thirty months. But what was originally interpreted as a domestic conflict later took on an international dimension as state and non-state actors like Britain, France, the Red Cross, the USSR, and the World Council of Churches became involved in the conflict. The war received one of the highest humanitarian interventions in recent history. The massive number of children and women facing starvation attracted the attention of groups like the World Council of Churches, the International Committee of the Red Cross, *Caritas Internationalis*, Interreligious Affairs for the American Jewish

Committee, and UNICEF.<sup>3</sup> The relief effort resulted in unusual Jewish-Christian cooperation.<sup>4</sup> Countries like France, Germany, the Nordic Countries, and <sup>5</sup> made enormous contributions toward the relief effort. [OBJ] The international media also highlighted the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn region and successfully brought this part of the world into global focus. *The London Times*, *New York Times*, *Le Monde* of France, and *La Stampa* of Italy were some of the newspapers that effectively covered the war.

The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War, both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo were targeted for extermination by the Muslim north. A year before the war, during the 1966 massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the alleged indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets and the widespread hunger in secessionist Biafra did a lot to rouse the world's conscience to the humanitarian crisis facing Biafran peoples. The international media played a significant role in exposing the humanitarian tragedies, especially in the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra. And many years after the war, scholarly accounts of the war, mostly by scholars from the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra, have privileged insights into some of the most hideous acts unleashed on Biafrans during the war. Yet not much has been reported about the atrocities perpetrated against the minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces and the Biafran militias. This lack of acknowledgment is a gap in Biafra's history.

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<sup>3</sup> National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968.

<sup>4</sup> NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> The Nordic countries comprise of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and their associated territories, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Svalbard, and Åland Islands.

*Newsweek*, in one of its reports titled "The Resurrection of Biafra," stated that "some of the worst massacres of the war, in fact, occurred when federal troops captured minority regions—whereupon the minority tribesmen turned on the <sup>6[OBJ]</sup>. This quote presents the Igbo as the victims in the hands of the minority groups without reference to any experience the minorities might have had in the Igbo-dominated region before the arrival of the federal troops. Another report claimed that "in some areas outside the East which were temporarily held by Biafran forces, as in Benin and the Mid-Western Region, Ibos were killed by the local people with at least the acquiescence of the federal force: about 1,000 Ibo civilians perished at Benin in this <sup>7[OBJ]</sup>. Nigerian troops were said to have hunted and killed Igbo males above the age of five, leaving the impression that the war was <sup>8[OBJ]</sup>. Colin Legum, a commonwealth correspondent for *The Observer* of London, also noted that "the worst killing occurring among the Ibos has come from the struggle itself that inevitably produced conditions of <sup>9[OBJ]</sup>. Peter Enahoro, who seemed to have sympathized with Biafra, wrote: "The Ibos <sup>10[OBJ]</sup>. Gordon Wainman, a volunteer for the Canadian University Service Overseas at Kurra Falls in Nigeria, reported the massacre of 30,000 Igbos in

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<sup>6</sup> "The Resurrection of Biafra," *Newsweek*, March 24, 1969. Ibo refers to the same group as Igbo. Ibo was commonly used in colonial writings.

<sup>7</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien, "A Condemned People," *The New York Review* ix, no. 11, December 21, 1967.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Colin Legum, "Nigeria vs. Biafra: On Taking Sides," *Christianity and Crisis: A Christian Journal of Opinion*, xxix, no. 9 (March 26, 1969): 151.

<sup>10</sup> Peter Enahoro, "A Night of Deep Waters" *Nigeria/Biafra*, April 1969. Peter Enahoro was the brother of late Anthony Enahoro, former Federal Commissioner for Information and Labour under General Gowon. Peter's support or sympathy appears to have been with Biafra.

Northern <sup>11[08]</sup> Wainman said that many of those who were killed were either buried in mass graves or left to rot in the fields with a thin layer of dirt thrown over them to reduce the stench of the decaying flesh.

While not denying the gruesome atrocities committed against the Igbo during the Biafra War, there is an error in the representation of the victims of the massacres. For instance, some of the victims of the 1966 massacre in Northern Nigeria were members of minority groups but were generally grouped with Igbos. The report of the G. C. M. Onyiuke-led tribunal clearly shows that many people belonging to ethnic minority groups in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria were victims of the May 1966 attack perpetrated by Northerners.<sup>12</sup> Members of the minority groups were easily mistaken for Igbos because it was difficult to differentiate between the two by mere physical appearance. There were no facial marks as could be found among the Hausa and the Yoruba, and the pattern of dressing, mostly western, was similar. N.U. Akpan, Secretary of Government, Republic of Biafra, noted:

The killings in the North in 1966, particularly those which occurred from the end of September, were indiscriminately directed against people from Eastern Nigeria, known in the North by the generic name of *Yameri*...The subsequent attempts in the North to distinguish between the Ibos and other peoples of Eastern Nigeria came too late to make any impression on the non-Ibo members of Eastern Nigeria, who now shared the same fears and dread of the North as the Ibos.<sup>13</sup>

The indiscriminate killing of members of Eastern Nigeria accounted for the divided loyalty

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<sup>11</sup> Gordon Wainman, "I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre," *Toronto Daily Star*, December 14, 1968.

<sup>12</sup> Report of the Atrocities Tribunal: Appendix B: Eyewitness Accounts of the 1966 Pogrom, December 1966.

<sup>13</sup> Ntiyong U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession, 1866-1970* (London: Frank Cass, 1972), 152.



of the minority leaders. While some supported the Biafran secession, others felt it was better to remain as Nigerians.

## **THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN NIGERIA**

Nigeria, like most African countries, is a multiethnic society with many ethnic minorities. The ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to, Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, and are located along the Eastern border and the oil-rich southern coast. They are found in the present-day Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa States, Cross River, and Rivers State, forming a larger part of the area now known as the Niger-Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent. Although these designated minority groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language, and cultural practices.

Part of the overarching argument about the war is that it was a war of two majority ethnic groups—the Hausa-Fulani and the <sup>14</sup>Yoruba. This interpretation is simplistic, and available evidence suggests otherwise. It was rather a war between the minorities and the majorities in Nigeria. The first and second military coups on January 15 and July 29, 1966, respectively, ushered in a historic moment in the history of the minorities in Nigeria. The Richards Constitution of 1947 created a faulty regional structure that encouraged regionalism in Nigeria's post-independence politics. Apart from the fact that one of the regions was large enough to dominate the other two regions, the political parties in the federation were regionally oriented with politicians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, and Ahmadu Bello, depending on ethnic and regional support to achieve national power. For instance, the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was seen as an Igbo party while the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa, was considered a Hausa-Fulani party. The Action Group was

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<sup>14</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien, "A Condemned People."

called a Yoruba party because its leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was Yoruba. Within the existing regional structure, minority aspirations were sometimes ignored but could easily be used to promote party <sup>15[08]</sup> Leaders of the minority ethnic groups found themselves in a disadvantaged position in the entire federal political equation. It was against this background that minority leaders in different regions formed movements that started agitating for the creation of more states where their interests could be adequately protected. Some of the major movements that were formed before independence included the Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement in the Eastern Region, the Mid-West State Movement in the Western Region, and the Middle-Belt State Movement in the Northern Region. These movements were neither cultural nor national groups but were "situationally" or circumstantially formed to agitate for minority rights in the larger state. Though not homogenous, the ethnic minorities were able to form formal structures that represented their groups, a development that challenges constructivist arguments that the "lack of pure identities means that groups are not homogenous and cannot be represented through formal structures"<sup>1617</sup>

The leaders of these state creation movements believed that the formation of more states would eliminate their fears of domination by the majority ethnic groups. This concern led to the setting up of the Minorities Commission by the colonial authorities in 1957.<sup>18</sup> It was evident that state creation would allay the fears of the minorities and guarantee more stability in the federation, but the Commission pointed

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<sup>15</sup> NAE (Unclassified document), "Understanding the Nigerian Crisis," Benin: Department of International Affairs and Information, Benin, 1968, 5.

<sup>17</sup> Stephen May et al., *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8-9.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria* (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 242.

out that if new states were created, they would be given two years to settle down before independence could be granted to the country.<sup>19</sup> As events later revealed, the euphoria of gaining the long-awaited independence blinded the national leaders to other realities. As the domination of the minorities continued, riots from minority areas like Tiv lingered. Under the leadership of Joseph Tarka, the Tiv had agitated for the creation of the Middle-Belt State. The Mid- West minorities in the former Western Region formed their own state because of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) plot against the Action Group (AG – a Yoruba-led party). The Mid-West creation was a way of weakening the influence of the Action Congress in the Western Region.

The growing agitations of groups dedicated to improving the fortunes of minorities in Nigeria received a remarkable boost by Nigeria's first and second coups of the late 1960s. While the first coup dismantled the influence of the Hausa-Fulani potentates, the second coup dislodged the Igbo from their positions of military control. These developments altered the balance of power and ethnic minorities in the army, and civil servants became central players in Nigerian politics. General Yakubu Gowon, who is Ngas, a minority ethnic group in the Northern Region, had Colonel Akahan, a Tiv, as his Chief of Staff. Some commentators interpreted the new leadership structure as the government of Middle-Belt minorities that emerged to dominate politics of Northern Nigeria.<sup>20</sup> When Lt. Colonel Joseph Akahan died in a plane crash, some leaders of the Middle-Belt region accused Northern leaders of masterminding his death.<sup>21</sup> Although no evidence linked Akahan's death to Northern leaders, the ensuing controversy led to the withdrawal of Tivs from different parts of the North to Tiv land. At the center of the civil service were minority group members such as Philip Asiodu, A. A. Atta, and

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<sup>19</sup> Nigeria Ministry of Information, *The Struggle for One Nigeria* (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1967), 3.

<sup>20</sup> Department of State, Telegram, The Death of Akahan, August 1967.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Allison Ayida, who were regarded as the “super- permanent secretaries” because of their influence. People also regarded these super-permanent secretaries”as members of the “Oxford tribe” because they <sup>22</sup>University. [OBJ] Asiodu and Ayida, particularly, belonged to Gowon’s three-member kitchen cabinet. [OBJ] Edwin Ogbu, who was a permanent secretary in charge of External Affairs, was equally a minority from the Middle-Belt. Apart from Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, some of the commissioners who largely championed the war politics were of minority ethnic origin. Anthony Enahoro, Commissioner in the Ministry of Information, and Okoi Arikpo, Commissioner in the Ministry of External Affairs, were minority members. There were obviously other members of Gowon’s cabinet from the majority ethnic groups but those of the minority ethnic groups appeared to have wielded more influence. The Nigeria-Biafra War era was perhaps the first time members of the minority groups could occupy many important positions in the military, politics, and civil service. The assistance provided to Gowon by the increased number of minorities in the civil service and army was critical in the administration’s successful prosecution of the Nigerian civil war.

The minorities’ ascendancy after the July 1966 coup created an opportunity for them to address the grievances which they had long expressed through their movements. The project of state creation came at a time when the country was in a political stalemate. The coups and countercoups, the massacres of Igbos in different parts of Nigeria, the failure to implement the Aburi Accord by the Nigerian government, the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the creation of twelve states by General Gowon worsened the tension between Nigeria and Biafra. It was a clash of rights, and both General Ojukwu and General Gowon seemed to have legitimate claims. Biafrans claimed the right to survival while Nigerians claimed the right to the corporate existence of the country. Two new states were carved out of the former Eastern Region, leaving it with a total of three states. This seemed to be a trump card for the federal government to court the minorities and forestall the Eastern secession. That was obviously the

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<sup>22</sup> John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 26.

immediate objective but the long-term goal of the minority leaders in state creation was to liberate the minorities from majority dominance. While the argument in favor of state creation was ostensibly to ensure stability and national unity, it was no less a struggle of the minorities against the old dominant majorities in the various regions. Within the Hausa-Fulani leadership, state creation was considered a dangerous development, but to the new states like Kwara and Benue-Plateau, it was an opportunity to get liberated from the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.<sup>23</sup> For some of the ethnic minorities in the former Eastern Region, state creation meant liberation from the alleged Igbo domination.

## **ETHNIC MINORITIES AS VICTIMS IN BIAFRA**

Violent conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict serious injuries and create victims of all kinds. To the outside world, the known victims of the war were the Igbo who, apart from being targets of the 1966 massacres, also suffered indiscriminate bombings and monumental starvation that allegedly took about two million lives. Within the forty-two years since the war ended, more revelations about the war atrocities against the minorities have emerged. Surviving records and oral histories of the war suggest that minorities in Biafra became individual and collective victims of the war. These accounts also reveal how individuals and groups committed heinous atrocities under the pretense of either fighting a war of survival for Biafra or a war of national unity for Nigeria.

One recurrent question comes up about the Biafran minorities: what was the attitude of the minorities to the Biafran secession? This cannot be answered with certainty. While Biafra claimed that the minorities were wholeheartedly in support of the secession, the federal government maintained that the minorities had been longing to be liberated.<sup>24</sup> Suzanne Cronje, one of the most prolific journalists on the Biafra war,

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<sup>23</sup> National Archives United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO 38/222, Political Affairs, (Internal) Demonstration.

<sup>24</sup> O'Brien, "A Condemned People."

observed that “the feelings of the minorities were difficult to define.”<sup>25</sup> In the first place, the anti-Igbo uprising, which would have come from the minorities as people that needed liberation, did not emerge, and there was no noticeable form of unrest among the minorities under the Biafran administration. Loyalties were, in fact, divided. The supporters of the Biafran secession were those who felt that the Easterners as a group had shared the same fate as victims of the 1966 massacres and expulsion from the North, while those who joined the Nigerian government saw it as an opportunity to have a separate state of their own and be free from any domination. Although the ethnic minorities had clamored for a separate state of their own, it was very difficult to determine what they actually wanted during the war. A plebiscite could have given them an opportunity to express themselves, but the proposal was strongly rejected by the federal government who felt it would imply a withdrawal of the federal troops to prewar boundaries.<sup>26</sup>

To understand the divergent attitudes of the minorities to the Biafran secession, an examination of oral histories from people who occupied positions of authority during the war as well as from ordinary people is necessary. The Ikun in the present-day Cross River State offers a good example of the crimes committed against minorities. The Ikun clan is in the Biase Local Government Area of Cross River State. The people share a common boundary with the Ohafia, an Igbo clan, in the present-day Abia State. When the war broke out, Biafra stationed some of its troops in the Cross River region, including Ikun. According to a female survivor of the Biafran occupation, the Ikun initially supported Biafra and had friendly relations with the soldiers, who were also accommodating. As time went on, tensions emerged. Some Ikun men were suspected of collaborating with Nigerian soldiers. This led to arrests, looting, rapes, and other

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<sup>25</sup> Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth,” *Nigeria/Biafra*, April 1969.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Document 35.

atrocities in Ikun land.<sup>27</sup> William Norris of the *London Times* visited Biafra and reported an eyewitness account in which some men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at Umuahia on April 2, 1968.<sup>28</sup> These Ibibios, who included old men and young men, were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people attacked them with sticks and clubs.<sup>29</sup> Oral testimony by the survivor corroborates this account. According to the eyewitness, Biafran soldiers allegedly took Ikun men to Ohafia for a meeting but never brought them back. The informant also alleged that the soldiers returned to the community and rounded up some men within their reach and shot them. This survivor who lost her four-day-old son and her grandmother seemed to have suspected foul play from the Ohafia people, who share a common boundary with her community. The victimization continued until the Biafran headquarters likely issued an order again that people should not be killed.<sup>30</sup> By this time, the remaining people had escaped the community, leaving behind only the soldiers, the Ohafia, and some Ikun who were said to be of mixed blood—half Ohafia and half Ikun. These remaining groups, according to the survivor, shared the fish ponds, forests, and farms belonging to Ikun<sup>31,32</sup>

In a related account, B.J. Ikpeme, a member of a minority group and retired Senior Medical Officer in the then Eastern Region, revealed atrocities perpetrated by Biafran soldiers against the minorities in some towns in the present-day Cross River and Akwa-Ibom States. Ikpeme argued that Ojukwu's declaration of the Republic of Biafra had

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<sup>27</sup> Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles at Amanki Village in Ikun Clan of Biase Local Government Area, April 14, 1994. Transcript in my custody. The informant is described as victim-survivor because, she lost her four day old baby and grandmother.

<sup>28</sup> Department of State, Telegram, Nigerian Rebel Atrocities, May 1968.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

been issued against the wishes of the majority of the people of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces, who for many years had agitated for a separate state of their own. According to Ikpeme, the Igbo leadership, who did not like the minority agitation, decided either to force the five million non-Igbo minorities into the new republic or eliminate them. It was on this basis, claims Ikpeme, that Biafran soldiers were quickly sent to the minority areas to “keep down the people, detain or even kill all who dared raise a voice in protest against the idea of Biafra.”<sup>33</sup> During this period the non-Igbos started experiencing different forms of inhumane treatment, ranging from torture and detention to killing. Ikpeme himself was detained in what he described as a “concentration camp” and was later transferred to a prison cell, where he was given urine to drink when he demanded water.<sup>34</sup>

Ikpeme described instances where the Biafran soldiers allegedly perpetrated atrocities against some members of non-Igbo groups. In Asang town in Enyong, from where Ikpeme originated, about four hundred people were carried away to an unknown destination. Another town called Attan Onoyon, also in Enyong, was burnt down with many people killed by the Biafran soldiers. In Ikot Ekpenyong in the present day Akwa-Ibom State, Biafran soldiers were said to have shot many villagers. Ikpeme also recounted similar killings carried out by Biafran soldiers that took place in places like Ikot Okpot and Ido. He equally alleged that when the Nigerian troops landed in Calabar on October 18, 1967, about 169 civilians in detention were lined up and shot by Biafran soldiers. This same allegation had also been published in *The New York Times* as an informational advertisement by the Consulate General of the Federal

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<sup>33</sup> Presbyterian Church of Canada Archives (hereafter PCCA), “The Secessionist Regime and the Non-Ibo ‘Minorities’ in the East of Nigeria.” This was a text of statements at the Peace Talks on the Nigerian Civil War, at Kampala, Uganda. Ikpeme who was a retired senior medical officer in the former Eastern Region also served as a member of the Federal Government delegation at the Kampala Peace Talks.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.



Republic of Nigeria in New York.<sup>35</sup> These two accounts, given by the survivor of Ikun and Dr. Ikpeme, portray similar pictures of gross atrocities but with different underlying objectives.

Biafra ran a special operations group known as the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters (BOFF), a paramilitary organization set up by the civil defense group in Bende.<sup>36</sup> This special operations group was instructed to suppress the enemy, but they apparently targeted some minorities in Cross River and Akwa-Ibom States on the account of sabotage against the Biafran government.<sup>37</sup> Philip Effiong, who was from one of the ethnic minorities, probably ordered the BOFF's "combing" operations after the death of Major Achibong. In an interview, the informant did not reveal the circumstances surrounding the death of Major Achibong, who was also a member of a minority group. He argued that if Effiong ordered any "combing" operation, it could not have been aimed at exterminating members of his ethnic group. What the informant's testimony reveals is that some members of the BOFF who also operated as the Bende Special Operations group could have taken advantage of the assignment to accomplish selfish interests. For instance, an intriguing revelation about the Bende Special Operations group shows that some of its members decapitated their victims for ritual purposes.<sup>38</sup> Head-hunting in warfare was a cultural practice in some parts of Biafra known as Old Bende. This tradition survived up to the beginning of the 20th century. In the pre-colonial era, it was culturally acceptable for members of a certain age-grade to go to war and come back with human heads as trophies. Successful warriors who brought back trophies were highly honored among members of their age-grades and in the whole community. The war situation might have created an

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<sup>35</sup> "The Nigerian Civil War: the Way Out," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1968.

<sup>36</sup> Bende area covers some local governments in the present-day Abia State.

<sup>37</sup> S. B. A. Atuloma, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 18, 1990. Transcript in my custody.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

opportunity for the warrior group to reactivate a tradition that had faded as a result of Western influence.

Although all the minority groups suffered different forms of atrocity, the minorities in the Rivers area seemed to be worse off. Apart from torture and other forms of human rights abuse, they were also evicted from their homes. For instance, when two strategic villages on the New Calabar and Sombriero Rivers fell to the federal troops in February 1968, the news that followed was that most of the soldiers who led the operation were Rivers young men, predominantly Kalabari. Consequently, many people from Bakana, one of the major Kalabari towns, were removed and sent to Igbo towns like Abiriba, Ozuitem, Owerri, and Umuahia, most likely to avoid further infiltration of the enemies.<sup>[OBJ]</sup> Chief Samuel Mbakwe<sup>39</sup>Okigwe Province, noted the influx of refugees from Port Harcourt but did not explain whether or not they were forcibly removed by the Biafran forces.<sup>[OBJ]</sup><sup>40</sup> that the Igbo soldiers were suspicious of some Rivers people who sometimes led federal troops through their lines along hidden creeks.<sup>[OBJ]</sup> This attitude, according to the priest, created a mixture of panic, fear, and hatred among the Biafran troops toward some indigenous people of Rivers State. People who were maltreated were said to have been involved in this act of "sabotage" against Biafra.

At Bolo and Ogu in Okirika and at Onne in Eleme, the villagers suffered the same fate. After the battle at Onne, Biafran troops removed the town inhabitants suspected to have collaborated with federal troops and sent them to the Rainbow Town headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade in Port Harcourt. Graham-Douglas, who was also thrown into detention, claimed to have seen about three hundred men detained in the Rainbow Town. He asserted that no fewer than 6,000 Rivers people were sent to different refugee camps in Igboland.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Samuel Onunaka Mbakwe, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Avutu/Etiti, September 18, 1990. Transcript in my custody.

<sup>40</sup> Donald Musgrave, "Priest Tells of War Atrocities," *The Irish Times*, May 23, 1968.

<sup>41</sup> Graham-Douglas, *Ojukwu's Rebellion*, 17.

Significantly, propaganda played a prominent role in the Nigeria-Biafra war. Some of the pamphlets published by Nigeria and Biafra or their agents were loaded with misinformation. Commenting on a section of Graham-Douglas' pamphlet titled *Ojukwu's Rebellion and World Opinion*, John Tilney of Liverpool observed, "That may be propaganda. What Graham-Douglas says may not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda by both sides."<sup>42</sup> Both Biafra and Nigeria professionally engaged propaganda as a potent tool in the war. While Biafra hired Markpress, Nigeria engaged the services of Galatzine Chant Russell and Partners for the public relations job.<sup>43</sup> Graham-Douglas' story that the minorities in Biafra had suffered more hardships and molestations than the Igbo could claim to have suffered at the hands of Northern Nigerians was apparently part of Nigeria's propaganda, which he also presented in London in August 1968.<sup>44</sup> Graham-Douglas' comments about Biafra had been criticized by an official of the British High Commission for lack of inside information about Biafra.<sup>45</sup> He was equally described as talking "out of the back of his head" because of unverifiable comments he made about the Catholic Church.<sup>46</sup>

J.O.J. Okezie observed that Graham-Douglas' switch to the Nigerian side might have led to the Igbo attitude of distrust toward the minorities. He pointed out, however, that the sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suffered the same intimidation and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained by the Ojukwu-led government

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<sup>42</sup> House of Commons Report on the Nigerian Situation, London, August 27, 1968.

<sup>43</sup> NAUK, FCO 65/ 445/1, Nigeria Press: Biafran Propaganda.

<sup>44</sup> "Graham –Douglas Speaks," *West Africa*, August 17, 1968.

<sup>45</sup> NAUK FCO 23/182, Nigeria and Biafra, 1968.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha and Enugu.<sup>47</sup> A brigadier in the Biafran Army narrated his personal experience in the sabotage accusation. The officer stated that two members of a local militia had written an anonymous petition against him. When the writers were discovered, they confessed that they had undertaken to cut down on his popularity. The two officers were brought before Ojukwu by Major General Effiong who ordered their execution. The officer in his magnanimity refused to execute the petition writers.<sup>48</sup> This illustrates how the sabotage syndrome assumed a life of its own and became an instrument of victimization against innocent persons. There is no doubt that many people lost their lives without substantial evidence, as is common during times of war, whether in Africa or elsewhere.

Violence toward minorities was not perpetrated only by the Biafran troops. The federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In the Andoni area of Rivers, for example, an appeal was sent to the Biafran Head of State narrating how the villages were attacked on Sunday, March 31, 1968, as a result of their loyalty to Biafra. The report alleged that the attack was led by five collaborators who were likely members of the minority group. One of the victims of the attack was said to be an undergraduate student at the University of Ibadan, who was a member of the Biafran Provincial Enlightenment Committee. Apart from burning down houses and property, the petitioners also alleged that over 500 persons, including children, were killed.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, approximately 2,000 Efiks were reportedly killed in Calabar by the federal

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<sup>47</sup> J. O. J. Okezie, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 17, 1990. Transcript in my custody. He was a medical doctor and first republic politician.

<sup>48</sup> P. C. Amadi, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Owerri, September 19, 1990. Transcript in my custody. Amadi was a brigadier in the Biafran Army.

<sup>49</sup> Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, *The Case for Biafra*, first independence anniversary edition (Enugu: Ministry of Information, Republic of Biafra, June 12, 1968), 28-29.

troops. The victims were said to be returnees who revolted against the federal occupation. The killing was reported to Gowon, who subsequently appointed Dr. J. B. Ikpeme as Chief Justice when the killing had nearly been completed.<sup>50</sup>

The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities' areas. They were accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian-occupied areas. William Norris of the London *Sunday Times* in "Nightmare in Biafra," reported how the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centers in Biafra. He stated:

Slowly, but effectively, a reign of terror has been created. The ruins of Mary Slessor Memorial Hospital at Itu, of the hospital of Itigidi, and of the Cheshire Home at Port Harcourt, stand as a kind of grisly memorial to something that must be if words are to retain any meaning. It is certainly not war.<sup>51</sup>

These targets were all in the minority areas. Cronje similarly reported that the Nigerian Air Force had bombed the minorities as much, if not more than the Igbos.<sup>52</sup>

The plight of the minorities had been so alarming that several Nigerian students of Rivers State origin staged a peaceful protest in London against the killing and displacement of their people. In addition to a peaceful march from Trafalgar Square to the House of Commons in London, they also sent out petitions to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), His Holiness Pope Paul VI, Emperor Haile Selassie, the British Prime Minister, and other relevant recipients, asking them to bring pressure on the warring parties to stop the senseless killing of innocent and defenseless people of Rivers State.<sup>53</sup> The petition may not have produced any direct result but must have contributed to the pressure on the warring parties to negotiate for peace.

The war had been fought not just for political reasons but also for economic motives with oil resources in mind. And for a national economy that had begun to

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 27-28.

<sup>51</sup> Quoted in Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, 23.

<sup>52</sup> Suzanne Cronje, "Two Levels of Truth" *Nigeria/Biafra*, April 1969.

<sup>53</sup> NAUK, FCO 38/222, Demonstration.

depend on oil, control of the oil-bearing region inhabited by the ethnic minorities became crucial to winning the war. Recent discoveries by the Ministry of Defense-sponsored humanitarian demining project buttress the claim that the oil-rich minority areas were hotly contested in the war. Although the war had ended, people in different parts of the then Biafra continued to die from the accidental explosion of unexploded mines. According to Emeka Uhegbu, the field administrator of the United Nations-mandated demining project, the minority areas of Rivers State had the highest number of landmine victims. Akwa Ibom and Imo States follow on the list.<sup>54</sup> The demining team discovered 400 unexploded bombs in a forest in Rivers State. These bombs and landmines had killed several unsuspecting villagers who went to farm, resulting in the nickname, "evil forest."<sup>55</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

Brutal conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict painful injuries on all people. The few cases examined in this chapter show that the ethnic minorities were also individually and collectively victimized. Gowon's creation of new states and Ojukwu's declaration of the Republic of Biafra created a sharp division among ethnic minorities. This meant loyalties and disloyalties to the two warring parties. Upholding Nigeria's principle of twelve-state structure meant sabotage to Biafra, while supporting Biafra's secession implied rebellion to the Nigerian government. The minorities in the oil-rich region seemed to have been worse off in the war. The warring parties wanted to control the region and its oil resources. It was largely for this reason that the region assumed strategic importance and became a theatre of war.

General Gowon's declaration of "No Victor, No Vanquished" after Biafra's

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<sup>54</sup> Emeka Uhegbu, interview by author, July 14, 2011. Field Administrator, Ministry of Defence-sponsored Humanitarian Demining Project. The project was mandated by the United Nations Organization under the Ottawa Convention of 2001.

<sup>55</sup> Uhegbu, interview by author.

capitulation was a good social therapy that helped calm the war tensions among the groups that were involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the war are still present in the minority areas. The unexploded bombs in these highly contested areas still pose a huge threat. People continue to lose their limbs and lives following accidental explosions. The victims of these accidental explosions are yet to be given adequate rehabilitation.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the sufferings of the ethnic minorities during and in the aftermath of the war, their perspective in the civil war discourse remains almost forgotten. Their victimhood, like that of the Igbo, should be accorded a place in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The struggle for Nigeria's unity wouldn't have been possible without the minorities. The struggle over control of the oil-rich region placed them in a disadvantaged position by exposing them to more dangers and destruction. Recognizing the ethnic minorities as victims would place them in their rightful position in the nation's history.

## ENDNOTES

1. Francesco Capotorti quoted in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation" HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf), 2. ↑
2. OHCHR, "Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992," accessed February 28, 2013, [http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights\\_en.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf). ↑
3. National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/ Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968. ↑

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

4. NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968. [↑](#)
5. The Nordic countries comprise of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and their associated territories, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Svalbard, and Åland Islands. [↑](#)
6. "The Resurrection of Biafra," *Newsweek*, March 24, 1969. Ibo refers to the same group as Igbo. Ibo was commonly used in colonial writings. [↑](#)
7. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "A Condemned People," *The New York Review* ix, no. 11, December 21, 1967. [↑](#)
8. Ibid. [↑](#)
9. Colin Legum, "Nigeria vs. Biafra: On Taking Sides," *Christianity and Crisis: A Christian Journal of Opinion*, xxix, no. 9 (March 26, 1969): 151. [↑](#)
10. Peter Enahoro, "A Night of Deep Waters" *Nigeria/Biafra*, April 1969. Peter Enahoro was the brother of late Anthony Enahoro, former Federal Commissioner for Information and Labour under General Gowon. Peter's support or sympathy appears to have been with Biafra. [↑](#)
11. Gordon Wainman, "I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre," *Toronto Daily Star*, December 14, 1968. [↑](#)
12. Report of the Atrocities Tribunal: Appendix B: Eyewitness Accounts of the 1966 Pogrom, December 1966. [↑](#)
13. Ntiyong U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession, 1866-1970* (London: Frank Cass, 1972), 152. [↑](#)
14. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "A Condemned People." [↑](#)
15. NAE (Unclassified document), "Understanding the Nigerian Crisis," Benin: Department of International Affairs and Information, Benin, 1968, 5. [↑](#)
16. Stephen May et al., *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 8-9. [↑](#)
17. Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria* (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 242. [↑](#)
18. Nigeria Ministry of Information, *The Struggle for One Nigeria* (Lagos: Ministry of Information, 1967), 3. [↑](#)



19. Department of State, Telegram, The Death of Akahan, August 1967. [↑](#)
20. Ibid. [↑](#)
21. John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 26. [↑](#)
22. Ibid., 150. [↑](#)
23. National Archives United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO 38/222, Political Affairs, (Internal) Demonstration. [↑](#)
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25. Suzanne Cronje, "Two Levels of Truth," *Nigeria/Biafra*, April 1969. [↑](#)
26. U.S. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Document 35. [↑](#)
27. Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles at Amanki Village in Ikun Clan of Biase Local Government Area, April 14, 1994. Transcript in my custody. The informant is described as victim-survivor because, she lost her four day old baby and grandmother. [↑](#)
28. Department of State, Telegram, Nigerian Rebel Atrocities, May 1968. [↑](#)
29. Ibid. [↑](#)
30. Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles. [↑](#)
31. Ibid. [↑](#)
32. Presbyterian Church of Canada Archives (hereafter PCCA), "The Secessionist Regime and the Non-Ibo 'Minorities' in the East of Nigeria." This was a text of statements at the Peace Talks on the Nigerian Civil War, at Kampala, Uganda. Ikpeme who was a retired senior medical officer in the former Eastern Region also served as a member of the Federal Government delegation at the Kampala Peace Talks. [↑](#)
33. Ibid. [↑](#)
34. "The Nigerian Civil War: the Way Out," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1968. [↑](#)
35. Bende area covers some local governments in the present-day Abia State. [↑](#)
36. S. B. A. Atuloma, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 18,

1990. Transcript in my custody. [↑](#)
37. Ibid. [↑](#)
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40. Donald Musgrave, "Priest Tells of War Atrocities," *The Irish Times*, May 23, 1968. [↑](#)
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42. House of Commons Report on the Nigerian Situation, London, August 27, 1968. [↑](#)
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44. "Graham –Douglas Speaks," *West Africa*, August 17, 1968. [↑](#)
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48. P. C. Amadi, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Owerri, September 19, 1990. Transcript in my custody. Amadi was a brigadier in the Biafran Army. [↑](#)
49. Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, *The Case for Biafra*, first independence anniversary edition (Enugu: Ministry of Information, Republic of Biafra, June 12, 1968), 28-29. [↑](#)
50. Ibid., 27-28. [↑](#)
51. Quoted in Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, 23. [↑](#)
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54. Emeka Uhegbu, interview by author, July 14, 2011. Field Administrator, Ministry of Defence-sponsored Humanitarian Demining Project. The project was mandated by the United Nations Organization under the Ottawa Convention of 2001. [↑](#)
55. Uhegbu, interview by author. [↑](#)

56. Ibid. [↑](#)

## CHAPTER 10

### Old Wine in a New Bottle:

### Is 'Africapitalism' an Antidote to Africa's Developmental Crisis?

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## INTRODUCTION

Africa has been enmeshed in a crisis of development since its integration into the global market through colonialism and globalization. While governments across the continent and other stakeholders have attempted an array of solutions to the continent's perennial and existential challenges, these solutions have recorded some fluctuating fortunes. This chapter examines the phenomenon of Africapitalism as one of the solutions to Africa's developmental crisis. An eclectic theoretical orientation weaved around the Marxist, dependency, and the world system theories is the basis of this analysis. The study argues that the concept of Africapitalism, despite being homegrown, has fallen short to solve this developmental crisis because it was anchored on modernization and neoliberalism. The study, therefore, recommends, among other things, that as long as the concept of Africapitalism is domestic with foreign components, it may not be able to address Africa's perennial development crisis. Thus, a homegrown antidote that

addresses Africa's historical, socio-cultural, and economic peculiarities must be developed.

Africa is blessed with mineral, human, and capital resources. However, these tripartite endowments have not lifted the continent out of poverty and its developmental crisis. This explains Africa's underdevelopment paradox. The continent has an abysmal record in terms of development. Some reasons have been specified as causes of Africa's development crises, from the nature of the post-colonial state;<sup>1</sup> the debt crisis<sup>2</sup> impact of colonialism;<sup>3</sup> colonial capitalism, state terrorism, and racism;<sup>4</sup> oligarchy and its lack of political will; religion; institutions; cross-border conflict; weak institutions; and multi-dimensional dimensions,<sup>5</sup> among other factors. To address these issues, scholars, think-tanks, agents, and global development financial institutions have proffered models and

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<sup>1</sup> H. Alavi, "The Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh" *New Left Review*, Vol 1 No 74, (1972): 59-81; Peter P. Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 17, No. 1. (1975): 91-112.

<sup>2</sup> U. Ezenwe, "The African debt crisis and the challenge of development," *Intereconomics* Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Vol.28, Iss. 1, (1993): 35-43, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02928100>

<sup>3</sup> W. Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. (Dar-ES-Salaam: Bogle-L'Overture Publications, 1972); S. Ocheni, & B. C. Nwankwo "Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa" *Cross- Cultural Communication*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2012): 46-54; W. Rodney, *History of the Guyanese working people 1881-1905* ed. Franklin W Knight and Richard Price (London: Heinemann educational books 1981).

<sup>4</sup> J. Asafa, "The Triple Causes of African Underdevelopment: Colonial Capitalism, State Terrorism and Racism" *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (2015): 75-91.

<sup>5</sup> A. O. Augustine "The Crisis of Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Multi-dimensional Perspectives" *Journal of Political Science & Public Affairs*, Vol.6. No 4.(2018): 1-9

policies to address these developmental crises of the continent and its developing countries.<sup>6</sup> However, resolving the problem of the post-colonial state after many decades seems to have defied all possible solutions. Prominent political scientist Julius Ihonvbere posits that all attempts to tamper with Africa's role and peripheral location in the world capitalist system have been cosmetic.<sup>7</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to align with the provision of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy as regards to economic development. The constitution states that the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power, directs its policy toward ensuring the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development, harnesses and distributes as best as possible the material resources of the nation to serve the common good, and provides every citizen with equality of rights, obligation, and opportunities before the law.<sup>8</sup> This chapter examines another intervention known as "Africapitalism" as a proposed panacea to address the developmental crisis of the Nigerian State. It further examines the actors and interests of the ideology.

## **THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATION**

A multifaceted theoretical orientation weaved around Marxist theory, dependency theory, and the world system theories forms the basis of this analysis. Marx's analysis of capitalism is relevant to this discourse as it exposes the extraction of surplus value from

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<sup>6</sup> Some of these were the Development plans, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Green Revolution, Operation Feed the Nation, National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), etc.

<sup>7</sup> Julius Ihonvbere, "Introduction: Underdevelopment and Crisis in Africa" In Ihonvbere J ed *The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake*. Lagos: JAD Publishers, (1989): 15-28.

<sup>8</sup> Federal Republic of Nigeria, *1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Fundamental Rights*. (Abuja: Lagos Printers., 1999), Chapter II: LL 25-LL 30

owners of the only productive power (i.e., labor) by vendors of the means of production including raw materials, factories, machines, and wage labor. These unequal relations of production lead to irreconcilable class antagonisms between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The social relations of production are further cemented through the instrument of the capitalist state, which always defends capital against labor because the state's self-reproduction depends on the primitive capital accumulation. Lenin argues that the need for raw materials and foreign markets to export excess supply prompted the capitalists to foreign colonies.<sup>9</sup>

Dependency scholars such as Samir Amin and Walter Rodney examine how the global north under-develops the global south. For them, the relations that exist within the metropole have taken a global dimension such that the global north becomes the bourgeoisie while the south becomes the proletariat.<sup>10</sup> They argue that the continued dependence on the market of the global north for raw materials or extractive materials serves as the underbelly of Africa's developmental crisis.<sup>11</sup> In such historically determined relations of production, the global south has to delink from the global capitalist system before the global south will undergo development. To understand the origin of this complex bourgeoisie, Segun Osoba divides them into two categories.<sup>12</sup> They are "the business and the technocratic or bureaucratic bourgeoisie."<sup>13</sup> He argues that the business bourgeoisie comprises mainly those self-employed Nigerians who are in commerce,

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<sup>9</sup> D. G Smith, "Lenin's Imperialism: A Study in the Unity of Theory and Practice" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (1955): 546—569.

<sup>10</sup> S. Amin, "On Delegitimizing Capitalism: The Scourge of Africa and the South" *Africa's Development*, Vol.1XXXVII, No. 4. (2012): 15-72; W. Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. (Dar-ES-Salaam: Bogle-L'Overture Publications), 1972.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> S. Osoba, "The Nigerian Power Elite." - In: Gutkind, Peter and Peter Waterman (eds.): *Africans Socials Studies—A Radical Reader*. London: Monthly Review Press. (1977): 368-382.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

industry, and other corporate institutions, and who closely identified with the governing parties in the regions, at the federal levels, or both while the technocratic or bureaucratic bourgeoisie includes those Nigerians with considerable academic and professional training (e.g., army officers, university professors, lawyers, senior civil servants) who work in the public or quasi-public services; for the big foreign firms; or in full or partial self-employment as lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, bankers, and similar professional roles.<sup>14</sup> Osoba was clear on this arrangement when he warned that the Nigerian national bourgeoisie exerts the greatest influence on the Nigerian neo-colonial state and that it is from the national bourgeoisie that the neo-colonial state is drawn.<sup>15</sup> Osoba has elsewhere stated that the then-former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo had divided the bourgeoisie into four categories: the commercial or business trading outpost agents, the bureaucratic trading outpost agents, the technical trading outpost agents, and the intellectual trading outpost agents.<sup>16</sup>

World-systems analysis, for Wallenstein, underscores how the global capitalist system constructs different regions on the basis of the division of labor involving the periphery, semi-periphery, and core countries.<sup>17</sup> He argues that the periphery supplies raw materials, natural resources, and market to both the semi-periphery and the core; the semi-periphery supplies cheap labor to the core and manufactured goods to the periphery; the core exploits the other two by exporting foreign direct investment to them and expatriating of capital from them. These theoretical underpinnings are relevant to the discourse because they do not only explain the concepts, but they also place the contextualization in its proper perspectives.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>16</sup> S. Osoba, "The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie" *Review of African Political Economy*, 5, 13: (1978): 63-77.

<sup>17</sup> I. Wallenstein, *Modern World Systems III*. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989).



## **CAPITALISM AND THE (UNDER)DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN AFRICA**

The concept of capitalism is important because Africa was forcefully integrated into the system through British Colonial incursion in the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the structure of the neo-colonial state is related to its colonial history as a result of the centrality of the state and thus cannot be discussed in isolation from its neo-colonial base.<sup>19</sup>

Capitalism concentrates the means of wealth production in a few hands and by unequal distribution of the products of human labor.<sup>20</sup> But the core aim of capitalism is to accumulate profit. Thus, the production of goods and services as well as the commodified labor is compensated based on the interest of the owner. In other words, whatever labor gets does not come from the benevolence of the owner but his or her own interest.<sup>21</sup> Capitalism is, however, based on the following pillars: private property, self-interest and competition, a market mechanism, freedom to choose, and limited role of government. <sup>22</sup> By this setup, capitalism thrives on the basis of no government intervention. This notion changed during the Great Depression of the 1930s in which the

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<sup>18</sup> D. A. Ityavyar, "The Political Economy of Health Care Problems in Nigeria." *Ufahamu*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (1983): 45-63

<sup>19</sup> D. A. Ityavyar, "The State, Class and Health Services in Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 22, No. 3, (1987): 285-314.

<sup>20</sup> W. Rodney, *History of the Guyanese working people 1881-1905* ed. Franklin W Knight and Richard Price (London: Heinemann educational books, 1981); Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*, 7.

<sup>21</sup> S. Jahan and A. S. Mahmud, "What is Capitalism? Free markets may not be perfect but they are probably the best way to organize an economy" *Finance and Development*, (2015): 44-45.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

government had to intervene to address the global economic downturn. To ameliorate the challenges, John Maynard Keynes argued that until there is government intervention by cutting taxes and increasing its spending, laissez-faire capitalist economies would fail and struggle. Keynes' point was further asserted by some scholars that society must save capitalism from the capitalists. His assertion was based on the argument that since the capitalist economy allows for competition which results in winners and losers, some elites or capitalists may influence government's policies to gain monopoly.<sup>23</sup> As prominent African scholar Claude Ake notes, "the capitalist mode of production polarizes into a very small group of people who monopolize the available means of production, and the vast majority who essentially have no means of production."<sup>24</sup>

Be that as it may, capitalism appears not to have enjoyed a wide acceptability among some scholars both outside and within the African continent as they believe that the philosophy, rather than uplifting them, has made their lots worse. Thus, rather than the market forces determining price, these few individuals have continued to set the agenda and have also taken different toga. From national bourgeoisie, national business bourgeoisie, comprador bourgeoisie, to auxiliary bourgeoisie or ruling class, Osoba warned of the power they wield in the post-colonial state.<sup>25</sup>

Renowned political economist and Marxist scholar, Yusuf Bangura argues that capitalism created a high-import dependency syndrome, over-reliance on oil revenue for economic development, and expansive projects that mainly benefited the private sector.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> R. Rajan, and Luigi, Z. *Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity*. (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2003).

<sup>24</sup> C. Ake *A Political Economy of Africa*. (Nigeria: Longman, 1981), 14.

<sup>25</sup> Osoba, "The Nigerian Power Elite." - 370-382.

<sup>26</sup> Y. Bangura, "IMF and World Bank conditionality and Nigeria's Structural Adjustment Programme" In K.J. Havnevik, ed. *The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: Conditionality,*

Sharing a similar notion, Dunning avers that capitalism may be the best economic option knowledgeable to mankind in the creation of wealth, but its current state has resulted in all manners of rectitude ranging from an increase in poverty to environmental and security challenges.<sup>27</sup> While the author may have hyped the philosophy as the best to have happened to mankind, such a statement is reckless, "Euro-Saxon"-centric, and hypocritical; a valid and germane point was made because of its present implication. There is no doubt that the unpopularity of capitalism as well as its failure to take the post-colonial states out of the development conundrum has led to the underdevelopment crisis in Africa. What then are these crises?

The African crisis is multifaceted as it stems from social and political to economic and cultural. Onimode adds that the African crisis is also accentuated by intellectual deficits. However, he divided the crisis into structural and historical.<sup>28</sup> He further held that:

Africa's political contour is disturbed, with widespread and growing repression, resulting in a massive refugee problem, coups and counter-coups, apartheid oppression and external subversion. Then, too, there is the intellectual crisis, which results not merely from the lingering colonial mentality and foreign intellectual domination, but from the dominant bourgeois scholarship's fundamental irrelevance to African social reality, especially in the imported social services.<sup>29</sup>

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*Impact and Alternatives*. Uppsalla: Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, 1987) 95-118.

<sup>27</sup> J.H. Dunning, "Is Global Capitalism Morally Defensible?", *Contributions to Political Economy*, Vol. 24: (2005): 135–51.

<sup>28</sup> B. Onimode, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*. (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988),

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid

Ihonbere avers that these developmental crises have been exacerbated by the contact with the forces of western imperialism, which did not only distort, disarticulate, and under-develop the continent, but which also ensured its structured incorporation into and peripheralization in the international division of labor.<sup>30</sup> He further held that the implication of such an arrangement manifests in unequal exchange, dependence of African states on the production and exportation of a narrow range of cash crops for foreign exchange earnings, dependence on cash crops, vulnerability of price fluctuations largely due to the manipulation of multinational corporations and their home governments, scientific and technological backwardness, among other effects.<sup>31</sup> Some scholars at an international conference in Kinshasa in 2015 called on African countries to reduce their excessive dependency on raw material exports and imported consumer goods and services as the only alternative to addressing the poverty and social inequality on the continent.<sup>32</sup>

Africa remains poor, and extreme poverty leads to hunger. More than 30 percent of African children suffer from growth disorders, such as stunting, due to their chronic malnutrition; the region has the highest infant mortality rate in the world; 59 million children between the ages of five and 17 years are still out of school, among other

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<sup>30</sup> J. Ihonbere, "Introduction: Underdevelopment and Crisis in Africa" 15-16.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>32</sup> Africa Development Bank Group [ADBG] "Africa must reduce its dependency on raw material exports and imports" (2015, November 5). <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africa-must-reduce-its-dependency-on-raw-material-exports-and-imports-14957>

manifestations of widespread poverty.<sup>33</sup> Foremost African economist and investor Tony Elumelu attests to the inhumane condition of the African continent and the people.<sup>34</sup>

The case of Nigeria is even more pathetic. The country was designated as the capital base of poverty in the world since 2018, and the country is presently experiencing fragility and poverty with about 90 million poor people, half of whom are children under 15 years old.<sup>35</sup> In 2021, the country was labeled a failed state.<sup>36</sup> The characteristics of underdevelopment associated with the continent include infrastructural deficits, a poor healthcare system, bad governance, an unfavorable political economy, over-dependence on oil or Dutch syndrome, and a poor investment base.

While the modernists and foreign powers have attempted to address the crises of developing states, including Africa, through modernists theories and neoliberal policies that thrive on Africa as a producer of only raw materials and capitalism with privatization of its economy, respectively. Scholars and stakeholders from these areas have suggested what best suits them. It is against this backdrop that the philosophy of Africapitalism has been espoused. This raises the question: will Africapitalism resolve Nigeria's

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<sup>33</sup> *SOS Africa*, "Poverty in Africa—The Indicators" (no date) <https://www.sos-usa.org/about-us/where-we-work/africa/poverty-in-africa> (accessed 22 June 2021).

<sup>34</sup> T. O. Elumelu, "Africapitalism and Africa's Sustainable Development" *Horizon*, Vol 6, No. 6. (2016). At <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2016--issue-no-6/editorial> (accessed 19 June 2021).

<sup>35</sup> J. Baier, M. . B , Kristensen, and Davidsen, S. "Poverty and Fragility: Where will the poor live in 2023?" *Brookings*. (2021, April 19). <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/04/19/poverty-and-fragility-where-will-the-poor-live-in-2030> (accessed 24 June 2021).

<sup>36</sup> R. I. Rotberg, and J. Campbell, "Nigeria Is a Failed State" *Foreign Policy* (2021, May 7)

developmental crises? Some scholars have also asked if Africapitalism is Africa's developmental magic wand.<sup>37</sup>

## **RESOLVING AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL CRISIS THROUGH (AFRI)CAPITALISM**

The basis for Africapitalism is based on Ubuntu. Ubuntu was proposed by Kwame Nkrumah, who based its principles on Africa's dignity in the thoughts of post-colonial leaders, such as Obafemi Awolowo, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, and<sup>38</sup> Ubuntu is an African philosophy that underscores the development of the continent based on Africa's communalism.

The concept of Africapitalism was proposed in 2011 by one of Nigeria's leading entrepreneurs and capitalists, Tony Elumelu. It is an economic philosophy that embodies the private sectors to take the initiative in the economic transformation of the African continent through investments that generate both economic prosperity and social wealth without depending on foreigners.<sup>39</sup> Political economist Kingsley Moghalu appears to also be a modernization apologist and claimed that Africa is the last frontier of capitalism, a fact which is historical considering existing realities on the continent.<sup>40</sup> For the proponents of Africapitalism, Africa lacks such parameters associated with a capitalist world as private ownership of means of production and foreign direct investment. Thus, these proponents see a unique "opportunity" for Africa's development with a greater involvement of the

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<sup>37</sup> E. Adegbite, O. Daodu, and J. Wood, "Will Africapitalism work? *Africa Journal of Management*, Vol. 6, 4 (2020): 419-434

<sup>38</sup> C. B. N. Gade, "The Historical Development of the Written Discourses on Ubuntu." *S. Afr. J. Philos.* Vol. 30 No. 3: (2011) 303-329

<sup>39</sup> Elumelu, "Africapitalism and Africa's Sustainable Development"

<sup>40</sup> K. Moghalu, *Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy's Last Frontier Can Prosper and Matter*, (United Kingdom: Penguin, 2014)

local bourgeoisie in determining the socioeconomic conditions of labor and other oppressed classes in Africa.

Africapitalism emphasizes that African business meets social and economic needs by creating goods and services with an innate understanding of the local environment and needs.<sup>41</sup> There are three fundamental tenets of Africapitalism. These are wealth creation, entrepreneurship funds, and transparent competitive markets. Some of the defining principles of Africapitalism are inclusive capitalism, responsible capitalism, sustainable capitalism, and progressive capitalism, and its four tenets include a sense of progress and prosperity, a sense of parity, a sense of peace, and harmony, and finally a sense of place and belonging.<sup>42</sup> In this respect, the Africapitalism project emphasizes collective benefit whereby the advancement of communal good is expected to stimulate business progress.<sup>43</sup> At a conference in Ghana in 2017, Tony Elumelu, while answering some questions from journalists, affirmed Africapitalism as the magic wand to Africa's underdevelopment and that this was achievable if Africans realized that investing at home was better than investing abroad but that government must be carried along so as to understand that whatever will be beneficial to the private sector will be better for the larger society.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> I. Abba, "What Does Africapitalism Actually Mean? Power, Gender and the Promise of Africapitalism." *The Republic*. (2022, December 21/January 22) <https://republic.com.ng/december-21-january-22/what-does-africapitalism-mean/>

<sup>42</sup> K. Amaeshi and U. Idemudia, "Africapitalism: A Management Idea for Business in Africa?", *Africa Journal of Management*, Vol. 1.No. 2, (2015): 215-216, DOI: 10.1080/23322373.2015.1026229

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> F. K. Forson, "Nigerian Millionaire Says 'Africapitalism' a Solution to Africa's Joblessness" *Voice of Africa*. (2017, March 16). <https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-millionaire-says-africapitalism-solution-africas-joblessness> (accessed 9 July 2021).

Evidently, African financial technology (fintech) start-ups have generated about \$400 million in 2015, and there are postulations that this amount would further grow.<sup>45</sup> Tony Elumelu and other capitalists have also continued to give grants to African start-ups and generate employment opportunities across the continent, Nigeria in particular. But the question remains: how sustainable are these gestures, or put differently, have these gestures addressed Africa's existential crises?

## **OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLE?**

### **TRAVAILS OF AFRICAPITALISM IN NIGERIA**

The preceding analysis has shown that Africapitalism would aid investment, promote wealth, and generally, grow Africa's economy and Nigeria in particular. However, it appears that after almost a decade after its introduction, Africa remains neck-deep in underdevelopment.

In an assessment of the concept of Africapitalism, some factors have been specified for its failure or weaknesses in Nigeria. Adegbite, et al., gave six limitations to the potential of Africapitalism.<sup>46</sup> They are, for lack of a clear interpretation, inability to properly delineate the complexity of the philosophy; absence of provision for any other alternative structure for the implementation of the philosophy; the question of whether it is normative or abstract since it only suggests ways by which firms behave in a feeble institutional environment; blurry lines on ethical issues that Africapitalism has not been able to distinctively clarify; and finally the framing of the philosophy in capitalist

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<sup>45</sup> T. Kene-Okafor, "How African startups raised investments in 2020" *TechCrunch*. (2021, February 11). At <https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/11/how-african-startups-raised-investments-in-2020/>

<sup>46</sup> Adegbite, et al "Will Africapitalism work?" 419-434



shadows.<sup>47</sup> On their part they stated that corruption, political instability, bad governance, and difficulty of doing business are some of the hindrances to Africapitalism to thrive.<sup>48</sup> While these points are instructive, they are deficient because they only analyze the ideology of Africapitalism from an ethical or business prism. Clearly, such explanations are highly insufficient, leading to an intellectual impasse. What then are these limitations from the prism of political economy?

First, like capitalism, the ideology of Africapitalism is self-serving and based on primitive accumulation, which does not only divorce the producer from the means of production but also enslaves and exploits the laborers. In other words, it only serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and capitalist agents. The likes of Aliko Dangote, Tony Elumelu, and Wale Adenuga, among others, have only embraced the ideology in order to avoid competition from the outside. Former Ghana president and political philosopher Kwameh Nkrumah warned of such a mistake where the cookie-jar is handed over to only a few. As the concept connotes, development and investment must be from home-grown investors to take the continent and country out of poverty.<sup>49</sup> They also assert that the government spoon-feeds them by giving them all the necessary incentives and providing an adequate environment for them to thrive. The irony of this idea is even when the government does these things, the elite classes have never increased the number of workers or benefited the populace by reducing the prices of their products or paying the true value of its labor force. The Backward Integration Policy (BIP) of the Olusegun Obasanjo administration indicated that only importers who could guarantee the establishment of local

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> D. Tambi and V. Kum, "The concept of Africapitalism and the role of the private Sector in Africa's socioeconomic development the concept of Africapitalism and the role of the private sector in Africa's socioeconomic development" Working paper. Nkafu Policy Institute, 2021)

<sup>49</sup> K. Nkrumah, K. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last State of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers, 1965).

industries would be given import licenses, and this policy has not only stifled many foreign investors but has also made the like of the Dangote Group monopolize and control the fate of cement prices in Nigeria.<sup>50</sup> This policy has also made the company control about 60% of Nigeria's cement market and the largest homegrown cement producer in Africa.<sup>51</sup> Obasanjo puts it succinctly:

The challenges Nigerian domestic manufacturers face in many sectors are not necessarily always caused by imports but simply because they are nearly not as competitive as they need to be. There is a need for an honest recognition that industrial policies that prioritise only protection without an equal focus on capabilities and competitiveness are harmful, detrimental to our local manufacturers and undermine our efforts to diversify exports.<sup>52</sup>

This sense of detrimental effects has been reflected in the prices of cement, which is locally produced in Nigeria, especially by these bourgeois classes. For example, in spite of the incentives that the Dangote Group enjoys from the government, the prices of its cement moved from ₦1800 (\$4.5) in 2013 to ₦3600 (\$9) in 2021. It must be noted that in spite of the rise of some of these local industrialists (national bourgeoisie) as espoused by the proponents of Africapitalism in the cement industry, the prices remain one of the highest in Africa as compared to the \$5.03 sale price in South Africa, which has a highly competitive market and industries.<sup>53</sup>

Secondly, the class struggle or internal wrangling among the capitalist class is one other factor that may continue to hinder the advancement of Africapitalism. In fact, Marx

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<sup>50</sup> N. Ogbonna, "How trade policies make domestic industries uncompetitive" *Stears Business*. (2021, March 7). <https://www.stearsng.com/article/how-trade-policies-make-domestic-industries-uncompetitive> (accessed 22 June 2021).

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

believed that this may be the end of capitalism as it would become extinct by sowing the seeds of its destruction.<sup>54</sup> Economic power is being concentrated in the minority class of the Bourgeoisie whereas the majority class members of the proletariat do not have economic power because of their state of alienation and indignation.<sup>55</sup> The way forward from the bourgeoisie is to create wealth by giving the working class or entrepreneurs a token (grant). The question remains: who owns the wealth and what is its source? Without mincing words, these are derivatives from the surplus product after the cost of production is paid. As a renowned political economist, Ekekwe argues that “there is a difference if this income/wealth derives either from wages or from revenue. The owner of the means of production or the non-owner who performs (at least part of) the function of capital derives his income from revenue.”<sup>56</sup>

The reason for the class struggle in most cases is not for the benefit of society as capitalism espouses; rather, it is for surplus value that the capitalists aim to gain from the labor. To be sure, when the Chairman of BUA Group, Alhaji Abdulsamad Rabiu, commissioned a sugar factory in Port Harcourt, the Chairman of Dangote Industries Ltd, Aliko Dangote, and the Chairman of Flour Mills of Nigeria Plc, John Coumantaros, accused Rabiu of not only violating the laws laid down in the National Sugar Policy but that his action would distort the country’s local sugar industry.<sup>57</sup> At first, it would seem that Dangote and Coumantaros were on the side of the populace, but no doubt that they were for their self-interest as they knew that having many local industries would saturate the market and drastically reduce the prices of the commodity. The wrangling among the

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<sup>54</sup> M. A. Adebisi, “Reflections on Theories of social change” In Salawu B (ed.) *Sociology, Concepts and Themes: An Introduction*. Ibadan: Cresthill Publishers. (2007): 188-205

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 194.

<sup>56</sup> E. Ekekwe, *Class and State in Nigeria*. (London: Longman., 1986). 6

<sup>57</sup> O. Sunday, “BUA fires back as Dangote engages company in Sugar war” *Daily Post*. (2021, April 9) <https://dailypost.ng/2021/04/09/bua-fires-back-as-dangote-engages-company-in-sugar-war/> (accessed 22 June 2021).

bourgeoisie would suggest to many that they are fighting because of the proletariat or working class, but in reality, it appears that these internal strivings are only but smokescreen, as they cooperate and align with their interests among themselves and their metropolitan counterparts. This possibility was further macadamized when the Nigerian business bourgeoisie who act as commission agents visited France in 2021 to further promote trade between both countries in the pretext of a Nigeria-France bilateral relation. The leader of the Nigerian delegate, Abdul Salam Rabiou, assured the French companies and its business elite of providing the platform to facilitate their penetration into Nigeria's market as the country was endowed with numerous potentials in solid minerals, mining, manufacturing, and food processing sectors.<sup>58</sup> A critical examination of these factors shows that there was no attempt to prioritize the exportation of finished goods or technological transfer, which is the hallmark of capitalism; rather, it was to further promote the imperialist and modernist ideology of Africa supplying the raw materials. Such parallel lines where the national business bourgeoisie and the national bureaucratic bourgeoisie and government walk are what some scholars have warned against because they posit that such an arrangement will not move the state forward even if the government was genuinely committed to iron-cast the foreign exchange because the Nigerian business bourgeoisie are not willing to cooperate.<sup>59</sup>

The idea of a transparent competitive market by the Africapitalists is also not only questionable but also jaundiced. To be sure, the government has not been fair to the major players in the industries as some seem to enjoy government patronage more than others. This unequal playfield given to the players has not only led to the demise of many industries, but it has also led to low foreign direct investment (FDI) and ipso facto, low gross domestic product. This reflects the state of the Nigerian society despite its proposal

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<sup>58</sup> *The Guardian Newspaper* "France-Nigeria Business Council to bolster bilateral ties" (2021, June 30). <https://guardian.ng/business-services/france-nigeria-business-council-to-bolster-bilateral-ties/> (Accessed 9 July 2021).

<sup>59</sup> Osoba,) "The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie" 72

for Africapitalism. In 2016, the federal government promised to grant more than \$14 billion to the Dangote Group for the establishment of his refineries and fertilizer plant even when the country was complaining of a shortage of foreign exchange due to the country's dwindling foreign reserves because of the slump in oil prices.<sup>60</sup> And rather than the government mandating the capitalists to regulate their prices since they enjoy government support and subventions, the government even became the spokesperson for the group. For instance, it was not surprising when the Minister of Finance and National Planning, Zainab Ahmed, declared that Nigerians should not expect lower prices of fuel by the time Dangote Refinery takes off in 2021 because Alhaji Dangote will be selling at an international selling price.<sup>61</sup> It is not surprising that such a statement is coming from a member of the national bourgeoisie, whose paymaster had abandoned state refineries to give allowance and unhindered access to foreign exchange even at a lower rate than official rates to the over-pampered child, the Dangote Group.<sup>62</sup> Any wonder then that economic historian Moses Ochonu describes Dangote as the poster child for patrimonial monopoly capitalism in Nigeria.<sup>63</sup> Ochonu aptly captures it:

The Nigerian people basically sell him their oil revenue dollars at the heavily subsidized rate of 199 Naira, taking an instant loss of at least 100 Naira for every dollar they sell to him. It is undeserved instant profit at the expense

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<sup>60</sup> C. Oguh . "CBN to provide forex support for Dangote refinery" *Financial Nigeria*. (2016, January 11). <http://www.financialnigeria.com/cbn-to-provide-forex-support-for-dangote-refinery-sustainable-photovideo-details-288.html>

<sup>61</sup> P. Okafor, "Dangote refinery will not reduce price of petrol — FG." *Vanguard*. (2020, September 14) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/09/dangote-refinery-will-not-reduce-price-of-petrol-%E2%80%95-fg/>

<sup>62</sup> The refinery has not even taken off as at October 2022

<sup>63</sup> M. E. Ochonu, "The Dangote Paradox" *Sahara Reporters*. (2016, March 25) <http://saharareporters.com/2016/03/25/dangote-paradox-moses-e-ochonu> (accessed 22 June 2021).

of Nigeria. To compound this skewed deal, other businessmen with equally legitimate business needs do not enjoy this guaranteed Forex access.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly, Akinola posits that the Dangote Group enjoys nothing but rent-seeking patronage.<sup>65</sup> But Dangote is not the only one who enjoys such an undue advantage over other industrialists. To be sure, Dangote Group, BUA Sugar, and only a few other industrialists were allowed to export goods outside the shores of Nigeria, especially its Benin and Niger Republic borders, because the government wanted to curb smuggling and boost local production.<sup>66</sup> This unequal relation has also transcended into inter-state or inter-governmental levels, thereby enriching a few to the detriment of the majority. Another celebrated case was the alleged grant given to one tech company owned by Adamu Garba in 2019 to develop a homegrown application known as Crowwe to rival some foreign application software such as Twitter and Facebook.<sup>67</sup> While it is not a bad idea to grant such to local inventors, this particular case was not through competitive bidding in line with extant public procurement regulations and international best practices. Similarly, in 2020, the federal government gave a federating unit the license to mine its gold reserves and keep the proceeds. Although this gesture is the ideal posture of federalism, the misapplication of such gesture to some States while denying others only smacks of ethnicity, nepotism, and contradictions. This is because it not only enriches

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> A. O. Akinola, "rent Seeking and Industrial Growth in Africa: The Case of Dangote's Cement Industry" CESRAN, Vol 9, 1 (2019).

<sup>66</sup> E, Onu and T. Alake, "Nigeria Exempts Dangote, 2 Others from Border Closure" Bloomberg. (2020, November 9) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-09/nigeria-exempts-dangote-cement-from-land-border-closure> (accessed 22 June 2021).

<sup>67</sup> M. Ileyemi, "EXCLUSIVE: Bank document expose how Buhari regime funded Adamu Garba's Crowwe to rival Facebook, Twitter" Peoples Gazette. (2021, June 23). At <https://gazettengr.com/exclusive-bank-documents-expose-how-buhai-regime-funded-adamu-garbas-crowwe-to-rival-facebook-twitter> (accessed 24 June 2021).

a few but also widens the poverty gap in society. Moreover, Nigeria, like most African countries, continues to play the raw material supplier to the developed economies. And in terms of expatriates, the key stakeholders and workers at the higher cadre of these industries continue to be dominated by foreigners and despite the local content law of the Federal Government, much has not been achieved to turn the tide. This is because more than half of Nigeria's output is still generated from the primary sector, mainly agricultural and extractive industries.<sup>68</sup>

Finally, other factors such as insecurity, foreign exchange manipulation or instability, energy challenges, lack of technological and scientific knowhow to transform the primary sectors for self-utilization, and bad leadership will continue to affect the workability of Africapitalism in Africa or the developing countries and Nigeria in particular. For example, the so-called tech entrepreneurs do not own the technology under which they operate. Such imitation without owning the technology or space is even dangerous and will eventually lead to failure just as the importation of socialism by some post-colonial African states who claimed to be apprentices or appendages of socialism.<sup>69</sup> What then is the essence of funding entrepreneurs without the basics—technology and wealth? In other words, how can they survive in an insecure and uncondusive environment for business? Any wonder then that unemployment rate in Africa's so-called <sup>70</sup> *tech hubs*

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<sup>68</sup> L. N. Chete, J. O. Adeoti, Adeyinka, F. M. and Ogundele, O "Industrial development and growth in Nigeria: Lessons and challenges." Working Paper. No 8. (2014).

<sup>69</sup> A. O. Olutayo and Omobowale, A.O. (2007) "Capitalism, Globalisation and the Underdevelopment Process in Africa/: History in perpetuity" *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXII, No 2. 97-112.

<sup>70</sup> 701,000 to 7.2million in South Africa; Nigeria is second highest in the globe. Nigeria has the second highest unemployment rate with 33 percent globally. Namibia is in front with 33.4%. see also, M. Vanek, "South Africa Unemployment Rises to Record as More Look For Jobs." Bloomberg. (2021, February 23).

More worrisome is putting the country's economy in the hands of a few, allowing the government to shirk from its duties as enshrined in the constitution. Even the disciples of Africapitalism or its marketing agents, Amaeshi & Idemudia, warned of the dangers of unguarded capitalism and its entirety as the causes of human rights infringements, inequality, and instability, among others.<sup>71</sup> If indeed they are conscious of the dangers of the Africapitalist philosophy, why then are they promoting its variant? Any wonder then that Ouma warned of any variant of capitalism which has been indicted as one of the destructive and dehumanization reagent to the global economic system and Africa's development<sup>72</sup>. Indeed, the Africapitalists have made an indigenous effort to turn around the African developmental crisis; unfortunately, it is an old wine brandished in an old bottle. Also, it focuses only on the economic aspect, thereby neglecting the multifaceted nature of the African development crisis.

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter has shown that in the quest to tackle the developmental crisis in Africa and Nigeria in particular, one of the national bourgeoisie proposed the concept of Africapitalism. Findings have shown that Africapitalism is but a neoliberal movement that is intended to cement the capitalist system with its local and global contradictions in Nigeria. It is rooted in an archaic form of capitalism but without an invisible hand.

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<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-23/south-africa-jobless-rate-rises-to-record-32-5-in-4th-quarter>

<sup>71</sup> Amaeshi, and Idemudia, "Africapitalism: A Management Idea for Business in Africa? 210-223.

<sup>72</sup> S. Ouma, 'Africapitalism' and the limits of any variant of capitalism" review of African Political Economy, (2020, July 16). <https://roape.net/2020/07/16/africapitalism-and-the-limits-of-any-variant-of-capitalism/> (accessed 9 July 2021). It also appeared in the Elephant blog. At <https://www.theelephant.info/ideas/2020/09/18/africapitalism-and-the-limits-of-any-variant-of-capitalism/?print=pdf>



Supporting this assertion, Laclau argues that capitalism is based on the extraction of surplus by the capitalist class, the concentration of power in the hands of a few, and unequal distribution of resources.<sup>73</sup> This no doubt infringes on the rights of the African people and again alienates government and the citizenry. Thus, Africapitalism has not been able to resolve the development crisis on the continent and Nigeria because it is nothing but an old wine brandished in a new bottle.

This chapter's point of analysis and argument is that while various philosophies to address the development crises in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, have been proposed, the case of Africapitalism has not deviated from the neo-liberal or modernist propositions. This is detrimental because these neo-liberal policies and programs have further impoverished the African continent, concretized its over-dependence on the global north, and further alienated the citizenry from its government. Simply put, Africapitalism is a desperate attempt to further the neoliberal agenda. Thus, for any development paradigm to solve Africa's perennial development crisis, the continent must not only delink from the ideology of the neoliberals or modernists, but Africa's development must also articulate the peculiarities of Africa's socio-economic, political, and historical roots, which must be holistic.

## ENDNOTES

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2. U. Ezenwe, "The African debt crisis and the challenge of development," *Intereconomics* Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Vol.28, Iss. 1, (1993): 35-43, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02928100>

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<sup>73</sup> E. Laclau, *Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America*. (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 1986).

3. W. Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. (Dar-ES-Salaam: Bogle-L'Overture Publications, 1972); S. Ocheni, & B. C. Nwankwo "Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa" *Cross- Cultural Communication*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2012): 46-54; W. Rodney, *History of the Guyanese working people 1881-1905* ed. Franklin W Knight and Richard Price (London: Heinemann educational books 1981).
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## **CHAPTER 11**

### **Colonial Legacies:**

# **Neo-Colonialism and Nation-Building Challenges in Post-Colonial Africa**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter focuses on two of contemporary Africa's main challenges, those of neo-colonialism and nation-building. While these challenges have exhibited new and emerging characteristics, and unlike scholarship that analyzes them as being recent, this chapter argues that both have antecedents set during the colonial period in Africa. In the post-colonial era, the continued influence of the former European colonial powers, their allies, and indeed other international actors, both states and multi-national firms, has made the challenges even worse. The exposure of African economies to the international community, the global geopolitics of the Cold War, and the intrusion of international monetary organizations have not only placed African economies and politics on the global scene but have also contributed to economic and socio-political instability. This does also not absolve the intra-state challenges in the continent, including poor quality of leadership; economic mismanagement; inefficient bureaucracies; and ethnic, political, racial, and religious tensions, all of which have contributed to Africa's current position. Approaching these issues from such local and transnational perspectives is important in putting socio-economic and political developments in Africa on a global map, for better and for worse. This chapter covers these issues in three major sections, namely the motivations for the colonization of the continent, economic and socio-political changes

under colonial rule, and post-colonial Africa's challenges on neo-colonialism and Nation-building.

## **COLONIZING THE AFRICAN CONTINENT**

Modern Africa is comprised of 54 independent states. European powers created the boundaries that separate the various states in the continent at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. According to Uzoigwe, this mapping occurred after the convening of the Berlin Conference from 1884 to 1885, itself the peak of the historical process called "The Scramble and Partition of Africa." Several factors precipitated the scramble, chief among them being economic motivations. In modern African history, the period between 1880 to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was one of the most significant eras, laying the foundations of what has since happened to most African countries. Four main perspectives explain the processes of scramble and partition of the African continent. First, there is economic theory, or the so-called "economic imperialism." Its proponents, including such figures as Vladimir Lenin and J.A. Hobson, argue that the European Industrial Revolution played a key role in influencing European imperialism at the time. The Industrial Revolution, which occurred in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, created demands for raw materials from Africa. It also made Africa an alternative potential market for European manufactured goods, especially those that the European population could not consume. There was also the need to export surplus capital outside of Europe, where banks and industries created "super profits," in what has elsewhere been described as "the highest stage of capitalism."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 20-21. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 263-268. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 206-207.



The second motivating factor comprises of psychological theories. These, among other things, focus on the notion that the Europeans' superiority complex drove European imperialism. The Europeans, it is argued, were of the view that their race, religion (especially Christianity), and indeed civilization were superior to those of Africans, justifying their colonization and domination of Africa.<sup>2</sup> Then there are the so-called diplomatic theories, which mainly explain the political motivations for European imperialism. They pinpoint the national egotism or prestige of European states that often pushed them toward competition within and outside Europe. The notion of popular nationalism drove part of this, whereby "the creation of new nations of Italy (1866) and Germany (1870)" threatened the European balance of power that had been there since the age of Napoleon at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. African colonization was thus a prerequisite for the great power status for such European countries as Belgium, Germany, and Portugal, who envied the extensive and established empires of Britain and France, among others. In other words, the European powers occupied Africa for strategic and political interests and not always because of the African continent's economic worthiness.<sup>3</sup> Lastly, there is the African dimension theory. This ideology asserts that Africans themselves had a role in what became the process of Scramble and Partition. The process traced back to over three hundred years of African and European economic contacts, chief among them being the slave trade. Following the abolition of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the subsequent transition to

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<sup>2</sup> G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 21-23. For the British Empire, see Peter J. Cain, "Character, 'ordered liberty,' and the mission to civilize: British moral justification of Empire, 1870-1914," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 40, no.4 (Nov. 2012): 557-578. For the French Empire, see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 23-25. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 268-269.

"legitimate trade," African resistance to increasing European influence precipitated the actual European conquest of the continent. This, in some parts of the continent, created room for "smooth" European acquisition of African territories.<sup>4</sup>

In 1884 the Berlin Conference, convened by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, deliberated and recognized claims of the various European powers to African territories. The conference culminated in the partition of the African continent, a process completed by the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Among other key issues, the conference emphasized the principle of effective occupation, whereby a territorial claim by a European power had to be followed by establishing<sup>5</sup> structures. This process included the installation of European officials in charge of colonial and territorial administration. The European powers gave themselves legal rights to claim African territories without the approval of the African peoples. The various motivations and processes that led to the partition and colonization of African territories at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century set in motion the political, social, and economic processes that African states and their peoples have undergone. Later, this chapter will show that the processes of neo-colonialism and challenges to achieve the nation-building agenda are attributed to the incorporation of current African countries into European colonial empires from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century through the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

## **AFRICA UNDER EUROPEAN COLONIAL RULE:**

### **LATE 19TH CENTURY TO THE MID-1960s**

The period when African states were under colonial rule lasted up to the mid-1960s (at most). This section focuses on the economic policies and practices of the European

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<sup>4</sup> G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 26-27.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 29-31. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 201-205.

powers that set in motion the neo-colonialist tendencies that modern-day African countries are struggling to resolve. The focus will also shift to the socio-political impacts of European colonial rule in African colonies, some of which laid the foundations for modern Africa's nation-building challenges.

## **ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL INTRUSION**

Once the European powers formally colonized various African territories, they began to get directly involved in the dynamics and trajectories of African economies. Their involvement was in multiple areas, including the production of cash crops, extraction and trading of mineral resources, and the use and exploitation of African wage labor. This sub-section discusses these encounters in detail.

As noted by Gilbert (2002), before European colonial intrusion, Africans were already economically engaged with the outside world, including with Europeans. Africans sold agricultural products, manufactured goods, forest products, and later, enslaved labor to Arabic, Asian, and European merchants. In return, the Africans received such products as cloth, iron, onions, and salt.<sup>6</sup> Walter Rodney has argued elsewhere, that during that time, the involvement of Africans in such trade transactions, from the late 15<sup>th</sup>,<sup>7</sup> a trend that has continued for the hundreds of years that have followed.<sup>8</sup> The advent of colonial

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<sup>6</sup> Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," in Toyin Falola, ed., *Africa, Vol.3: Colonial Africa, 1885-1939* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 107-108.

<sup>7</sup> Walter Rodney, "The colonial economy," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 332.

<sup>8</sup> Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," 107-108. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 211-223.

rule, however, increased and accelerated the levels of foreign intrusion in the economies of African states. In many instances that was to the detriment of the African economies.

Prior to colonial rule, most African societies were involved in subsistence agricultural production with households that produced foodstuffs for self-sufficiency or self-survival. They traded only surplus foodstuffs, not by using money, but by using a barter system (i.e., exchange of goods with other goods). Such forms of production also did not require the use of wage labor. Subsistence production often thrived from the labor of close family relations, friends, and neighbors. Other Africans with means also purchased and utilized enslaved labor, although they rarely used the latter. Africans in such societies also rarely paid regular taxes, as known in their modern use. Rather, some societies at times required the citizens to pay "tributes" to the rulers, either chiefs or kings and queens. They paid tributes based on the percentage that one had produced, either in the form of crops, animals, and animal products. The pre-colonial African states, big or small, never directly forced the rural producers on the types of crops to produce or types of animals to domesticate.<sup>9</sup>

Once colonial rule was established and entrenched, Africans lost their economic sovereignty and experienced a new colonial economic system, which developed over time and reached its prime in the aftermath of the Second World War. Although the development of colonial economies varied from colony to colony, in general terms, the period from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century up to the eve of the Second World War laid the foundations of what came in the war's aftermath (McCracken, 2012).<sup>10</sup> The transport and communication sectors were developed to create the basis for the economic exploitation of Africans and their resources. The Europeans constructed roads and railways and laid down telegraph lines. They strategically constructed these communication networks in

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<sup>9</sup> See for instance, John McCracken, *A History of Malawi, 1859-1956* (Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2012), 74-99.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Rodney, "The colonial economy," 332-333. See also Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," 109-110.

areas that served European economic and administrative interests, and in the process they helped to accelerate the processes of colonial economic exploitation. These infrastructural projects, or commercial networks, also accelerated the integration of various parts of the African colonies into global economic processes. The networks operated beyond African borders and helped to link Africans and their products to European metropolises.<sup>11</sup>

Apart from the infrastructural projects and commercial networks, the colonized Africans were also enticed—or in other cases coerced—into growing cash crops that would be sold for money (in European currencies). These crops included coffee, cotton, palm oil, sisal, tobacco, and tea. African colonial states produced, distributed, and controlled the money given to the Africans, and the colonial government or a government-controlled marketing board judged the quality and set prices for African-produced goods.<sup>[OBJ]</sup> These trends, where Europeans and other foreign buyers determine prices for African goods (both agricultural goods and mineral resources), have continued in post-colonial Africa.

Furthermore, European colonial intrusion also accelerated the practice of wage labor, both by subsistence farmers and the European producers. The wage laborers helped to increase the amount of produce from the agriculture and mining sectors. The laborers also needed to work for wages in order to meet the taxation demands (payable only with money) set by the colonial state. The major forms of taxation demanded from Africans included such names as “poll tax,” “head tax,” and “dog tax.” Other African laborers also needed the money to pay school fees for their wards, to pay hospital fees, and sometimes to buy consumer goods, both raw and manufactured.<sup>12</sup>

Analyzing the theme of economic developments in the former British colonies in Africa, Kaniki (1985) argued that the British, just like the other European colonial powers,

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<sup>11</sup> Erik Gilbert, “The economic impact of colonialism,” 108-110.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 109-110. The subject of colonial taxation measures has been widely covered in African history. See for instance, Leigh A. Gardner, *Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

did not develop a universal economic theory or practice applicable to all colonies. Rather, two key variables were behind their operations—namely, the reactions of the diverse colonial societies and the influence of diverse environments (fauna, flora, land, and water) found in each of the colonies. However, there were two fundamental assumptions associated with British colonial economies: the colonies had to provide raw materials to feed into Britain's industries, and the colonies had to import manufactured goods from the imperial power. As such, from the onset, the British Empire had two distinct economic camps, the colonies and the metropolis. The colonies were obligated to export to Britain before they could consider any other foreign buyer. On the other hand, there was no obligation for Britain to import only from any of its colonies. Britain imported products that were cheaper and of good quality, using the rational economic choice model, which provided it the liberty to do business serving its economic interests. The colonized peoples were also often at a disadvantage, as they sold cheap raw materials, and in return, bought expensive British manufactured goods,<sup>1314</sup>

As these exploitative measures continued, it was often clear to colonial administrators that British colonial rule was never exclusively meant to develop the Africans' socio-economic livelihoods. The British colonial states often served the economic interests of the European settlers. These were part of the capitalist class that operated banks, farms, mining firms, and other commercial entities. Their economic demands often determined the types of state-subject relations that existed in colonial states. Colonial governments created conditions for the successful operation of these businesses,

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13 M.H.Y. Kaniki, "The colonial economy: The former British zones," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 382-383.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 383-384. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945," *Economic History Review*, 40, no.1 (Feb. 1987): 1-26

including the maintenance of “law and order,” which facilitated effective exploitation of colonial resources, both human and material ones.<sup>15</sup>

The capitalist class also benefited from the land alienation policies of the colonial era. Land, in most parts of Africa, was—and is still—the basic and most important means of production. The British settlers, for instance, with government support, moved quickly to secure land concessions from African chiefs. The chiefs were often compelled to sell their rights to land to the European prospectors, which often went against African communal values, where the land had no market value (and hence was not<sup>16</sup>communities.<sup>[00]</sup> With government support, the settlers often took the most fertile and profitable portions of land, while the Africans were pushed into overcrowded and unfertile reserves. For instance, in colonial Kenya, British settlers took the most fertile land in the Kenyan highlands, about 2.7 million hectares, while the Indigenous peoples settled<sup>17</sup>.<sup>18</sup>

South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) experienced similar trends of land alienation. Initially, the government set aside most of the alienated land for mineral exploitation, rather than agricultural production. In South Africa, things significantly changed between 1865 and 1900, when the discovery of precious stones (mineral resources) made the country become more attractive to European businesses. The discovery of diamonds took place in the Cape Colony in 1867, followed by the

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<sup>15</sup> Elizabeth Colson, “The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights,” In Victoria Turner, ed., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Vol.3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 193-196.

<sup>16</sup> M.H.Y. Kaniki, “The colonial economy: The former British zones,” 384-387.

<sup>17</sup> Ralph Austen, *African Economic History* (London: James Currey, 1987), 155-162.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 163-164 and 122-130. See also M.H.Y. Kaniki, “The colonial economy: The former British zones,” 387-390. Apart from De Beers and the BSAC, there were also other such monopoly companies in colonial Africa. This included: The British East Africa Company; The Royal Niger Company; The British United Africa Company; and the French Compagnie Francaise del’ Afrique Occidentale (CFAO).

discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886. European (mainly British) businesses dominated the South African mining industry. For instance, De Beers Consolidated Mines dominated the diamond mines in Kimberly. The company's director was Cecil John Rhodes, who had the backing of major British financiers and controlled shares in diamond and gold mining ventures in other parts of colonial Africa, including Angola, the Belgian Congo, Namibia, and Sierra Leone.<sup>19</sup> In what is now Zambia and Zimbabwe, Rhodes stretched his economic muscle to satisfy his desires for mineral exploitation. Hoping to find the so-called "Second Rand" and using funds generated from De Beers, Rhodes occupied these two countries using another company called the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The BSAC operated as a monopoly landowner and claimed sovereignty over the lands alienated from African chiefs, through dubious treaties. Rhodes even named these two countries after himself, namely Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). He and the BSAC ruled the two territories using a Royal Charter, issued by the British Crown in 1889. They earmarked Southern Rhodesia for gold and diamond deposits and Northern Rhodesia for copper deposits.<sup>20</sup>

## **SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACTS OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL RULE**

European colonial rule had other social-political consequences that, as this chapter argues, have had lingering impacts as they pertain to nation-building agendas in modern-day Africa. The social changes associated with European colonial rule have been discussed by a wide range of Africanist scholars, including Afigbo (1985), Boahen (1985),

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<sup>19</sup> A.E. Afigbo, "The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 487.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 486-488.



and Iliffe (2017). This sub-section focuses on those impacts that had a direct impact on the nation-building agenda.

Afigbo posited that there are mainly two schools of thought regarding social impacts of European colonial rule in Africa. The first school, known as the imperial apologists school, posits that European colonial rule was responsible for many changes in Africa's traditional societies. Such changes brought significant progress and were responsible for Africa's linear transition from its static and barely productive culture to a dynamic and limitless modernism, seen in most parts of Africa today. The second school of thought is the colonial nationalist school." Its proponents argue that European colonialism represented the disruption of the livelihoods of colonial societies, such that it left behind the turmoil, instability, and uncertainty currently prevalent in Africa.<sup>21</sup> Afigbo argues against both schools of thought. He argues that while European colonial rule brought in some changes, it is wrong to argue that pre-colonial African societies were static. Rather, the societies were products of hundreds of years of changes. Such societies exhibited their own elements of modernization, including in such areas as occupational specialization, urbanization, social mobility, and in other instances, labor migration. Furthermore, European colonial rule did not wipe out all African cultural, political, and economic activities. There were differences from African society to society, in the ways European colonial rule affected them, with so many instances of African cultural resilience and adaptation or modification. African societies adopted those European elements that they deemed useful, including such elements as language, the use of money, western education, and western political systems.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 493. See also Kings M. Phiri, "Malawi and the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 1964-1980," in Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe, eds., *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960-1994* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014), 565-583.

<sup>22</sup> A.E. Afigbo, "The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures," 493-502. See also A. Adu Boahen, "Colonialism in Africa: Its impact and significance," in Adu

One of the lingering social effects of European colonial rule has been the political one. After European colonial rule was established in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (except for Liberia and Ethiopia until 1935), African societies lost most of their sovereignty and hence could not participate in global affairs as independent agents. Furthermore, the newly established state boundaries also cut off the pre-existing links (ethnic, economic, family, and religious) that existed in pre-colonial Africa. There are so many cases of such processes in colonial Africa. For instance, the split of the Efik peoples of West Africa into Nigeria and Cameroon. The Yoruba of West Africa were found in Nigeria and Dahomey (now Benin). In Southern Africa, one found the Ngoni, the Yao, the Lhomwe, and the Sena peoples in both Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) and Nyasaland (now Malawi).<sup>23</sup>

In the process, European colonial states also brought together, under one political entity, African societies that never co-existed as such. During the colonial period, the system seemed to work as these multiple ethnic groups were under the stewardship of a European official, named a governor, or commissioner, or consul. The co-existence of such multiple ethnic groups in post-colonial Africa has not been as smooth. Furthermore, the artificially created colonial societies also altered the pre-existing class structures that existed in pre-colonial African societies. While the colonized Africans were not a homogenous entity, in general terms, their status dwindled as compared with that of European colonists and Asian migrants into the colonies. The European colonists had the monopoly of political, economic, and educational power, and thus left the Africans underprivileged. European colonial policies, anchored by social Darwinism, placed the Black Africans at the bottom of the order and ladder of civilization. Well-qualified Africans

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Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 798-803

<sup>23</sup> Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and its impact: A comparative approach to the end of the colonial empires* (Massachusetts, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 1-16; and 199-231.

had limited access to well-paying jobs, business opportunities, and political opportunities. Racial-based segregation also extended to residential areas, especially in urban areas. Europeans occupied areas with better houses, better hospitals, and established European-only social clubs.<sup>24</sup> Some of these practices have continued in post-colonial Africa, indicating that the end of colonial rule did not represent a complete departure from systems and practices that served imperial rule in Africa.

## **POST-COLONIAL AFRICA AND ITS ATTENDANT CHALLENGES**

The modern-day African states gained their political independence from European rule in the period from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1960s. The remaining ones followed suit, including Mozambique and Angola in 1975; Zimbabwe in 1980; Namibia in 1991; and South Africa in 1994. Scholars of that historical phase have coined the term decolonization to refer to the processes that led to the departure of European powers from Africa. Martin Shipway (2008) termed the late 20<sup>th</sup> century as the classic period of decolonization, considering the large number of countries that attained independence during that period, especially in Africa and Asia.<sup>25</sup>

The process of decolonization requires comprehension of the context of global dynamics that culminated into the Second World War (1939-1945) and its immediate aftermath. Three major forces or explanations eventually led to the surrender of political

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<sup>24</sup> John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: A comparative perspective* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-16

<sup>25</sup> Frederick Cooper, "Africa in world history," in J.R. McNeil and Kenneth Pomeranz, eds., *The Cambridge World History, Vol.7.1: production, destruction, and connection, 1750-present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 578-579.

sovereignty to African leaders. In brief, these explanations included the nationalist explanation, international explanations, and metropolitan explanations. The nationalist explanation credits the roles played by Indigenous-led organizations, either political parties, pressure groups, or guerilla movements, in fighting against colonial rule. African leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), among others, led their peoples to win back political autonomy. The international explanations consider the changing global forces during and after the Second World War to be the major driving forces in addition to the rise of two new anti-imperial powers (USA and USSR), the rise of the Cold War (an ideological and geopolitical warfare that pitted the two superpowers and their allies against each other), and the United Nations Organizations (UNO), which promoted the principle of self-determination. The metropolitan explanations focus on the decisions made by the metropolitan governments, either in Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom to decide on when to hand over power to Indigenous African rulers. Such decisions materialized after considering the economics of either continuing with colonization or handing over power to Africans.<sup>26</sup>

The end of European colonial rule in Africa did not necessarily mean a complete departure from some of the processes, practices, and relationships that existed during the colonial period. In the words of Frederick Cooper (2015), a historian of the decolonization period in Africa: "It would be a mistake either to see 'colonialism' as a phenomenon that could be turned off like a television set—with all problems instantly into 'African' responsibilities—<sup>27</sup> The next sub-sections of this chapter discuss the

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<sup>26</sup> John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: A comparative perspective* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-16.

<sup>27</sup> Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The last stage of imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1965), ix-xiv and 1- 14. Other scholars have described the late colonial era economic exploitation as "The Second Colonial Exploitation." See for instance,

continuities that are traceable from the colonial to the post-colonial period, as these pertain to neo-colonialism and nation-building challenges.

## **NEO-COLONIALISM IN AFRICA**

The concept of neo-colonialism, is often associated with Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah. In *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in 1965, Nkrumah explained the conceptualization and practical aspects of the term. According to Nkrumah, although African countries had attained their independence, many of them lacked real sovereignty. International forces still directed their economies and political policies. The international forces were either the direct former colonial power, or a new power (either a country or a firm/consortium) that was not involved during the colonial period. Such powers were involved in processes like sending troops to the neo-colonial state, determining the prices of Africa's raw materials, and providing funds for the sustenance of the bureaucracies of the neo-colonial state. These interventions have often left room for the imperial powers to dictate policies (socio-economic and political) in the neo-colonial states. What was and has been unfortunate for Africa is that the imperial powers are interested in exploitation, rather than the development of Africa's material and human resources. In the process, the imperial powers have also weakened the position of the neo-colonial states on the international scene, as many of them have remained in poverty and lack a voice in most global forums. Nkrumah also argued that these trends trace back to the colonial period, especially the post-World War II era. The European colonial powers embarked on extensive colonial exploitation, with an aim of using Africa's resources to revive the European economies damaged by the war. The

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Bekeh Utietiang Ukelina, *The Second Colonial Occupation: Development Planning, Agriculture, and the Legacies of British rule in Nigeria* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017).

European “welfare states” survived by exploiting African natural (agricultural products and mineral resources) and human resources.<sup>28</sup>

Since Nkrumah’s foundational publication, various scholars have taken over the mantle to trace continued imperial intervention in Africa. They have traced the continued influence of the former colonial powers, and of new players in the field, including countries, firms/consortiums, and global monetary organizations, such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All of these entities shoulder the blame for Africa’s stagnating economic position and the high levels of poverty. In the former sub-Saharan African French colonies for instance, France retained economic interests and influence after independence. Apart from leaving French troops and military bases in the former colonies, France also controlled the political and economic space. French companies controlled most of the industries, thousands of French expatriates continued to live and work in the former colonies. Operating through an organization called the Africa Cell, France also exerted its powers over political successions in the former colonies. France also placed the former colonies under the franc zone, which was a monetary union of the former French colonies; the franc system itself was controlled by the French Treasury. The Africa Cell’s use of French currency meant a surrender of economic autonomy by the participating African countries, as France even retained powers to devalue the currency without consulting African central banks and governments. This arrangement also saw French companies, working without proper restrictions, export products from Africa without the required investment in the African countries where they operated.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 175-180.

<sup>29</sup> See for instance, Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution, 2008). See also Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, eds., *The rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities, and Critical Interventions* (London: Zed Books, 2012).

Apart from the old imperial powers, such as Britain and France, current scholarship is also skeptical of the influence of Asian powers, especially China and India. As emerging global powers, since the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both countries have ventured into Africa in search of diplomatic allies and in search of Africa's natural resources. The resources include petroleum, land, precious stones, and agricultural products to supply<sup>30</sup>. It is imperative for African countries to draw lessons from their economic interactions with other imperial powers and avoid repeating the same mistakes as they deal with the Southeast Asian powers. Similarly, as Africanist scholars have argued, African governments must be concerned about the roles of foreign firms, welcomed in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and organizations such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the UN, and the European Union (EU). Their economic intervention and aid have usually come with strings attached, many of which have been detrimental to the development of African economies. The Bretton Woods-influenced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), for instance, contributed to worker retrenchments, company closures,<sup>31</sup>

One other entry point into post-colonial African affairs was through the rivalries of the Cold War. Although the Cold War was not of African origin, it did not take long before the two warring blocs (the Western bloc led by the USA and the Eastern bloc led by the

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<sup>30</sup> Mark Langan, *Neo-Colonialism and the poverty of 'development' in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35-57, 89-114, 119-142, and 177-202. See also Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz, "Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.114, no.3 (Autumn 1999): 479-502.

<sup>31</sup> For a thorough understanding of the origins of the Cold War and its global ramifications, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

USSR) began to “poke their noses” in African affairs.<sup>32</sup> The two superpowers also looked toward Africa as a continent where they could exert their ideological (communism and capitalism), socio-economic, and political influences. They took advantage of the economic slump then taking place in European metropolitan powers in the aftermath of the Second World War. The USA and USSR seized the opportunity to impose themselves on the African continent and indeed across the globe.<sup>33</sup>

Elizabeth Schmidt (2013) narrates how the Congo (formerly Zaire) became a Cold War battleground immediately after independence from Belgian rule in June 1960. The Congo was of fundamental concern to the imperial powers because it was (and still is) rich in strategic mineral resources. These include some of the world’s important deposits of cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds, tantalum, tin, uranium, and zinc. Although Belgium had granted independence to Indigenous politicians, led by Joseph Kasavubu (as president) and Patrice Lumumba (as prime minister), the Congo’s mining industry was still in the hands of the Belgians and their Western allies, including the USA, a classic example of neo-colonialism. Since Lumumba exhibited anti-Belgian and anti-Western tendencies, including being a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), he was an obstacle to the imperial powers. By September 1960, Western influence led to the removal of Lumumba from power, including placing him under house arrest. On January 17, 1960, secessionist forces from the Katanga province assassinated Lumumba under the supervision of Belgian and American security and intelligence personnel. He had <sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> See for instance, Jeffrey James Byrne, “The Cold War in Africa,” in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Craig Daigle, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 149-162.

<sup>33</sup> Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror*, 57-65.

<sup>34</sup> See for instance, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila* (London: Zed Books, 2003).



Unfortunately, the Congo, as have many African countries subjected to such Cold War interventions, has not yet achieved <sup>35</sup><sub>[Obj]</sub>. The following sub-section covers the subject of instability in Africa. From these cases, however, contemporary African governments and their leaders must tread carefully in their interactions with global powers, be it the former colonial powers or the new entrants on the African economic scene. Many of them have not been interested in Africa's economic development, for its own sake, but are rather interested in exploiting the continent's resources.

## **NATION-BUILDING CHALLENGES IN AFRICA**

As African countries gained their independence in the 1960s, the leaders set aside five main historic and humanistic objectives for their own countries as well as for relations with other countries in Africa and beyond (i.e., domestic and international objectives). The five objectives were decolonization, nation-building, development, democracy, and regional integration. There have generally been variations in the ways individual African countries have moved to achieve these objectives. Some have fared well, while others have not. This sub-section focuses on the objective of nation-building, aimed at bringing together multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious entities into one united nation. Since independence, this objective has been problematic, as most parts of the African continent have experienced political tensions, ethnic tensions, and economic tensions. Over the years, African countries have also experienced coups, civil wars, and perennial instability.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *Africa's Resurgence: Domestic, Global, and Diaspora Transformations* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2014), 3-5.

<sup>36</sup> Liisa Laakso and Adebayo O. Olukoshi, "The crisis of the post-colonial nation-state project in Africa," in Adebayo O. Olukoshi and Liisa Laakso, eds., *Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa* (Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 1996), 7-39. See also Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor, "State and Nation-Building since Independence,"

Influenced by local and international dynamics (including the socio-economic instability caused by the imposition of SAPs, by the Bretton Woods Institutions since the late 1970s), the last decade of the 20th century saw conflicts and civil wars in Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria (after the 1993 botched presidential election), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.<sup>[OBJ]</sup> Some of these have spilled over into the 21st century. There have been efforts to enhance nation-building. These include such policy decisions as changing names of states; changing and re-locating capital cities; conscription for national service; the forced homogenization of religions and languages; the creation of one-party states; the creation of unifying ideologies (such as *Harambee* in Kenya and *Ujamaa* in Tanzania); the nationalization of land; and the creation of national anthems and pledges. Setting aside national days of independence celebrations, and the creation of multi-racial sports teams, among other measures, the <sup>37</sup> persist.<sup>[OBJ]</sup> Below, this chapter discusses the factors for such trends with the argument that some of these challenges trace back to the colonial period.

Most Africanist scholars now attest that such challenges have their roots in the colonial period. There are two interrelated crises behind this, namely the lack of nationhood and statehood, both of which have contributed to instability in most African countries. The crisis of nationhood emanates from the lack of or having a flawed collective identity. On the other hand, the crisis of statehood is a by-product of unstable political authority. The challenge of a coherent nationhood or national identity is a by-product of artificial boundaries and colonial societies created by European colonial powers, which the post-colonial governments retained. Post-colonial African leaders and their

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in Toyin Falola, ed., *Africa: Vol.5: Contemporary Africa* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 188-190.

<sup>37</sup> Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay and Elliot Green, "Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa," *World Development*, vol.45 (2013): 108-118. See also Lynette Steenveld and Larry Strelitz, "The 1995 Rugby World Cup and the politics of nation-building in South Africa," *Media, Culture, and Society*, vol.20 (1998): 609-629.

international allies, including the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, regarded the nation-state as a symbol of modernity, modeled on European nation-states. Unfortunately, most post-colonial African countries have struggled to create unity (i.e., national unity) among the heterogeneous ethnic groups brought together by colonial rule. Military intrusion into civilian politics through coups often hampered the creation of statehood. The permanent military itself was also a colonial-era creation. Here, the post-colonial states have struggled to create an effective centralized political authority and have hence faced challenges from both internal and international forces.<sup>38</sup>

Other divisive colonial-era policies were also responsible for the crises of nation- and state-building. For instance, in British colonies since the 1930s, the policy of indirect rule favored working with traditional leaders, rather than the educated elite. In the post-World War II era, the same colonial governments also sided with the educated elites, who had benefited from educational opportunities under colonial development and welfare funding. In the post-colonial period, the relationship between traditional leaders and the educated elite has not always been cordial. Moreover, the civilian (western educated) political elite and the military have experienced unstable relations. African political leaders have largely failed to create a sense of nationhood—that is, bringing their people together under the larger or central political system or the nation-state (irrespective of their ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity differences). While such identities are both historical and important, they have overridden efforts to build cohesive nation-states. The ordinary people must also accept the authority of the state and be willing to co-exist with other groups of different identities. These differences have also predominated political party formation and activities, where parties survive along ethnic

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<sup>38</sup> J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, "Nation-building and changing political structures," in Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji, eds., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VIII: Africa since 1935* (California: UNESCO and James Currey, 1999), 435-446. See also Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 97-106.

or regional lines. The same also applies to allocating positions in state institutions (civil service, the army, the police, and the legal system), where identities play an important role in staff recruitment and retention. These institutions or bureaucracies are themselves colonial-era creations used for accumulative purposes by the post-colonial <sup>39[100]</sup>. These practices have been divisive and ineffective, as they have left out competent personnel for not conforming to the favored identities. Instead of focusing on nation-building, the leaders concentrate on economic and political aggrandizement, both of which are also inherited colonial-era practices. The nation-building agenda will prevail only when African leaders recognize the pluralism of their nation-states and co-opt all people in valuing unity and participating in achieving national goals.

Where the military has intervened in African politics, the results have not been as encouraging. Since the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 by the Egyptian army, military coups have dominated the African political scene. Other coups followed in countries such as Sudan in 1958, Zaire in 1965, Nigeria in January 1966, Ghana in February 1966, and so on and so forth. By the mid-1980s, Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, had experienced more than 70 military coups. These have continued well into the 21st century in such countries as Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Zimbabwe. The coups have emanated from various socio-economic and political forces and have local and international influences. Some begin because of ethnic conflicts; political authoritarianism; bureaucratic corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency; international influence, especially from forces against an incumbent leader; and sometimes due to conflicts between the army personnel and political leaders. Irrespective of the motivations for a military coup, once successful, most military regimes have generally failed to achieve the nation-building agenda. In trying to maintain law and order, they overlook the internal differences in their countries, and they do not sort out their citizens' economic challenges. The overreliance on state coercion has assisted in

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<sup>39</sup>J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, "Nation-building and changing political structures," 437-445.

state-building rather than nation-building, hence the continued polarization along with <sup>40</sup>racial, and other such identities.<sup>[66]</sup> Hence, African countries must at all costs avoid creating the so-called conducive conditions for military intervention in civilian politics and state administration. The military must belong to the barracks, just as much as civilians do not and must not interfere in military affairs.

Where nation-building has not succeeded, it has created room for the rise of religious fundamentalist groups and terrorist organizations (such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia, among others). On the other hand, these organizations, many of which are affiliated with other international terror organizations (such as Al Qaeda and ISIS), are also a major contributing factor to the failure of both nation-building and state-building and consolidation. In North Africa, economic strains on the populations and the feeling of being abandoned by the state bureaucracies also contributed to the "Arab Spring," which toppled governments in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, among others, from 2011 and beyond.<sup>41</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter has contributed to the debate on two of contemporary Africa's main challenges, namely neo-colonialism and nation-building. The key argument is that these emanate from both historical and transnational forces. The historical ones trace back to the establishment, consolidation, and impacts of European colonial rule in Africa

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 454-463. See also Philip Roessler, *Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: The logic of the coup-civil war trap* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army rule in Africa: Motivations and constraints*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).

<sup>41</sup> Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2018), 59-63 and 239-291.

throughout a period that stretched from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the 1960s. Most of the former colonial powers, such as Britain and France, have continued to influence the state of economic and political affairs in their former African colonies. On the other hand, the transnational forces pinpoint the influences of the Cold War, multi-national firms and consortiums, and other global organizations, including the Bretton Woods Institutions, the EU, and the UN. The policy directions from such global institutions have not been well-suited to African conditions. Current scholarship also analyzes the challenges posed by relatively new entrants in exploiting Africa's resources, especially the Southeast Asian countries of China and India. While focusing on the foreign influences, both colonial and post-colonial, this chapter has argued that one must also focus on intra-state flaws in each African country. These include the poor quality of leadership; economic mismanagement; inefficient bureaucracies; and ethnic, political, racial, and religious tensions, all of which have contributed to Africa's current position. African governments and their peoples must take a leading role in resolving their economic and socio-political challenges and never play the role of pawns in international relationships. The same also applies to the continent's leaders to create conducive conditions for both economic autonomy and state survival.

## END NOTES

1. G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 20-21. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 263-268. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 206-207. [↑](#)
2. G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 21-23. For the British Empire, see Peter J. Cain, "Character, 'ordered liberty,' and the mission to civilize: British moral justification of Empire, 1870-1914," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 40, no.4 (Nov. 2012): 557-578. For the French Empire, see Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). [↑](#)

3. G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 23-25. See also Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 268-269. [↑](#)
4. G.N. Uzoigwe, "European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview," 26-27. [↑](#)
5. Ibid., 29-31. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 201-205. [↑](#)
6. Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," in Toyin Falola, ed., *Africa, Vol.3: Colonial Africa, 1885-1939* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 107-108. [↑](#)
7. Walter Rodney, "The colonial economy," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 332. [↑](#)
8. Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," 107-108. See also John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 211-223. [↑](#)
9. See for instance, John McCracken, *A History of Malawi, 1859-1956* (Suffolk, UK: James Currey, 2012), 74-99. [↑](#)
10. Walter Rodney, "The colonial economy," 332-333. See also Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," 109-110. [↑](#)
11. Erik Gilbert, "The economic impact of colonialism," 108-110. [↑](#)
12. Ibid., 109-110. The subject of colonial taxation measures has been widely covered in African history. See for instance, Leigh A. Gardner, *Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). [↑](#)
13. M.H.Y. Kaniki, "The colonial economy: The former British zones," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 382-383. [↑](#)
14. Ibid., 383-384. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945," *Economic History Review*, 40, no.1 (Feb. 1987): 1-26. [↑](#)
15. Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights," In Victoria Turner, ed., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Vol.3: Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 193-196. [↑](#)
16. M.H.Y. Kaniki, "The colonial economy: The former British zones," 384-387. [↑](#)
17. Ralph Austen, *African Economic History* (London: James Currey, 1987), 155-162. [↑](#)
18. Ibid., 163-164 and 122-130. See also M.H.Y. Kaniki, "The colonial economy: The former British zones," 387-390. Apart from De Beers and the BSAC, there were also other such monopoly companies in colonial Africa. This included: The British East Africa Company; The Royal Niger Company; The British United Africa Company; and the French Compagnie Francaise del' Afrique Occidentale (CFAO). [↑](#)

19. A.E. Afigbo, "The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 487. ↑
20. Ibid., 486-488. ↑
21. Ibid., 493. See also Kings M. Phiri, "Malawi and the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 1964-1980," in Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe, eds., *Southern African Liberation Struggles: Contemporaneous Documents, 1960-1994* (Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014), 565-583. ↑
22. A.E. Afigbo, "The social repercussions of colonial rule: The new social structures," 493-502. See also A. Adu Boahen, "Colonialism in Africa: Its impact and significance," in Adu Boahen, ed., *UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 798-803. ↑
23. Martin Shipway, *Decolonization and its impact: A comparative approach to the end of the colonial empires* (Massachusetts, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 1-16; and 199-231. ↑
24. John Springhall, *Decolonization since 1945: A comparative perspective* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-16. ↑
25. Frederick Cooper, "Africa in world history," in J.R. McNeil and Kenneth Pomeranz, eds., *The Cambridge World History, Vol.7.1: production, destruction, and connection, 1750-present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 578-579.
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35. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, *Africa's Resurgence: Domestic, Global, and Diaspora Transformations* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2014), 3-5. [↑](#)
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## CHAPTER 12

# The Nexus Between Culture and Human Rights in Africa: The Case of LGBTQ Rights in Zimbabwe

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## INTRODUCTION

Homosexuality can be defined as the erotic attraction to the people of the same sex, physically, emotionally, and psychologically (Currie, Dewaal 2017, 228). In the context of this study, homosexuality encompasses the sexuality of individuals who are lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and persons who might be erotically attracted to all gender identities. While transgender is not a sexuality but a gender, it is often included within the umbrella of sexuality. "Homosexuality" as a term itself is becoming increasingly obsolete in favor of more applicable abbreviations, such as LGBTQ or longer acronyms or, more broadly, non-heteronormativity.

The recognition of LGBTQ rights has ignited a universal debate. Members of the LGBTQ community, like individuals from other marginalized or under-represented groups, are protected by international human rights laws. Article 1 of the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" states, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Article 2 of the same declaration further enunciates that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion." In the "Issues/Campaigns" section, the United Nations website adds, "Everyone deserves equal rights, freedom from violence,

persecution, discrimination, harassment, and stigma—including LGBTIQ+ individuals.” This narrative is further cemented by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 26 of the covenant enshrines that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.” Thus, the absence of sexuality in the main international covenants does not justify homophobia and anti-LGBTQ sentiments and actions.

However, without explicitly mentioning sexuality in their decrees, international human rights laws have failed to present a unanimous applicable stance on LGBTQ rights. Individual states voluntarily incorporate sexuality as a protected identity in their municipal laws. As a result, efforts to utilize international human rights regimes to advance LGBTQ rights are often met with resistance across the globe, and Africa is not an exception to this exclusion. Ibrahim (2015, 281) observes that African states, together with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, have been instrumental in thwarting any initiatives toward recognition of LGBTQ rights in the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council. Most of these states claim that democracy is a Western philosophy lacking an appreciation of African values and ethics. Thus, the homophobic movement in Africa is billed as resistance to Western culture as a whole. It is against this backdrop that this chapter seeks to explore the relationship between culture and human rights in Africa, particularly focusing on LGBTQ identity. Zimbabwe serves as a unit of analysis in this study. In addition to being homophobic, Zimbabwe presents an ideal example of an African state with a tarnished past on human rights. Since attaining its independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe has been accused of a plethora of human rights violations, including derogating pre-emptory norms such as the right to life and prohibition from torture and inhuman treatment or degrading punishment. Political leaders remain adamant, violently impeding any dissenting voices against human rights abuses. Cultural relativism is often abused by political elites to dismiss the rights of marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ community. For example, fundamentalist clergy have also been on record for publicly labeling homosexuality as demonic and anti-Christian (Galz 2017).

Documentary research and key informant interviews are the methods that were used to gather data. The interviews took place on online platforms, such as

Zoom, Google Meet, and Skype, as the participants were not comfortable with face-to-face interactions, hence ensuring anonymity. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, snowball sampling was used to select the respondents, and thematic analysis was used to analyze and interpret data.

The chapter, therefore, seeks to ascertain whether LGBTQ identity is alien to African culture. The impact of fundamentalist religious beliefs, political views, and social factors toward the recognition of LGBTQ rights is part of the analysis. The research also aims at proposing several recommendations toward the recognition of LGBTQ identity in general. In addition to the introduction and the background on LGBTQ identity, sexuality, and rights in Africa, the chapter consists of the following segments in their descending order: Culture and Homophobia: The Zimbabwean Perspective; Religious Fundamentalism and LGBTQ Identity in Zimbabwe; Biology and Sexuality; Gender Identity, Law and Homosexuality in Zimbabwe; LGBTQ Identity and Politics: The Zimbabwean Experience; and Homosexuality in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic, as well as a conclusion and recommendations.

## **BACKGROUND: LGBTQ RIGHTS IN AFRICA**

The section below seeks to unveil intertwined factors that have culminated in the failure of most of the African states to embrace and advance LGBTQ rights. The continent lacks a unified position toward the recognition of rights for members of the LGBTQ community. The African Charter of Human and People's Rights to which most of the African states are signatories, like other International Human rights agreements, is silent about the recognition of sexuality. This omission has divided the continent along with cultural, legal, and religious beliefs, hence thwarting the advancement of LGBTQ rights. It is alleged that 36 out of 53 countries, including Zimbabwe, have criminalized sodomy (Ibrahim 2015,264). At least 19 African nations have never had sodomy laws or decriminalized diverse sexuality (Ibrahim 2015, 264). Reports also reveal that stiff penalties ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment and in some severe cases, death penalties have been endorsed to punish offenders. The Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act (SSMPA) of Nigeria, for example, imposes a 10-year prison sentence on anyone who registers, operates, or participates in gay clubs, societies, and organizations or aiders of such initiatives (Human Rights Watch 2016). While there is no crude evidence of individuals who

have received such hefty penalties due to their LGBTQ identity, extensive media reports of cases of physical violence, aggression, arbitrary detention, and harassment of the LGBTQ community in Nigeria became more prevalent after the passage of the SSMPA (Human Rights Watch 2016).

Throughout Africa, homophobia is perceived as a way of rejecting Western influences that seek to prescribe alien rights and undermine African ethics, values, and beliefs. However, critiques such as Ibrahim (2015), Galz (2017), and Ushie, et al. (2020) have dismissed the assertion that LGBTQ identity is a Western phenomenon, arguing that in the pre-colonial era, same-sex relationships were tolerated in several African societies, although covert. Homophobia, however, was entrenched into contemporary African legal systems by colonial masters, particularly with the prevalence of fundamentalist Christianity and Islamic religions. History points to the existence and legal recognition of same-sex relationships among the Azande people during pre-colonial Sudan. Ibrahim (2015) further identifies the Meru people of Kenya, the Bantu tribe in Angola, and the Zulu people of South Africa among examples of African descent that tolerated transgender relationships before colonialism (Ibrahim 2015, 265). Thus, from the above assertion, LGBTQ identity is not a new phenomenon to the African tradition.

Unfortunately, homophobia has been endorsed as a salient feature of African culture. As a result, LGBTQ people face numerous forms of discrimination, torture, and degrading treatment in their local communities. This situation has been further exacerbated by political elites who publicly criticize LGBTQ identity and are supported by religious leaders who often dub same-sex relationships as a psychiatric and spiritual challenge rather than a biological phenomenon. In addition to stiff penalties, several African countries, such as Nigeria, Uganda, and Togo just to mention a few, are on record for passing punitive laws to hinder the recognition of LGBTQ rights (Ushie, Etal 2020). The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act of Nigeria serves as an illustration of legal instruments designed to thwart LGBTQ rights campaigns. With the absence of laws and legal institutions that protect such under-represented groups, those perceived as LGBTQ continue to be physically, verbally, and emotionally abused by the public in the local communities as well as in various media platforms and social media. However, this treatment has been a norm even for those states with LGBTQ rights enshrined in their constitutions. For example, even though section 9 of the South African Constitution upholds LGBTQ rights, it is alleged that several individuals

have been murdered and sometimes assaulted for their sexuality or gender identity. The gruesome murder of a young gay and transgender activist, Thapelo Makutle in Johannesburg in June 2012, illustrates the density of hate crimes against LGBTQ identity and sexuality<sup>1</sup>.

It is a hyperbole to label the entire African continent as homophobic. Although marred by severe irregularities, some African states have taken great strides toward upholding LGBTQ rights. In 2006, South Africa amended section 9 of its constitution to include the prohibition of unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexuality and gender identity (Currie, Dewaal 2017, 278). Ghana, with the influence of Western countries, has been commended for repealing the infamous Anti-homosexuality Act in 2014, and Mozambique phased out repressive colonial laws penalizing homosexuality in July 2015 (Ibrahim 2015, 264). In another positive development, in 2019, the Botswana High Court decriminalized laws that prohibited consensual sex between adults of the same sex.

Given the above background, one can note that the recognition of LGBTQ rights is characterized by numerous challenges across the African continent. The following subtheme, therefore, seeks to evaluate the impact of cultural relativism on the advancement of LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe.

## **CULTURE AND HOMOPHOBIA:**

### **THE ZIMBABWEAN PERSPECTIVE**

Evidence points to the manifestation of same-sex relationships in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. Traditional leaders concur that historically, communities tolerated homosexuality although such relationships were clandestine (Galz 2017, 5-7). Ibrahim (2015) identifies philology as crude evidence that LGBTQ identity is not a product of neo-colonialism. Implied above is the study of the history of traditional oral and written terms used to describe LGBTQ identity and sexuality in Zimbabwe. The fact that vernacular names allocated to this group of people are independent from colonial or foreign languages serves

<sup>1</sup> See Conway-Smith, Erin "South Africa: Thapelo Makutle, gay pageant winner, killed and 'beheaded' in apparent hate crime (UPDATES)," Global Post, June 13, 2012. [www.pri.org>stories.thapelo](http://www.pri.org>stories.thapelo)(accessed October 7, 2020)

as a testimony that communities in Zimbabwe were aware of same-sex relationships before colonialism. An analysis of some of the local terminologies referring to LGBTQ individuals such as *ngochani*<sup>2</sup> in Shona and *Isitabane* in Ndebele<sup>3</sup> reflects that these terms are independent from Western influence.

The above assertion, therefore, addresses the question of the origins of LGBTQ identity and sexuality in Zimbabwe. In other words, the prevalence of vernacular words describing same-sex relationships proves that non-heteronormative sexuality could have existed in the pre-colonial era in Zimbabwe. This historical proof further cements the assertion raised in the background of this chapter, which noted that same-sex relationships were tolerated in several African societies, although covert (Ibrahim 2015). The implication is that it is an exaggeration that LGBTQ sexuality and identity emerged from the Western countries; rather, it is the idea of clamoring for the recognition of these rights that is being championed by the West.

However, Zimbabwe is among other African countries that dismisses LGBTQ rights as a Western component that lacks appreciation of African norms, ethics, and values. Cultural contingency is frequently utilized by political elites to sanitize human rights violations. In the same vein, democracy is not only viewed as an incursion of African political ideas, but an instrument used by Western countries—e.g., the United States of America and Britain—to maintain their hegemony over developing countries. As a result, homophobia is viewed as a triumph against Western philosophy and a move to protect Zimbabwean culture. Prominent political figures are accused of instigating violence and hatred against the LGBTQ community. Former President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, for example, played a formidable role in entrenching the culture of homophobia in Zimbabwe. During his tenure, the former president maintained a staunch opposition against homosexuality and affirmed the need to eradicate any same-sex relationships. In 2015, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Robert Mugabe was quoted as saying, “We equally reject attempts to prescribe new rights that are contrary to our values and

<sup>2</sup> *Ngochani* is the standard Shona term for homosexuality; refer to Victora Ndambakuwa, (2020) “Vashona Project: online English to Shona language dictionary,” [vashona.com/en/dictionary](http://vashona.com/en/dictionary).

<sup>3</sup> *Isitabane* is a Ndebele word referring to romantic or sexual attraction or behavior between members of the same sex or gender. This word is also similar to the Zulu term due to similarities in these two languages. Visit Zulu English dictionary online.

norms, traditions, and beliefs. We are not gays" (Buchanan 2015, par. 7).

Implied above is that LGBTQ rights are perceived as alien to Zimbabwean culture; thus, they have no place in any political forums and policy agenda. There is a popular belief among most Zimbabweans that homosexuality is an infiltration of basic human virtues that define Africans and an "unnatural" act proliferated by the West.

Rhetoric from political figures, however, cannot be held solely responsible for the homophobic culture in Zimbabwe. The country consists of a conservative society that is deeply rooted in fundamentalist Christian values. As a result, government initiatives that seek to suppress LGBTQ rights from receiving widespread support at grassroots levels. This has been further intensified by the punitive laws that purport to punish offenders. For instance, section 73 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, criminalizes all sexual acts between men with a maximum penalty of one-year imprisonment and the possibility of a fine. Although the act does not explicitly mention same-sex relations between women, the impact of this law is felt by both men and women. This has culminated to the crystallization of a culture of fear among Zimbabweans. Most people are scared to assert their LGBTQ sexuality and identity and to lobby for LGBTQ rights. It is estimated that 10% of the Zimbabwean population is perceived to be gay or lesbian, but most of them must hide their sexual identity or migrate to other countries with inclusive policies (Badza 2019).

## **RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND LGBTQ IDENTITY IN ZIMBABWE**

When colonialism ended, Christianity had already been entrenched into Zimbabwean ethics and norms. Although there are other religious organizations in Zimbabwe, the Afro barometer estimates that about 89% of the Zimbabwean population describe themselves as Christians and at least 75% attend religious services (Galz 2017, 10). This predominance of traditional beliefs has not only shaped the Zimbabwean culture but has directed the course of the LGBTQ narrative.

Although it is not suggested that Christianity takes sole responsibility for homophobia in Zimbabwe, its contribution cannot be ignored. The Christian community, especially in Zimbabwe, is fundamentalist and largely conservative, hindering any



suggestions for endorsing LGBTQ identity and non-heteronormative sexuality. LGBTQ relations are alleged to be demonic and contrary to biblical teachings. The Bible is treated by the Christian community as a sacred book and the supreme, infallible authority of faith, and scriptures that denounce homosexuality are constantly quoted by religious authorities who publicly criticize the promotion of LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe. As a result, most Zimbabweans lack a clear understanding and knowledge about LGBTQ identity as a whole.

## **BIOLOGY AND SEXUALITY**

Across cultures, 2% to 10% of people are alleged to be in same-sex relations (Kretz 2013, 2)<sup>4</sup>. Despite these numbers, many people still consider non-heteronormative sexual behavior to be an anomalous choice. However, biologists have documented same-sex behavior in more than 450 species, arguing that same-sex behavior is not an unnatural choice and may in fact play a vital role within populations.

Along with sexuality, gender identity is not widely understood concept in Zimbabwe and some other religiously conservative cultures. A study by Yale School of Medicine in 2021 and the Trevor Project Survey of 2020 established that gender is not just male or female. Rather, it is a continuum that emerges from a person's genetic makeup (Mazure 2021, 3). According to the 2020 Trevor Project Survey, while 75% of youth use either he/him or she/her pronouns exclusively, 25% of LGBTQ youth use other pronouns such as they/them, or a combination of pronouns, such as she/they. Nonetheless, misconceptions persist that LGBTQ identity is a choice that warrants condemnation or conversion and leads to discrimination and persecution.

Sexual behavior is widely diverse and governed by sophisticated mechanisms. As with other complex behaviors, it is not possible to predict sexuality by looking into a DNA sequence as if it were a crystal ball (Butler 2010, 15). Such behaviors emerge from constellations of hundreds of genes and their regulation within the external environment. While there is no single "gay gene," there is overwhelming evidence of a biological basis for sexuality that is programmed into the brain before birth based on a mix of genetics and

<sup>4</sup> Adam J. Kretz, "From 'Kill the Gays' to 'Kill the Gay Rights Movement': The Future of Homosexuality Legislation in Africa," 11 *New J. International Human Rights*. 2013, 207-208). <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol11/iss2/3>

prenatal conditions, none of which the fetus chooses.

Although homosexuality does not appear to be adaptive from an evolutionary standpoint because same-sex sexuality does not produce children, there is evidence of its existence throughout human history. Many biological factors have been considered by scientists, such as prenatal hormones, chromosomes, polygenetic effects, brain structure, and viral influences, and no scientific consensus exists as to how biology influences sexuality (Kretz 2013,8)

## **GENDER IDENTITY**

A person's sex refers to their identification as male, female, and intersex. Gender is a separate concept that refers to their personal gender identity—for example, whether they identify as a man or a woman. While some people's gender identity matches their sex assigned at birth, this commonality is not always the case. If a person's gender identity does match their sex assigned at birth, they identify as transgender. In the past, sex, gender, and sexuality were "conceived and applied in tight relation to each other both intellectually and normatively" (Valdes 1995,4). The term gender is used to depict masculine and feminine characteristics that are socially and culturally constructed categories, fluid traits, and subjective with meanings produced through actions (Courtenay, 2000). The sex/gender system coined by both Rubin (1984) and Butler's (1990) heterosexual matrix show the way in which culture forges links between biological sex, social gender, and sexual attraction by constructing gender as an elaboration upon biological sex. Although the conflation of sex and gender is no longer seen as valid, these systems are particularly useful when addressing societies, such as Zimbabwe, in which this conflation still occurs, thus promoting a hetero-patriarchal society (Valdes 1995, 23).

Gender identity<sup>5</sup> affects every aspect of our lives, dictating the outcomes of conversations, workplaces, and relationships. Before most infants are named, they are assigned a sex often based on only the appearance of their external genitalia but

<sup>5</sup> Gender identity refers to "one's sense of oneself as male, female, or transgender" (American Psychological Association 2006, 18). When one's gender identity and biological sex are not congruent, the individual may identify as transgender or as another transgender category (cf. Gainor, 2000).

sometimes alongside analysis of their sex chromosomes and reproductive hormones to conclude a medicalized, official identification (Gibbons et al 2008, 56). These decisions are made in a typically binary fashion, with no expectations for ambiguity. Though the typical assigned sexes are “male” and “female,” often designated at birth, being transgender does not limit gender identity to these two categories, as many who identify as transgender do not feel they are exclusively masculine or feminine. Importantly, transgender identity is independent of sexuality.

Transgender identity has long been associated with poor mental health, particularly the diagnoses of “gender identity disorder” and “gender dysphoria.”<sup>6</sup> However, the World Health Organization is actively working toward declassifying transgender as a mental disorder; this change is partially prompted by recent studies uncoupling the mental and physical health problems experienced by transgender people from their gender identity (Mojo 2014,17). People who have suffered gender-related mental health ailments could vastly attribute their afflictions to societal stigma, discrimination, and violence. In some cases, their appearance and mannerisms and other outward characteristics may conflict with society’s expectations of gender-normative behavior. Most scientists agree that gender is most likely the result of a complex interaction of environmental, cognitive, and biological factors. From this biological explanation, it can therefore be noted that the issues of LGBTQ sexuality and gender identity are not alien to Zimbabwe; hence, based on these grounds, it is not justified to discriminate or criminalize LGBTQ people.

## **LAW AND LGBTQ IDENTITY IN ZIMBABWE**

LGBTQ rights are not enshrined in the constitution of Zimbabwe. Section 56(3) of the Zimbabwean constitution stipulates:

*Every person has the right not to be treated in an unfairly discriminatory manner on such grounds as their nationality, race, color, tribe, place of birth,*

<sup>6</sup> Gender dysphoria involves a conflict between a person's physical or assigned sex at birth and the gender with which they identify. People with gender dysphoria may be very uncomfortable with the sex they were assigned, sometimes described as being uncomfortable with their body (particularly developments during puberty) or being uncomfortable with the expected roles of their assigned gender (American Psychological Association 2016).

*ethnic or social origin, language, class, religious belief, political affiliation, opinion, custom, sex, gender, marital status, age, pregnancy, disability or economic or social status, or whether they were born in or out of wedlock.*

As noted above, discrimination on the grounds of sexuality is not explicitly mentioned in the human rights section of the constitution. The question of whether the word "gender" as mentioned in the constitution is inclusive of "sexuality" was addressed by Judge President Chidyausiku in the case of *State v Banana*. Interpreting section 23 of the old constitution, which is like section 56 of the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe, also termed the new constitution, Chidyausiku ruled that a law criminalizing sodomy between consenting male adults did not violate the constitution. The Judge President held this point:

*The framers of the constitution were aware that...consensual sodomy between males was an offence. If it were their intention to alter that position one would have expected them to use more explicit language as indeed is the case in the South African constitution. (Linington 2001, 685)*

From the above judgment, it can be argued that section 56, like section 23 of the old constitution, precludes sexuality. In addition to the above, section 73 (1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of Zimbabwe prohibits consensual sexual intercourse between male adults or any act involving physical contact other than sexual intercourse that might be deemed by a reasonable person to be an indecent act. Offenders according to the act shall be guilty of sodomy and liable to a fine, imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or both. By failing to include female adults in its context, section 73 (1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of Zimbabwe unfairly discriminates against men based on gender and violates of section 56 of the constitution.

While there is no equivalent act that prohibits similar relations between female adults, the impact of the stigma from the law is similarly felt by individuals who identify as gay and lesbian (GALZ 2017, 7). Individuals perceived to be LGBTQ experience all forms of abuse, ranging from discrimination, physical, and emotional abuse. Allegations of expulsion of adolescents who show signs of LGBTQ identity from schools are often reported. Unfortunately, because there is no law that protects LGBTQ rights, victims suffer in silence. In most instances, families of such children choose to reprimand them and invest in preventing the community from knowing rather than challenging the status quo. State institutions such as the police are also accused of aggravating the situation, through

soliciting bribes from those perceived to be homosexuals (Galz 2017, 7). Due to the above-mentioned factors, people in the LGBTQ community lack the confidence to approach existing legal institutions and request reimbursement if their rights have been infringed.

Exclusion of sexuality from section 56 does not preclude members of the LGBTQ community from enjoying all the rights enshrined in chapter 4 of the constitution. Section 57 of the constitution affirms the right to privacy to all Zimbabweans and despite their status, individuals who identify as LGBTQ equally benefit from all the other constitutional provisions. In other words, the absence of sexuality does not justify the violation of all the other rights that are stated in chapter 4 of the constitution on the grounds that someone is LGBTQ. The LGBTQ community, like the cis-heteronormative population, can still invoke section 85 of the constitution and claim their *locus standi* if one presumes their constitutional rights are likely to be, are being, or have been infringed.

However, the chapter must acknowledge that while certain human rights violations are exclusive to people in the LGBTQ community, Zimbabwe is among the African countries with a poor record of upholding constitutional rights. The ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), with the aid of state institutions, is accused of undermining rule of law, perpetrating violence, and using terror to thwart any opposition from entities such as political parties, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, religious bodies, and other institutions. Thus, regardless of sexuality and gender identity, advocating public policy changes is one of the most challenging initiatives in Zimbabwe.

## **CIVIL SOCIETY AND LGBTQ RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE**

Over the years, civil society organizations have been applauded for championing human rights, promoting democracy, advocating for policy changes, and complementing government efforts in public service delivery, just to mention a few activities. Since 1980, Zimbabwe has witnessed a considerable increase in the number of organizations that seek to represent minority and marginalized groups such as people living with disabilities, women, and youths, among others. It is against this backdrop that the following segment seeks to evaluate the role of civil society organizations in the promotion of LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe.

The term “civil society” is a highly contested field that suffers from definition exactness. However, the working definition for this paper is going to be borrowed from scholar Lloyd Sachikonye, who distinguishes civil society as “an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities—economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life—and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions” (Masunungure 2014, 4). From the above definition, civil society encompasses a range of non-state actors which are neither partisan nor for profit-making establishments through which members organize shared objectives and interests toward the state. These organizations might operate at national, international, and regional levels; at rural or urban domains; or within formal or informal establishments. In the same vein, Masunungure identifies the following as illustrations of civil society organizations: non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, research institutions, trade unions, employer organizations, cooperatives, professional/business associations, and non-profit media.

Given the above definition and illustrations, the attitude of civil society organizations toward promoting LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe can be classified into three categories. The first group is the conservative group, mainly faith-based associations and other organizations that have acted as a hindrance to the advancement of LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe. The segment on religious fundamentalism reveals how the church as one of the most important affiliates of civil society has entrenched homophobia in Zimbabwe. The second class is the passive group. This group constitutes the largest percentage of civil society in Zimbabwe. These organizations generally promote human rights, democracy, good governance, human development, and marginalized groups. They neither condemn nor openly advocate for the promotion of homosexuality. This is perpetuated by the hostile political and policy environment in Zimbabwe. The last group is the active class. This group comprises those organizations that openly support, advocate, and represent LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, this class constitutes the smallest percentage of civil society that supports the LGBTQ community.

Currently, there is no organization that represents the LGBTQ community that is registered with any government ministry or department in Zimbabwe. Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), an organization that strives for the fulfillment of full and equal

human, social, and economic rights in all aspects of life for lesbians, gay, bisexual, trans, and intersex persons is not registered either (GALZ 2017, 10). However, according to law, GALZ is recognized as *universitas*, meaning a juristic or legal person.

Social media has evolved as another alternative platform through which individuals with similar objectives harness their interests and influence policy changes. In a country with a shrinking space for freedom, expression, and democracy, most Zimbabweans have turned mainly to Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp platforms to mobilize support from the masses and channel their grievances toward the government. Although LGBTQ-focused online campaigns have also attracted a following and sometimes score positive comments from the masses, the attention has been minimal as compared with other human rights movements. In most instances, these campaigns are met with staunch resistance from the masses.

## **HOMOSEXUALITY AND POLITICS:**

### **THE ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE**

LGBTQ issues have become increasingly visible in the international context, including in Zimbabwe. Recent recognition of homosexual rights and approval of equality in laws in several countries confirms the relevance of the issue in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Reaction from conservative groups in different contexts has also brought LGBTQ rights to the forefront in both national and international political agendas. Homophobia is deliberately fomented by political actors (even presidents and ministers) as soon as they confront a legitimacy crisis. In economic crises, in which public criticism of abuses of power, excessive corruption, and patronage by a small ruling elite begins to increase, heads of state and high-ranking politicians employ homophobia to attack people of different sexuality and/or gender identity vehemently in the regime-friendly media.

Since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, former President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe and his political party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), relied heavily on political rhetoric that demonized lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer-identifying (LGBTQ) persons. It can be argued that the anti-LGBTQ political rhetoric in Zimbabwe is part of a larger program known as "patriotic history," which

emphasizes a particular kind of Zimbabwean identity which sought to legitimize the continued rule of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The value of combining patriotic history and political homophobia emerges out of the unique political and economic context which Mugabe's regime found itself unable to adequately address. To illustrate how and why this has happened, the chapter focuses on two key incidents: the 1995 Zimbabwe International Book Fair and the public conversation over writing a new constitution between 2010 and 2013.

In 1995 poverty and unemployment increased in Zimbabwe, accompanied by cuts in education and health care because of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). In 1991, the government of Zimbabwe abandoned its highly interventionist economic strategy and adopted a market-driven Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). A major objective of ESAP was the reorientation of the economy from the production of non-tradable to tradable goods. At that time the low-income rural and urban population was also hit hard by HIV/AIDS and deficiency-based diseases exacerbated by misdirected aid programs during the many years of devastating drought and corruption. President Mugabe diverted attention from bad administrative decisions during his rule with homophobic hate speech and sought to legitimize his incitement by invoking the anti-colonial independence struggle.

In 1995 the annual international book fair took place in the Zimbabwean capital of Harare. Shortly before it opened, a political row broke out on the participation of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) organization. The Ministry of Information put the organizers under pressure to exclude GALZ, and Dumiso Davengwa, former Minister of Information and Publicity, explained that non-heteronormative sexuality was abnormal and prohibited in Zimbabwe. In his opening speech, President Mugabe emphasized that social morality, anchored in religion, had to be protected against what he called "sexual perverts."

The prosecution of LGBTQ individuals had been introduced by the British colonial authorities at the beginning of the 20th century at the behest of European missionaries. Colonial laws criminalized sexual practices that had been tolerated in pre-colonial days (Buttler, 2010, 78). Nevertheless, at a major event held by the party's ZANU Women's League, Mugabe affirmed that homosexuality is against the culture and traditions of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, he claimed, it is immoral and against the will of God. To repel the "perversion" that threatened national identity, he invoked both a selective neo-



traditionalism and the influence of the Christian church, although the latter had been championed in Zimbabwe only from the end of the 19th century within the framework of European colonialism. President Mugabe diverted public attention back to himself. In a parliamentary debate shortly after the book fair in 1995, Chief Chigwedere, one of the traditional authorities, gave many homophobic speeches and compared LGBTQ-identifying individuals to a “festering finger” that had to be cut off to save the body. He, too, called for draconian punishments for LGBTQ individuals (Dunton, Palmberg, 1996, 25). Between the book fairs in 1995 and 1996, there were many international protests against Mugabe’s homophobic utterances, which encouraged the organizers of the book fair and GALZ to take further legal action (Gibbons et al 2008, 65). This response had become necessary because the Minister of Information had officially refused to allow GALZ to participate. The still-independent Constitutional Court at that time enabled GALZ and the organizers of the book fair to defend themselves successfully against the state’s action. The conflicts also escalated in the religious domain. A case in point was an international meeting of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1998 in Harare. GALZ was refused permission to participate after controversies between official churches from Western and Eastern Europe. However, the church-related and innovative men’s organization, Padare, which had been set up by committed Christians of the Ecumenical Support Services in Harare to tackle gender-specific violence and to martial male images, invited GALZ to take part in a discussion. Since then, the controversy in Zimbabwe’s official churches on dealing with LGBTQ Christians has continued. The rising number of evangelical, often fundamentalist, Pentecostal churches has further inflamed homophobia.

The smear campaign escalated in 1998 when Canaan Banana, the first President of Zimbabwe, was prosecuted for alleged sexual assaults of male subordinates. Mugabe ordered the secret service to investigate all members of parliament and ministers in order to discover who practiced non-heteronormative sexuality. Shortly before this crisis, he had asserted that the British cabinet was controlled by LGBTQ individuals, while his ministers were all “real” men. Broadcasting in Zimbabwe has been a contested terrain since its introduction in the then-colonial Rhodesia in the 1930s. Despite claims to neutrality by both pre- and post-independence governments, the ruling elite has always used broadcasting as a tool for political control and manipulation of the masses. In the name of national interest, national security, and national sovereignty, broadcasting from Rhodesia to

Zimbabwe has been characterised by two salient features: its legal status as a state monopoly and its location under the Ministry of Information, which rendered it a political tool in the hands of the government.

The regime-friendly press in Zimbabwe intensified its smear campaign against GALZ to divert attention from Mugabe's predicament (Muparutsa 2014, 4). In addition to the extension of censorship of the distribution and possession of materials that were against dominant morals, which meant primarily GALZ's information materials, a 2006 revision to Zimbabwe's criminal code expanded the penalty for sodomy to include acts that "would be regarded by a reasonable person as an indecent act." This code included two men holding hands or hugging, punishable by an extended prison term.

In the run-up to later elections, especially the contested election of 2008 and the constitutional debate of 2012, security-police operations against GALZ events escalated; GALZ's office was also searched and computers confiscated. GALZ representatives were accused of insulting the president; staff and activists were arrested, abused, or threatened. Since the politically motivated attacks on GALZ in the mid-1990s, the organization, unfortunately, has faced infiltration by police informers and the bribery of individual members by state security forces, who testified against GALZ. On August 20, 2012, incursions on GALZ were the second raid in a single month, and the events of this raid were published in the *Human Rights Watch Report of August 27, Zimbabwe: End Attacks on LGBT People*.

During the period of the government of national unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe (2009-2012), the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Morgan Tsvangirai, pushed to include sexuality and gender identity as protected statuses in the new Zimbabwean constitution, only to be thwarted by his governing partners, resulting in the codification of criminal penalties for homosexuality in that very constitution.<sup>7</sup> This left LGBTQ Zimbabweans worse off than they were before Tsvangirai's affirmative push. This was a failed attempt at providing minimal protections for members of the LGBTQ

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., John Campbell, *Mugabe Fights the Proposed Zimbabwe Constitution with Homophobia*, Council on Foreign Relations (Sept. 27, 2012, 15), <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/09/27/mugabefights-the-proposed-zimbabwe-constitution-with-homophobia/>; see also "Robert Mugabe Says No to Gay Rights in Zimbabwe's Constitution," *Pink News*, July 19 2010, 3),

community's positions. The MDC's constitution Section 5.10 states:

*The MDC alliance is cognizant of the fact that Zimbabwe is populated by minority and special interest groups that have suffered from years of exclusion and discrimination.....the MDCA will thus ensure that the interests of the Minorities and special interest groups are protected in the proposed citizen charter.*

The above clause, however, is not explicit about which groups are "minority and special interest groups." Furthermore, not much has been done by MDC because the major opposition political party ensures that the party's policies and structures are inclusive of the LGBTQ community (Mafekone 2013, 16; Mabvurira et al 2012, 35).

Hate speech uttered by the leadership in Zimbabwe has created an environment of permissible homophobia, demonstrated regularly during the people-driven constitutional reform process in 2010-2012 (Maseko 2012, 15; Mabvurira et al 2012, 36).<sup>8</sup> This process fashioned a podium for conservative and oppressive opinions and views on sexual behavior and sexuality to come to the fore.

Butler (2010, 23) argues that the rhetoric of the constitutional process was "people-centered" and participatory. However, the messages of democracy and human rights were juxtaposed with indignant acts that offended humane and public morality of LGBTQ individuals.<sup>9</sup> Perceptibly, the lack of religious and cultural empathy affected the inclusion of LGBTQ persons in Zimbabwe's constitution (Solomon, Hove 2017,30). Human rights activists in Zimbabwe point to this as a driving force in the denial of LGBTQ rights initiatives.

## **HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE 2nd REPUBLIC**

According to a 2018 survey, 50% of gay men in Zimbabwe had been physically assaulted and 64% had been disowned by their families. 27% of lesbians also reported disownment. In 2013, the Zimbabwe Constitution was amended to define marriage as being between a man and a woman; Zimbabwe does not recognize same-sex marriage or

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/07/19/robert-mugabe-says-no-to-gay-rights-in-zimbabwes-constitution/>

<sup>9</sup> Ken Williams, "In Zimbabwe, Final Constitutional Draft Criminalizes Homosexuality and Marriage

civil unions (Kuveya 2018, 10). After Robert Mugabe's forced removal from the presidency in November 2017, Emmerson Mnangagwa was declared President of Zimbabwe. In May 2019, Mnangagwa's Cabinet approved amendments to Zimbabwean marriage law, which would ban both child marriages and same-sex marriages, aligning it with the Constitution. There were hopes that Mnangagwa would reverse Zimbabwe's decades-long persecution of LGBTQ people, led by the virulently homophobic former President Robert Mugabe.

In January 2018, Mnangagwa spoke on the issue of LGBTQ for the first time, saying: "Those people who want same-sex marriage are the people who should canvass for it, but it's not my duty to campaign for this," as noted by Muparutsa in a *Herald* article. In June, ZANU-PF, the ruling political party, met with LGBTQ activists to discuss the situation of LGBTQ rights in Zimbabwe and to "improve the lives of LGBT people through local governance." Chester Samba, director of GALZ, noted, "As an initial meeting it was great that they responded positively and somewhat surprising as this marked a departure from the previous leadership which did not engage with us. A willingness to engage is indeed an important shift" (Kuveya 2018, 3). The July elections were welcomed by LGBTQ activists, who called them a "historic win," after which they witnessed a reduction in homophobic hate speech and in the politicization of LGBTQ individuals as campaign tools. Previously, the LGBTQ community had been a target of systematic verbal and physical abuse in Zimbabwe. The hate speech often escalated during the election season when politicians would use the topic of sexual identities as ammunition to fuel campaign rallies. There were fewer reports of such abuses in the lead-up to the 2018 election, but members of the LGBTQ community still faced difficulties. The LGBTQ community urged political parties and the government to ensure that all citizens would vote freely regardless of their sexuality and gender identity (Kuveya 2018, 6).

GALZ director Samba states some political formations, including the ruling party ZANU PF, responded positively in the pre-election period. The association during this pre-election period increased its work on advocacy for LGBTQ rights and acted as a space for social community activities, as well as a support center for any issues affecting individuals. Rights group Amnesty International commended the prevailing political tolerance. There had always been a lot of intolerance from the previous government, and the current political parties are showing more tolerance (Kuveya 2018 a, 10): "We are very happy about that, to see a marginalized community being brought into the broader group of

society in Zimbabwe—as Zimbabweans, as human beings that have inherent rights guaranteed in the constitution” (Kuveya 2018b,22). Soon after the 2018 elections, there were high expectations from human rights activists in Zimbabwe and outside of the new government, to take a different stance on LGBTQ rights. However, Zimbabwean laws still criminalize what they define as “unnatural” sexual relationships between individuals. According to observers and community members, any tolerance toward the LGBTQ community that prevailed before the 2018 election, proved artificial as politicians tried to canvas votes from the marginalized groups and show a positive picture of Zimbabwe to the international community. Despite movement forward, the LGBTQ community is actively excluded from society so much that they indeed must follow different pathways to access services because the pathways for everyone else are engineered to exclude non-normative sexual and gender identities. There has been an outcry both nationally and internationally over the various violations of human rights in Zimbabwe since 2018, which is evident in the unlawful arrests and detention of political activists and journalists; it is, therefore, noteworthy to point out that with this shrinking space in democracy, there is still a long way to go before the government can guarantee human rights for the LGBTQ community.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The major findings that subsequently emerged reveal that LGBTQ identity is not a new phenomenon in the African culture, and Zimbabwe is not an exception to that. A colonial legacy that ushered in religious fundamentalism and punitive laws entrenched homophobia in African legal systems. In the same vein, laws that criminalize sodomy in Zimbabwe are a residue of the colonial system and as such do not completely reflect the Zimbabwean pre-colonial traditions. Unfortunately for the queer community, they are the least represented in the Zimbabwean civil society, which makes it difficult for them to lobby for favorable policies. This has been further exacerbated by a hostile political and legal environment. However, culture should not be used to sanitize the removal of LGBTQ rights. Human rights are rights regardless of what ethics and norms prescribe. Just like how the gender equality movement has become a success against traditional and religious beliefs in Zimbabwe, LGBTQ identity and sexuality should be included as well.

As a result, a lot of investment should be channeled toward in-depth research and awareness campaigns on LGBTQ identity, sexuality, and rights in Zimbabwe. In addition, the inclusion of the topic into school curriculums to sensitize the communities from the grassroots levels is necessary. This comes after the realization that most Zimbabweans are ignorant about the history and the biological, cultural, and social factors that shape the LGBTQ narrative. Thus, such an initiative will unveil myths that surround the topic. There is also a need to amend laws that criminalize LGBTQ sexuality to set standard procedures that can be followed by institutions. This will also contribute to policy reforms and unlock opportunities for the queer community in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe can also emulate South Africa, which has endorsed LGBTQ rights in its constitution. The success of the above initiatives is embedded in the collective effort from various stakeholders—namely, education, the government, state institutions, civil society organizations, the media, political parties, academic institutions, and the medical community. In addition to enabling the government to make informed decisions, such a concerted effort will ensure that homegrown solutions are incubated. However, Zimbabwe will require support from external players

as well.

## ENDNOTES

1. See Conway-Smith, Erin "South Africa: Thapelo Makutle, gay pageant winner, killed and 'beheaded' in apparent hate crime (UPDATES)," Global Post, June 13, 2012. [www.pri.org>stories.thapelo](http://www.pri.org>stories.thapelo)(accessed October 7, 2020)
2. Ngochani is the standard Shona term for homosexuality; refer to Victoria Ndambakuwa, (2020) "Vashona Project: online English to Shona language dictionary," [vashona.com/en/dictionary](http://vashona.com/en/dictionary).
3. Isitabane is a Ndebele word referring to romantic or sexual attraction or behavior between members of the same sex or gender. This word is also similar to the Zulu term due to similarities in these two languages. Visit Zulu English dictionary online.
4. Adam J. Kretz, "From 'Kill the Gays' to 'Kill the Gay Rights Movement': The Future of Homosexuality Legislation in Africa," 11 New J. International Human Rights. 2013, 207-208). <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol11/iss2/3>
5. Gender identity refers to "one's sense of oneself as male, female, or transgender" (American Psychological Association 2006, 18). When one's gender identity and biological sex are not congruent, the individual may identify as transgender or as another transgender category (cf. Gainor, 2000).
6. Gender dysphoria involves a conflict between a person's physical or assigned sex at birth and the gender with which they identify. People with gender dysphoria may be very uncomfortable with the sex they were assigned, sometimes described as being uncomfortable with their body (particularly developments during puberty) or being uncomfortable with the expected roles of their assigned gender (American Psychological Association 2016).
7. See, e.g., John Campbell, Mugabe Fights the Proposed Zimbabwe Constitution with Homophobia, Council on Foreign Relations (Sept. 27, 2012, 15), <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2012/09/27/mugabefights-the-proposed-zimbabwe-constitution-with-homophobia/>; see also "Robert Mugabe Says No to Gay Rights in Zimbabwe's Constitution," Pink News, July 19 2010, 3),

8. <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/07/19/robert-mugabe-says-no-to-gay-rights-in-zimbabwes-constitution/>
9. Ken Williams, "In Zimbabwe, Final Constitutional Draft Criminalizes Homosexuality and Marriage
10. Equality," (San Diego Gay & Lesbian News, Feb. 27, 2012, 4), <http://sdgln.com/news/2012/02/27/zimbabwe-finalconstitutional-draft-criminalizes-homosexuality-and-marriage-equality> (quoting Mangwana further: "If gays and their supporters harbor hopes that homosexuality might be legalized in Zimbabwe, they should forget it. Homosexuality has been shut out of the constitution and there is no going back on that.")



## CHAPTER 13

# **Predicament of Muslim/Christian Relations Within the Context of Indigene/Settler Segregation in Jos, Northern Nigeria**

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### INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa encompassing more than 217 million people that belong to more than 470 ethnic and linguistic groups that are not only distinguished by language, culture, and myth of origin but also vary in size, power, religious affiliation, and influence (Bagudu 2004: 10). The population of Nigeria is expected to reach more than 400 million by 2050, which will make it a third position in the world. These are what makes Nigeria more complex than most countries in the world (Alemika and Okoye 2002: xviii and Alubo 2006: 1). The largest ethnic groups that have the largest population and political influence in the country are the Hausa/Fulani<sup>1</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Hausa and Fulani are two independent ethnic groups, but I have merged them together in this work as most scholars do for many reasons. First, they are the dominant ethnic groups that live closely together in northern Nigeria and are inseparable. Second, their affiliation with Islam made them identical partly due to the deep influence of the Islamic religion and its culture among the two groups from its very beginning in the region and partly due to the reform of Usman Danfodio (nineteenth century reformer), which brought and cement them together to establish the Sokoto Caliphate. Lastly, these ethnic groups, considering the factors above, have intermarriages among them and therefore, predominantly mix up today. Such a mixture is experienced in most Hausa/Fulani families

followed by the Yoruba and then Igbo, which all exist in the different regions though with significant mixture in other regions especially in the northern part probably due to its tolerant disposition towards the other ethnic groups from the South. Officially, there are 6 regions in Nigeria, 3 in the north and 3 in the south: North West, North East, and North Central in the northern part with 19 states excluding the Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory, Abuja,<sup>2</sup> which is also located in the north. The other regions include South-West, South-South, and South-East with 17 states.<sup>3</sup> Northern Nigeria here includes the North Central, which is often referred to as the Middle Belt,<sup>4</sup> which is characterized with ethnoreligious diversity (Best 2014: 7).

in northern Nigeria. For example, my grandfather is a Hausa from Kano State who settled in Jos since the 1930s. On the other hand, my father got married to another Hausa woman (my mother) whose mother was a Fulani from Kaduna State. For this reason, I always refer to myself as Hausa/Fulani. This is unlike other ethnic groups such as the Igbo.

<sup>2</sup> The number of states in the north can be considered 20 when Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is added. Abuja, the administrative capital of Nigeria has an administrator similar to that of a governor and it contains 6 area councils: Abaji, Abuja Municipal, Bwari, Gwagwalada, Kuje, and Kwali.

<sup>3</sup> The states in Nigeria are divided among the 6 different regions. North-West has 7 states: Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Birnin-Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, and Zamfara. The North-East consists of 6 states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. North-Central has 6 states and the federal capital: Benue, Federal Capital Territory (FCT - Abuja), Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, and Plateau. South-West consists of 6 states: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo while South-South also has 6 states: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers. Lastly, South-East contains only 5 states: Imo, Anambra, Abia, Enugu, and Ebonyi.

<sup>4</sup> North Central Nigeria is often referred to as the Middle-Belt, an identity promoted by mostly Christian inhabitants of Plateau State, Southern Kaduna, and Benue State. It is an

The Hausa/Fulani dominated the northern region from inception amidst other numerous smaller ethnic groups, while the Yoruba dominated the South-West and the South-East is dominated by the Igbo apart from other smaller ethnic groups that intertwined in the different regions. The South-South also consists of different ethnic groups such as the Ibibio, Ijaw, Efic, Urhobo, Ogoni, etc. Ethnic groups in Nigeria are a group of people that relentlessly share a common ancestral origin, which created a persistent sense of common cultural, decent, interest, and identity<sup>5</sup> (Tanko 2002: 201).

area dominated by mostly Christians and partly practitioners of Traditional Religion and then Muslims (Yoroms 2002: 25). The name Middle-Belt was meant to intimidate and intentionally dissociate it from the Muslim-dominated north. Religion, ethnicity, and politics play a significant role in the discourse, religious identity, and politics of the Middle Belters, which dissociated it with the Hausa/Fulani majority in northern Nigeria, an attitude that has weakened its political visibility at the national level due to the dominance of the Hausa/Fulani in different aspects of life.

<sup>5</sup> Belonging to an ethnic group is important in Nigeria otherwise one risk losing important job employment opportunity or appointment into an important political position in the country. During admission into higher institutions or employment, it is important to clearly state one's ethnic identity by presenting an indigene certificate. In order to obtain an indigene certificate, a person has to be certified by the local government where he/she belongs and sometimes even by the ward head or a committee of elders that could identify a person's family connection within a certain locality. Sometimes employment, political office or appointment is rotated among different ethnic groups within certain area as an arrangement among them. States and local governments only consider members of their own locality/ethnicity in a particular state/local government job opportunity. This has presented a major challenge to many young people whose parents have settled in a state other than their own such as Plateau State, in most cases, they are being segregated against as non-indigenes, therefore, second-class citizens. The situation of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos is a good example, they are referred to as "settlers" (immigrants),

Ethnic groups in Nigeria are always in solidarity with one another and it was the main reason why politicians constantly promote ethnic affiliation because they always benefit from votes from such affiliates during local elections even when they do not merit it. Ethnicity has been the cause of many violent conflicts in Nigeria, which has resulted in the death of thousands of people in the country from 1980 until today. Ethnicity often becomes even more dangerous when it is mix up with religion or politics, while local politicians know when to instigate the dispute and cause havoc. For example, many people are killed during conflicts as they move across boundaries not because they commit any crime, but because they belong to a different ethnic identity. It has become a culture in places such as Jos (Plateau) and Kaduna to look out for the other members of a ethnicity that are considered as enemies during conflicts and eradicate them. This often happens especially when a person is trapped at the “wrong” side of the divide while traveling or passing through an area dominated by a different ethnic group during tension (Bagudu 2003: ix). For example, the Daily Trust Newspaper of 15<sup>th</sup> August, 2021 reported the following heading: “Irigwe Youths Kill 25 Fulani Travellers in Jos, over 50 missing.” This incident almost led to the outbreak of conflict between Christians and Muslims in Jos.

This is because the different ethnic groups in Nigeria are spread over the various regions and states of the federation,<sup>6</sup> and mostly belong to either Islam or Christianity. For example, as one travel to Kaduna from Jos, the road passes through Muslim and Christian villages and towns, the identity of the villagers always reveal that. Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in Nigeria, almost equally divided, though Muslims have the largest population of about 53.5% against the Christian population of 45.9% according to the 2020 Pew Report on religion in Nigeria. A limited percentage of

meaning, they do not have any right to the numerous benefits from the Plateau state government, which only “indigenes” do.

<sup>6</sup> Nigeria is a federation of different entities, the northern and southern parts brought together as one country.

Nigerians still practices the African Traditional Religion<sup>7</sup> mostly in the countryside (i.e., rural areas), which is the original traditional belief and practice among the various ethnic groups in the country before the coming of Islam and Christianity and still persists today. The diversity and bringing together of the different regions in Nigeria is considered an intentional creation of the British colonials (Tanko 2002: 199).

The British colonials established Nigeria as a large colony probably “to put together a large and powerful state” in Africa that consisted of different ethnic and religious diversity, which was expected to play a leading role in the whole of Africa with its multiplicity. This assumption has proven to be a wrong idea considering today’s negative developments in the country especially of the proliferation of ethnic and religious conflicts among the diverse people probably due to lack of an established system of governance or a strong central state that might bring the different parts together, which the British failed to pay particular attention to (Tanko 2002: 199). Therefore, ethnic and religious diversity of Nigeria ended up causing more harm than good to the country and its people. Today, Nigerians first see themselves as members of their ethnic group/region, then religion, then the state at large. For example, region and state of origin seems more important than country of origin for most Nigerians. In order to be identified with certain

<sup>7</sup> African Traditional Religion (ATR) is the original religion practiced in the whole of Africa at large and Nigeria in particular in both the northern and southern parts before the coming of other foreign religions especially Islam and Christianity and the practice continues even today. For example, the earliest Hausa inhabitants of Kano are known to worship a god called *Tsunburbura* in Hausa, which is carved out of wood and kept in a shrine on top of the Dala Hill where spirit forces are said to reside. The shrine of *Tsunburbura* was built around a huge baobab tree called Shamus inside the shrine. The presence of the shrine was during the period of Barbushe the grandson of Dala guarded by a man called “Mai *Tsunburbura*” (servant of *Tsunburbura*) and only Barbushe, was allowed to enter and have an interface with it. Dala was the first settler at the bottom of the hill that bears his name.

ethnic group or particular area of residence, many Nigerians today have a certificate of origin as a requirement, which is presented during admission into higher institutions of learning, when applying for a scholarship, or when seeking for employment. The National Identity Card (NIN) does not matter in Nigeria considerably except in few occasions such as in the bank when opening a new account, obtaining a driving license, etc.

There are fundamental issues of consideration in the situation of Nigeria. First, Nigeria is the largest Black Country in the world today, which would have ordinarily united the citizens as a great and unified country of the African continent. Second, Nigeria as a nation ought to have become a basis for the unity of its citizens like the situation of most developed countries where citizens look up to the country as their source of pride, inspiration, and unity. Third, the major religions in Nigeria, Islam, and Christianity, are sister religions that have emerged from the same source, the Middle East, with history, civilization, and scriptures that are similar not only in context but also the same source. Economically, the huge population in Nigeria would have to make up a great source of economic prosperity for the state and its citizens as one people. These commonalities would have benefited Nigerians more than the harm brought by promoting negative views of ethnicity and religion. For example, the next section analyzed the similarities of the Muslim and Christian belief systems, scriptures, and prophets. Yet, Nigerians seem to be one of the most divided people in the world, a division that often cause misunderstanding and bloody conflicts, as well as the destruction of one another's property.

Two theories benefited this work: hybridity theory and the theory of autochthony. Autochthony means exclusive belonging as some section of the citizens are considered *allogène* (or strangers) within their own country. The term autochthony is mostly promoted in low-income countries such as Nigeria, especially by selfish politicians (Geschiere 2010: 46). Hybrid theory on the other hand refers to state fragility that often engenders violent conflict among the citizens, a situation that often leads to state collapse e.g. the case of Somalia. One of the major roles of the state is the provision of security for the citizens. Closely related to this is the concept of hybrid government, which refers to the emergence of local institutions, organizations, and individuals that often become

powerful and fill the gaps created by weak states, which are unable to protect the lives and property of their citizens (Meagher et al 2014: 1). The use of these theories in this work is important because the success of ethnicity (autochthony in other words) is only achieved in situations where there is a weak state that is unable to provide equal rights to its citizens. Unlike the situation in most African countries today, the impact of the state in advanced societies is evident in almost every aspect of the life of citizens, its authority, social welfare, and security. This has enabled the society to advance its interest in the life of the individual and family who constantly feels its presence (Lambach 2004: 2). Both the state and society become interdependent on molding the other, a working system that produces a better result. The empirical reality in Africa, especially the situation in Nigeria, presents a contrast. The existence of the state is not felt except in limited parts of the life of a few individuals like the civil servants who collect insignificant monthly emolument far less than what is obtainable in even some African countries. This led us to the discussion on the theory of fragile state in Africa. (Boege 2008: 2). Fragile state is considered "an obstacle to the maintenance of peace and development," and by implication, it lacks the willingness or capacity to perform adequate state functions in the area of security and welfare of its citizens (Boege 2008: 3). This is because fragility of the state is characterized by the control of many actors that compete for the authority of the central state. In Nigeria for instance, this could be likened to ethnic and religious figures that function as "second state" within their domain either because of their connections with top politicians or because they have become untouchable. The state functions alongside these diverse "non-state" actors/authorities who have developed stronger mechanisms of civilian control, which gives them almost equal authority with politicians who constantly need civilian votes to ascend to positions of power.

On the other hand, it is important to note that central or national identity is losing meaning in Nigeria due to the ebullition of other more powerful identities i.e., religion and ethnicity, one of the worst challenges confronting the country today. Religion and ethnicity would not have become destructive in Nigerian politics (destroying relations between ethnic and religious groups) without introducing the ideology of autochthony,

and today, a section of citizens were excluded and considered allogeneous in their own country (Geschiere 2005: 10). Peter Geschiere (2010: 46) confirmed this assertion:

“... autochthony can become a dangerous rival to national citizenship, drastically undermining earlier ideals of national unity and the equality of all national citizens. But it can also be seen as coinciding with national citizenship. In such cases, autochthony slogan demands a purification of citizenship and exclusion of ‘strangers,’ who ever these may be ... autochthony always asks for exclusion.”

Politicians in Nigeria choose the path of autochthony instead of the path of national unity and cohesion that will bring development and reduce poverty because it yields private benefit for them. They play the autochthony card supporting their various religions and ethnicities to further divide the nation for their advantage to ascend to position of power and control of the masses. This makes them ethnic heroes rather than national heroes (Geschiere 2010: 10).

This chapter outlined the challenges faced by the minority Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos (for being considered *allogène* or non-indigenes/settlers), the capital of Plateau State especially the younger generation as they struggle to recreate their own identity and belonging within an aggressive Christian dominant population. It also looks at the reaction of the majority Muslim population in northern Nigeria to the situation in Plateau State. These attitudes, responses, and reactions produce both positive and negative impacts on relations between Christians and Muslims within the city of Jos in particular and northern Nigeria at large. Plateau State is chosen for this analysis because of its uniqueness of bringing together more than 50 ethnic groups from different parts of Nigeria.

Apart from the introductory part, this chapter starts by analyzing the position of Jos as a meeting point of Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. This is important as most cities lack the quality to ascend to that position even despite the incessant crises situation in Jos and Plateau State at large. The context of ethno-religious relations in Jos is discussed in order to understand how ethnicity is intertwined with religion in the politics



of Plateau State. Despite the lack of development in Plateau State and the individual benefit that few acquire as a result of the series of ethnic and religious conflicts yet, the people in Plateau hold on tied to the ideology of ethnic divide. The sub-heading that follows look at the ethnic and religious segregation that was ingrained in the politics of Plateau State alongside the status of Hausa/Fulani migrants in Jos as settlers. The last sub-heading, i.e., “determinant of Muslim-Christian peaceful coexistence and conflict” provide the details of how politicians take advantage of the use of religion and ethnicity to obtain political and economic power in the State.

## **JOS: MEETING POINT OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS**

Religion serves as a major source of inspiration in Nigeria and apart from Islam and Christianity, Nigeria has become a notable religious market<sup>8</sup> due to the emergence of many new religious movements that have gained popularity (Meagher 2009: 397; Orok 2014: 47). The new religions in Nigeria and which mostly have branches in Jos include: Hare Krishna Consciousness, Rocirusians, Guru Maharaji, Eckankar, Grail Message, Christian Science, Latter-Day Saints, etc. Despite the fact that Islam and Christianity are the two dominant religions in the country, Nigeria runs a secular constitution, which does not recognize a state religion; therefore, all religions are considered equal by law and this is guaranteed in the federal constitution. Islam has the largest population, especially among the Hausa/Fulani and other related ethnic groups in the northern region. Christianity followed closely with dominance in the South-East and South-South among the Igbo and some minority ethnic groups of Cross Rivers, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom,

<sup>8</sup> Many researchers have described Nigeria as a religious marketplace due to the popularity of new as well as various religious movements in the country. Worship places for Muslims and Christians are established in nearly every corner of Nigeria that brings religious prosperity to the religious figures and almost every new religious movement is gaining followers every day and establishing worship centers.

whereas the South-Western region has a divided population between Muslim and Christian. Muslims and Christians often engage in disputes and even bloody conflicts in Nigeria, especially in the North-Central. Understanding the origin and relationship of the two major religions is fundamental.

Christianity and Islam originated from the Middle East as Abrahamic Religions from the same root, i.e., the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Ishmael. Christianity emerged on the part of Isaac and Islam on the part of Ishmael, making both sister religions (Abubakar 2014: 214 and Chentu 2010: 223). Islam and Christianity are complex, as religions and systems of belief and worship, they also represent historical civilizations that grew and flourished over many centuries with shared values and heritage of revelation and prophecy mixed with Greek philosophy and science (Lewis 2003: 4). Apart from similarities in dogma, Christianity provides a clear gap that divides the relationship between state (government) and religion, which was contrary in Islam due to the blending of state and religion as one in the Muslim's concept of *shari'a*. For example, the Bible (Mark 12:17) emphasized that: "give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God." Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam on the other hand, establishes a state in Madīna as a political entity where religion controls both the state power and a religious community (Lewis 2003: 5). The complex nature of these religions presented a major complication for Nigerians that engage in a political and ethnic struggle against one another, which delineated their relationship and contributes to the continuous experiences of religious conflicts in the country (Abubakar 2014: 215).

The presence of Islam in Nigeria started in the present Borno State, northern Nigeria between the ninth and the second half of the eleventh century (Clarke and Linden 1984: 11). Islam was introduced in Kanem-Borno Empire through an Arab scholar called Muhammad Ibn Mani who came to Borno at the invitation of the Kanem ruler Umme-Jimmi (rule: 1085-1097 CE). Abdul-Rahman Doi (1997: 23) emphasized that: "With the introduction of Islam in Kanem, it became the principal focus of Muslim influence in the central Sudan, and relations were established with the Arab world in the Middle East and Magrib." Islam came to the other route through Kano in the early 14<sup>th</sup> century through

the Wangarawa<sup>9</sup> traders and scholars from Mali. It was reported that about 40 Wangarawa traders brought Islam to Kano during the reign of Ali Yaji Dan Tsamiya (reign: 1349-1385CE) (Doi 1997: 24). The famous Muslim scholar Al-Maghili (1440-1505 CE)<sup>10</sup> came to Kano purposely to preach and teach Islam. Later, he moved to Katsina (175.9 km from Kano) where he made it a center of Islamic learning in the whole of the Hausa land in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The development of Islam continued in the Hausa land until the *jihad* (Islamic reform) of Usman Danfodio (1754-1817)<sup>11</sup> that culminated in a wider

<sup>9</sup> Wangarawa, sometimes called Dyula, Jula, Jakhanke, or Jalonke is a Mande sub-ethnic group, a popular merchant class that specialized in Trans-Saharan Trade and the secret trade of Gold Dust in West Africa. The Wangarawa were converted to Islam by the Soninke of Ghana. Akinwumi and Raji (1990) stressed that they were attracted to northern Nigeria especially Kano because of its economic potential. They also brought their religion Islam to the region, which made a lot of impact by becoming the religion of the rulers and their subjects (375).

<sup>10</sup> Muhammad ibn Abdalkarim al-Maghili (1440-1505 CE) popularly known as al-Maghili in northern Nigeria was a Berber Muslim scholar from Tlemcen modern-day Algeria. Al-Maghili was responsible for converting the Hausa and Fulani ruling class and their masses to Islam. His first station in northern Nigeria was Kano and later moved to Katsina. Al-Maghili was also responsible for the spread of the ideology of *sharī'a* in West Africa.

<sup>11</sup> Usman Danfodio (1754-1817) (Hausa: son of Fodio, meaning jurist in the Fula language), the historical Muslim reformer of the Hausa region was born at Maratta. He grew up in the Hausa city of Degel, a province of Gobir (El-Masri 1963: 435). Gobir was one of the seven original kingdoms of the Hausa land. Coming from a scholarly lineage, Danfodio studied from many Muslim scholars and became highly respected. This led him to challenge the Muslim practice of Islam in the Hausa land, especially the political class leading to the *jihad* that reformed the practice of Islam among the Hausa in the region (Galadanci 1993: 53).

spread of Islam in the northern region, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The main focus of the reform was on Muslim morality and spirituality.

Christianity came to Nigeria in the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the southern region. First in 1839 when several freed slaves from the West returned to Nigeria after their freedom and instead of settling in Freetown (a reserved territory for slaves now Sierra Leone, West Africa), they came to Lagos and Badagry in Nigeria (Falk 1997: 124). These few Christian converts made an individual and unsuccessful effort to spread Christianity in their different communities. Later, Christianity came again in 1842 and 1846 respectively through the effort of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), which was successful. The success of the CMS made other western missionary groups followed which resulted in the spread of Christianity in the southern region and later, it was extended to the northern part from 1857 and continued up to 1894 and afterward (Ayandele 1991: 4 Gaiya 2004: 6).

Thomas Jefferson Bowen (1814-1875)<sup>12</sup> of the Southern American Baptist Mission was the first to establish a mission center in Ilorin, a Muslim-dominated town in 1855. Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809-1891)<sup>13</sup> followed Bowen's steps in 1857 with his diplomatic and patient friendship with some Emirs (kings) in the north such as that of Nupe, Egga,

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Jefferson Bowen (1814 – 1875) was an American Baptist Church Missionary who had spent a long time conducting missionary activities in Oyo, Nigeria and places such as Ogbomosho, Ijaye, etc. He was the founder of the Baptist Church Mission in Nigeria. After his effort to evangelize the north was thwarted by the Emir of Ilorin, he turned his attention to the Yoruba land until his return to the United States of America.

<sup>13</sup> Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809-1891) was a Yoruba born in Osoogun in Oyo State Nigeria. He was captured by Muslim slave riders and sold into slavery in March 1821 to the Portuguese when he was 12 years old and later became a freed slave and was resettled in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Crowther was taken to England to study linguistics and later continued his studies at the Fourah Bay College under the Anglican Mission and became a full-time missionary.

and Kipo, where he established mission centers with the hope of getting Christian converts. He also persuaded the Emirs of Bida, Ilorin, and Gwandu, and even the Sultan of Sokoto<sup>14</sup> to receive Arabic Bibles as gifts from the Church Missionary Society (CMS) (Ayandele 1991: 118). These continued efforts have led to the success of Christianity in northern Nigeria, especially in areas where Islam has limited influence such as Plateau State, parts of Kaduna and Taraba states, etc.

Due to this development, Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria can be examined in different phases that gradually shaped their interaction over the course of history as people of the same nation. The history of southern and northern Nigeria need to be considered as completely different entities consisting of people that practice different cultures and religions altogether. The people were abruptly brought together as one under the 1914 British amalgamation policy, making Nigeria a federal entity. Explaining the challenges of the amalgamation, Matthew Hassan Kukah (1995: 102) states: "The values that have followed therefrom are values that are related to a stratified society in which the ruler and the ruled, the believers and non-believers, all lived in two worlds apart". The first phase, therefore, was that of living apart before the coming of the British and during the early period of British occupation. During this period, there is limited interaction between the different parts. This according to Abubakar (2007: 3) was the "contact phase", a period where each party tries to know about the other. The parties work for the British administration and engage in trade and political activities, reaching out to one another. This continues up to the independence in October 1960 and beyond

<sup>14</sup> The Sultan of Sokoto is today considered as the leader of the Muslims in northern Nigeria. It was a two-century-old position originally established by Usman Danfodio in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the British maintained it as a ceremonial position with limited influence. The present sultan Sa'ad Abubakar occupies the seat in November 2006 as the 19<sup>th</sup> sultan. He is considered the spiritual leader of the Muslims in northern Nigeria, the president *Jama'atu Nasril Islam* (a Muslim umbrella organization in Nigeria), and the president general of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA).

it to the 1970s. This was the longest phase of Muslim-Christian relations, which unfortunately was not utilized either by the British or the founding fathers of Nigeria to produce better results for future relations between different independent groups. The second phase was termed the "trial phase" that started from 1980 to 2010 (i.e. three decades). This period was dominated with hostility, enmity, crisis, and conflicts as well as the destruction of lives and property. Thousands of people were killed from each side and properties worth billions of naira (i.e., hundreds of millions of US dollars) were destroyed (Abubakar 2007: 5). During this period, each group competes for supremacy and superiority over the other with politicians systematically instigating each side. The last phase started from 2010 until present and it is referred to as the "misunderstanding phase." This period is full of undesirable discourses on population, political dominance over the other, conspiracy against the other, etc. This period is likely to result in future large scale armed-conflict aimed at eliminating one another or self-liberation and emancipation. The cases in Rwanda and Sudan were a good example in Africa. The following section examined Jos as an example.

Jos, the capital of Plateau state, is almost at the center of Nigeria and its closeness to Abuja (Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria), giving it and the people many advantages. Its strategic location makes it easily accessible by citizens from both northern and southern parts as well as access to job opportunities in Abuja for many of its young population. Many ethnic groups are represented in Jos, meaning that almost all religions, ethnic groups, and denominations found in Nigeria are also represented in the city of Jos. The pleasant weather in Jos<sup>15</sup> is another advantage, which used to attract foreigners who often compare the similarity of the weather to what is obtainable in especially western countries (Plotnicor 1969: 31). Jos is about 1,000km North-East of Lagos, 650km South-East of Sokoto, 600km South-East of Maiduguri and 300km North-East of Abuja, which

<sup>15</sup> The weather in Jos can be similar to the weather in Berlin (Germany) during October to November. The only difference was the dryness/harshness of the weather like the situation in most northern cities during severe cold.

makes it almost at the center of Nigeria. The city is surrounded by hills of an average height of over 1250 meters (4000ft) above sea level, with granite peaks over 1800 meters. The average monthly temperature in Jos ranges from 21 – 25 °C and at night sometimes the temperature drops to as low as 7 °C (Neiers 1979: 89). Jos weather and rainy atmosphere make it distinct from other cities in Nigeria. Plateau State is one of Nigeria's thirty-six states known for its outlook of natural beauty and the principal feature of this beauty is partly in the surrounding plateau from which the state got its name.

The popularity of Jos started before the colonial era as a *zango* (Hausa: a trading link) for the Hausa/Fulani traders at a place called Narkuta (about two kilometers from the present Jos) before the movement to Jos. Many reasons contributed to the relocation according to oral narrative; relocation of the mining field from Jos to Rayfield by the British, frequent death of the sarki (chief), etc. Jos gradually grows into an exciting metropolitan. First, it became the colonial administrative headquarters of "Jos Division" during the British era and remains the seat of government until today despite the creation of Benue (1967) and Nassarawa (1996) states, which gives it a strategic position as an attractive commercial center in North Central Nigeria (Egwu 2004: 109). During the colonial period, Jos owed its development to the colonial mining economy with peculiar history of urban population, socio-economic, and socio-political characteristics. Tin mining was then critical to the expansion of the steel industry of leading industrial nations of Britain and the United States of America. Nigeria became the world's sixth largest producer of tin ore in 1902 and 1903, contributing 5% of world production. Plateau State alone produces 80% of Nigeria's tin and Columbite and 83% of its metalliferous output (Egwu 2004: 110). More than 80 British mining companies operate in Jos during that period, which attracted the influx of people from diverse social, cultural, and religious backgrounds within and outside Nigeria. This includes business persons from Britain and other places in Africa, colonial workforce, local miners, and colonial mining laborers and their accompanying families, traders, etc. The attraction came mainly from the enterprising ethnic groups of the Hausa/Fulani from northern Nigeria, and the Igbo and Yoruba from the south (Egwu 2004: 111). The trooping in of the different migrants from

all over Nigeria makes Jos an interesting meeting point for ethnic and religious interaction in the country, an opportunity that would have brought a lot of development including investments from both local and foreign business people in Plateau State. The population of Jos city today slightly exceeds two million from few hundreds of thousands in the 1950s and 1960s. Local migrants (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, etc.) are estimated to make up about 70% – 75% of the population. These migrants were the most visible residents of Jos at the different markets, street shops, and commercial vehicles, Napep (tricycles or Indian Rickshaw), Okada (motorcycles), etc. as well as petty trading and menial jobs.

## **THE CONTEXT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN JOS**

The end of the military rule and return to civilian administration in 1999 signifies an increase in ethnic and religious instabilities in Nigeria, which are related to claims and contestation over space and identity as a basis of determining who is included or excluded from decision-making, opportunities, and domination. The religions of Islam and Christianity are both exclusivists<sup>16</sup> and since ethnic groups in Nigeria mostly belong to either Islam or Christianity, it is always a “we” versus “them” relationship. Most citizens in Nigerian see themselves as different from the other and this is clear from the way different people dress, their language, and attitude, therefore; they easily differentiate and could tell who belongs to what religion or ethnicity. Ethnic groups on the other hand often share a common ancestry, identity, language, and culture. As the culture has been in preliterate societies in Nigeria, even today most ethnic groups do not want to share their city spaces, economic prosperity, and political opportunities with others. Politicians in Nigeria explore this opportunity to enhance their effortless chances of winning elections; therefore, they often play the ethnic and religious card. For example, if they

<sup>16</sup> According to Islamic and Christian belief, you either are a believer or an unbeliever (i.e., disbeliever or *kāfir*), which is an important concept of inclusion and exclusion. Believers in Nigeria seem to rate every relationship with the “other” on this basis and it is what determines the acceptability or otherwise in most relationships in Nigeria.



are seeking elections within their ethnic enclave, they seem to have more chances when they sing the mantra of ethnicity, their ethnic comrades will vehemently vote for them no matter the suitability of the other candidates. Religion is also used in the same way. The attitude of politicians and members of ethnic enclaves have, therefore, been the cause of many violent conflicts in the country. Within the period of 55 months, from 1999 to 2003 of civil rule in Nigeria, there were over 80 ethnic and religious clashes in different parts of Nigeria, to which Alubo Ogoh (2006: 2) concluded that it is the "defining characteristic of the return to civil rule." These conflict situations continue until today and are claiming hundreds of lives every year in the country. For example, the Economist (October 20, 2001: 50) reported that:

... more than 6000 people have been killed in civil unrests since 1999. The Muslim-Christian divide has usually defined the combatants. More than 2000 people died in clashes in Kaduna in February 2000, and hundreds more in Aba the following month. In June this year [2001], hundreds died in similar clashes in Bauchi State, and more than 500 died in Jos, a city in the center of Nigeria last month.

The main boundary for identifying one another between groups is usually language, religion, and history of origin. Different ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria have different physical and cultural identities. Whenever they meet during regular daily interaction, they always see themselves as different whether on the street, in the marketplace, at tertiary institutions, or at private and public offices. Therefore, as citizens interact in Jos, they often generate tension among themselves, which promote a negative feeling of "we" versus "them" dichotomy. Competition over employment, promotions at work, state scholarships, and job employment as well as obtaining contracts (supply, rehabilitation or construction) with especially the government are the most fertile grounds for breeding ethnicity in Nigeria (which is very common in Plateau State). Ethnicity reinforces the understanding of a common origin, which gives a sense of belonging to certain group(s) and antagonism to others, i.e., "we" versus "them" dichotomy. This attitude often results in the discrimination and exclusion of the "other" that is characterized as not belonging to a particular place (Yusuf 2009: 19). The "other" is

usually in the minority and has a disadvantaged position. Ethnicity takes a greater meaning in competitive situations as well as situations in which available resources are relatively scarce like the situation in Plateau State (Onigu 1990: 15). The state in Nigeria is to be blamed for the discourse on ethnicity and politics of inclusion of one part of its citizens as belonging and exclusion of another as not belonging like the situation of the Hausa/Fulani in Plateau State. Samuel Egwu (2004: 82) maintains that "the state remains a central factor in the discourse on identity and the crisis of citizenship" in Nigeria. For example, in 2004, Alhaji Aminu Mato (a Hausa/Fulani) was appointed as a care-taker committee chairman of Jos North Local Government but he was rejected by some indigenous ethnic groups in Jos that see the Hausa/Fulani as non-indigenes (migrants), which led to conflict between the two groups. Another Hausa/Fulani Alhaji Mukhtar was appointed by the federal government to head its state poverty alleviation program in Plateau in 2001 and the same indigenous ethnic groups conducted riots and rejected the appointment, which also led to a crisis situation. The rejection of these appointments was purely based on ethnicity not because they are incompetent. The discourse on ethnicity and citizenship as well as inclusion and exclusion defines the level of the awareness and mental development of a particular people in any country especially in plural societies today.

## **MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS AND CONFLICT**

Religion is an important part of social and economic life in northern Nigeria and its physical presence is perceived in every corner of the region, mosques and churches are erected everywhere and are always full with worshippers. Most people always identify with their religion on the street or at the market. For example, there are constant calls to prayers in Muslim areas in Jos such as Bauchi Road (the city center), Anguwan Rogo, Nassarawa, Gangare, etc. during prayer time and deafening music from churches on Sundays in Christian areas such as Gada Biyu, Anguwan Rukuba, Jenta Adamu, Apata, etc. Schools and businesses often acquire religious names and people adapt to religious phrases in whatever situation, which Abubakar describes as the attitude of physical

religiosity contrary to the reality of true Nigerian life. Nigerians seem to adapt to the context of physical belonging to a particular religion without really believing in the religion. They often neglect important tenets such as truth, piety, honesty, morality, etc., yet Nigerians could die to protect their religion or kill the “other” that abuses their religion (Abubakar 2014: 387). An example is the recent case of Deborah Samuel, a 200-level student of Shehu Shagari College, Sokoto that was gruesomely killed in May 2022 by some people in Sokoto that accused her of blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad. Rather, most religious followers in Nigeria tend to focus on issues that promote disunity, enmity, and conflict among them as a way of practice of their religion.

Relationships between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria used to be cordial before independence and afterwards probably because they are still learning to understand one another which could be described as the formation stage of Muslim-Christian relations. Most Muslims only hear of Christians from their Holy Scripture, the Qur’an labeling them as *ahlul kitab* that is, people of a past revealed scripture, the Bible. Therefore, Muslims in Nigeria are aware of Christianity from their Qur’an even before Christianity was introduced in the country in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as earlier discussed. Nigerians who later converted to Christianity through the British missionaries seem to have not received proper guidance to respect and live in peace with their Muslim counterparts as citizens of one nation. Muslims on their part seem not to have received proper guidance on relations with their Christian counterparts despite the abundant information about Christians in the Qur’an. On the other hand, Nigeria’s founding fathers seem not to have also well prepared the citizens politically for a better future relation with one another, a relationship of harmony and understanding. Until the 1980s, Muslims and Christians coexisted in a relatively peaceful atmosphere with tendencies of limited misunderstanding, which was not given serious attention to manage for the future. Amidst this misunderstanding, there are instances of mutual coexistence exemplified by Muslims and Christians through the

exchange of food and other pleasantries during festivities such as *īd*<sup>17</sup> and Christmas, etc. During such moments of joy, both Muslims and Christians distribute food to their neighbors and in extreme situations even buy new clothes for the children of the neighbors in order to celebrate with their own children, which actually promote good relationships with neighbors at that time. Many older interlocutors seem to remember such moments in their life.

Two decades of unregulated situations of Muslim-Christian coexistence from 1970 to 1990 produced the negative effect of what Nigerians are witnessing today in their relationship. First was the establishment of two rival but also representative religious organizations in the country's religious scene: *Jamā'at Nasril Islam* (society for the support of Islam, JNI) established in 1962 representing Muslims and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) established in 1976 to represent Christians. The main aim of these groups is to defend their faith and members against all odds. This development has probably caused more divisions among the citizens than promoting national unity. These religious organizations provide immense services to their respective faith and its members as well as go to any length to protect them even at the detriment of national unity. What follows was the emergence of various other religious groups among the Muslims and Christians that further deepen divisions, inter and intra conflicts, and chaos in Nigeria. Today, there are tens of Muslim groups and Christian denominations in the country each independent of the other and struggling to get power, followers, and admiration from Nigerians. Religious leaders in Nigeria appear on the media (social media, newspaper or television and radio, or through the use of loudspeakers from their religious places, etc.) and publicize any national or local issue to the public, castigate whomever they desire as well as challenge the government since there is no strict government regulation that restricts religious involvement in political and national issues in Nigeria. This attitude

<sup>17</sup> *īd al-fitr* and *īd al-adha* are Muslim festivities in which they celebrate the end of the fasting period which signifies forgiveness for believers while in the second, celebrates the end of the *hājj* (pilgrimage) activity by slaughtering an animal imitating Prophet Abraham.

constantly produces enmity, tension, and conflicts in Muslim-Christian relations in especially North Central. The division of power and loyalty may appear simple on the surface, but it is complex. The Nigerian president has the power of the secular state and the army whereas, on the other hand, prominent religious figures have the power of their congregation to even challenge the state power. Historical examples in other parts of the world show that the Filipino Cardinal Jaime Sin challenged the power of President Ferdinand Marcos in the 1986 revolutions in the Philippines. Ayatollah Khomeini challenged, which even led to the overthrow of President Shah of Iran in 1979 while Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu led the South African Ecumenical Council of churches against the apartheid region in the early 1990s (Chentu 2010: 223). In the context of Nigeria for example, in December 2015, the Shi'ite group under Shaykh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky challenged the state authority in Nigeria by blocking the public road during one of their activities in Zaria claiming to have more right to its usage than the Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff who came through that road on his way to pay homage to the Emir of Zazzau.<sup>18</sup> During COVID-19, many Muslim and Christian religious leaders challenged the government's ban on public religious gathering to restrict its transmission. Prominent among them are Shaykh Sani Yahya Jingir of Izala and Pastor Chris Oyakhilome of Chris Embassy. The government has arrested some religious leaders (imams and pastors) for flouting the regulations but it could not touch the likes of Jingir and Oyakhilome because they are powerful religious figures, partly because of their influence and partly because politicians need them during voting.

Another angle of tense relations between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria is that of suspicion of one another, which also started from the 1970s onwards. The debate on

<sup>18</sup> This development led to the destruction of the Movement's center in Zaria called Hussainiyya and the residence of their leader El-Zakzaky, as well as the death of hundreds of the Shi'ite members.

the inclusion of the *sharī'a* court<sup>19</sup> in the Nigerian constitution that started in 1976 and Nigeria's membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986<sup>20</sup> as well as the implementation of *sharī'a* in twelve states of northern Nigeria<sup>21</sup> in 1999 in areas

<sup>19</sup> Nigeria's preparation for the Second Republic in the mid-1970s requested the drafting of a new federal constitution. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) appointed a Constitutional Drafting Committee to make changes to the constitution and the draft produced was debated by the Constituent Assembly, consisting of elected members from all the 19 states in Nigeria. The issue that generated heated debate was the inclusion of a Federal *Sharī'a* Court of Appeal (FSCA). This debate also became an issue between the Muslim and Christian populace in the country, with one section in support and the other against it (Laitin 1982: 411).

<sup>20</sup> The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference is an international organization that was established in 1969 to give voice to majority Muslim countries, protect and promote international peace as well as encourage harmony. Presently, it consists of 57 countries with a collective population of 1.8 billion.

<sup>21</sup> The debate on *sharī'a* started with the inclusion of *Sharī'a* Court of Appeal in the Nigerian constitution during the 1970s constitutional reform. Since then, Muslims in northern Nigeria have agitated for *sharī'a* in one way or another. The return to democratic rule in 1999 (after 29 years of military rule with an interval of civilian dispensation in 1979 – 1983) was one of the issues that led to the agitation for the implementation of *sharī'a*. Nigeria experienced its first military coup d'état in January 1966 where 22 people were killed including the first Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. In 1979, General Olusegun Obasanjo (b. 1937) handed power to civilian president Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1925 - 2018). Shagari was overthrown in 1983 by the military headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari (b. 1942) who ruled for 2 years (December 1983 – August 1985) and was overthrown in 1985 in another military coup headed by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (b. 1942). He later handed power to an interim head of state Ernest

where Muslims form a majority were among major issues of disputes. A recent issue is that of the assumed Arabic inscription<sup>22</sup> on the naira note. For the Christians in Nigeria, these and other related issues represent Muslims' conscious efforts to Islamize Nigeria. Surprisingly, these were the issues majorly pointed out to me during an informal discussion with a group of pastors as processes of Islamization in Nigeria. For Christians in northern Nigeria, they constantly accuse Muslims of making a conscious effort to transform Nigeria into an Islamic state because of the decades of debate on *shari'a* implementation. The implementation of *shari'a* was the issue that caused Christian riots

Shonekan (1936 - 2022) in 1993. Shonekan was overthrown 2 months later by General Sani Abacha (1943 – 1998) in yet another coup. Sani Abacha ruled until his death in June 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar (b. 1942) took power as a military *de facto* president and handed it to an elected president Olusegun Obasanjo who returned in a civilian dispensation in May 1999 until 2007. With the returned to civilian rule, many Muslims in northern Nigeria agitates for the implementation of *shari'a* in the region, which was initiated by the former governor of Zamfara State Alhaji Ahmed Sani Yariman Bukura (b. 1960) and was followed by other governors, presently a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Deputy Minority Leader of Senate until 2019. He promised the people of Zamfara State during his campaign to establish *shari'a* and fulfilled the promise after he was voted into office. Yarima invited Muslims from within and outside Nigeria and *shari'a* was launched in October 1999 (Oduyoye 2000: 1). Muslims in other states pressurized their governors, which led to 12 states with a Muslim majority to implement *shari'a* in northern Nigeria. These states are: Zamfara, Kano, Birnin Kebbi, Borno, Bauchi, Kaduna, Katsina, Gombe, Sokoto, Niger, Jigawa and Yobe. *Shari'a* institutions established in these states to operate the new system includes: *Hisba* (known as *shari'a* police), Council of Ulama (highest *shari'a* body meant to issue Islamic ruling), *Zakat* Board (to administer the collection and disbursement of state *zakat*), and the Censorship Board (Abubakar 2015: 62).

<sup>22</sup> It is actually Hausa *ajami* written in Arabic numeral, not Arabic.

in Kaduna State, which led to conflict with Muslims in 2000, leading to the loss of hundreds of lives.

Competition between Muslims and Christians appears to form a chunk of problems in Nigeria. For example, the issue of public holidays in the country, which group has more population in the country, or who dominates the police or military forces, the national/state civil service, and even in terms of important strategic positions within those areas. Another issue includes which group has the largest number of worship places, or dominates the public space or the atmosphere in terms of sound, etc. These issues are prone to creating grievance and suspicion of one another in Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. In institutions of higher learning and in public and private workplaces, each group tries to dominate in order to show its superiority over the "other" because visibility and influence according to this understanding signifies dominance, an important drama in Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria. The use of the media provides another focal point in Muslim-Christian relations through bias and favorable reporting, especially during tensions. Some journalists belonging to the "other" religion are prone to describing the other religion negatively during reportage. The introduction of social media and the popularization of fake news has also complicated relations between the two groups. In the event of slight provocation, fake pictures of burnt religious buildings and dead bodies of one religious group are often disseminated in order to instigate one faith against the "other" (Chentu 2010: 248). Boko Haram terrorism (BH) is another burning issue that has complicated Muslim-Christian relations. Surprisingly, BH is a terrorist group that is against both Muslims and Christians and has even killed more Muslims than Christians since its emergence in the North East region in 2009 yet, some Christians in Nigeria have always used its disdainful activities to criticize Muslims, which further cause disunity among them. Tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria often degenerate into violent conflicts and this is what gives way to the use of ethnicity and politics and its mix-up with religion.



## **ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION AGAINST THE HAUSA/FULANI IN JOS**

There are numerous challenges confronting the Muslim Hausa/Fulani migrants as minorities in Jos due to their circumstances in Plateau State that make them unwanted citizens and owing to the indigene/settler dichotomy. To be an indigene in Plateau State for instance according to the political ideology of the people in the state, one must belong to a certain restricted ethnic group such as the Berom, Anaguta, Afizere, Tarok, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Goemai, Buji, Amo, Ron, Rigwe, etc. These ethnic groups share a common historical origin in the state before the arrival of the Hausa/Fulani, each has a unique language, and they somehow share similar traditional religion and culture, and today, are predominantly Christian. Most of them share negative views of the Hausa/Fulani and northern Nigeria as a whole. On their part, the Hausa/Fulani are generally Muslims, which presented them as second class as well as opponents especially because of differences in religious belief. Though, the Hausa/Fulani have been living in Jos for almost two centuries producing about five generations yet, they are rejected and always seen as migrants that do not have a stake in the state. They can vote but do not have the right to higher political appointments, state educational scholarships, or employment in the state because they are seen as "settlers" (migrants) or *allogène* and so, do not belong. For example, Abubakar's grandfather, Muhammadu Na Rimi came from Rimi, a town in Kano State, and settled in Jos since the 1930's but being a Hausa/Fulani by birth; even Abubakar's children cannot claim indigeneity (belonging) in Plateau State because they are not considered belonging to the ethnic groups in the area. Therefore, by the coincidence of birthright, one will automatically become a first or second-class citizen in Plateau State and by implication in Nigeria. This seems to be the typical attitude in less advanced countries, especially in most parts of Africa.

Since the 1970s, there has been tense discussion among the indigenous ethnic groups on whether to accept the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Jos or reject them. In fact, the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos almost relocate to the neighboring Sabon Gari in Toro

Local Government in Bauchi State (a predominantly Hausa/Fulani community), but the then Military administrator of Plateau State Group Captain Dan Suleiman intervened and convinced them to stay in Jos (Egwu 2004: 103). Despite this intervention, the situation led to a stray relationship. The continued situation of crisis from 2001 has forced many Hausa/Fulani to still relocate to Sabon Gari in Bauchi State leading to the formation of a large Hausa/Fulani migrant community of what I call the "economy Jos." People that moved there constantly come to Jos daily to seek livelihood and return.

Some of the frustration of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos includes denying them recognition as indigenes of the area, which automatically excludes them from any state benefit. During President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration, he faulted the promotion of the "indigene/settler" concept in Jos and Plateau State at large and branded it as unhealthy in the situation of Nigeria's development (Danfulani 9). The president argued that going back to history; everyone could be a settler in their present place of abode. This argument challenged the "indigene/settler" concept yet, nothing concrete was done by the government to change the policy (Bagudu 2004: 15). Appointment into important positions in government is also dependent upon one's belonging. This policy has isolated Muslim Hausa/Fulani in Jos and made them "stateless citizens" in their own country. Over the years, for the Hausa/Fulani to obtain scholarship at tertiary institutions or get employment at federal or other states in Nigeria, especially within the north, they have to falsify indigene certificate of another place. This has resulted in more enmity and had caused many violent and bloody conflicts in the State<sup>23</sup> since September 2001. For

<sup>23</sup> In Nigeria, every citizen must have an indigene certificate to identify with a certain local government area and by extension a state in any part of the country, and this form of identity is more powerful than the national identity. Many citizens do not hold a national identity card. Indigene certificate identifies a person's birthplace and religion, which is also a strong identity of inclusion and exclusion. For every important position, a cross-examination is conducted to ascertain the true indigeneity of a person in question and

example, Zainab Hashimu stressed that she has obtained three indigene certificates from Kaduna, Bauchi, and Birnin Kebbi states all in pursuit of education and scholarship (Interview 2020). Danladi, a Hausa/Fulani resident of Jos obtained employment in Abuja as a police imam using the indigene certificate of Kano State, while Kabiru, also from Jos secured a job in Jigawa State using an indigene certificate he obtained from Jigawa State (Interviews 2020). Not belonging to a particular area of residence by indigeneity makes a person stateless in Nigeria. Every person in Nigeria carries a certificate of identity as an indigene but those that cannot authoritatively claim a place are liable to lack many opportunities as citizens.

The population growth of some enterprising ethnic groups in Jos such as the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo seem to instigate envy from some members of the indigenous ethnic groups such as the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere (Egwu 2004: 112). The Hausa/Fulani were the earliest “settlers” then the Yoruba and followed by the Igbo. The attention of the indigenous ethnic groups is mainly on the Hausa/Fulani for many reasons. The Hausa/Fulani are northerners like them and share the experiences of pre-colonial wars with one another therefore, a source of animosity unlike the Igbo and Yoruba who came from the faraway south. Second, the population of the Hausa/Fulani in northern Nigeria is intimidating to them; therefore, they constantly live in fear of an imagined domination. This fear comes in three dimensions; social, religious, and political.<sup>24</sup> After the independence, the north started the policy of “one north”, which for the people of central Nigeria also means domination; therefore, they prefer to align with

his/her religion, especially important political positions such as ministerial or ambassadorial slots, etc.

<sup>24</sup> During the colonial period, the British often install the Hausa/Fulani into administrative positions over the people in the north central. This was due to the fact that the Hausa/Fulani had experiences of centralized political authority prior to the British unlike the people in north central that had loose and decentralized political systems. Therefore, by installing the Hausa/Fulani to head them, they could acquire administrative skills.

southerners who are mostly Christians like them. Since most people in North Central are Christians, aligning with Christian brethren from the south will possibly give them formidable power to challenge the Muslim north.

However, there are some major challenges confronting the people of north central (Middle Belt), which causes them a lot of confusion and frustration. The people of southern Nigeria always see them as synonymous to the Hausa/Fulani northerners; this is partly because of their identity and the region they belong to even though they are Christians like them. There will always be suspicion of them being the same as the Muslims in the north. The Igbo in the South will never trust the people of the Middle Belt for any meaningful political alliance because for them, they are closer to the Hausa than they are to the Igbo and might betray them at the slightest instigation. This reduces the chances of any meaningful political alliance between them. For example, the Igbo in the south will scarcely vote for a Christian northerner into an important political office such as the presidency. All the political alliances that have worked for the people of Plateau State (and by extension north central or Middle Belter) since independence was with the Hausa/Fulani in the north either during the military rule or political dispensation. It is clear that if the situation of conflict and animosity persists between the people in Plateau State with the minority Hausa/Fulani in the State and the Middle Belt at large, it is most likely that the dominant Hausa/Fulani population in northern Nigeria might continuously segregate against the people in Plateau (and Middle Belt) in terms of religion and politics, which can be detrimental to them as a minority in the north. It is very unlikely for the people of the Middle Belt to have a fruitful collaboration with the Igbo in Southern Nigeria for many reasons. The Igbo in the South will only align the people in the Middle Belt for their own benefit not that of the Middle Belters. However, it is important to note that the people of the Middle Belt need the Hausa/Fulani in northern Nigeria for any meaningful political participation in the national politics more than the Hausa/Fulani might need them; after all, they were the most beneficiaries as minorities in the region. For example, Plateau State cannot provide employment to all its youths after graduation from higher institutions; they can access employment in other northern states where people pay less

attention to modern education. But today, an Igbo person from the South can easily get employment in the north but not someone from Plateau State who is considered an antagonist to the Hausa/Fulani. Also, their population will never produce any political position at the national level. This negative development is detrimental to the masses in the Middle Belt whose children will be denied admission into higher institutions of learning and employment in the other northern states more than the politicians. The politics of exclusion has already isolated and Plateau State one of the poverty centers and less developed states in northern Nigeria.

## **DETERMINANT OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND CONFLICT**

The ruling elitists (specifically the political class) in Nigeria continue to take advantage of religion and ethnicity as a means to selfish ends. In order to grab and retain political and economic power, the elitists always try to diversify their survival strategies by adopting any strategy provided it works for them. For example, the “divide-and-rule” strategy through the use of ethnicity and religion works for them while the masses serve as victims. The so call indigenes of Plateau State for instance find the idea of being manipulated by the political class provocative because this would imply that they have been brainwashed or hypnotized. They, therefore, remain oblivious to the agents, goals, purpose, and method of the elitists’ manipulation (Chentu 2010: 189).

Though, the 21<sup>st</sup> century seems to present some complications to the politicians in Nigeria as they gradually lose their grip and respect in the eyes of many, especially among youth. An example was the recent #Endsars protests<sup>25</sup> in 2020 in many cities in

<sup>25</sup> #Endsars is a popular decentralized mass protest involving mostly youth that began in October 2020 in Lagos, Nigeria and became widespread in almost every state in the country. The protest started as a response to Police brutality in Nigeria. The protest was specifically against a special unit of Police called SARS (Special Anti-rubbery Squad) that

Nigeria. Those in government for instance in Plateau have failed to provide good governance and the provision of social amenities such as electricity, running tap water, road networks, security, employment, basic infrastructure, and quality education. Disrespect for politicians in Nigeria will most likely increase in the coming years for the above reasons. Most politicians in Nigeria are corrupt and selfish and are accused of squandering the country's wealth and enriching themselves, building mansions, and sending their children abroad for studies. Religious figures, on the other hand, are continually allying with the political class to suppress the citizens and if this attitude continues, they are likely going to experience a similar fate. Most religious figures today seem to be living a luxurious life though they do not have standard employment except working for religious bodies, which does not pay well. For example, they drive expensive cars and live in mansions as well. Most religious leaders enmesh wealth through their alliance with the political class. Many young people seem to be wary of the situation in Nigeria; conflicts, bloodshed, insecurity, Muslim-Christian conflicts as well as ethnic encounters. Globalization has widened the opinions of many young people who envy their counterparts in other parts of the world and wish for similar livelihoods.

In Jos today, many Hausa/Fulani young people have overlooked the challenges of securing employment in Plateau State and have since dispersed to other places in northern Nigeria, especially Abuja. Others have engaged in various forms of trade and manual work such as tailoring, commercial driving, local manufacturing, mining, etc., and

uses torture, and ill-treatment to punish suspects and extract information. Sometimes in the process of their duty, innocent people are often punished or even killed. This attitude instigated the protest by citizens that requested the government to scrap the unit. The protest went out of hand probably due to the hardship that citizens experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown in the entire country therefore, citizens demand the administrators to leave the office for their inability to provide good governance to its citizens. The protesters also burgled most of the government stores around the country and carted away with foodstuff.

were often successful. Every area within Jos has become a mini market, and shops and stalls have sprung up all over the city. This has engaged many Hausa/Fulani youths away from idleness and has to some extent reduced conflict between Muslims and Christians in the city where each party is considering another as opposition. This does not however mean that there are no idle youths that engage in negative things that might lead to disturbances in the city such as drug abuse and cultism, which have become very popular recently, especially in places such as Congo-Russia, Gada-Biyu, and Angwan Rukuba, etc., areas that have become spots of turbulences.

Despite this situation, there are also instances of new initiatives on the relationships between Muslim and Christian youths today, and even the instances of inter-marriages in Jos. Young Muslims and Christians in Jos are making desperate effort to reestablish cordial relationships among themselves. Some of these youths have created many social media platforms that connect them with one another to organize a series of events in Jos. According to Abdussalam Ibrahim (Interview September 2022), there are many social media platforms, but one of the popular social media platforms used by the youths to conduct various activities on Facebook is called "ChopLife." Through this platform, they organize hiking and mini hangouts, where they eat and interact with one another. They also organize *īd* and Christmas feaster to eat and merry make. The youths often visit orphanages and vulnerable people in society and distribute money, foodstuff, books, and other relief materials. Videos and pictures of these activities are often uploaded on their site. When I checked the "ChopLife" social media site in September 2022, there are about 70,000 members. Another group of young Muslims and Christians is called the "Jos Town Ambassadors." The group according to Abdussalam carries out a peace football project called "Music plus football equal to peace." They organize music concerts and football matches with teams created around peace components such as "Team Love," "Team Reconciliation," "Team Unity," etc. Muslim and Christian youths are mixed up together in each of the teams so that it will attract as well as enlighten both Muslim and Christian fans as they come to watch the matches. Muhammad Lawal (Interview September 2022) agrees that new forms of relationships have emerged among

Muslim and Christian boys and girls in the post-crisis era in Jos. One of these relationships is the increase of proper and recognizes marriage among them, which is legitimate among Muslim religious circles though with some challenges. In this case, mainly Muslim boys marry Christian girls but not the other way around. Another type is the illegal relationship, which is seen as a form of protest against the traditional societies in Jos, especially among some parents where young people stay together and even have children without proper and recognized marriage. Both Muhammad Lawal and Abdussalam gave me examples of Muslim girls (Zainab and Walida) that rebelled against their parents and went to stay and even have children with Christian men. This shows that as politicians struggle to disrupt relations between Muslims and Christians, situations are slowly changing, and a new form of relationship is emerging among the youth. These developments if continued among Muslim and Christian youths, it will define the future of ethnic and religious relations in Jos.

## **CONCLUSION**

Jos is a twentieth-century city that has attracted various people from different regions of Nigeria especially the Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslims. The British missionaries brought Christianity to Jos, which increase colonial workers that are mostly Christians making Jos a meeting point for Muslim-Christian relations in northern Nigeria, especially with the conversion of most Plateau people from traditional religion to Christianity. Hausa/Fulani minority Muslims in Plateau State are considered "settlers" (migrants) and by extension second-class citizens in Jos while the other ethnic groups are seen as indigenous and therefore first-class citizens. From 2001, Jos has witnessed the beginning of decades of bloody ethnic, political, and religious conflicts between "settler" Muslims and "indigene" Christians, a situation that has polarized not only Plateau State but also northern Nigeria along religious and ethnic lines. Although the dispute of "indigene/settler" continues in Jos with adverse effects in the whole of Northern Nigeria, there seems to emerge no success probably because it is a preliterate attitude in a 21<sup>st</sup>-century world. The minority Hausa/Fulani Muslims face many challenges in Jos as



“settlers” especially the young population as they struggle to recreate their own identity and belonging within an aggressive “indigene” Christian population. These attitudes, responses, and reactions produce both positive and negative impacts on relations between Christians and Muslims within the city of Jos in particular and northern Nigeria in general. The people of Plateau State have promoted the “indigene/settler” dispute for decades, which was probably heralded by opportunistic politicians to ascend to power making Plateau a political and ethnic war zone, which underdeveloped the state, making it one of the poorest and less developed states in the region. The chapter uses Peter Geschiere’s (2005) theory of autochthony to examine the “indigene/Settler” concept and its implication for relations between Muslims and Christians in Jos and northern Nigeria at large. It has been the reason for segregation, animosity, and conflict with devastating consequences for many citizens.

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## **CHAPTER 14**

### **Kinship Ties Among the Igbo: A Sociolinguistic Overview**

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

Kinship is a concept that cuts across different cultures of the world. Each culture or society has its own definition of kinship. Observation shows that kinship ties are dwindling among the Igbo people of Nigeria. This chapter sets to find out what constitutes kinship ties among the Igbo, how the ties are maintained, the reason(s) behind their maintenance, the cause(s) of the decrease in the relationship, the effect of the decrease, and the way forward. The chapter employs a qualitative approach with primary data sourced through structured interviews. Thirty adult male and female respondents as well as thirty youths from different Igbo communities were purposely sampled and interviewed. Findings reveal that Igbo kinship ties stand on a tripod of paternal, maternal, and marital relationships. Kinship relationship is maintained through non-formal education, which highlights the importance of kin through songs and kinship names. The major reasons behind the maintenance of the ties are to avoid incest and to build a strong family structure. Findings reveal that westernisation, urbanisation, and religion have a strong negative impact on Igbo kinship so that the relationships between kin are no longer as strong as it used to be. The study appeals to the society, especially parents, to show their children their kin and teach them the importance of kinship relationships. Such exposure will go a long way in building the Igbo family structure. The family remains the base of every society.

Kinship is a means of establishing relationships with the people one is born with as well as the ordering of such relationship.<sup>1</sup> The above definition makes plain that kinship depends on blood relationships. It also has a system of arrangement. In the views of Anthony Giddens, Mitchell Duneier, Richard Appelbaum, and Deborah Carr, "Kinship ties are connections among individuals established either through marriage, through the lines of descent that connect blood relatives...or through adoption".<sup>2</sup> This definition is more elaborate as it elucidates a group that can be tied in a kinship relationship. Kinship ties can either be through blood relationships, marriage, or adoption. Kinship, according to Aroh, is the relationship between individuals based on blood ties or marriage, adoption, or any other means by which a given society recognizes such.<sup>3</sup> This explanation is in line with the previous ones, but it highlights that kinship is based on what a society takes it to be.

According to Conrad Kottak, kinship is culturally constructed.<sup>4</sup> Culture differs from one society to another. It can therefore be said that what constitutes kinship in one society may be slightly different from what it is in another society. Anthony Giddens explains that "in most western societies, kinship connections are for all practical

<sup>1</sup> Butari Upah "Kinship Terms as Universal Concepts: A case Study of Jukan and English," in *Issues in language and Human Development. A Festschrift for Jerome Ikehukwu Okonkwo*, ed. Polycarp Anyanwu and Ifeoma Obuasi (Enugu: SAN PRESS, 2012), 300.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Giddens, Mitchell Duneier, Richard Appelbaum, and Deborah Carr, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York: Norton & Company, Inc., 2012), 497.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Aniche, "Dwindling Impact of Kinship/Extended Family System Among the Ndị Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria". *Online Journal of Arts Management and Social Sciences (OJAMSS)* vol. 2 no.1 (2017), 247, accessed on May 9,2022 [www.gojamss.net](http://www.gojamss.net).

<sup>4</sup> Conrad Kottak , *Cultural Anthropology (9th ed.)* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 201-202.

purposes confined to a limited number of close relatives".<sup>5</sup> Continuing, Giddens notes that most people have only a vague awareness of relatives more distant than first or second cousins.<sup>6</sup> The situation is not the same for some African countries, especially the Igbo people of Nigeria. The Igbo practice an extended family system.

Kinship is of great advantage to every society. John Mbiti enumerates that kinship controls social relationships between people in a given society, governs marital customs and regulations, and determines the behavior of an individual toward another.<sup>7</sup> Kenny Michael and Kirsten Smillie (2015, p. 70) describes kinship as an integrating force, an all-purpose social glue. Continuing, they note that "'blood kinship' provides the basis for the formation of cohesive groups, marriage, establishes cross-generational connections between them, and bonds of affection and complex economic relationships hold it all together."<sup>8</sup> The explanation likens kinship to a social adhesive that holds societal concerns in place.

It is a truism that language, society, and culture are entwined since every society expresses their culture through language. It is through language that every society socializes their younger ones into societal norms. Kinship ties are a cultural part of every society, which is expressed through language. The Igbo has a way of expressing the relationships between kin. Paternal kin are referred to by the generic term *Nwanne m/Umunne m* "my sibling(s)." When someone wants to be more specific, they may use *Ada anyi* "our daughter" for a female, or *Nwanna m* "my father's son" for a male. The choice is based on the belief that the groups descend from the same ancestor.

On the maternal side, a son or daughter refers to their maternal relations as *nne/nna m ochie* "old mother/father" while they refer to them by the generic *Nwadiala*

<sup>5</sup> Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*. (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993),390.

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, 390.

<sup>7</sup> John Mbiti, *African Religion and Philosophy*, (London: Heinemann, 1969),104.

<sup>8</sup> Kenny Michael and Kirsten Smillie, *Stories of Culture & Place An Introduction to Anthropology*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015),70.

“child of the soil.” In marital kinship relationships, both parties call themselves *ogọ* “in-law,” but when they want to be gender-specific, they call *Ọgọ m nwoke/nwaanyi* “Male/female in-law.” Through such names, it is very easy for an Igbo to delineate the relationship between a group of people. The Igbo word for relations is *ikwu*. When one does not want to be specific on the level of their relationship with another, he simply refers to such as *ikwu m* “my relation.” The younger ones are socialized into the culture.

Considering the great importance of kinship to the society, it calls for great concern the weakness of the ties in some societies, especially among the Igbo. Kinship has cultural peculiarities, and this chapter examines the Igbo kinship system.

## **KINSHIP AMONG THE IGBO**

The origin of kinship in Igboland, according to Iwu Ikwubuzo, can be traced to a primordial family which, according to myth, had just one man, Igbo, and his children. The primordial Igbo family always moved about and settled together, guided by the consciousness that they are of one blood.<sup>9</sup> Iwu Ikwubuzo further elucidates:

As the children of Igbo increased, multiplied and dispersed to different locations where they inhabit [sic] throughout Igboland, their movement and association were based on kinship consideration. As the population of the erstwhile single family continued to expand, their relationship started becoming distant and different level of kinship began to develop.<sup>10</sup>

Ikwubuzo’s explanation is a very comprehensive one as it covers not only the origin of kinship among the Igbo, but sheds light on levels of kin relationships. It can be inferred that family is the foundation of kinship among the Igbo.

<sup>9</sup> Iwu Ikwubuzo, “The Kinship System”, in *Nigerian Heritage. The Igbo Culture*, ed. Kehinde Faluyi and L. Dioka (Lagos: Rebonik),93.

<sup>10</sup> Ikwubuzo, “The Kinship System,”93.



On kinship networks among the Igbo, Victor Uchendu points out that lineages constitute the most important kinship network. The lineages are father's lineage, mother's lineage, father's mother's lineage, mother's mother lineage, and wife's lineage.<sup>11</sup> Iwu Ikwubuzo further classifies the network under blood kinship, kinship by marriage, and non-legal secondary kinship, which is a relationship that is not based on blood connection or marriage. Adoption and assimilation of redeemed slaves fall under the last category.<sup>12</sup> The present study adopts Ikwubuzo's first two classifications—blood kinship and kinship by marriage.<sup>13</sup> This choice occurs because slavery has been abolished among the Igbo, hence the lack of data to account for it in research.

Blood kinship and kinship by marriage are related because it takes a marriage to raise a group of people who are related by blood. In blood kinship, the Igbo teach their children who their kin are from an early age. When a woman is married into a family, some of her husband's kin, who could not join their in-laws' house on the day of marriage, pay a visit to the newly married, to see their new wife. About a day after the marriage ceremony, the immediate co-wives of the newly married or other close co-wives (if the woman is the first to be married into the family), take her around the kindred to meet her husband's kin. As they take her around, they tell her the relationships between her husband and the kinspeople. The newly married woman joins the meeting of *inyomdi* "married women in the kindred." In the meeting, she meets other co-wives and learns more from the older women in the kindred about their husbands' kin. When the newly married woman starts having children, she educates them by showing them their kin. The boys join the *Umunna* "kinsmen" meeting while the girls join the *Umuada / Umukpu* "daughters of the kindred" meeting. In such meetings, they meet their kin. They are also groomed to understand the importance of kinship.

11 Victor Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), 64.

12 Iwu Ikwubuzo, "The Kinship System," 77.

13 Iwu Ikwubuzo, "The Kinship System," 77.

Regarding kinship by marriage, the Igbo believe that *ogọ bu ikwu atọ* "in-laws are the third in line of kinship." In-laws have earlier been mentioned to constitute one of the tripods on which Igbo kinship stands. From the day a man pays a visit to another family and pays the bride-wealth for their daughter, he and his kinsmen have become in-laws to the kinsmen of the woman whose bride-wealth they paid. Whenever a man visits his father-in-law, he does not just stop at his house. The father-in-law sometimes takes him around to meet his own kinsmen; it is through such meetings that he knows his in-laws. He gets to know them more as he attends functions among their kindred. It is the same for the father-in-law. Although he may not deliberately plan a visit to his son-in-law's house, but some occasions like title taking, a close relative's marriage, and burial ceremonies take him to his daughter's marital home. During such visits, he gets more acquainted with the son in-law's kinsmen. It is through such visits and relationships that marital kinship is established.

On the part of the children, they pay homage to the maternal family. Victor Uchendu elucidates that:

A person is a privileged honorary member in his mother's lineage. It is a place where he is made most welcome ... he depends on his mother's agnates to protect his jurial rights in his patrilineage. He seeks their support in any serious case in which he is involved.<sup>14</sup>

A child gains much from their maternal family. Chiamaka Oyeka (2022) clarifies that the child who is referred to as *nwadiana* "child of the soil" has responsibilities toward their maternal family. Topmost in the list is to take good care of their sister, who is their mother. Failure to do so attracts its own punishment, especially when their mother dies.<sup>15</sup>

A good kinship relationship has numerous advantages. Butari Upah notes that "Apart from maintaining effective social relationship, kinship provides a way of

<sup>14</sup> Victor Uchendu, *The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria*, 66

<sup>15</sup> Chiamaka Oyeka, "Strategies in Obituary Announcements of Married Igbo Women: A Review." *UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities*. Vol. 23. no.1. (2022), 50-51.

transmitting status and property from one generation to the next.”<sup>16</sup> Among the Igbo, kin are solely responsible in matters that relate to burial and burial ceremonies. They help in marriages and title-taking ceremonies. They also help in the settlement of disputes among kin. They encourage and support one another. Lambert Ejiiofor makes it plain that “the sense of kinship regulates the behavior of related families to the point of goals, identity and shared life.”<sup>17</sup> Kin bond among the Igbo is so strong to the degree that it affects sexual relationships. It is forbidden among the Igbo for someone to marry their kin or to have any sexual relationship with them. Any carnal knowledge of a member of one’s kin becomes incest. Incest is a taboo which requires spiritual cleansing. Everyone in Igbo society must have great respect for kinship.

Incidentally, kin relationships among Igbo are no longer what they used to be with respect to bonding and solidarity; time and societal evolution have left their mark on a culture that once served as the glue that bound groups. Alexander Aniche<sup>18</sup> takes a look at the dwindling impact of the kinship/extended family system among the Igbo of South-Eastern Nigeria. His findings show that capitalism and such related forces of modernisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, transportation, communication, and Western education affected the socio-cultural life of the Igbo, especially as it regards kinship.

The aim of the present study is to critically evaluate Igbo philosophy on kinship as expressed through language. The work will also delve into the present situation of kin relationships among the Igbo.

<sup>16</sup> Butari Upah (2012, p. 300), “Kinship Terms as Universal Concepts,” 300.

<sup>17</sup> Lambert Ejiiofor, *Dynamics of Igbo Democracy* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1981), 39.

<sup>18</sup> Alexander Aniche 2017 “Dwindling Impact of Kinship/Extended Family System”

## METHODOLOGY

Participant observation and unstructured interview methods provide the source data in this study. The researcher is an active member of *Umụada* in her community, and her participation in *Umụada* functions gave her the opportunity to collect three of the songs used in this study. The researcher, to obtain more comprehensive data for the study, purposely sampled and interviewed thirty adult male and female respondents as well as thirty youths, from different Igbo communities. For the adults, the researcher sought to know how they maintain kinship ties in the communities, the reason(s) behind their maintenance, if kinship ties are the same as they were in time past, reason(s) behind the difference, and the way forward. On the part of the youths, the researcher sought to determine if they know their kin, how they relate with them, and the reason(s) behind their relationships. Some of the answers to the questions in Igbo were transcribed into the English language.

## DATA PRESENTATION

Based on Iwu Ikwubuzo's classification,<sup>19</sup> this study examines two classes of kinship among the Igbo: blood and marriage, since the third part is presently anathema.

### BLOOD KINSHIP

Kinship by blood starts with a family. A family is established by the coming together of a man and a woman or women (as the case may be) in a culturally acceptable way. The family starts expanding as the couple starts having children. It follows that the first kin a child or children meet are their parents. The Igbo firmly believe that the father is the head of the family, and the children are taught the same. The need to honor and respect the father is stressed from childhood, and this respect for fathers is further buttressed with the aphorism *Nwa fee nna, nna erue ya* 'when a child honours his father,

<sup>19</sup> Iwu Ikwubuzo, "The Kinship System," 77.

he grows to become a father.” The maxim brings to the fore what one gains by honoring his father, which is long life and the honor of having his own children.

The Igbo further stress the importance of kinship through names. Names, according to Doris Odo and Angela Asadu, are a mark of cultural identity, which expresses cultural reality in the language that bears the culture.<sup>20</sup> The importance of a father as the first in line of kin is expressed in names. Consider the following names:

1. *Nnabuihè* – father is light
2. *Nnabūudo* – father is the source of peace
3. *Nnabūike* – father is the source of strength
4. *Nnabūisi* – father is the head
5. *Nnabūudu* – father carries fame
6. *Nnabuugwu* – father confers prestige
7. *Nnabūenyi* – father is dominant (in comparison to an elephant)
8. *Nnakaenyi* – father is more dominant than elephant
9. *Nnabuihe* – father is valuable
10. *Nnanyeluugo* – father bestows honour

Names 1 to 8 state categorically what a father is, which are light, peace, strength, head, fame, prestige, dominant, and valuable. The attributes ascribed to a father suggests very clearly that almost everything needed in life is wrapped in a gift called “father.”

Name 1, *Nnabuihè*, states clearly that a father is light. Light helps people to find their ways. Movement is easier and faster with light, and light helps people to avoid dangers on the way. Light fades once one moves away from its source. With these attributes of light, everyone clearly needs it. By stating that a father is light, the Igbo maintain the kin relationship between the father and his children. Fathers, due to their

<sup>20</sup> Doris Odo and Angela Asadu (2018, p. 188), “Cultural Values in the Life of Igbo (Nsukka) People: A Sociolinguistic Perspective,” in *Igbo Institutions and Leadership*, ed. Gabriella Nwaozuzu, Patrick Okpoko, Boniface Mbah and Ndubuisi Ahamefula Nsukka: Centre for Igbo Studies, 2018), 188.

age and experiences in life, have gathered enough light to show their children the right way in the form of guidance. For the Igbo, *ihe okenye nọ ala hụ, nwata rigoro elu oche, ọ gaghị ahụ* "what an adult saw while sitting down, a child who mounted a chair cannot see it." It is based on all these premises that children need a close relationship with their father to find their ways early enough in life.

Name 2, *Nnabụudo*, is also a way of highlighting a kin relationship with one's father. An outsider cannot love or care for a child as their father would. A father's listening ear and counsel gives peace to a troubled child. A father is equally the centre of peace in the average family or a polygamous setting where co-wives' squabbles sometimes extend to the children. A close relationship with a father gives the child peace from all forms of trouble, and fathers are passionate about peace in the home and society because they know the implications of trouble.

The third name, *Nnabụike*, further stresses the importance of a father in one's life. Right from childhood, when a child is confronted or beaten by an older fellow, the response even while crying is *m ga-agwa ya Papa anyị* "I will tell it to our father." At this point, the father is the child's strength, and a father's protection is a solid source of strength for any child. Encouragement that comes from a father in a time of distress strengthens a child, too. The idea of *Ike* in this context could be symbolic: a man may be naturally or physically weak, but strong in character, so children can draw strength from their father's character and strong virtues such as honesty, integrity, and uprightness.

Name 4, *Nnabụisi*, states the obvious Igbo principle that the father is the head of the family. No one leaves the head to consult others. The Igbo believe that *a dighi ahapụ isiaka agba uriọ* "you do not snap without the thumb." For a child to make progress in life, they must consult and accord due respect to the father, who is the head. The Igbo reiterate the importance of headship by noting that *isi bụ isi, ọ soya buru isi okuko* "the head remains the head even if it is a fowl's head." The saying implies that no matter the state or status of the head, it remains the head and must be accorded due respect. In other words, whether the father is rich or poor, responsible or irresponsible, big or small, is immaterial; he remains the fulcrum around whom the family revolves. More importantly, this headship must be acknowledged by other members of the family, such

as the wife and children and honoured ones. From the literal perspective, on the head lies the eyes for sight, ears for hearing, mouth for speaking, nose for breathing, and other vital organs for their purposes. The name implies that a father is a full package that should not be neglected if a child or a wife must survive in life.

Names 5 and 6, *Nnabụudu*, and *Nnabuugwu*, are saying the same thing in different ways. When one serves his father well, adheres to a father's advice, and receives his blessings, such a person will be famous basically because he has gained much from the experience of the old and has also received a blessing that enables one to move on in life. Having a father bestows prestige on a child. The first question a stranger asks a child is *nwa be onye ka i bu/ kedu aha nna gi?* "Whose child are you/ what is the name of your father?" The question is a deep one, and its answer allows a person to trace their genealogy. A person also proves through a proper answer to the question that he is not a bastard. The most humiliating question the society can pose to someone is *I ga-atụnwu akaebe e liri nna gi?* "Can you point specifically to where your father was buried?" Most areas bury their loved ones in the family compound and not in burial grounds. A son must be very responsible to hold the privilege to bury his father among the Igbo. The Igbo stress the need for a child to be close to their father because the father bestows fame, and closeness to one's father bestows prestige.

Names 7, 8, and 9, *Nnabụenyi*, *Nnakaenyi* and *Nnabuihe* are declarations on the worth of a father in terms of his positional dominance in the family. In patriarchal societies such as Igbo, the fact that the father is the head implies his dominance in the family. He is the one who dictates the way the family goes and functions. As the elephant is dominant in the forest with its huge size and intimidates other animals, so is the father in the family although not in an oppressive or intimidating manner. While *Nnabụenyi* states clearly that a father's worth is as massive as an elephant, the principle puts it in a different form, which is that a father's worth is more massive than an elephant—i.e., his worth is incomparable. *Nnabuihe* states clearly that a father is valuable. Putting the worth in other forms as in names 7, 8, and 9 are ways of drawing a child's attention to maintain a good relationship with his first kin: a father.

The last name in this category, *Nnanyeluugo*, is another way of eulogizing a father's worth. *Ugo*, which is eagle, is the king of birds, which is rarely seen. It has great attributes like beauty and vision. Literally speaking, to say that a father bestowed honor to his child can be likened to saying that the child was given the world. A father bestows honor to the child in many ways. The peak of honour in the traditional Igbo society is when a father initiates the child into the prestigious *Ọzọ* title. One of the designations that mark an initiate is a red cap with eagle feathers. With the physical evidence of a cap with eagle feathers, a child can affirm that a father bestows honor indeed. With given names that project fathers in favorable light, the Igbo brings to fore the need and benefits of someone maintaining a cordial relationship with their first kin. Mothers are second in line when it comes to the blood kin relationship. Like fathers, their values are equally expressed in names. Consider the following names:

11. *Nnedịuto* – mother is sweet
12. *Nneamaka* – mother is very good
13. *Nnedịogo* – mother is prestigious
14. *Nnebuugo* – mother is eagle (very beautiful, precious/valuable)
15. *Nnebuaku* – mother is wealth
16. *Nnebuìhè* – mother is light
17. *Nnebuìhé* – mother is valuable
18. *Nnedịmma* – mother is good
19. *Nnedịmkpa* – mother is important
20. *Nneebuka* – mother is invaluable
21. *Nnebuugwu* – mother confers prestige
22. *Nneka* – mother is greater

The first two names in this category, 11 and 12, state that the mother is both sweet and very good. The sweetness and goodness of mothers come in the form of their love and care. Apart from taking care of their children, the mother gives comfort to a child. What a child cannot obtain through their father or any other kin, they will receive through the help of a mother. The names *Nnedịuto* and *Nneamaka* are put in a song that



conveys the beauty and sweetness of a mother as compared with a special delicious soup used in every special occasion, especially in Anambra state:

*...nne amaka,*

mother is very good

*Nne na-aso ka ofe Onugbu*

Mother is as sweet as bitterleaf soup.

The name underscores the value of a mother, hence the need for serious attachment to her as kin.

Name 13, *Nnediogo*, points to the fact that a mother is prestigious; mothers are celebrated from time immemorial for their ability to coordinate the family. A father may reject his children in extreme cases, but not a mother. What one cannot confide in a father, they trust to a mother, who knows how to relate to the father.

Name 14, *Nnebuugo*, states that a mother is an eagle as she takes care of her children. An eagle is beautiful, courageous, brave and tenacious; an eagle flies very high, does not scavenge, and above all, has good vision. A mother nurtures her children, watches them closely as they grow, and does not do all within her ability to save them from trouble. Just like the eagle, she knows when to wean the children. With these qualities in place, a child has a good start in life. Thus, the beauty of having a mother can be equated to the beauty of the king of birds, the eagle.

Names 15 to 17, *Nnebuaku*, *Nnebuihè*, and *Nnebuihé*, are different ways of stating that a mother is invaluable. She is both a great source of wealth and a light as stated in names 15 to 17. The wealth included in these names covers both physical and emotional. A mother is considered valuable in many ways, as she shines the light in different ways for her children to find the way. From conception, the child's survival depends to an extent on the mother's guidance. After birth, the mother starts to breastfeed the infant. The nourishment and protection a child receives right from the womb along with the breastmilk, which is of great advantage to the survival of the child, are great sources of wealth that should not be neglected. As the children grow, they learn much from their mothers; in other words, she shows them the light to enable them to find their feet in

life. Infants identified as girls grow and, through their mothers, learn how to build their homes in marriage. When the girls grow into women and start having their own children, it is their mothers who visit to take care of them and their newborn babies. Mothers have also supported their sons financially and otherwise, thereby helping them to be established in life. Based on the abundant assistance a mother provides to her children, the Igbo establish that a mother is a great source of wealth. Also, based on the great help one receives from a mother, the Igbo prove that a mother is good, important, and invaluable as name 18, *Nnedimma*-mother is good; as name 19, *Nnedimkpa*-mother is important; and as name 20, *Nneebuka*-mother is invaluable.

Names 21 and 22, *Nnebuugwu* and *Nneka* highlight further the importance of mothers. No one can sacrifice for another in the way a mother would. Additionally, when a mother is said to be greater, it does not imply that she is in competition with anyone, such as the father or the children; it is only a way of appreciating her numerous sacrifices and calling attention to the immense benefits one gets from maternal kin.

#### KINSHIP BY MARRIAGE

Kinship relationships with in-laws are also stressed through names that show how advantageous the in-laws are:

23. *Ogomeremeze* – In-law bestowed kinship on me
24. *Ogobaka (uru)* – In-law is very useful
25. *Ogobuugo* – In-law is an eagle
26. *Ogokolam* – May I not be left without an in-law
27. *Ogodimma* – To have an in-law is good
28. *Eziogomaka* – Good in-law is very good

Name 23 shows the extent of the benefits received from an in-law. In this case, it is not that the in-law crowned the name giver king in his community but that he did something great that elevated his in-law to feel and act like a king. Such things include financial and material support, appointments to prestigious positions, and intervention during periods of conflict. Name 24 reiterates the usefulness or benefits of an in-law to demonstrate that in-laws come to one's aid in so many ways. For name 25, the symbolism of an eagle

have already been established. Moreover, stating that an in-law is an eagle still falls in line with the earlier names on the gain of having an in-law. The 26th name is a prayer. The name giver's desire is to be favored with an in-law due to the benefits that come through them. Name 27 notes that it is good to have an in-law. The benefits of having an in-law range from having grandchildren to extending one's kinship group. The last name in this category states categorically that a good in-law is good. The name implies that one may have a bad in-law who can be a source of sorrow to him and his kinspeople. No one wants to identify with a bad in-law.

#### KINSHIP BY BLOOD AND MARRIAGE

The generic *ikwu* "my relation" refers to one's relatives when one does not want to be very specific about the relationship. There are also *ikwu* names that project kinship that is inclusive of blood and marriage:

29. *Ikwubuuzo* – One's relations are considered first
30. *Ikwukauba* – Relations surpass wealth
31. *Ikwumereze* – Relations make one a king
32. *Ikwuakolam* – May I not lack relations
33. *Ikwuaghalam* – may I not be forsaken by relations
34. *Ikwuazoka* – relations greatly saved
35. *Ikwukananne* – maternal kin is greater

The first name under this category, *Ikwubuuzo*, places priority on a person's relatives above strangers. It is the person's kin who rally around them when they are in need; hence, the need to place them above others. Name 30, *Ikwukauba*, compares relations to wealth and concludes that relations rank higher than wealth. The reason is that even when a person has money, it is their relations who will help the person to do what money cannot do. Name 31 refers to the massive support and assistance received from relations, while names 32 and 33 are pleas that one will not lack or be forsaken by relations. The prayer is based on the abundant help and support that relations render. Name 34, *Ikwuazoka*, shows that the name-giver was greatly helped by relatives when they were in need. The last name under this category, *Ikwukananne*, establishes the fact

that maternal kin relationships have greater benefits than other types of kin relationships. Maternal kin relationships are devoid of rancor and other unhealthy competitions that sometimes crop up in paternal kin relationships, even among Igbo.

## KINSHIP IN SONGS

Kin relationships are supported and reinforced through songs among the Igbo. Chinwe Ezeifeke and Ifeyinwa Ogbazi aver that:

Songs are intricately tied to cultural expression. In Igbo culture, they provide powerful means of communication through humor and conviviality. Group songs bring people together and by so doing, create a conducive forum for transmission of serious cultural issues.<sup>21</sup>

Songs play a major role in the transmission of Igbo culture. *Umụada* play a big role by drawing attention to kin relationships through songs. They use different opportunities to do so. *Umụada* uses songs in social gatherings to illustrate and encourage kin relationships:

**Song 1:** *Onye di ọgọ 3x*

When one is prestigious

*O nwee nwanne*

They will have kin.

Prestige in the above song does not refer only to outward looks but of good character. Through the song, *umụada* warn about the need to maintain a good character to draw relations more closely. *Umụada* further stress kinship with the following songs, especially during burial ceremonies:

**Song 2:** *Umụada ọ bukwoṅụ nwanne*

Daughters of the kindred it is kin

*Ọyị nachaa na nwanne aya ana*

<sup>21</sup> Chinwe Ezeifeke & Ifeyinwa Ogbazi, "Undercurrents in Selected Traditional Igbo Songs: Contemporary Igbo Women's Voice". *Studies in Literature and Language*, Vol. 12, no. 5. (2016),1, accessed on May 9,2022. www.cscanada.org.

When friends have all gone, kin remain.

The song enthrones the persistence of a person's kin above that of a friend. A good relationship with relations when one is still alive is projected in *umuada's* song thus:

**Song 3:** *Metuta nwanne gi ahụ ooo2x*

Have a body contact with your kin ooo

*Ubochi o ga-abụ na i ma na onye ozo ga-abia mgbe o ji so ya.*

The day it will be, you know that another person will come when they will

*Ma o sonu ya igba mgbalu*

If it pleases the person to come for the burial ceremony.

The above song equally places value on good relationships with a person's kin. When someone dies, the friends may come when they like. Some may not even come at all, but kin will always be there. These songs enable Igbo society to enculturate their younger ones.

*Umuada* sometimes adopt melodious greetings that project kinship. For instance, some *umuada* use such greetings as *arunwanne* (kin's body) and the response comes: *arunwanne di utu* (kin's body is sweet). The last syllable in the greeting and response are usually stressed, making the greetings sound melodious. The greeting simply means that kin relationships are sweet. All these songs by *Umuada* fall in line with Azubuike Ifionu's explanation:

An examination of different categories of Igbo music demonstrates vividly that Igbo music grows out of human experiences and is also an inter-human phenomenon which operates as part and parcel of almost all Igbo cultural activities.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Azubuike Ifionu, "The Role of Music in Igbo Culture: An Ethnomusicological Explanation," in *Igbo Language and Culture*. Vol 2, ed. F. Chidozie Ogbalu and E. Nolu Emenanjo (Ibadan: University Press, 1982),41.

## **IGBO KINSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES**

There is a decline in kinship relationships among the Igbo. E. Ugwueje and Ngozi Mogbo note that although kinship structures exist, they are becoming less emphasized.<sup>23</sup> Respondents point out that urbanization, westernization, and religion are the major causes of the decline. Many people leave their villages where they have communal living with their kin for towns, aiming to relocate to search for greener pastures. Living apart creates a gap in relationships, especially for those who live very far away from their ancestral homes. Harsh economic situations and extra efforts to make ends meet give little to no room for relations who stay even in the same town outside their ancestral home to pay visits to each other. When such happens, a wider gap is created between relations. When eventually the relocated people start having children, it becomes very difficult for their children to know their relations. Keeping a distance from one's relatives hinders good relationships with kin.

Some youths admit that they hardly visit their village as they might have done when they were very young. They admit that there is no strong relationship between them and their kin, even with those who live in the same town as them. An interviewee stated clearly that the last time he visited home, the cousins gave him a negative attitude, making him feel inferior; from that time on, he kept his distance from them. Another pointed out that each time she visits home, she will spend time reminding her uncles of her name and other things. To her, the whole process is disgusting. A handful of youths that have a good relationship with their kin claim that they enjoy a very cordial relationship with their maternal families more than their paternal family members who tend to play down their achievements for undisclosed reasons.

<sup>23</sup> E. Ugwueje and Ngozi Mogbo, "Patterns of Social Structure in a changing Igbo Society," in *Igbo Institutions and Leadership*, ed. Gabriella Nwaozuzu, Patrick Okpoko, Boniface Mbah and Ndubuisi Ahomefula Nsukka: Centre for Igbo Studies, 2018),149.

Among the things that came with westernization is their culture. Lambert Ejiofor points out that “the Igbo have embraced western civilization with enthusiasm.”<sup>24</sup> Kinship in western culture is totally different from what it is among the Igbo. While western culture practices a nuclear family system, it is an extended family system for the Igbo. In Igbo culture, kinship stands on a tripod of paternal, maternal, and marital relationships. Presently, most Igbo young couples give detailed attention only to their immediate families and little or none to the extended family. Economic downturn in the country also contributed to such a kind of life.

Western culture came with the Christian religion as opposed to the traditional religion the Igbo practiced, and some practices within Christianity brought some damage to the kinship relationships. The Christian religion has played a strong part in neutralizing the kinship system of Igbo; people who belong to different Christian sects or denominations see themselves as more bound by their sect than bound by blood. This experience has estranged kin from one another even among family members who belong to different sects. Some Christians take members of their church as their kin and refer to them as brothers and sisters, while neglecting their blood relations. An interviewee revealed a situation where a man made it clear that he would rather help his Christian sister than his kin.

Another side of Christianity that has further harmed kinship relationships is the prophetic aspect. Some prophecies point to people’s kin as the ones behind their challenges. This is not to say that there are no bad kinsmen. There are cultural ways of sorting things out when there is a suspicion between relatives. The parties might take an oath *irinụ iyi* or make a peace treaty *igba ndụ* and continue to carry on as relatives. The Christian religion condemned the traditional way of making peace and introduced the Christian dimension—*irinụ iyi uka* “Christian oath,” which faded with time. At present,

<sup>24</sup> Lambert Ejiofor, *Dynamics of Igbo Democracy*, 36.

suspicious lead to cold feelings toward kin and negative prayers against them. During ceremonies, *umụada* are admonished to sing Christian songs instead of traditional songs that teach the importance of kin relationships.

Some families downplay some marital ceremonies at present by conducting their children's traditional marriages in their places of residence. They overlook other ceremonies that follow Igbo traditions, such as taking the new bride around to meet the husband's kin and the traditional invitation of the bride's extended family to visit and know their daughter's marital home and her husband's kinspeople. Such ceremonies do not represent complete Igbo rites of marriage. By conducting such marriages in the city, both the married couple and the younger generation are denied the full experience of Igbo traditional marriage, which includes introductions to the kin network.

## **EFFECTS OF CONTEMPORARY KINSHIP**

As it is presently practiced among the Igbo, kinship has side effects; peace has eroded many families and communities because of the kind of kinship that is practiced. Some young adults claimed in interviews that they have not visited their ancestral home since they believe "village people are wicked." The effect is that such groups do not know most of their kin, especially the distant ones. Interviewees reported three different situations they experienced when youths presented their kin to be considered for marriage. One is the experience of introducing a member of the kinship group as a wife without knowing that they are bound by blood. A family was saved from serious embarrassment because their couple decided to present their intentions to their parents first. There are several cases of couples living together and having children before involving their parents in the relationship, only to discover that they are related by blood. It is a taboo that requires serious cleansing for kin to gain carnal knowledge of themselves among the Igbo.

Communal living is no longer what it used to be. People hardly take their children to their ancestral homes due to fear of being poisoned or spiritually attacked. When they do, they hardly allow their children to mix with other kin due to the same reason. Such



children are warned not to collect any edible product from anyone to avert problems such as sickness or even death. Such negative socialization brings much division in the society.

Another vital aspect of communal living that has been lost is ceremonies. Kinsmen used to run errands, dig graves, and lower the body of their loved ones in the grave, but it is no longer so. Almost everything is contracted, as undertakers do most of the work of kinsmen during burials. The food contractors have taken over the cooking earlier done by married women in the clan. Masters of ceremonies are brought in from the outside to take the time usually allotted the *Umụada* in traditional social functions. Most of the time, the *Umụada* receive only limited time to register their presence. Based on all these changes in tradition, the younger generation knows next to nothing about their culture. The general effect is that Igbo society has children who are Igbo by name but have nothing to show or share about the Igbo culture.

## **REVIVING IGBO KINSHIP**

Considering the importance of kinship in every society, there is need to uphold it. Parents should show their children their relatives by integrating the children into the larger family. It is only when the children know who their kin are that they can talk of establishing good relationships with them and maintaining kinship ties. Parents, especially those in diaspora, should teach their children Igbo language. Igbo is their cultural heritage and speaking the language will go a long way in helping the children to interact with their relatives in their ancestral homes.

In situations when parents cannot afford to bring their children home during festive seasons, they should take time to contact relatives in the homeland through video calls where their children can see and interact with kin in the homeland. For those who can afford to bring their children home, they should allow them to mix with their relatives at home and attend the *Umụnna/Umụada* meetings. Younger women married into the family should also be encouraged to attend their own meetings. It is through such meetings that people get to know more about their kin and community of relatives. Parents should

also teach their children the importance of kinship to the Igbo society and give their children names that depict good kinship relationships.

On the part of the children/youths, they should be patient with their uncles and aunties who pose different questions to them whenever they visit. These questions are basically because the elders do not recognize the children, and some may suffer from dementia. Secondly, issues of natural physical change and development among the youth constitute a challenge to the old; sometimes, the older people become confused because the last time they last saw the youth was during their childhood. The youths need to understand these facts and accommodate the older ones by reminding them of who they are whenever they face such “embarrassing” questions. The youths should also create and communicate through different social media platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram and Zoom for their distant families. Through such platforms, they will get to know their kin and establish good relationships with them.

*Umunna* should continue to reinforce the importance of kinship in their meetings and caution those who abuse it. Even though musical artists are invited to almost all functions and have gradually taken the roles of *umuada*, space remains for *umuada's* performance at burial and marriage ceremonies. *Umuada* should understand that their traditional songs and their dance steps are both educational. They should utilize the opportunity they are given at such ceremonies to perform cultural and familial work by educating the society on kinship relationships. When all these are done, there is hope that kinship relationships will be revived.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study investigated kinship ties as they relate to language use in Igbo society. Kinship among the Igbo centers on paternal, maternal, and marital relationships. Language is used to illustrate the importance of each of these relationships. Some of the advantages of kin relations are inscribed in names. When people are called by such names, the message sinks into societal narratives. Other benefits of kinship are reflected in songs by *umuada*. Younger ones are socialized into the system as they attend

traditional functions and listen to the names and songs that promote kinship. Parents also play their parts by telling and showing their children who their relatives are. The reasons behind kin relations are mainly for bonding, solidarity, and avoiding incest. A person gains much by associating with his kinsmen.

Westernization, urbanization, and religion emerge as reasons behind the wane in kinship relationships. The decline has done more harm than good to the society as the youths today may not have much family heritage to bequeath to their children. The kinship relation is fast eroding the bases of Igbo social life and relationship. The study suggests that parents should take the responsibility of teaching their children who their kin are and allow their children to associate freely with their relatives. Relatives in the village who scare others from coming home should refrain from such. Kinship names should be given to children as it is one of the ways to preserve kin relationships. *Umuada* should revert to songs that extol kinship relationships in traditional ceremonies rather than Christian songs and choruses. When all groups are involved in the efforts of reviving kinship among the Igbo, the society will stand stronger than it is at present.

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## **CHAPTER 15**

# **The Roles of Sanctions and the Contributions of African Americans in the March from Apartheid to Freedom in South Africa, 1913-1994**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Based on the experience of Apartheid South Africa, sanctions indeed work as effective tools of international diplomacy and national transformation. Sanctions had failed in the past as instruments of statecraft partly because they were not universally applied, not strong enough, and not strictly enforced. African Americans in all works of life—e.g., U.S. Congress, sports/entertainment, religion, Civil Rights and lobbying establishments, or groups—had played enormous roles in the fight against apartheid. Of course, the internal forces in South Africa, such as the activities of the ANC and Trade Unions, in the end helped to facilitate an election resulting in making President Nelson Mandela as the first Black president of South Africa in April 1994. In future cases of sanctions and embargoes, the international community should monitor the progress of sanctions and close all loopholes. While there was overwhelming evidence—as shown by the South African example—that sanctions worked, there was equally compelling evidence that they failed in the past because they were either not strong enough or not strictly enforced. The international community should, in the interest of future cases, articulate effective ways to make sanctions more comprehensive. This practice would ensure that the target nations might be stopped much sooner regarding human rights violations and perhaps more lives could be saved in the process. Presently, post-Apartheid South Africa is a testimony that when people of good will are

unified, the sky is the limit in their potential to promote the universal principles of democracy, freedom, equality, and the rule of law around the globe.

## **BACKGROUND**

The road to the end of apartheid in South Africa from its inception in 1913 to its dissolution in April 1994, pursuant to the election of Nelson Mandela as the first Black president of South Africa was long. But few have any clear knowledge or idea about it and its nature, scope and effects, and challenges as an abhorrent policy of racial segregation on the African Indigenous population of South Africa as well as the debates surrounding how best to end that evil system. Post-Apartheid (also known as New) South Africa turned 23 in April 2017.

The birth and origin of Apartheid could be traced to the racial segregation and White supremacy that were the pillars or cornerstones of South African policy long before apartheid began. This predisposition was in fact manifested in the controversial Land Act of 1913, passed three years after South Africa's unification on May 31, 1910, which came out of the amalgamation of four previously separate British colonies: Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal Colony. South Africa gained independence from Britain in 1934, and the confluence of the two events – codification of the 1913 Land Act and the 1910 unification—marked the beginning of territorial segregation. Under this Act, Black Africans were forced to live in designated reservations, making it illegal for them to work as sharecroppers. This policy was vehemently opposed by the African National Congress (ANC).

It was not until the release of Nelson Mandela, Leader of the African National Congress (ANC), in February 1990 that the opportunity of negotiation with President F.W. de Klerk was realized. The cooperation of these two idealist and transformative leaders culminated eventually in the creation or drawing up of a new South African constitution. In 1993 a breakthrough occurred when both sides made concessions. The

efforts of these two statesmen would later be rewarded with the conferring of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

The social and political context in South Africa was further complicated by the resultant miseries of both the Great Depression and World War II, which brought increasing economic dislocation and woes to South Africa and convinced the government to strengthen its policies of racial segregation and nativism. In 1948, the Afrikaner National Party won the general election under the slogan and party platform "apartheid" (which literally means racial segregation or separation). Their goal was not only to separate South Africa's White minority from its non-White (Black) majority, but also to separate non-Whites from each other, and to divide Black South Africans along tribal lines to decrease or marginalize their political power. This "divide and conquer" political strategy was also designed to undermine the universal democratic principle of majority rule. In other words, to distort and dilute the political power of the Black majority in South Africa, which had traditionally been based on one person, one vote.

The racial policy of Apartheid was more deeply institutionalized by 1950 when the government banned marriages between Whites and people of other races, such as mixed color, and prohibited sexual relations and interracial marriages between Black and White South Africans. In fact, the Population Registration Act of 1950 provided the basic framework for apartheid by classifying all South Africans by race, including Bantu (Black Africans), Colored (mixed race) and Whites. A fourth category, Asian (meaning Indian and Pakistani), was later added. The legislation had other collateral damages or consequences. For example, in selected cases, the legislation split families. For instance, parents could be classified as White, while their children were classified as Colored.

A series of Land Acts set aside more than 80 percent of the country's land for the White minority, and "pass laws" required non-whites to carry documents authorizing their presence in restricted areas. To limit contact between the races, the apartheid government established separate public facilities (drinking fountains,

libraries, schools, restaurants, movie theaters etc.) for Whites and non-Whites, limited the activity of non-White labor unions, and denied non-White participation in national government.

Under Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who became prime minister in 1958, Apartheid policy took on a geographic/community or neighborhood dimension. Verwoerd refined apartheid policy further into a system he referred to as "separate development." Under the separate development concept, there was the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 that created 10 Bantu homelands known as Bantustans. Under the law, separating Black South Africans from each other enabled the government to claim there was no Black majority, thereby reducing the possibility that Blacks would unify into one national organization. Hence, this arrangement permitted every Black South African to be designated as a citizen of the Bantustans, a system of "homelands" that supposedly gave them full political rights but effectively removed them from the nation's participatory and body politics.

One of the negative consequences of apartheid was that the government forcibly removed Black South Africans from rural areas designated as "White" to the homelands, sold, expropriated, or seized their land, and transferred them and, in some cases, sold them at little or nothing to White farmers. Consequently, between 1961 and 1994, more than 3.5 million people were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated or transplanted in the Bantustans, where they were plunged into poverty, neglect, and hopelessness, having been robbed of their land and community possessions.

With the tightening of restrictions on Black Africans, resistance to apartheid within South Africa took on a new twist from non-violent demonstrations, protests, and strikes to political action and eventually to armed resistance. Having formed a coalition with the South Indian National Congress, the ANC organized a mass meeting in 1952, during which attendees burned their pass books. In 1955 under the aegis, auspices, and sponsorship of a group calling itself the Congress of the People, some who had attended the meeting adopted a Freedom Charter, a platform, or manifesto declaring



that "South Africa belonged to all who lived in it, black or white." In reaction, the government broke up the meeting, arrested several people, and charged them with high treason.

In 1960, at the Black township of Sharpeville demonstration, the police opened fire on a group of unarmed Black demonstrators who were affiliated with the Pan-African Congress (PAC), an offshoot of the ANC. The group had arrived at the police station without passes, inviting arrest as an act of resistance and civil disobedience. Several Black individuals were reported killed and many more wounded. The Sharpeville massacre incident convinced many anti-apartheid leaders that they could not achieve their objectives by peaceful means. Thus, this development thrust the PAC and ANC into establishing military wings even though neither had posed a serious military threat to the apartheid state. By 1961, most resistance leaders had either been captured and sentenced to long prison terms or executed, including activist Nelson Mandela, founder of Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), the military wing of the ANC. Mandela was later incarcerated from 1963 to 1990. Mandela's long imprisonment with hard labor drew international attention and helped garner support for the anti-apartheid movement on a global scale.

The resulting incidents and clashes with the apartheid regime showed that the handwriting about the regime's demise was on the wall. In 1976, thousands of Black children in Soweto, a Black township outside Johannesburg, who demonstrated against the Afrikaans language requirement for Black African students, were met with the police, who opened fire with tear gas and bullets. The protests and government crackdowns that followed this brutal treatment, combined with a national economic recession, exposed South African apartheid government for what evil it really was. It also increased the attention and scrutiny by the international community that saw and exposed apartheid as an antithesis of peace or prosperity to the nation. Consequently, the United Nations General Assembly denounced apartheid in 1973, and in 1976 the UN Security Council voted to impose a mandatory embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. Subsequently, in 1985, the United Kingdom and United States

governments followed suit by imposing economic sanctions against the apartheid regime.

Under intense and unrelenting pressure from the international community, the National Party government of Pieter Botha instituted some bogus artificial reforms, including abolition of the pass laws and the ban on interracial sex/dating and marriage. Nevertheless, the reforms fell short of any substantive change and expectations. By 1989, Botha was pressured to step aside in favor of F.W. de Klerk. His resignation put forth a new human face to apartheid. De Klerk's government also repealed the Population Registration Act as well as most of the other legislation that formed the legal basis for apartheid. A new constitution was later enshrined, which enfranchised Blacks and other racial groups, taking effect in 1994. Elections that year (April 1994) eventually led to a coalition government with a multiracial non-White majority, marking the official end of the apartheid system with the election of President Nelson Mandela as the first Black president of post-apartheid South Africa.

This chapter retraces the nature, scope, and effects of apartheid as an abhorrent policy of racial segregation on the African Indigenous population of South Africa as well as and revisits the debates surrounding how best to end the evil system of apartheid. It traces the history of the South African sanctions movement, assessing the extent to which sanctions induced political change in South Africa to determine whether sanctions were effective tools of political pressure and reform in South Africa. The chapter explores the nature and objectives of sanctions as an instrument of political transformation, contributing to both literature and general theory available on sanctions as an instrument of political liberalization in general and in South Africa in particular. Extending beyond South Africa, it identifies some of the strengths and weaknesses of sanctions as an important element in international diplomacy, and as an example, it shows the impact of Black U.S. legislators in the shaping of American policy toward South Africa. Finally, the chapter determines the contributions of Black lobbyists, entertainers, sports stars, and educators in the anti-apartheid struggle.

Throughout the chapter, "new South Africa" denotes South Africa in the post-apartheid era, from April 1994 to the present.

## **THE DEBATE OVER APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS**

Much of the debate about the utility of sanction as an instrument of statecraft has revolved around its effectiveness. Bronwen Manby has defined sanctions as "the governmental measures imposed by individuals, governments or international organizations, rather than nongovernmental actions by companies or individuals used as a tool of retaliation against external aggression or other violations of international law."<sup>1</sup> Others, including Richard Olson, see sanctions as legal policy instruments used to enforce international law.<sup>2</sup> When sanctions are imposed, their objectives have been to induce changes in the domestic policies of the target states for the purpose of achieving the national interests of the states or entities imposing the sanctions.<sup>3</sup> The effectiveness of sanctions as a means to force South Africa to reform its policy of apartheid, which the United Nations condemned as a "crime against humanity," generated heated debates. Two main arguments against sanctions were posited. One was that sanctions against South Africa would not work because of the inconsistent and arbitrary use of them, but that trade sanctions against South Africa by the international community would not achieve their desired goal because of South Africa's

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<sup>1</sup> Bronwen Manby, "South Africa: The impact of Sanctions," *Journal of international Affairs*, 46, 1 (Summer 1992)

<sup>2</sup> Richard S. Olson, "Economic Coercion in World Politics, with a Focus on North-South Relations," *World Politics*, 31 (July 1979): 471-494.

<sup>3</sup> Bronwen Manby. *Op Cit.*

ability to circumvent it to the extent that any impact would be so minimal and ineffective that it would not be able to translate into substantive policy change.<sup>4</sup>

Prior to the independence of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1980, the same argument was propagated until sanctions were considered necessary to change the intransigent behavior of Ian Smith's White minority government in Rhodesia. Nonetheless, the impact of the sanctions was limited by the ambivalence and selective enforcement attitude that U.S. President Jimmy Carter's administration showed toward it because Congress passed the Byrd Amendment in 1971, which exempted Rhodesian chromium from the sanctions.<sup>5</sup>

Another competing argument against sanctions was that they would be counterproductive. Rather than causing a change in South Africa's behavior, sanctions would unleash some negative effects and unintended consequences that are usually dysfunctional to the primary intended goals and objectives. In the case of South Africa, opponents that the sanctions would not only fail to bring down the minority government of South Africa but would undermine the economic interest and well-being of Blacks whom it was designed to protect, by undermining overall South Africa's economy and creating massive employment. The consequence would be, it was suggested, the regime's intransigence and resistance to political change and reform.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa: Pro and Con" Congressional Digest (October 1985), 235. ; See also Kim R. Nossal, "International Sanctions as International Punishment," *International Organization*, 43, 2 (Spring 1989) 301.

<sup>5</sup> Marc Levy, "Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe: The U.S. and the Internal Settlement," (Revised Version), Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Doc. C16-91-827.0 (1988), 2.; Johan Galtung, "International Economic Sanctions: With examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, XIX (1967): 378-416; James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," *International Affairs*, 55 (July 1979): 367-84.

<sup>6</sup> Margaret P. Doxey, "International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis, With Special Reference to the U.N. and South Africa," *International Organization*, 26 (Summer 1972): 527-50. ; Richard C. Porter, "International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23 (December 1979): 579-612. ; J.P. Hayes, "Divided Opinions on Sanctions against South Africa," *World Economy*, 11 (June 1988): 267-80.

The counter-productive impact of sanctions appeared to drive the liberal white opposition candidates in South Africa to argue that sanctions would not succeed in bringing about the collapse of the government in South Africa but would obstruct the process of fundamental change whose effect would undermine the South African economy and hence weaken the economic muscle blacks had successfully used to bring about reform through economic pressure.<sup>7</sup> This mode of thinking influenced American foreign policy toward South Africa during U.S. President Ronald Reagan's administration. Chester Crocker, the chief architect of American policy of "constructive engagement," noted:

"In deciding the course of American policy, we need to have some consensus not only about what is going on in South Africa, but also about basic U.S. objectives, the American interest at stake, and the broad principles of policy effectiveness. Clearly, the fundamental goal is the emergence of South Africa, as a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship without constraint, embarrassment or political damage."<sup>8</sup>

While urging that American interest depended strongly on encouraging positive reforms, Crocker warned that the possibility of reforms might be damaged if trade or investment between South Africa and the United States were undermined through the imposition of sanctions.<sup>9</sup>

Crocker suggested that while the blueprint for change in South Africa should never be imposed from an external entity, the responsibility of the United States as a global actor would be to help create a regional climate amenable to compromise and

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<sup>7</sup> See Bronwen Manby.

<sup>8</sup> Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, 59, 2 (Winter 1980/81), 324.

<sup>9</sup> Chester A. Crocker, 327.

accommodation among states.<sup>10</sup> Sanctions are designed to achieve at least four salient goals.<sup>11</sup>

1. Compliance: make target state of South Africa change its policy and comply with rules of international law and behavior. In other words, South Africa to must abandon its apartheid policy in lieu of a constitutional and multiracial democratic system.
2. Subversion: Cause economic destabilization in order to create hard conditions—e.g., inflation, declining standard of living, and mass unemployment—and generate mass discontent and internal opposition as a way of undermining or overthrowing the regime.
3. Deterrence: Not only to discourage other states from emulating the behavior and conducts of the target state, but to deny it the moral, political, economic, and military support necessary to sustain an army that would enable it to contain or suppress internal and external opposition or even to engage in military adventures.
4. Symbolism: Sanctions are imposed, not necessarily to produce results or change of attitude, but to serve as a public expression of a community's moral disapproval of an act.

The primary aim of sanctions against South Africa was to force it to abandon its policy of apartheid. In pursuit of this goal, numerous United Nations resolutions called for international sanctions "until clear evidence of profound and irreversible progress toward reform was achieved in South Africa."<sup>12</sup> In 1986, the Commonwealth Heads of

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 346.

<sup>11</sup> 11. Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Scott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985), 985; Also, Jahann Galtung, "Pacifism from a Sociological Point of View," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (March 1955): 69-71. ; Joel Feinberg, *Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970): 96-97.

<sup>12</sup> The Declaration on "Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences" adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 1989.

Government issued a declaration on steps South Africa must take before sanctions could be lifted to include the lifting of the state of emergency; repeal of apartheid laws; release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees; the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-African Congress, and other political parties; and the resumption of constitutional and multiracial dialogues.<sup>13</sup>

It was therefore based on the fulfillment of the criteria outlined above that this investigation would measure the effectiveness of sanctions on political change in South Africa—i.e., the extent to which the behavior of the target state, South Africa, was changed by the imposition of sanctions. Thus, the central thesis of this investigation is that internationally imposed sanctions, made possible primarily by the contributions of African Americans, were responsible for bringing about political change in South Africa.

## **HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA**

The amalgamation of the Dutch-speaking Afrikaners and the English-speaking elements formed the Union of South Africa in 1910. With the ascendancy of the National Party to power in 1948, apartheid (policy of racial separation and separate development) was introduced as an official policy. In South Africa's House of Assembly in 1963, Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd noted that the apartheid policy was designed to guarantee "white control and supremacy over non-whites."<sup>14</sup> Since then, the General Assembly of the United Nations condemned apartheid as "a crime against humanity and obstacle to international peace and cooperation."<sup>15</sup>

The international community never coalesced around the issue of apartheid until the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. Even the unilateral sanctions imposed by India at

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<sup>13</sup> Communique of the Commonwealth Heads of State Review Meeting, London, August 3-5, 1986.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in "South Africa Fact Sheet," (New York: The Africa Fund, November 1988).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

the urging of Nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi to protest South Africa's oppression of its Indian minority group in 1946 showed limited effect.

The Sharpeville incident occurred on March 21, 1960, when Black South Africans protesting the state law to carry "reference [Pass] books" at the Sharpeville Police Station were attacked by the South African police and defense forces. A total of 69 persons were killed while 180 were wounded. This incident enflamed world anger against South Africa and generated a serious global response in 1962 when the United Nations General Assembly called on its members to cut trade and transportation links with South Africa. In August 1963, the sanction was expanded to include a mandatory arms embargo.<sup>16</sup>

In 1973, world hostility to the Pretoria Regime and sympathy to the oppressed majority in South Africa culminated in the recognition of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) as the "authentic representatives of the majority of the South African People."<sup>17</sup> It should be noted that the emergence of the non-aligned movement as a global actor in the multi-polar world appeared to reinforce antiapartheid coalitions against South Africa's apartheid system. Moreover, the impact of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after the October War of 1973 between Israel and the Arab states gave impetus to popular international support against South Africa.

The global oil cartel acting under pressure from African members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) imposed an oil embargo against South Africa in 1973. The consequence of this embargo was that it greatly undermined the economic relations that existed between Iran and South Africa under the Shah who was at the time South Africa's greatest supplier of oil. This trend, however, continued until the

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<sup>16</sup> General Assembly Res. 1761 (XVII), 1962. ; See also Security Council Res. 181 and 182, 1963.

<sup>17</sup> Newell M. Stultz, "The Evolution of the U.N. Anti-apartheid Regime," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 13 (Fall 1991): 18-19.



Iranian revolution in 1979. The embargo was not without its price. According to a study by a New York-based Africa Fund in association with the American Committee on Africa published in November 1988, the OPEC oil embargo to South Africa between January 1979 and January 1988 cost South Africa \$20 billion just to secure oil on the spot market.<sup>18</sup>

In 1976, the Soweto uprising once again catapulted South Africa into center-stage. On June 16, 1976, school children in the Black township of Soweto protested South African decision to introduce Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in primary schools. Prior to this date, English was the medium of instruction. In the brutal response to put down the protest, South African forces killed about 1,000 pupils with thousands more severely injured. In an emergency meeting, the U.N. Security Council issued a resolution declaring that the situation in South Africa "constituted a threat to international peace and security" and imposed a mandatory arms embargo under its charter.<sup>19</sup>

No substantive measures were mounted against South Africa despite its global image of an outlaw until 1985, following the turn of events in which the South African regime cracked down on Black demonstrators and proclaimed a state of emergency in 36 magistrate districts that resulted in mass arrest. There was growing pressure on Washington to reconsider its policy of "constructive engagement" in favor of mandatory economic sanctions including divestment. In reflecting the situation in South Africa and its impact on American policy, Chester Crocker, the U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Reagan Administration, addressed the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, on August 16, 1985:

"The wave of unrest and repression that has now swept across South Africa for almost a year has touched some of the most sensitive nerves in our body politic. The practice of racism through apartheid, the denial of the inalienable rights of

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<sup>18</sup> "South Africa Fact Sheet," (New York: The Africa Fund, November 1988).

<sup>19</sup> U.N. Security Council Resolution 418 (1977)

citizenship, and the disregard for due process of law are affronts to our national conscience."<sup>20</sup>

## **AFRICAN AMERICANS AS MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT**

### **I: THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES**

The Sullivan principles were the ideas floated, pursued, and promoted by Philadelphia Baptist minister Leon Sullivan at the middle of intense protest in the United States by students and civil society that universities and corporations divest from South Africa. Sullivan argued that corporations that agreed to certain fair labor and employment standards in South Africa should not be subjected to protests or divestiture. He further argued that the principles would be part of a compromise between those who wanted labor reform and those for total divestiture, thereby allowing for substantive and tangible change and improvement of the social and economic conditions of the Black majority in South Africa.

Before official American sanctions movement in the 1980s, many substantive changes in South Africa were inspired by the work of Reverend Leon Sullivan, who proclaimed a set of principles in 1977 and guided investment in South Africa. The Philadelphia-based civil rights leader was not new to political change, both nationally and internationally. In the 1960s, during the Civil Rights movement, he organized boycotts of retailers who discriminated against Blacks and other minorities in employment. Also, he had established skills training centers for Black youth in several cities and African nations. For example, in 1971 when General Motors (GM) was under pressure to diversify, Rev. Sullivan was hired to direct this transition in GM. At this time, he used the bully pulpit to challenge GM to facilitate its divestment operations in South

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<sup>20</sup> Congressional Studies Quarterly (October 1985), 226.

Africa. Sullivan's six principles for divestment of American Corporations in South Africa were as follows:<sup>21</sup>

1. Integration of eating facilities and restrooms.
2. Nondiscrimination in employment.
3. Equal pay for comparable work.
4. Institution of vocational training programs.
5. Hiring of more Black supervisors.
6. Increased corporate support for improvements in housing, schools and health facilities for Blacks.

To give legitimacy to the principles, Sullivan pressured other companies, including General Motors, to embrace them. By 1985, many multinational corporations had signed on. The Sullivan Principles were later amended to include pledges to recognize Black labor unions, publicly oppose apartheid, and pay a fair minimum wage. The slow pace of change in South Africa, even many years after the introduction of the Sullivan Principles in 1977, renewed opposition by some activists in the anti-apartheid movement who believed that the Sullivan Principles reinforced apartheid by ascribing for cosmetic change and focusing on procedural rather than substantive change.

For example, Richard Rothstein showed that in 1984, many years after the adoption of the Sullivan Principles, the unskilled workforce demographic was 96.6% non-White while managers were 5% non-White. Equal pay meant little if Black and White South Africans rarely did comparable work; desegregated restrooms in de facto segregated work areas lacked even symbolic effects and support of signatories to the Sullivan Principles in the tune of \$300 million to improve Black schools; and housing and health facilities did very little to improve the living conditions of 25 million Black

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<sup>21</sup> Richard Rothstein, TAP, Vol. 7, #27, July1 – August 1, 1996, pp. 1-10.

South Africans.<sup>22</sup> All the criticisms never deterred Rev. Sullivan's resolve to carry his principles to a conclusive end. To monitor compliance to his principles, Sullivan hired the consulting firm Arthur D. Little (ADL) to conduct the analysis and pay special attention to fees paid by levy on each Sullivan signatory. ADL Vice President D. Reid Weedon adopted standards of measurement: making "good progress"; making "progress"; "needs to become active"; and "failure."

While Weedon based his scores on surveys examining empirical data, such as the number of Black and White employees in each job category, Sullivan relied extensively on face-to-face interaction. Thus, he frequently traveled to South Africa to inspect and advise management on how best to comply with his principles—desegregation of the work facility, implementation of minimum wage policy, and bargaining with Black labor unions. As failing grades were awarded to American subsidiary corporations like Carnation, W.R. Grace, and Celanese in South Africa, the parent firms in the U.S. fired the managing directors of their subsidiaries. On many occasions, the South African businesses raised wages comparable with those paid by American companies that paid Sullivan's minimum wage. Hence, the Sullivan reform was successful.

## **II: THE CONYERS AMENDMENT**

As a result of tremendous pressure put onto the U.S. Congress by the public and some interest groups, especially Trans-Africa, many members of Congress were persuaded to introduce several anti-apartheid bills. On March 7, 1985, Rep. William Gray (D-PA) and others co-sponsored the H.R. 1460, known as the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985. The act stated that "bank loans, new investments, sale of computers and software including the sale of South African Krugerrands in the United States be banned."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>23</sup> Congressional Studies Quarterly, October 1985, p. 226.

Additional language of the bill provided that new investment and Krugerrand sales might be waived by the President if the South African government met one of the conditions. The waiver was to be in effect for one year but could be extended for six-month periods thereafter; each time, the South African government met conditional requirements but with the approval of both Houses of Congress.<sup>24</sup> On May 8, 1985, two amendments to H.R. 1460 made by Rep. Ed Zschau (R-Calif.) and Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) were accepted on the floor of the House of Representatives, respectively. The Zschau amendment encouraged the president not only to consult with other countries on future implementation of anti-apartheid measures, but to make annual reports to Congress on the status of apartheid and human rights in South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

The Conyers Amendment prescribed the prohibition of all nuclear assistance to South Africa, including equipment, material, and technology. With an emphasis on divestment, Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) introduced an alternative amendment to include mandatory disinvestments and denial of landing rights in the United States to South African aircraft.<sup>26</sup>

Given the mood of Congress on the issue, President Reagan saw the possibility of passing a harsh sanction against South Africa as a fait accompli. His strategy became to undercut it by proposing a watered-down version. On September 9, 1985, by Executive Order, President Reagan announced a series of anti-apartheid measures. After proclaiming his opposition to legal discrimination and condemnation of the Congressional anti-apartheid bill as both draconian and strategically futile, he stated that the aim of sanctions should not be to punish South Africa, because it would injure the very people the United States was trying to help. He then threatened a veto.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 242.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 231.

<sup>27</sup> Malcolm Fraser and Olusegun Obasanjo, "What to do about South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, 65 (Fall 1986), 154.

## THE COMMONWEALTH GROUP

At this time, the Commonwealth Group with historic ties to South Africa was meeting in the Caribbean. In October 1985, the 49-member Commonwealth in a summit in Nassau established a small group of "Eminent Commonwealth Persons" to encourage the process of political dialogue in South Africa. The group was co-chaired by Rt. Hon. Malcom Fraser, Former Prime Minister of Australia, and General Olusegun Obasanjo, former Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) mandate was issued in the "Nassau Accord" or the "Commonwealth Accord" on South Africa. The agreement called on South Africa to "initiate in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of communication across lines of color, politics and religion with a view to establishing a nonracial and representative government."<sup>28</sup>

The EPG noted that the South African government was not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental changes, countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, or face the prospect of ending its White-dominated minority government. It, nonetheless, predicted that South Africa's continuation of its policy of apartheid would lead to violence along with loss of lives and property unless pressure could be applied through sanctions.<sup>29</sup>

Having refuted the assertions of the opponents of sanctions that sanctions do not work, the EPG issued a declaration:

"There is no guarantee that sanctions will work, but greatly increased international pressure involving the use of sanctions offers the only chance to avert the tragedy of which we speak involving the destruction of all Western interests in South Africa. Even if we knew that sanctions would not work (and

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 161-162.

nobody will make that assumption with any validity), we would still be in favor of the West applying sanctions."<sup>30</sup>

## **TRANSAFRICA**

In October 1986, the Anti-Apartheid Act was passed when President Reagan's veto was overridden by Congress. In a testimony before the House Sub-Committee on Africa on aid to the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), Randall Robison, Executive Director of Trans-Africa, said that passage of the anti-apartheid law was an indication of American stand against apartheid. But Robison observed that the impact and effectiveness of the sanctions would be better realized over time as more nations embraced it.<sup>31</sup> Also, in a statement by Robison before the Sub-Committee on Africa and the Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and Trade Committee on Foreign Affairs in the U.S. House of Representatives, Robison gave an assessment of the first 17 months of the Sanctions Act. He identified two major flaws of the act and accused the Reagan Administration of sabotaging and undermining the true spirit of the act by deliberately failing to execute the law faithfully by letting federal agencies write implementation regulations full of loopholes; gutting and circumventing the ban on South African uranium imports by the exemption of uranium hexafluoride, a gaseous form of uranium oxide; failing to penalize foreign countries taking advantage of the sanctions, as required by the Act; sidestepping the prohibition of food and agricultural products by the continued importation of South African lobster provided they were processed "offshore"; declining to organize meetings with other

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<sup>30</sup> Hearings on aid to SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference): Testimony of Randall Robison, Executive Director of Trans-Africa before the House Sub-Committee on Africa, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1987.

<sup>31</sup> Prepared Statement of Randall Robison, Executive Director of Trans-Africa before the Sub-Committee on International Economic Policy and Trade Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Wash., D.C., March 23, 1988; See also Testimony by Randall Robison before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 22, 1987.

governments to coordinate pressure on South Africa as required by law; and vetoing resolutions in the United Nations Security Council calling for international adoption of American sanctions.<sup>32</sup>

On July 10, 1991, President George Bush announced that his administration was ending the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. He justified his action to end sanctions on the basis that a profound transformation had occurred in South Africa and that the progress so far made toward dismantling apartheid was irreversible.<sup>33</sup> He, however, noted that many aspects of the sanction—which included an arms deal with South Africa, support of IMF, and export-import bank loans to South Africa; and a ban on intelligence cooperation under the 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act—remained in effect. Before the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was repealed, the *New York Times* reported that “American imports from South Africa had declined by 35% between 1985 and 1987 and had cost South Africa an estimated amount of \$417 million in export earnings.”<sup>34</sup> Numerous appeals were made by Nelson Mandela, who stated that the presidential action was premature and could have been delayed until more progress in dismantling apartheid was evident. Others were those of the South African Human Rights Commission and the Amnesty International, asserting that the action be withdrawn because at least 850 legitimate political prisoners remained in South African jails.<sup>35</sup>

## THE SPORTS GROUP

There was no doubt that President Bush exploited both international and domestic political climate to announce his decision. First, the announcement came a few hours after the international Olympics competition. The United States’ boycott of

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<sup>32</sup> New York Times (July 11, 1991).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.



the Olympics had held prior to this time perhaps due to the work of Dr. Leroy T. Walker of North Carolina Central University, the president of the U.S. Olympic Committee. Dr. Walker, an African American educator, was a retired professor of physical education (1945-1983) and Chancellor of North Carolina Central University (1983-1986). Furthermore, Arthur Ashe, the Black American tennis star, was the Captain of the U.S. Davis Cup tournament. Consistent with his anti-apartheid commitment, Ashe had used his good offices to persuade players like John McEnroe and others to boycott South Africa against the regime's very attractive financial offers and other incentives designed to lure them against the collective will of the international community.

Given the state of internal politics in the United States, it was conceivable that a presidential veto could be sustained since it was unlikely to muster two-thirds majority votes in both Houses of Congress necessary to override a presidential veto.<sup>36</sup>

On September 24, 1993, Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC, appearing before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, asked that economic sanctions against South Africa be lifted except embargo on arms sales and the withdrawal of full diplomatic recognition until a newly elected multiracial government was established following the election of April 27, 1994. This request in effect marked the end of nearly two decades of international isolation of South Africa.

## **ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS**

Sanctions inflicted enormous costs on South Africa. In 1989, it was estimated that South Africa lost about \$2 billion per annum just to break the oil embargo through purchases it made on the spot market and its cost of developing and operating SASOL oil-from-coal facilities. Also, estimates showed that South Africa faced a debt crisis that caused the value of the Rand to drop to half of its 1984 exchange value. Not only did

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<sup>36</sup> Quoted in Bronwen Manby, OP CIT.

the situation induce massive export of capital between 1985 and 1988, but it also forced the South African Trust Bank to forecast in 1988 that sanctions would cost South Africa not less than R40 billion (\$20 billion) from 1985 to 1990 and that the average income per capita of White South Africans would decline by 10%. As the Africa Fund study observed, during this period most of South Africa's \$22.6 billion short-term foreign debt was due in less than one year. In September 1985, virtually, all external lending to South Africa ended after Pretoria declared a debt repayment standstill as a result of the growing refusal of foreign bank to provide new loans.<sup>37</sup>

Economic impacts of sanctions had far-reaching implications not only on the economic sphere of South Africa, but on its politics as well. Its impacts unleashed a plethora of political reforms that support Anthony Marx's informed observation:

"The combination of formal and informal sanctions was effective in squeezing the South African economy, at least on the margins. Coming together with continued internal unrest, divisions within the white community and the diminished threat from the Soviet Union, international economic pressure helped to provoke the dramatic reforms that continue to unfold in South Africa."<sup>38</sup>

In January 1985, a coalition of six employer groups that claimed representation of 80% of the South African work force issued a communique calling for political liberalization and substantive reform of the apartheid system of government.<sup>39</sup> In August 1985, another group of four South African businesses recommended to the South African government that no meaningful economic reform would endure without a concurrent political liberalization and urged the government to open communication with the ANC.<sup>40</sup> Consequently, in May 1989, the Reserve Bank of South Africa warned

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<sup>37</sup> Quoted in Anthony W. Marx, "International Intervention in South Africa: The Difficult Transition to Development Assistance," *Journal of international Affairs*, 46, 1 (Summer 1992).

<sup>38</sup> *Wall Street Journal* (January 9, 1985).

<sup>39</sup> *Financial Times* (August 30, 1985).

<sup>40</sup> *New York Times* (June 4, 1989); See also *Washington Post* (June 2, 1989).

that economic stagnation would undermine South Africa as a nation state if political reforms were not initiated, at least to head off potential additional sanctions.<sup>41</sup>

It was not surprising, henceforth, that in September 1985 a delegation of South African business representatives in a symbolic gesture flew to Lusaka, Zambia, to demonstrate the urgency of a political negotiation between South Africa and the ANC. Zambia, under President Kenneth Kaunda, was an ardent supporter and host of the ANC liberation organization and its membership. Although these moves might have proved insignificant, they nonetheless put in motion a political climate tolerant of political discourses and negotiations. Hence, the move for political change was symbolized by President F.W. de Klerk's inaugural speech in September 1989 that it was time for South Africa to restore its image and end its global isolation, economic disintegration, and political divide.<sup>42</sup> This policy announcement was followed by the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. On February 2, 1990, F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC, the Pan-African Congress, and other national liberation movements abolished in 1960, and he began the process of dismantling the legal structures of Apartheid. At the heart of apartheid was the Public Safety Act of 1953 that allowed the president not only to declare a state of emergency but also to suspend normal judicial procedures and remedies.

Another pillar of apartheid was the Internal Security Act of 1982, which permitted South African Security Forces to detain suspected political activists indefinitely without charge or trial and denied suspects access to legal counsel, family members, and private doctors. Also at the root of apartheid is the Group Areas Act under which the government classified, controlled, and maintained neighborhoods according to race. Although specific legislation regulating the pass laws and influx

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<sup>41</sup> New York Times (September 21, 1989).

<sup>42</sup> South Africa Review, 4, 3 (March 1992); Khehla Shubane, "South Africa: A New Government in the Making," Current History (May 1992): 202-207.

control was abolished in June 1986, subtle practices continued under the guise of trespassing laws, housing, and work permits.

In December 1991, the South African government embarked on serious negotiation with Black organizations aimed at laying the framework for the construction of an interim administration in which the National Party and the African National Congress would share power. Before real and substantive discussions and commitments were made, F.W. de Clerk wanted to clarify doubts that he might be negotiating with the mandate of the National Party or in short, the support of majority of White South Africans, especially in the wake of the election of February 1992 at Potchefstroom in Northern Transvaal. In the election, the right-wing Conservative Party won, having based its campaign on the platform of scrapping the negotiations for multi-party democracy and returning the country to White minority rule. This result appeared to dislodge F.W. de Clerk's efforts. In a strategic move designed to measure the opinions and attitudes of Whites toward political negotiations and liberalism and to strengthen his hand in the negotiation, F.W. de Clerk called a "Whites only" referendum on March 17, 1992. By a landslide, 68.6% of the White electorate supported the constitutional talks by the National Party.<sup>43</sup>

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) made real progress despite some initial setbacks emanating from the early reluctance of the Pan African Congress to participate after boycotting the first two rounds of CODESA talks; the assassination of Chris Hani, head of the South African Communist Party; the ANC's temporary break off from negotiations with the National Party shortly after the June 17, 1992 killing of 40 people in Boipatong; and the disagreement between the government and the ANC over how much majority of an elected national assembly

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<sup>43</sup> Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: The One Year of Negotiations," *Africa Report* (Jan.-Feb., 1992): 48-50.; Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Deadlocked," *Africa Report* (July/August 1992) 55-57; Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Finding Common Ground," *Africa Report* (May/June 1993) 25-27.; Anne Shepherd, "South Africa: Keeping the Peace," *Africa Report* (July/August 1993) 57-59; See also Anne Shepherd, "South Africa: Problem Child," *Africa Report* (May/June 1993) 28-31.

would be needed to ratify a new constitution. The ANC insisted on 70%, while the government held onto 75%. The impasse led to a temporary suspension of the talks by the ANC on June 23, 1992.

Also, heated debate involved the fate of one of the stickiest issues in South Africa: the homeland (Bantustans), which constituted fragmented geographic areas that served as reservations for the African labor force. The ten Bantustans were Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Gazankulu, Kangwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Qwa-Qwa, Transkei, and Venda. While some parties, including the ANC, agreed to incorporate the Homelands into independent South Africa, other elements, especially the elites of Bophuthatswana, insisted on the maintenance of their sovereignty, which was conferred to four of their homelands, including Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda, with no international recognition of such status outside South Africa.

Upon breaking the deadlock or at least clearing major hurdles, the peace accord was signed by 29 parties and organizations on September 14, 1992. Prominent among the signatories were the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Inkatha Freedom Movement of Chief Buthelezi, National Party (NP), and the Pan African Congress (PAC).<sup>44</sup>

In his opening address to parliament on December 20, 1991, and reiterated on January 24, 1992, F.W. de Klerk articulated the views of the ruling National Party to amend the present South African constitution to serve as the transitional constitution, which would prescribe equitable representation of Blacks in the legislative and executive branches of government. In turn, the ANC took the position that the present ruling parliament and constitution be abolished to give way to an interim elected legislative government to serve as the supreme and governing authority until a new

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<sup>44</sup> Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Coming to a Compromise," AFRICA REPORT (March/April 1992): 45-48; See also Denis Herbstein, "South Africa: Getting Out to Vote," Africa Report (July /August 1993): 60-62.

constitution and constituent assembly were put in place. Although both the National Party and the ANC agreed on the need to set up a transitional government, they pondered on how to arrive at a new constitution and the way to constitute the provisional government.<sup>45</sup>

April 27, 1994, was set by the parties involved in the negotiation as the date to elect a constituent assembly that would not only write a new constitution but serve as the first post-apartheid legislature. On September 24, 1993, the South African Parliament passed a legislation designed to create a transitional council. This cleared the way for Blacks to join Indians, Whites, and the Colored as active participants in the affairs of South Africa.<sup>46</sup> The opportunity to test this newly won freedom came during the April 27-29, 1994, multiracial elections. On May 6, 1994, the South African Independent Electoral Commission announced the final vote tally. The African National Congress (ANC) won 12,237,655 (62.6%) of the votes to 3,983,690 (20.3%) for the National Party, while the Inkatha Party won 10.5% of the votes.<sup>47</sup> The overwhelming electoral victory by the ANC symbolized the birth of a new multiracial, constitutional, and democratic South Africa.

## **CONCLUSION**

Political liberalization took place soon after tighter international sanctions were imposed on South Africa. While sanctions are not the only causes of political change in South Africa, their impact as the major factor that induced political change cannot be disputed despite the loopholes inherent in their enforcement. The monetary cost of sanctions at least made it cost-ineffective for South Africa to maintain the apartheid system and its security forces that suppressed popular agitation in the townships. The cost of maintaining apartheid translated into the redirection of resources away from

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<sup>45</sup> Greensboro News & Records (September 25, 1993), A9.

<sup>46</sup> Ebony Magazine (August 1994), 68.

<sup>47</sup> New York Times (June 4, 1989); See also Washington Post (June 2, 1989)

social goods to internal security needs. The falling living standard of Whites convinced the ruling elites of South Africa that it was in their best interest to support meaningful political reform.

The goals set forth by the international community that must be satisfied by South Africa before sanctions were lifted had all virtually been met. They included the lifting of the ban on political parties; the resumption of multiparty negotiations to chart the path to a constitutional government; the release of political prisoners; the repeal of major apartheid laws; and the administration of the multiracial elections of April 27-29, 1994. These were made possible by no other factors in large part but sanctions, and without the unrelenting efforts and work by numerous African Americans, the sanctions would not have been possible. The work of a few African Americans that featured immensely in this endeavor include Representative William Gray (D-PA) who cosponsored the H.R. 1460 that prohibited all nuclear assistance to South Africa, including equipment, material, land, and technology. The amendment by Ronald V. Dellums (D-California), proposed mandatory divestment by United States and the denial of landing rights to South African aircraft on U.S. soil.

In October 1986, Randall Robinson, the Executive Director of Trans-Africa, an African American lobby, testified before the Sub-Committee on Africa to call attention to the Reagan administration's lax enforcement that allowed federal agencies to write implementation regulations full of loopholes; exemption of the importation of uranium hexafluoride and lobster from South Africa; failure to penalize foreign nations taking advantage of sanctions; and failure to support resolutions in the United Nations Security Council calling for international adoption of American sanctions. Other key African American personalities in the fight against apartheid were the late Arthur Ashe, Rev. Leon Sullivan, and Leroy Walker, former president of the U.S. Olympic Committee. All these efforts enabled Congress to monitor the progress of sanctions and to close further loopholes. While there was overwhelming evidence as shown by the South African experience that sanctions worked, there was equally compelling evidence that they failed to work in the past because they had been neither strong enough nor strictly

enforced. The international community should in the interest of future cases articulate ways to make sanctions more comprehensive. This would assure that the target nation could receive deserved consequences much sooner and perhaps more lives could be saved in the interim.

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42. *South Africa Review*, 4, 3 (March 1992); Khehla Shubane, "South Africa: A New Government in the Making," *Current History* (May 1992): 202-207.
43. Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: The One Year of Negotiations," *Africa Report* (Jan.-Feb., 1992): 48-50.; Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Deadlocked," *Africa Report* (July/August 1992) 55-57; Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Finding Common Ground," *Africa Report* (May/June 1993) 25-27.; Anne Shepherd,

- "South Africa: Keeping the Peace," *Africa Report* (July/August 1993) 57-59; See also Anne Shepherd, "South Africa: Problem Child," *Africa Report* (May/June 1993) 28-31.
44. Patrick Lawrence, "South Africa: Coming to a Compromise," AFRICA REPORT (March/April 1992): 45-48; See also Denis Herbstein, "South Africa: Getting Out to Vote," *Africa Report* (July /August 1993): 60-62.
45. *Greensboro News & Records* (September 25, 1993), A9.
46. *Ebony Magazine* (August 1994), 68.
47. New York Times (June 4, 1989); See also Washington Post (June 2, 1989)

## CHAPTER 16

### The Next Generation of African Immigrants in Kentucky

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#### INTRODUCTION

The story of life in diaspora for African families living in the United States is not complete without the voices of the next generation of African immigrants for whom America is now a home. Fueled by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and the introduction of the U.S. Diversity Visa Program in 1990, a steady flow of African immigrants and their offspring have made their way into the U.S. Whereas the research on African immigrant families has mainly focused on parents and their coping strategies upon relocation, the voices of the children of African immigrants in the complex story of immigrant families in diaspora are often missing.<sup>1</sup> Through interviews and participant observations, this chapter captures the stories of ten second-generation African immigrant children in Kentucky—some born in the United States and others brought to America by their parents as children or young adults. These interviewed children focused on family life, food, clothing, education, social interaction, views about Africa, career aspirations, and general outlook on life in the U.S. We wondered about the role of family and parental expectations in shaping educational aspirations and career choices of the second-generation African immigrants and the challenges they have experienced along the way. Based on how the second-generation African children perceive their ethnicities and cultures, the qualitative interviews illuminate who these young people are, what

<sup>1</sup> See Kanya, Hugo A. African Immigrants in the United States: The Challenges for Research and Practice. *Social Work*, 42 (1997): 154-165. See also Yewah, Emmanuel & Togunde, Dimeji (eds.). *Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States Diaspora*. Champaign, IL: Common Grounds Publishing, 2010.

motivates them, how they view their world, and how they navigate their way in America as the next generation of African immigrants in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. These young men and women are part and parcel of the immigrant story, not only as foreign-borns who tagged along with their parents upon relocation, but also as natives in the land where their immigrant parents sought new beginnings. These second generation African immigrants are a powerful force of movers and shakers (re)writing the immigrant story in the U.S.

## **WHO THEY ARE**

Interviewees in this study were children of African immigrants born in the United States and those legally brought to America as young children or young adults ranging from ages 13 to 26. The question of identity became the natural conversation starter in the interviews. Regarding their self-identification, responses ranged from African American, Kenyan American, Zimbabwean American, Congolese American, to African were common. Most of these young people are acutely aware of their American life along with their African heritage. As Ochieng explains, "I was born in Richmond, Kentucky, but my parents are from Kenya. I consider myself a Kenyan American." Nyasha considers Zimbabwe her home even though she has been in the U.S. for the past eleven years on permanent resident status alongside her parents, and she considers her stay in the U.S. temporary. "I was born in Zimbabwe. My family came here when I was very young. I'm Zimbabwean," she explains. Others maintain they are both African and American. As Bangaly puts it, "I identify myself as both African and American. My mother is American and my dad is from Guinea, West Africa. So in the truest sense of the form, I am African American." Deeply rooted in these responses is the undeniable fact that African immigrant children consider themselves transnational individuals whose stories and experiences transcend multiple locations, either as voluntary or involuntary immigrants in the United States. Yamukumba brought this point home as he recounted his journey to America. "I identify myself as the African in America. I am also an Emba in America. I have spent more time elsewhere other than the Congo. I lived in the Congo until I was eleven years

old, then we became refugees in Zimbabwe for four years after which we moved to the U.S. when I was 15.”

This second generation of African immigrants shares a sense of pride in their African heritage, as revealed in their views of Africa. Oraidia stresses her Libyan heritage: “I was born in Lexington, Kentucky. When I tell people I am African, they get confused because I am White in complexion. I am a Libyan Arab from North Africa. That is how I identify myself.” Mikal maintains her Kenyan identity: “I usually say I am Kenyan American. Kenya will always be a special part of our lives...we just happen to have been born here in Richmond, Kentucky.” As for Cubaka, the Democratic Republic of Congo is home: “I was born in the Congo and we relocated to Uganda when I was six years old. We moved to America when I was fourteen. I am unapologetically Congolese. America comes second.”

## **VIEWS OF AFRICA**

Africa holds a special place in the lives of the next generation of African immigrants. Most of the stories shared in the interviews revolved around traveling to various parts of the African continent, paying intimate visits to family and friends, eating meals prepared from scratch, attending weddings and funerals, touring African cities and national parks, attending school, and playing soccer, among other family adventures. Interviewees noted the lack of balanced stories when presenting the continent of Africa to the rest of the world. As Odhiambo explains, “People view Africa negatively. Africa has a more family feel to it than the U.S., where people may not even know their next-door neighbors. Kenya is a beautiful place. I show them pictures. I explain to them that Africa is a lot more than what they see on TV.” Others view Africa as a place that provided them with ordered lives at a very young age. Nostalgic memories of an elementary school left behind formed the backdrop of Nyasha’s account: “I went to school every morning. I loved my school...I had a lot of friends. I would like to go back to Africa as a medical doctor to help my people.” Permanent relocation to Africa is not a view held by all, as Ochieng explains, “I’d love to visit and help, but I will always live in the United States.”

These young people credited the role of family involvement in shaping their worldview on the African continent, its people, and culture. Making family visits to Africa, attending African events in the United States, reading African books, living in African homes, eating African food, wearing African clothes, listening to African music, and speaking African languages (for some) have all kept the African cultures alive. "Going to Libyan events in Lexington has helped me not to be ashamed of my Libyan heritage. The community as a whole is like family. There is always someone to lean on," says Oraidia. "Kenyans in Kentucky still find time to get together. Even if you are not blood related, you are still treated like family. Surrounded by people like that is how I have met my African friends . . . All my African attire have a special place in my closet," adds Mikal. These avenues have provided African immigrant children a platform to explore their own identities in a contested cultural terrain that sometimes calls their very heritage into question. Just like their parents who now call America "home," these second-generation African young people are deeply anchored in their ethnic backgrounds.

They are also concerned about educating others about Africa. As Mikal explains, "I think people have a totally different view of Africa. They often think of poverty. Whenever I visit Kenya, I enjoy going back to our compound. I love going to Aunt Jane's house and my grandparents. I have lots of cousins in Kenya . . . in class we watched a video about how we should be fortunate to go to school here in the U.S. compared to African children. People think Africa is a poor place. I tell them we have a house in Kenya. Kenyan children love going to school. I also did a scrapbook about my visit with pictures I took in Kenya. I feel that it has changed their perspective on Africa." Bangaly also aims to educate others, observing that "Americans do not understand that Africa is a diverse continent with thousands of languages and diverse cultures. There is a lack of understanding, and I am happy to educate others about it." Oraidia pointed out that "people have one image of Africa and they are stuck with it . . . of course there are some bad things that have happened in Africa, but there are also amazing things like buildings, educated people, doctors, lawyers, and many other professionals. I try my best to create a new image. If you respond with education, no one will argue with you." She put those

words into practice when she was a prime organizer of a multicultural fair at her high school.

## **SOURCE OF MOTIVATION**

Second-generation African immigrants are highly motivated individuals. Research on parental characteristics of children of African immigrants cite parental involvement and motivation as key contributors to the second-generation African immigrant children's academic progress.<sup>2</sup> Most of the children interviewed come from homes where the parents are heavily involved in their children's success.<sup>3</sup> Expectations are communicated and modeled early in these children's lives because most of these parents enter the United States with at least a high school diploma or an undergraduate degree.<sup>4</sup> Odhiambo, a rising high school junior at the time, explained that going to college was an obvious choice, citing mentoring and encouragement from his parents as the key factors that have made the difference: "My parents are both college professors. They are familiar with college requirements since that's what they do for a living." Nyasha, a middle schooler

<sup>2</sup> See for example Kevin Thomas, in "Parental Characteristics and the Schooling Progress of the Children of Immigrant and U.S.-Born Blacks." *Demography* 46, no. 3 (2009): 513-34.

<sup>3</sup> See Steinberg, Lamborn, Dornbush, & Darling (1992). Impact of Parenting, School Involvement, and Encouragement to Succeed. *Child Development*, 63, 1266-1281. See also Grolnick & Slowiaczek (1994). Parent's Involvement in Children's Schooling: A Multidisciplinary Conceptualization Model. *Child Development*, 65, 237-252.

<sup>4</sup> See Capp & Fix (2012). Young Children of Black Immigrants in America: Changing Flows, Changing Faces. See also Kaba (2007). Educational Attainment, Income Levels, and Africans in the United States: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. See also Kaba (2007). Educational Attainment, Income Levels, and Africans in the United States: The Paradox of Nigerian Immigrants. *West African Review*, 11: 1-27.



who has already taken the ACT exam, credits her academic success to her parents: "My parents are always pushing me to do better. They motivate me. If I don't meet their expectations, they are always there to comfort me." Bangaly, whose father is from Guinea and whose mother is a White American, has followed in the footsteps of his father in the food industry (at least for the time being) while he works on his aviation certification program. As a young entrepreneur with his own ice cream store, he draws his strength and foresight from his African heritage. Having visited his father's homeland as a child, he returned to the U.S. determined to succeed in his adult life. When asked what motivates him to succeed, Bangaly is quick to point out his parents' influence: "Had I not traveled with my dad and experienced the discomfort most people live with daily in Guinea, I would not have turned out the way I have." He recounts how his father came with nothing to the U.S., except the will to work hard and realize the American dream. A West African restaurant, an ice cream store, and a jewelry store in downtown Lexington serve as evidence of the fruits of hard work by the Savane family: "Our parents have taught us to be self-reliant. Look at my sister, she is only eighteen and she can balance the books at my mom's jewelry store while I step in for my dad."

Other young people, who explain that they owe their drive to achieve to their parents' involvement and daily examples at home, expressed this feeling: "My dad is always encouraging me to read. He always takes us to the library. He encourages me to join academic teams. Whenever I have a question about something, he is always willing to help me answer those questions. My mom also talks to the school if I am uncomfortable," stated Nyasha. Odhiambo explained that "academics come first in my family. I am expected to do well in academics, or I'm not allowed to do sports and other things. My dad is the dean of the College of Science at ECU. I know he had to do well in Kenya and make good grades and want more in order to be what he is today. My mother is a college professor. She wasn't born here. Both my parents had to face the battle of people thinking they were not good enough, but they worked hard and both have their PhDs." He has since joined the University of Kentucky and plans to use the public health platform to serve others, both in the U.S. and Africa. Yamukumba came to the U.S. as a refugee. When he started school, his mother was "not knowledgeable about the school system in

America. I had to work on my own choosing classes, checking my grades, doing my homework, and applying for admission to the university. My mom focused on teaching us to know who we are, our family line, and the struggles we have been through. The journey to the United States motivates me to work harder and where I come from determines the choices I make. My mother is my hero." As the new immigrant and refugee specialist at Bluegrass Community and Technical College, he is already paying it forward in his service to other immigrant groups in the Bluegrass region.

## **CAREER PLANS AND ASPIRATIONS**

The next generation of African immigrants interviewed are driven in their career plans and aspirations. Higher social and economic aspirations characterized their narratives, mirroring a study seeking to understand academic and occupational pathways for African immigrant children in which Vivian Tseng concluded that these children had higher social and economic aspirations compared to their peers with U.S.-born parents.<sup>5</sup> The young people expressed a desire to pursue degrees in professional areas such as medicine, law, business, aviation, teaching, public administration, and community organizing. While some of these career choices were influenced by parental desires for their children, others were completely individual in nature. For example, Bangaly, whose father thought he would take over the family business, prefers to be a pilot instead: "At one point it was expected that I would take over the family business. That is not my dream. I have a dream of being a pilot. It took some time for my dad to realize and accept that I want to make my own path and do my own thing. I'm appreciative that I can work alongside him to help the business grow, but that is not what I want to do for the rest of my life." Ochieng, whose parents are college professors, does not want to be a teacher. Medicine is the career of choice instead. Asked why he is drawn to the medical

<sup>5</sup> Vivian Tseng in "Unpacking Immigration in Youths' Academic and Occupational Pathways."

*Child Development* 77, no. 5 (2006): 1434.

career, he maintains that it will offer him a broader platform to “make a difference in the lives of others, not only in America but also in Africa.” He has since joined a medical school and hopes to work in the U.S. and volunteer his expertise in Africa upon graduation. Oraidia, the young Libyan woman, is interested in a law degree “so I can be a voice to the voiceless. I want to be a lawyer so that I can help undocumented students pursue education in the U.S. I have worked with ESL and Hispanic students and seen firsthand what they go through.”

Service to others was a common theme in most of the narratives. Giving back to the communities that nurtured them seems to be a driving force behind their career choices. Nyasha, the young Zimbabwean girl brought to the U.S. as a child, wants to excel in school and become a pediatric surgeon “so I can go back to Zimbabwe and help my people. I do want to have contact with my relatives in Zimbabwe. That is where I am from and that is where I feel I should be. There is a great need there,” she adds. For Cubaka, the Congolese-born refugee who lost his mother at a young age in Uganda and is now residing in Kentucky with his father, going back home has always been a life-long dream: “I want to be able to go back to my country. I want to be able to help organize in the community. I want to help people to be sufficient on their own, to be able to develop themselves. I want to go back to Africa and be part of the growth. There is so much work to be done at home. My mother taught me survival skills when she was here and my dad has enhanced those skills in her absence. I want to make a difference in the lives of others.” For Aisha, a rising philanthropist in Lexington, Kentucky, the 1600 backpacks donated to her former school in Burundi through her backpack project is just the beginning of greater things to come in the area of advocacy and philanthropic giving.

## **DIGITAL NATIVES**

The children of African immigrants are technologically savvy. They are smart, innovative, and way ahead of their parents in all things digital. The young people interviewed acknowledged that technology occupies a significant part of their lives, both at school and home. African parents have often registered frustrations about the impact

of technology on the African immigrant family. What has complicated the issue for these parents, most of whom were raised without any form of technology, is the fact that the American classroom has become a technological haven with some assignments requiring students to have a phone or a tablet at their disposal. Some school days have even been branded “technology days,” requiring students to bring some type of electronic item to the classroom. What the immigrant African parents are realizing is that technology is slowly changing African family dynamics. Conversations become scarce and tempers rise when technology is withheld or taken away altogether.

The average African immigrant young person is fully engaged in at least two or more social media platforms. When other platforms like texting and Snapchat are factored in, there is very limited time for family interaction. “These children text each other even in the same room. They no longer talk to each other,” lamented a Kenyan mother at an annual Kenya Community in Kentucky gathering. A growing concern for some parents is that the children have become less mobile when they return home from school and other extra-curricular activities: “They are either in their rooms flat on their backs with a cell phone in hand or sloughing on a couch, head bowed low, oblivious of their surroundings. It’s like I’m raising total strangers in my home,” retorted another frustrated mother. In defense of technology in modern day education, an African dad is quick to add that “technology is not always a bad thing. Look at these children. They are so smart compared to their age mates back home. They have information at their fingertips and are doing great things with it. Let the children explore.” Other parents are also wary of the danger posed by online activity and its effect on the future of their children. “These children have no idea information shared online is permanent and can damage their future irreparably,” said another frustrated mother.

The interviewees shared much in common with non-immigrant American young people when they talked about their parents and technology. One interviewee said, “I am definitely more tech savvy than my parents. They text slowly with one finger. They don’t know how to use simple things on their phones. It’s annoying.” Another said, “It’s miserable when my mother tries to text,” and another: “My dad’s idea of technology is YouTube. He watches Congolese news over and over again. He is also on Facebook to

keep in touch with his family and friends back home.” Still another explained, “Technology has made things like travel and finding places easier, but my dad still trusts printed out maps for places and attractions whenever we travel.” Clearly, the war between the digital natives and newcomers is here to stay.

## **“MOTHER MAY I”:**

### **PARENTING THE AFRICAN IMMIGRANT CHILD**

Parenting in the shifting terrain of the borderland is one of the greatest challenges facing African immigrant families. For the African immigrant parent, balancing parental control and respect for their children’s privacy is a tightrope to walk. Raised in authoritarian homes and close-knit family networks where the community was part of the “village” that raised the child, these parents find it extremely difficult to raise children in the U.S. where their authority is quite often questioned. Dating is one such thorny issue in the African immigrant home. African children born or raised outside their parents’ countries of origin do not view dating in the same way their parents do. As a matter of fact, some of their parents never dated before marriage. Because of this cultural difference, children of African immigrants quite often face resistance from their parents regarding dating before marriage. “I have taken the view that it is possible to live with a girl without getting married. This does not make sense to my mom. Sometimes uncomfortable conversations go on in my presence when my mom is trying to arrange a marriage between her friend’s children and me. I do understand why it is important for her that the families get involved,” explains Yamukumba.

Another area of conflict is social interaction outside school. African parents are very particular about who their children spend time with outside their home. For example, during events such as sleepovers and birthday celebrations, it is not uncommon for African immigrant parents to demand to meet with the host parent and ask about details such as adult supervision, time limits, and other details. Others sometimes wait in their cars until the event is over. Most of the children find this scrutiny offensive and an intrusion of their privacy and that of their friends. Clothing and general appearance at

home or in public is yet another challenging area. Most African parents require their children to be appropriately dressed. Sagging clothes and unkempt hair is not acceptable, even in cases when their children's peers exhibit alternative dress and grooming codes.

Many African immigrant parents come to the United States with fairly favorable academic credentials. They are driven and expect nothing less from their children. Cases of academic dropouts or stop-outs are rarely tolerated, creating tension between parents and their children. The same applies to employment. African immigrant parents expect their children to seek employment in reputable organizations with decent salaries. This phenomenon explains the push by parents to enroll their kids in highly specialized fields such as law, medicine, engineering, and business administration, among others. While some of the young people have embraced their parents' desires, others have rejected career paths chosen for them by their parents.

Based on conversations with the children and their parents, the children of African immigrants can sometimes become total strangers to their parents. Indeed, these children are "immigrants in our lives," as one parent put it at an African gathering: "We came here alone, and then the children came into our lives. They look like us, but their behaviors are totally alien." Another African parent and spiritual leader cautioned fellow parents at the 2017 annual Kenyans in Kentucky (KIK) gathering: "This generation lives in their own world. These children are not from Murang'a. They are Americans. They know their rights. You must be careful how you engage them. They live in a society where children and pets have more power than their parents." Overall, parenting the African immigrant child is a balancing act between the values the parents brought with them from their countries of origin and those acquired upon relocation.

## **STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND COMMUNITIES THAT CARED**

The dispersion of people of African descent around the globe has had a significant impact on African families.<sup>6</sup> Whereas the African immigrant parents have noted numerous opportunities in their newly acquired homes for themselves and their children, some of their offspring have faced many challenges as they find their path in the U.S. Some of the challenges that emerged in our conversations included language, discrimination, housing, and academic preparedness. The conversations also highlight communities and organizations that have extended a helping hand to the burgeoning African immigrant populations in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

## **ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND ALIENATION**

The children of African immigrants are highly unlikely to be fluent in their parents' native languages. Fueled by the need to excel in school and find employment, the language of choice for most parents and their children is English. Fluency in the English language is often viewed as the path to survival upon relocation. Some of these children, especially within refugee African immigrant populations, become the translators for their parents. The danger in focusing on English at the expense of the native languages is that the children who were brought into the U.S. as foreign-born lose their native languages (or sometimes become "ashamed of them"), preferring instead to perfect their English-speaking skills as a coping strategy for assimilation into their new environment.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Coe (2014). *The Scattered Family. Parenting, African Migrants, and Global Inequality.* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. See also See Min Zhou. *Growing up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants.* *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23(1997): 63-95. See also Cati Coe. *The Scattered Family. Parenting, African Migrants, and Global Inequality.* The Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> For an in-depth look at the role of education and language among African immigrants, see Nicholas Tarlebba. "An Ethnographic Study on the Role of Education and Language

Even in cases when parents have tried to salvage the situation by stressing the use of ethnic languages at home, the results have often been dismal, creating a barrier between children and their parents. The children become “strangers in their own homes”— unable to comprehend their parents’ native tongues. Whenever these parents visit their home countries with their children or talk to them on the phone, communication breakdown is normally the order of the day, as the non-English-speaking grandparents are unable to communicate with their grandchildren.

## **DISCRIMINATION**

Children of African immigrants sometimes face discrimination, both within the school and in the communities where they live. The young people interviewed noted being singled out because of their accents. Some of them shared stories of struggle mastering the English language for academic success and general survival. Moreover, even in cases when they had developed advanced use of the English language, African immigrant students still felt singled out for their accents by their peers as well as their teachers. Being labeled “that child who speaks funny” by peers made early years of school difficult for some African immigrant students. At other times these students felt the burden of daily proving themselves worthy of belonging to groups, ending up interacting with students from similar backgrounds. Others felt the burden of representing an entire continent in their classroom discussions, especially when any topic focusing on Africa was discussed. The label of being poor, displaced, and hungry is a burden that most African immigrant children carry around the various communities they participate in and is considered burdensome by many.”<sup>8</sup>

among African Immigrants as they Struggle to Integrate and Succeed in the United States.” *Journal of Alternative Perspective in the Social Sciences*, 2 (2010): 854-868.

<sup>8</sup> See Samson Omotosho, *Being an African Student: Stories of Opportunity and Determination*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. See also Carol Schmid, “Educational Achievement, Language-Minority Students, and the New Second



## HOUSING

Housing is another challenge facing some immigrants, especially refugee families. Some of the young people interviewed have lived in neighborhoods where security was not guaranteed. Others reported large families with limited living space. For example, at Westminster Village,<sup>9</sup> which is a Section 8 subsidized apartment complex in Lexington, Kentucky, rent is calculated based on income, making this location one of the most sought-after residences upon relocation for refugee families. It is not uncommon to find an average family of six occupying a two-bedroom apartment. Quality of life in such a crowded space can affect children in their formative years. While it is true that some refugee families have managed to move out and purchase homes for their growing families, the process is always long due to lack of resources and decent employment opportunities.

## ACADEMIC PREPAREDNESS

The feeling of “going through education alone” was a recurring theme for some interviewees. Whereas those children from highly educated middle-class families reported sailing through the often-confusing enrollment maze that accompanies education in America, others reported having to learn on their own what was required of them to succeed academically: “My parents are both in higher education. They are also academic advisors so I have always received extra help from home on what to do to succeed in school. Whenever I have questions about schoolwork, there is always help readily available at home,” explains Ochieng. This picture is not a common one for some students, especially from refugee homes.

Generation.” *Sociology of Education* 74 (2001): 72.

<sup>9</sup>Most of the families who call Westminster Village home fall below the extremely low or very low income threshold. For a detailed income limit per household size visit <http://section-8-housing.credio.com/l/1325/Westminster-Village#Eligibility&s=2FUxwH>

Studies have revealed that immigrant parents sometimes experience difficulties understanding the educational systems of the receiving countries. In their study focusing on problems and parental challenges facing resettled refugee parents, Marie-Antoinette Sossou and Christson Adedoyin found that this lack of understanding of the school system makes refugee parents “incapable of using the resources and opportunities available to advance their children’s educational goals.”<sup>10</sup> As Yamukumba, who has now graduated with his undergraduate and master’s degrees, reflects: “I had to learn on my own which classes to take and what was required. My mother offered support at home, but she did not understand how the system worked. I had to figure it out myself. Even when she enrolled in school herself, we were both uncertain what was expected of us. She is my role model. She is a strong woman.” Most of the refugee students relied on the support of volunteers and advocates within the community to guide them through the process.

To help students learn English and obtain extra academic help when they first arrive in the U.S., Newcomer Academies have been organized in various school systems around the country, including Louisville, Kentucky. In 2017-18, Fayette County Schools were prepared to open a Newcomer Academy if they had the need, but they did not because the number of new refugee students dropped in spring 2017 after President Donald Trump took office. The system had planned an individualized program designed to help students accelerate their language acquisition and mastery of academics for several months to a year before moving into middle and high schools. It would also have included special services for students who had missed formal education for two or more

<sup>10</sup> See Marie-Antoinette Sossou & Adedoyin, Christson Adeditun “A Qualitative Study of Problems and Parental Challenges of Resettled African Refugee Parents.” *Professional Development: The International Journal of Continuing Social Work Education*, Vol 15, no 2 (2012): 47. See also Musoni, Francis, Otieno, Iddah, Wilson, Angene, & Wilson, Jack. *Voices of African Immigrants in Kentucky: Migration, Identity, and Transnationality*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2019: 147-154.

years and because of trauma might need social, emotional, and psychological support.<sup>11</sup> Warren County Schools in Bowling Green, Kentucky, had already gone further and opened the GEO International High School, which “serves a multilingual community of new learners of English to prepare them for graduation, college and beyond. GIHS students develop English in a rigorous, academic, collaborative environment through partnerships with the Warren County Community.”<sup>12</sup>

Still, in Fayette County, some schools accepted the challenge of recently arrived, especially refugee, students. For example, the Family Resource Center Coordinator at Picadome Elementary School and the Youth Services Coordinator at Jessie Clark Middle School were proactive in 2016-17 in getting to know incoming students at Westminster Village, the Section 8 housing complex, who were transferred to their schools. In the spring, the elementary school Family Resource Center Coordinator noticed that parents could not easily come to the school to pick up food donated by Glean Kentucky and arranged for delivery directly to the Village. During the summer, the Youth Services Coordinator went to the Village one night each week to play soccer with the incoming students and get to know them. He also arranged for a special art program to occur at the Village during the summer. Both coordinators also planned events for parents, targeting clothing and school supply needs. During the fall, the Youth Services Coordinator organized a combination of basketball and tutoring opportunities for students and connected with students who often came to his office during their lunch hour.

## **CONCLUSION**

<sup>11</sup> Valerie Honeycutt Spears, “Academy for immigrant, refugee students planned for Fayette,” *Lexington Herald Leader*, June 19, 2017). Also Newcomer Academy PowerPoint presentation by Lisa Hillenbrand, Kate McAnelley and Michael D. Daily, Fayette Country Public Schools, 6/26/2017.

<sup>12</sup> See Warren County schools website. <http://www.warrencountyschools.org/>

The next generation of African immigrants is growing, not only in Kentucky but also in the rest of the U.S. These young people, whether American or foreign-born, are charting their own course and (re)writing the immigrant story in the U.S. While deeply anchored in their African heritage, these young men and women are not afraid to venture out and create their own paths in the new cultural environment their families now find themselves. In the area of career aspirations, for example, the next generation of African immigrants have high career aspirations. While a number of them aspire for careers that fall under professional degree programs such as medicine, law, engineering, and business administration recommended by parents, others are drawn to careers in community organizing, advocacy, public administration, health administration, aviation, and self-employment. Educational attainment is a top priority for these young people. While going to school has clearly been a challenge for some, the desire to break the cycle of under-employment and low-income characterizing the refugee community in Kentucky is evident. This next generation derives motivation from their parents and their community networks where individuals balance working at multiple jobs, attending school, running households, and sometimes taking care of aging parents. The African immigrant families and their dependents are grateful for the communities that have embraced and nurtured them, including soccer, basketball, church, and school, which includes other communities such as Bowling Green, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Kenan Mujkanovic. *Voices from Bowling Green: Tales of Young Visionaries*. Middletown, DE: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.

The narratives also show a group of visionaries who are well-connected and anchored in their communities (in the U.S. and abroad) and are willing to give back through philanthropy, community service, and legislative engagement, especially in the areas of health care, higher education, and legal counsel. For example, Oraida of Libyan heritage who led the organization of a multicultural fair at her high school was a co-organizer of a rally in downtown Lexington in spring 2017 to support refugees. The next generation of African immigrants is also aware of the current dialogue on race, ethnicity, and immigration and their role in changing the narrative about African people, societies, and cultures. As Bangaly Savane puts it, "I hope the next generation of African immigrant children do not forget where they came from. I hope they are patient and that they are able to educate people, especially in the current political climate. We come from a big continent with a rich history, and there is no reason we should not share that."

## END NOTES

1. See Kanya, Hugo A. African Immigrants in the United States: The Challenges for Research and Practice. *Social Work*, 42 (1997): 154-165. See also Yewah, Emmanuel & Togunde, Dimeji (eds.). *Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States Diaspora*. Champaign, IL: Common Grounds Publishing, 2010.↑
2. See for example Kevin Thomas, in "Parental Characteristics and the Schooling Progress of the Children of Immigrant and U.S.-Born Blacks." *Demography* 46, no. 3 (2009): 513-34.↑
3. See Steinberg, Lamborn, Dornbush, & Darling (1992). Impact of Parenting, School Involvement, and Encouragement to Succeed. *Child Development*, 63, 1266-1281. See also Grolnick & Slowiaczek (1994). Parent's Involvement in Children's Schooling: A Multidisciplinary Conceptualization Model. *Child Development*, 65, 237-252.↑
4. See Capp & Fix (2012). Young Children of Black Immigrants in America: Changing Flows, Changing Faces. See also Kaba (2007). Educational Attainment, Income Levels, and Africans in the United States: Washington, DC: Migration

- Policy Institute. See also Kaba (2007). Educational Attainment, Income Levels, and Africans in the United States: The Paradox of Nigerian Immigrants. *West African Review*, 11: 1-27.↑
5. Vivian Tseng in "Unpacking Immigration in Youths' Academic and Occupational Pathways." *Child Development* 77, no. 5 (2006): 1434.↑
  6. Coe (2014). *The Scattered Family. Parenting, African Migrants, and Global Inequality*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. See also See Min Zhou. Growing up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23(1997): 63-95. See also Cati Coe. *The Scattered Family. Parenting, African Migrants, and Global Inequality*. The Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014.↑
  7. For an in-depth look at the role of education and language among African immigrants, see Nicholas Tarlebba. "An Ethnographic Study on the Role of Education and Language among African Immigrants as they Struggle to Integrate and Succeed in the United States." *Journal of Alternative Perspective in the Social Sciences*, 2 (2010): 854-868.↑
  8. See Samson Omotosho, *Being an African Student: Stories of Opportunity and Determination*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005. See also Carol Schmid, "Educational Achievement, Language-Minority Students, and the New Second Generation." *Sociology of Education* 74 (2001): 72.↑
  9. Most of the families who call Westminster Village home fall below the extremely low or very low income threshold. For a detailed income limit per household size visit <http://section-8-housing.credio.com/l/1325/Westminster-Village#Eligibility&s=2FUxwH>↑
  10. See Marie-Antoinette Sossou & Adedoyin, Christson Adeditun "A Qualitative Study of Problems and Parental Challenges of Resettled African Refugee Parents." *Professional Development: The International Journal of Continuing Social Work Education*, Vol 15, no 2 (2012): 47. See also Musoni, Francis, Otieno, Iddah, Wilson, Angene, & Wilson, Jack. *Voices of African Immigrants in*

*Kentucky: Migration, Identity, and Transnationality*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2019: 147-154.↑

11. Valerie Honeycutt Spears, "Academy for immigrant, refugee students planned for Fayette," *Lexington Herald Leader*, June 19, 2017). Also Newcomer Academy PowerPoint presentation by Lisa Hillenbrand, Kate McAnelley and Michael D. Daily, Fayette County Public Schools, 6/26/2017.↑
12. See Warren County schools website. <http://www.warrencountyschools.org/>↑
13. See Kenan Mujkanovic. *Voices from Bowling Green: Tales of Young Visionaries*. Middletown, DE: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.↑

## **CHAPTER 17**

# **Ronald Reagan's Constructive Engagement and the Making of a Political Order in Southern Africa, 1981-1989**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Constructive engagement as a concept has largely informed the conduct of American foreign policy, thereby gaining a special forcefulness and stridency during the Ronald Reagan administration. Constructive engagement holds that American interests are better served by developing stronger economic and cultural ties with Southern Africa's apartheid and White minority rule regimes. Its goals were threefold: weaken the links between the Soviet Union and radical communist regimes; undermine the stability of these developing governments; and support or even execute their removal from power by all means. The policy called for an active American regional presence, intensive aid programs, a simultaneous Namibian resolution leading to independence, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Using analytical research methods, this chapter evaluates the application of constructive engagement in the context of Southern Africa's movement toward equality, social justice, democracy, and political order. It considers both the confrontational and friendly persuasion approaches adopted by Ronald Reagan, which culminated in the defense of the national interest. There were compelling economic and strategic interests for American policy toward Southern Africa during the Reagan years: the acquisition of mineral resources, rolling down Communism, and establishing a market economy. Such interests were considered "vital" on two grounds: first, they were of such real importance that no prudent policy maker could neglect to take them



into account; second, they were of such real importance either to the electorate at large or to the political class that, without them, the continuity of the administration or its ability to carry out a coherent foreign policy could have been jeopardised. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 effectively ended American foreign policy toward apartheid with a dramatic reversal of the Reagan veto by Congress. The U.S. domestic political opposition to constructive engagement drove much of the legislative agenda through the 1980s on Southern and South Africa. It transpires, therefore, that if South Africa were to remain the economic locomotive of the sub-region, its strong and developed economy should not have been weakened. Therefore, international stakeholders, under Reagan leadership, were to resist emotional calls for punitive sanctions. In the end, the Reagan administration tried to support South Africa without appearing to endorse apartheid. Constructive engagement was a failure because Cold War concerns overrode the explicit goal of ending apartheid in South Africa. By radically departing from earlier trends of America's vision of world affairs, Reagan's doctrine of reinvigorated global containment ushered in a new agenda for American foreign policy and rested on a particular set of intellectual constructs derived from a general system of foreign policy ideas.

The concept of engagement represents an indispensable tool in a foreign policy practitioner's armory. Constructive engagement has largely informed the conduct of American foreign policy, thereby gaining a special forcefulness and stridency during the Reagan administration.<sup>1</sup> The term was popularized in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement toward South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Although Reagan never outlined a comprehensive set of policies that he personally qualified as "Reagan Doctrine," his commitment amounted to a clear willingness to elaborate on a winning strategy to assist anti-Communist movements in the developing world.<sup>3</sup> Crafted by Chester A. Crocker, Assistant

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<sup>1</sup> Gar Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1970): 75 – 121. Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982): 216 - 229.

<sup>2</sup> Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, "Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (2000): xx – xx.

<sup>3</sup> Ronald Reagan, Speech to the United Nations, 24 October 1985, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. GPO (1986): 12 – 18.

Secretary of State for African Affairs, constructive engagement represented one of the most significant innovations of American diplomacy in the 1980s. Crocker maintained that unvarying hostile rhetoric leveled at the apartheid regime in South Africa served only to increase Pretoria's mistrust and dislike of Washington and hardened Pretoria's intransigence. He asserted that an open dialogue, together with a reduction of punitive measures, such as export restrictions, would gain the confidence of Pretoria, enabling Washington to influence South Africa toward a gradual change away from apartheid.<sup>4</sup>

The policy goals were threefold: weaken the links between the Soviet Union and radical Communist regimes; undermine the stability of these developing governments; and support or even execute their removal from power.<sup>5</sup> Policy makers historically viewed Africa as marginal to American national interests. However, as Reagan's constructive engagement shows, the proliferation of anti-apartheid activism demonstrated how citizen initiatives could significantly alter the placement of issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.<sup>6</sup>

Referring to American diplomacy in Southern Africa, some emerging questions flow from the above analysis. Did Reagan support White minority rule? What were the economic returns of collaboration with the apartheid regime? What about the differences and similarities between constructive engagement and other foreign policy doctrines? Did constructive engagement have any impact on the democratic revolutions that shook Southern Africa to its upheavals in the early 1990s? In answering these questions, this chapter evaluates the application of constructive engagement in the context of Southern Africa's movement toward full independence, equality, social justice, democracy, and political order. The analysis considers both the confrontational and friendly persuasion approaches adopted by the Reagan administration, which culminated in the defense of national interest. There is no doubt that constructive engagement was one of the strongholds of Reagan's policy in Southern Africa, probably the most elaborate policy design ever assembled by an American statesman. Reagan's policy, otherwise stated, to borrow from John De St

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<sup>4</sup> J. E. Davies, *Constructive Engagement?: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> Ronald Reagan, Department of State Bulletin. Washington D.C. April 1988: 27.

<sup>6</sup> Donald R. Culverston, "The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969-1986," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 1 (1996): 127-49.

Jorre, possessed a “conceptual base, a style (and tone), a coherency that goes beyond its predecessors.”<sup>7</sup>

There were strong economic and strategic interests for American policy toward Southern Africa during the Reagan years: ensuring acquisition of mineral resources, gaining access to the seas, rolling down Communism, and establishing a market economy in the sub-region. Such interests were considered “vital” on two grounds: first, they were of such real importance that no prudent policy maker could neglect to take them into account; second, they were of such real importance either to the electorate at large or to the political class that, without them, the continuity of the administration or its ability to carry out a coherent foreign policy could have been jeopardized.

In the end, the democratic settlements that occurred across the board in Namibia and in South Africa in the early 1990s were achieved despite, not because of the Reagan’s doctrine. Rather, international diplomatic efforts, political order in neighboring countries, and changes in Soviet “new thinking” established the preconditions for negotiations, while changes in the military balance in Southern Africa precipitated a commitment from all belligerents to seek a peaceful solution. On the same footing, conflicting objectives and strategies produced an inconsistent and at times contradictory application of American policy in Southern Africa.<sup>8</sup> These tactics ranged from covert military assistance, non-recognition, and open economic cooperation with South Africa’s minority White regime.

The first part of this chapter analyzes constructive engagement and the making of Reagan’s foreign policy. At this point, the analysis raises the general question of how the policy fitted within American diplomatic policy discourse by trying to discern if other alternatives were open in the context of Cold War ideology. The second part discusses America’s socio-political opposition through the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and the Anti-Apartheid movement. To comprehend its more general manifestations in Southern Africa, the chapter reviews the legacy of constructive engagement on political order and democratic participation of the early 1990s. It

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<sup>7</sup> John De St Jorre, “South Africa: Is Change Coming?” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1981): 106 - 122.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 105.

asserts that if post-apartheid South Africa were to remain the economic locomotive of the sub-region, its strong and developed economy should not have been crippled.

## **CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND THE MAKING OF RONALD REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY**

By the late 20th century, American foreign relations had coalesced into a powerful, mutually reinforcing body of ideas that had gone far toward dominating political thought. In *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (1987), Michael Hunt traces the origins of American foreign policy ideology, showing how it gained in coherence and appeal in the 18th and 19th centuries. Hunt argues that "ideology has figured prominently in virtually all attempts to account in broad, interpretive terms for American entry into the thicket of international politics and to explain the conduct of policymakers as they followed the path deeper and deeper into the underbrush."<sup>9</sup> Hunt's broader argument is that the fundamental propositions of American foreign policy are threefold: active quest for national greatness linked to the promotion of liberty in foreign countries; classification of other nations in a racial hierarchy; and a suspicion of foreign revolutions that failed to copy the American model.

A set of major elements formed the stronghold of constructive engagement. For Robert Fatton's *Black Consciousness in South Africa* (1986), it first rested on a new Cold War attitude based on the belief that any radical disruption of the international status quo was masterminded by the Soviet Union and that any revolutionary movement of national liberation constituted a Soviet surrogate.<sup>10</sup> As Reagan's foreign policy ideology, constructive engagement holds that American interests are better served by developing stronger economic and cultural ties with the South African apartheid regime.<sup>11</sup> The conviction is that such links will contribute to the gradual liberalization and the ultimate demise of apartheid. These ties will support

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<sup>9</sup> Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 4–5.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Fatton, "Black Consciousness in South Africa: The Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy." (PhD Dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, 1986).

<sup>11</sup> Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Reagan Policy toward South Africa: Ideology and the New Cold War," *African Studies Review* 27 (1984): 57- 82.

and encourage the political ascendancy of a modernizing autocracy of enlightened White elites. The latter's commitment to social and democratic change, so the argument goes, will transform Southern Africa into a multiracial democracy and a reliable partner in the overall American defense strategy.

Constructive engagement assumed that social transformations in the developing world were benefiting the Soviet Union. The new political order instilled by a realist foreign policy played to the United States' advantage because it blocked the ascendancy of Communist regimes and fostered liberal democracy instead, since the development of liberal democracies required American support for authoritarian regimes.<sup>12</sup>

As a foreign policy ideology, constructive engagement was grounded on the theoretical and political distinction between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" systems. Its implications for U.S. foreign relations were twofold. On the one hand, it led to either a benign opposition to, or an open embrace of authoritarian regimes, since these regimes were allegedly capable of democratic transformations. On the other hand, it led to an unbending antagonism toward totalitarian regimes because they were supposedly tyrannies destroyable only through war or military interventions.<sup>13</sup>

There were economic elements enshrined in constructive engagement. During the Cold War, South Africa was strategically relevant to the U.S.<sup>14</sup> With its extremely market-driven economy, the country unlikely possessed key minerals that were increasingly critical to the economies of the industrial world. Assuring this continued access was critical to the success of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Thus, it could be easily embraced as part of a global war on centralized models of economic development. It is clear that the U.S. had to support South African divisive politics in

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid: 58.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> R.E. Bissell, "How Strategic is South Africa?," in *South Africa into the 1980s*, eds. Richard E. Bissell and Chester A Crocker (Boulder: Westview, 1980); Michael A. Samuels, *Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy* (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1979); Larry W. Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis" *African Affairs* 81, no. 323 (1982): 159-91; Christopher Coker, "South Africa's Strategic Importance: A Reassessment," *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies* 124 (1979): 22-26.

order to substantiate the constitutional validity of the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine, that the U.S. Supreme Court first propounded in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) in litigation attacking racial segregation in railroad cars, schools, voting rights, entertainment facilities, and drinking fountains.<sup>15</sup>

The United States and South Africa shared some similarities about domestic racial politics. South Africa's apartheid and White rule mirrored to a greater extent America's slave politics and civil rights movements. From the earliest days of the inception of apartheid as a political ideology by its architects Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan (1948-1954) and his successor Johannes G. Strijdom (1954-1958), the West remained largely silent, as most failed to appreciate to recognize the extent of the transformation until it was too late. If South Africa's racial laws offended international morality, natural law, and liberal ideology, few liberals appreciated the implications of the National Party rule until the 1950s. Throughout the early 1990s, South Africa's National Party defended itself against internal and external enemies by creating a formidable security apparatus and subordinating the legal system to the goal of maintaining "color democracy."

In 1969, President Richard Nixon requested from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa. The National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) simply confirmed old strategies.<sup>16</sup> Chosen in its general outlines, Option 2 built on a new acquiescence in the fundamental permanence and even desirability of South African power. Its key premise is that South Africa is and should be the dominant power in the area and that White rule there (and in the Portuguese colonies) is "here to stay."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See also *Roberts v. City of Boston*, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849). *Linda Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court Case (1954) overturned the doctrine of "separate but equal."

<sup>16</sup> Edgard Lockwood, "National Security Study Memorandum 39 and the Future of United States Policy toward Southern Africa," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 4, no. 3 (1974): 63-72.

<sup>17</sup> United States of America, National Security Study Memorandum 9 (NSSM 39) Annex I, (Washington, DC: 1969). Susan A. Gitelson, "The Transformation of the Southern African State System," *Journal of African Studies*, 4, 4 (1977): 367 – 91 at 369; Timothy M. Shaw, "International Organizations and the Politics of Southern Africa:

For many years, American behavior vis-à-vis Southern Africa was ambiguous and controversial. The greatest differences in the policies of American postwar administrations came at the periphery of their Southern African strategies. For most of the time, it refused to choose between its economic interests and moral responsibilities. During the first major debate on apartheid at the United Nations in 1952, the United States, through its ambassador, declared its lack of competence, as apartheid was described as a matter of internal politics. In other words, it was argued that the UN had "no power to impose standards, but only to proclaim them."<sup>18</sup> It was not until the early 1960s that the U.S., through Adlai Stevenson, its UN ambassador (1961-1965), recognized the centrality of race as a social, political, and human rights determinant.

At the outset, Apartheid threatened America's vital interests in South Africa because it was drawing neighboring states into the vortex of political violence. Following a transcript of President Reagan's speech on July 23, 1986, on South Africa, the Head of State contended that:

The root cause of South Africa's disorder is apartheid, that rigid system of racial segregation wherein Black people have been treated as third-class citizens in a nation they helped to build. America's view of apartheid has been, and remains, clear: apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable. The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people, based on race. If South Africa wishes to belong to the family of Western nations, an end to apartheid is a precondition. Americans, I believe, are united in this conviction. Second, apartheid must be dismantled. Time is running out for the moderates of all races in South Africa.<sup>19</sup> The climate of unrest and insecurity that followed several months in the apartheid state paralyzed South Africa's economy, public service, industry, and private sector, producing a serious run on the stock exchange. It was the advent of the June 16, 1976, Sharpeville massacre during

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Towards Regional Integration or Liberation?" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 3, no. 1 (1976): 1-19.

<sup>18</sup> Amry Vandenbosch, *South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), 235.

<sup>19</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Speech in Washington D.C on South Africa," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1986, 00012.

which several dozens of Black people were killed that haunted the specter of revolution in Washington's mind. Thereafter, the United States, though haphazardly, came out in support of a transfer of power. From there, the United States expressed particular concern about the fact that Black nationalist leaders in exile were prone to assimilation and conversion to Communist ideology to save their race. Some believe that the United States intensified its presence in South Africa to contain violence rather than to quell it completely.<sup>20</sup> It was no longer possible to argue, as Joseph Satterthwaite, U.S. ambassador to South Africa from 1961 through 1965, had contended at the onset of hostilities, that the most America could do was to set an example by pursuing civil rights legislation at home, in the hope of proving conclusively that a pluralistic society could exist once racial discrimination has been rolled back from the statute books.<sup>21</sup>

Most proponents of the Reagan's constructive engagement policy disagreed about its practical application in Angola as support for the freedom fighters." The conservative wing of the Republican Party both in the administration and in Congress wanted to completely overthrow the ruling Angolan government. More moderate Reagan supporters saw assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as a means to pressure the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to accept the rebel group into a coalition government. Likewise, a substantial segment of Reagan supporters favored assistance to Jonas Savimbi to be covert and supplemented by negotiations with the ruling MPLA. As a minimum and primary objective, all constructive engagement supporters wanted to pressure the Cuban troops to leave Angola. By exacerbating the conflict, U.S. officials hoped to increase the military and political costs of a continued Cuban presence in Angola.<sup>22</sup>

The two-way approach to America's covert aid in Southern Africa was not always appropriate. Like many other conservatives, Constantine Menges, former National Security Council officer, has argued that George P. Shultz, 60th Secretary of

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<sup>20</sup> Davies, *Constructive Engagement*.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola," *International Security* 14 (3) (1989): 99–135, at 104.



State (1982-1989), was formally against military assistance to Angola.<sup>23</sup> In a letter to the House minority leader Robert Michel, Shultz expressed opposition to a Congressional resolution calling for \$27 million in humanitarian assistance for UNITA:

The suggested legislation should be discouraged. For the past several years the administration pursued a policy in Southern Africa aimed in part at securing the independence of Namibia, and in that context provide for the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola. The legislation which Congressmen Pepper and Kemp have proposed is ill-timed and will not contribute to the settlement we seek. I feel strongly about Savimbi's courageous stand against Soviet aggression, but there are better ways to help. A determined effort on our part to pursue the negotiation is a good approach.<sup>24</sup>

George Shultz reportedly supported the repeal of the Clark Amendment but wanted to assist Jonas Savimbi covertly, as a means of enhancing the American bargaining position and of not overthrowing Angola's ruling MPLA regime.<sup>25</sup> When Shultz met Black nationalist leader Oliver Tambo in Washington, D.C., on January 24, 1987, the State Department described the African National Congress (ANC) as having a "legitimate voice" in South Africa. Indeed, after the alleged encounter, the U.S. continued to implement an anti-ANC policy. In this vein, the 1987 Foreign Assistance Supplementary Appropriation Bill, passed on July 11, offered more than \$40 million projects among members of the Southern African Development Coordination (SADCC).

Beyond withholding recognition, the Reagan administration sought to damage the Angolan economy by prohibiting U.S. exports purported to have a military use. In this respect, Charles Redman, the State Department deputy spokesperson, has noted

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<sup>23</sup> Constantine C. Menges, *Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making of Reagan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 232 – 249.

<sup>24</sup> George P. Shultz, Letter in "Angola: Intervention or Negotiation," Hearings of U.S. House Committee on Foreign Relations, October 31 and November 12, 1985 (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1986), 3.

<sup>25</sup> See interview with Michael McFaul, cited in McFaul, "Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine." During an interview to McFaul on April 18, 1989, Chester Crocker repeated this statement.

that the purpose was to constrain "Angola's ability to earn foreign currency and thus fund its war against UNITA."<sup>26</sup>

Reagan's foreign policy in Southern Africa proved, at times, to be questionable. These tactics ranged from covert military assistance, non-recognition, and diplomatic isolation. In his first year as president, Reagan publicly endorsed UNITA and urged Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, the 5-year ban on secret cash and arms aid to rebel groups in Angola.<sup>27</sup> In the years since its passage in 1976, critics charged that the CIA and other American agencies had sent arms to the mercenary gangs by way of South Africa.

Applied to Southern Africa, constructive engagement called for an active American regional presence, intensive aid program, a simultaneous Namibian resolution, and the subordination of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. In spite of his reticence on the direct use of military force, Reagan launched a vigorous program to support nationalist movements.<sup>28</sup> He explained the rationale:

We have sought to advance the cause of freedom where opportunities exist to do so...In regional conflicts, for example, we have elaborated a policy of helping anti-Communist insurgents in their battle to bring self-determination, independence and human rights to their own countries...Our current efforts in Angola in support of freedom fighters constitute the most recent extension of this policy.<sup>29</sup>

During Reagan's first year of presidency, the United States resumed covert assistance to Angola through the UNITA-rebel group, thereby once again establishing a *de facto* alliance with South Africa.<sup>30</sup> Along with similar plans in Nicaragua and

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<sup>26</sup> U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Charles Redman, quoted in Gun Gillian, "The Angolan Economy: A Status Report," *CSIS Africa Notes*, 58 (May 1986): 4.

<sup>27</sup> Don Oberdorfer, "Reagan Urges to end Ban on Aid to Angolan rebels," *The Washington Post*, March, 20, 1981.

<sup>28</sup> Raymond W. Copson and Richard P. Cronin, "The 'Reagan Doctrine' and its Prospects," *Survival* 29 (1) (1987): 40 – 55, at 44.

<sup>29</sup> Ronald Reagan, *Department of State Bulletin* (April 1986), 8.

<sup>30</sup> William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras, An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).

Afghanistan, this was part of a global strategy aimed at shaping the resources of the Communist bloc fueling insurgencies against Soviet Union's "client states" in developing countries.<sup>31</sup> As a result, the threats to the ruling MPLA from UNITA, South Africa, and indirectly the U.S. led to large Soviet arms transfers to Angola in the second half of the 1980s, while also prompting Cuba, with Soviet support, to keep up to 50,000 troops in the country.<sup>32</sup>

From 1981 onward, constructive engagement went public and was no longer purely dealt with as a matter of secret bureaucracy. Chester Crocker had four meetings with Brand Fourie, the director general of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before his appointment to Washington. Likewise, Reagan met Pieter Botha within months of his own inauguration. Based on these principles, Crocker proceeded and signaled that the United States had no intention of allowing constructive engagement to degenerate into accommodation or unquestioned blessing.

Overall, the Republic of South Africa received enough credit and attention in American diplomatic discourses. The Reagan administration described it as a country that was strategically essential to the Free World and mused over its friendship during the Korean and Second World Wars. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the outspoken ambassador to the UN from 1981 to 1985, complained that it had become "the victim of double standards," and that the U.S. had no compunction about criticizing apartheid in unequivocal terms. In contrast, Kenneth Adelman, deputy U.S. ambassador to the UN, described South Africa as pursuing the only system in the world of "denying its natural citizens natural rights which is openly and legally based on racism, a fact which bestowed upon apartheid special distinction as the world's most condemned system."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Hodge T. *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 11.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Kenneth Adelman, Official Statement by U.S. Ambassador during the Plenary Debate, 30 November 1981, UN General Assembly, *Southern Africa Record*, 25/26 (December, 1981), 59.

## **SOCIO-POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT**

During the 1980s social movements created new political space and provided fresh perspectives on American foreign as well as domestic issues. Scholars have long recognized the role that social movements play in organizing and mobilizing challenges to American political institutions. David S. Meyer's *The Politics of Protest* (2014) offers both a historical overview and an analytical framework for understanding social movements and political protest in American politics. Opening with a short history of social movements in the United States, he argues that protest movements in America reflect and influence mainstream politics and that in order to understand the political system—and our social and political world—we need to pay attention to grassroots protest.<sup>34</sup> Donald R. Culverston examines the rise of American anti-apartheid activism as a result both of opportunities created by shifting power configurations in Southern Africa and of declining public confidence in U.S. government and corporate responses to political crises in South Africa. He explores how activists capitalized on structural changes in U.S. society to develop new resources for challenging U.S. connections to the apartheid system.<sup>35</sup>

Indeed, anti-apartheid activism began in the United States in 1969 when President Nixon sought to strengthen U.S. interests in Southern Africa by maintaining cooperation rather than confrontation with racist minority governments in the region.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> David S. Meyer, *The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford University Press, 2014); Marco Giugni, *Street Citizens: Protest Politics and Social Movement Activism in the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge University Press, 2019); Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos, *Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Post-War America* (Oxford University Press, 2014); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

<sup>35</sup> Culverston, "A Great Cause."

<sup>36</sup> Anthony Lake, "The 'Tar Baby' Option: American Foreign Policy toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

America's anti-apartheid activities reverberated around the world, leading other people to develop their own demonstration activities, and that was probably as critical to the overthrow of apartheid.<sup>37</sup> American internal political opposition to constructive engagement drove much of the legislative agenda through the 1980s on South and Southern Africa, arguing that only sanctions could dismantle apartheid.<sup>38</sup> The moral pressure exerted by American influential stakeholders, corporations, churches, and civil society organizations has been significant.

Constructive engagement and the Sullivan Principles were the guiding standards for United States conservatives and the business community regarding apartheid South Africa in the late 1970s through the 1980s. The Sullivan Principles aimed at restricting U.S. business activities in South Africa. Enunciated in 1977 by Reverend Leon Sullivan, the first African American appointed to the board of directors at General Motors, the principles called for a set of standards for American-based firms carrying out business in South Africa, including fair employment, fair pay, and non-segregation of employees in work facilities. Sullivan called for the withdrawal of American companies from South Africa.<sup>39</sup> Attacks on U.S. business interests became fashionable. The South African Institute for American Affairs maintained that U.S. firms adhering to the Sullivan Principles were violating the apartheid system and were following a pattern of direct confrontation with the South African government.<sup>40</sup>

Internal debates about what constructive engagement and the Sullivan Principles meant formed people's perceptions about how the United States should interact with South Africa and apartheid. For conservatives, it meant conflating both ideas to ignore the violence that apartheid inflicted on Black Africans and excuse American businesses reaping the rewards of an oppressed labor force. For liberals

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<sup>37</sup> Chris Simkins, "US Anti-Apartheid Movement Helped Bring Change to South Africa," *Voice of America* (VOA), April 24, 2014.

<sup>38</sup> David Malone and Robin W. Roberts. "An Analysis of Public Interest Reporting: The Case of General Motors in South Africa," *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 13 (no. 3 (1994): 71-92.

<sup>39</sup> S. G. Marzullo, "South Africa: Sullivan Calls for a Pull Out," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1987, Section 3, 2.

<sup>40</sup> Claiborne, "U.S. Firms Accused of Violating Apartheid," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1987, at A30.

and moderates, the debates created a more sustained push for divestment.<sup>41</sup> Whatever their limitations, the Sullivan Principles have contributed to genuine changes in laws and labor policies in South Africa, such as laws enabling the formation of independent Black labor unions.<sup>42</sup>

Community-based arguments against constructive engagement followed America's national and state trends. In September and October 1985, the student senate at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in Dallas (Texas) sent a bill to the SMU Board of Trustees calling for university divestment from South Africa. Under the leadership of law student Arif Virji, proponents of university divestment produced a compromise bill that asked the institution to consider divestment.<sup>43</sup> Opponents of the bill fell back on the arguments that conflated the Sullivan Principles with constructive engagement. Heading the opposition group, Janet Watson believed that the Sullivan Principles and constructive engagement would undermine apartheid in due time, when South Africans were prepared for it. She claimed that divestment would further degrade Black South Africans' standard of living and that the United States had no right to directly impose its values on another country.<sup>44</sup>

Civil society voices also emerged against constructive engagement. Increasing Black American interest in foreign affairs during this period led to the formation of several organizations. In 1953, Black and White civil rights activists chartered the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the oldest anti-apartheid organization in the United States. During its early years ACOA played a major role in the international effort to encourage United Nations intervention in South Africa. In the 1960s, it expanded its range of activities to include education and information provision, demonstrations, lobbying, conferences, publishing, and fundraising for relief projects in South Africa. Likewise, Black employees at the Polaroid Corporation's headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, founded the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement

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<sup>41</sup> North Texas Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Constructive Engagement and the Sullivan Principles," <https://blog.smu.edu/theanti-apartheidmovementinnorthtexas/history/constructive-engagement/> (accessed on August 21, 2020).

<sup>42</sup> Marzullo, "South Africa: Sullivan Calls for a Pull Out."

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

(PRWM) in 1970 in response to Polaroid's production and processing of film for South Africa's passbook system. Another social group, the National African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC), grew out of the uneasy coalition between Black elected officials in the Congressional Black Caucus and community-based Black activist groups. ALSC coordinated African Liberation Day marches in Washington, D.C., in 1972 and in thirty cities around the nation in 1973.

Several other Black organizations focused on American foreign policy on Southern Africa. These included the Congress of African People, the Africa Information Service, the African-American Scholars Council, the African Heritage Studies Association, and the Pan-African Liberation Committee. Alongside the formation of the African-American National Conference on Africa at Howard University on May 25-26, 1972, these community-led initiatives represented a major turning point in mobilizing a Black American constituency for Africa. However, as the coalitions that produced these organizations were short-lived, they failed to create a more substantial Black American grassroots base within the larger anti-apartheid movement.

On April 3, 1984, Richard Knight of the American Committee on Africa reported to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid on the effects of Reagan's new policy: The Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement has already led to a significant relaxation of the arms embargo. Stressing the goal of regional stability, the American government has now adopted a policy which they see as an 'even-handed' approach to all countries in the region. Thus the Reagan administration seeks to blame all sides equally for the violence in the region, ignoring the fact that the violence stems from apartheid. In reality, there is no even-handedness in the US's engagement in southern Africa: a policy which in the last three years has resulted in an increased South African ability to harass and dominate regionally. A study of the easing of the arms embargo reveals that more than \$28.3 million worth of military equipment was authorized for sale to South Africa for fiscal years 1981-1984, as compared to \$25,000 for 1979.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Richard Knight, "American Committee on Africa, Reagan's Administration of 'Constructive Engagement' and the Arms Embargo against South Africa," Statement

Another important dimension of constructive engagement concerned the emergence of Black empowerment programs. Such initiatives paled into insignificance alongside the determination of Black people to forge a new society by their own actions, and on a timescale much shorter than either Pretoria or Washington envisaged. America's development aid to South Africa was an average of \$5 million per annum between 1981 and 1984 and could not have far-reaching consequences in the nation's \$80 billion economy.<sup>46</sup> Black empowerment initiatives also suffered through their association with other components of constructive engagement, a fact well illustrated by contacts with trade unions. The Reagan administration identified labor organizations as the most progressive and effective tool of the Black opposition. As such, labor movements began to challenge the authority of the White minority government, thus becoming an ideal partner of the political game. Moreover, the training of union leaders in collective bargaining and negotiation techniques was an important empowerment technique aimed at easing both post-apartheid grassroots political participation and community leadership transitions.<sup>47</sup>

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 imposed sanctions against South Africa to end the apartheid system.<sup>48</sup> Representative William Gray III, Democratic Party Representative for Pennsylvania's 2<sup>nd</sup> Congressional District, introduced the legislation on May 21, 1986, which became Public Law No 99-440 on October 2, 1986.<sup>49</sup> The law was intended to express strong United States opposition to the apartheid regime of the White-controlled minority government of South Africa.

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before the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, April 3, 1984, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/embargo/rknight840403.htm> (accessed on July 15, 2020).

<sup>46</sup> Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Address Prepared for the World Affairs Council," Cleveland (Ohio), June 15, 1987, reprinted in Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S. and Southern Africa: A Current Appraisal," Department of State Bulletin, 1987, 87 (2125), 49.

<sup>47</sup> Alex Thomson, *Incomplete Engagement U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Republic of South Africa, 1981-1988* (Making of Modern Africa) (Avebury, 1996), 167.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Congress, H.R.4868 - Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. 99<sup>th</sup>

Congress (1985-1986). H.Rept 99-638 Part 1; H. Rept 99-638 Part 2.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.



The CAAA undermined apartheid by prohibiting the imports from South Africa of key selected products, namely any gold coin minted in South Africa or sold by its government; arms, ammunition, or military vehicles or any manufacturing data for such articles; and any article grown, produced, or manufactured by a South African parastatal organization except for certain strategic minerals and articles to be imported pursuant to a contract entered into before August 15, 1986, provided no shipments may be received by a U.S. national under such contract after April 1, 1987. Likewise, the scheme called for the termination of the 1947 air services agreement between South Africa and the United States; the prohibition of any aircraft of a foreign air carrier owned by South Africa or by South African nationals from engaging in air transportation with respect to the United States; and the prohibition of the takeoff and landing in South Africa of any aircraft by an air carrier owned or controlled by a U.S. national corporation.

The CAAA prohibited nuclear energy, unless the Secretary certified to the Speaker of the House and the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that South Africa would maintain certain international nuclear safeguards. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission could not issue a license for the export to South Africa of certain nuclear facilities, material, technology, or components. Likewise, the Secretary of Commerce could not issue a license for the export to South Africa of certain goods or technology that may be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes. In the same vein, the Secretary of Energy could not authorize any person to engage in the production of special nuclear material in South Africa, and any executive branch agency or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) could not approve the retransfer of nuclear goods or technology to South Africa.

The 1986 CAAA passed over Reagan's presidential veto on October 2. Both houses of Congress voted by significant majorities to override President Reagan's veto and thereby enact the provision into a binding law (H.R. 4868). The president had been cautioned that exercise of the veto would cause great harm to America's role in

Africa.<sup>50</sup> The Senate's roll-call vote of 84-14 demonstrated overwhelming bipartisan support for sanctions against South Africa.<sup>51</sup> Reagan believed the punitive sanctions were not the best course of action, since he believed they hurt the very people they were intended to help:

"My hope is that these punitive sanctions do not lead to more violence and more repression. Our administration will, nevertheless, implement the law. It must be recognized, however, that this will not solve the serious problems that plague that country. The United States must also move forward with positive measures to encourage peaceful change and advance the cause of democracy in South Africa. Now is the time for South Africa's Government to act with courage and good sense to avert a crisis. Moderate Black leaders who are committed to democracy and oppose revolutionary violence are ready to work for peaceful change."<sup>52</sup>

With the passage of the CAAA, constructive engagement was effectively dead, and Leon Sullivan was on his way to supporting full divestment from South Africa. Most sanctions against South Africa were dropped as of July 1991 after the country took steps toward meeting the preconditions of a democratic society. In the same vein, the final vestiges of the Act were repealed in late 1993. Though both programs failed to undermine apartheid, they marked important grounds for American debate over the best way to deal with the oppressive South African White-minority regime.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Steven V. Roberts, "Reagan Plans to Reject Pretoria Sanctions Bill," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1986, at Y8, col. 1; Steven V. Roberts, "Senate, 78 to 21, Overrides Reagan's Veto and Imposes Sanctions on South Africa," *The New York Times*, October 3, 1986.

<sup>51</sup> Winston P. Nagan, "An Appraisal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," *Journal of Law and Religion*, 5 (2) (1987): 327-365.

<sup>52</sup> **Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.**

<sup>53</sup> North Texas Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Constructive Engagement."

## **THE LEGACY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POLITICAL ORDER AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGES**

Back in South Africa, a series of important diplomatic talks took place between Pik Botha and Secretary of State Alexander Haig in May 1981. It transpired from such encounters that the Reagan administration was anxious about converting South Africa from an international outcast to a strategic ally in America's struggle for Soviet containment. In a State Department Memorandum on May 14, 1981, Chester Crocker made clear that "although we may continue to differ on apartheid and cannot condone a system of institutionalized racial differentiation, we can cooperate with a society undergoing constructive change."<sup>54</sup> The pacifying mission initiated by Reagan was not an easy one. In the very month of Reagan's inauguration, South Africa's forces conducted their first cross-border raid into Mozambique against the ANC bases. This was the beginning of an aggressive military presence in the sub-region, which reached its peak in 1983.

The United States designed a foreign policy with respect to ending apartheid and bringing about the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa. America adjusted its actions toward South Africa to reflect the progress made by the country in establishing a nonracial democracy, set forth actions to encourage South Africa to release political prisoners, and establish a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws. Likewise, the U.S. intensified mediation efforts toward the independence of Namibia. Upon assuming office, the Reagan administration subordinated its recognition of the MPLA to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.<sup>55</sup> In May 1988, Crocker headed a U.S. mediation team that brought negotiators from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa along with observers from the Soviet Union together in London. Intense diplomatic maneuvering characterized the next seven months so as to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 adopted on

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<sup>54</sup> U.S. State Department, *Scope Paper: U.S.: - South Africa Relations: Memorandum from Chester Crocker to Secretary of State* (Washington D.C: 14 May 1981).

<sup>55</sup> Testimony of Secretary of State Alexander Haig before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, January 1981, cited in Fred Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1986). 303.

September 27, 1978. This framework called for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia and established a UN Nations Transition Assistance Group for a period of up to 12 months to ensure the independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

Immediate political reforms were the starting point for any fruitful collaboration between the U.S. and Southern Africa. The United States abstained from voting on a UN Security Council Resolution 556 on October 23, 1984, condemning South Africa's apartheid policies. Later that month, Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale charged the Reagan administration with disregarding human rights and allying itself to reactionary rather than reformist forces.

Subordinating Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola was actually a new development in the negotiations. This question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops had been raised only once in the two-and-a-half years of negotiations over the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 prior to Reagan's inauguration.<sup>56</sup> At the Reagan-Gorbachev summit on September 29, 1988, it was decided that Cuban troops would be withdrawn from Angola, and Soviet military aid would cease, as soon as South Africa withdrew from Southwest Africa. Further agreements to give effect to these decisions were drawn up for signature at UN headquarters in New York on December 22, 1988.<sup>57</sup> Crocker attended the signing ceremony but UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, who would have assumed control of the country until Namibia's first universal democratic elections had been held, was one of the 259 passengers and crew killed when Pan American World Airways Flight 103 crashed at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, causing 270 casualties.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Alex Thomson's interview with Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1979–1981, Washington D.C., October, 20, 1992, cited in Thomson, *Incomplete Engagement*, 181 (n. 70).

<sup>57</sup> United Nations, *Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa*, UN Doc, No. S/20346 (The United Institute of Peace 1988).

<sup>58</sup> United Kingdom Department of Transport, "Aircraft Accident Report 2/1990 – Report on the Accident to Boeing 747–121, N739PA, at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on

An interesting point is the impact of constructive engagement on Southern Africa's political market of the early 1990s. The Republic of South Africa, for instance, was keen to cut its losses in Angola and find a solution to the Namibian problem. The first concrete step toward external disengagement came in December 1988, when Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed the New York Accords, under which Cuba promised to remove all troops from Angola, in return for South Africa's withdrawal from Southern Angola and UN-supervised elections in Namibia. The withdrawal of Cuban troops began in January 1989 and was completed by May 1991.

Namibia acceded to independence and organized the first-ever democratic and pluralistic elections won by the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO). During that period, the radical changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which brought about the collapse of Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall, all undermined Angola's ruling MPLA strategic relations with its historical allies and encouraged the party to reassess its ideological commitments.

As for Angola, a series of talks took place in Portugal in 1990-1991 and culminated in the signing of the Bicesse Accords in Lisbon on May 31, 1991. This comprehensive instrument provided for a ceasefire, the quartering of UNITA troops, the formation of new unified armed forces, the demobilization of surplus troops, multiparty elections, and the restoration of government administration in the UNITA-controlled south. The Angolan government and UNITA formed the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission and the Joint Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (JVMC) to oversee political reconciliation while the latter monitored military activity. The accords attempted to demobilize the 152,000 active fighters and integrate the remaining government troops and UNITA rebels into a 50,000-strong Angolan Armed Forces.

The Lusaka Protocol, signed in Zambia on October 31, 1994, reaffirmed previous truce initiatives. The protocol provided for a cease-fire between the Angolan government, led by the MPLA, and the rebel group, UNITA.<sup>59</sup> Under this truce, the

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21 December 1988," Air Accident Investigations Branch, Aircraft Accident Report 2/90 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990\\_N739PA.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990_N739PA.pdf).

<sup>59</sup> United Nations, *Peace Accords for Angola*, Annex, UN Doc. S/22609, 1991, 3 *Lusaka Protocol*, Annex, UN Doc. S/1994/1441 (1994).

Angolan government and UNITA would cease military fire and demobilize. Likewise, 5,500 UNITA members, including 180 militants, would join the Angolan National police; 1,200 UNITA members, including 40 militants, would join the rapid reaction police force; and UNITA generals would become officers in the Angolan Armed Forces. Foreign mercenaries would return to their home countries and all parties would stop acquiring foreign arms. The government promised to release all prisoners and give amnesty to all militants involved in the civil war.<sup>60</sup> To oversee its implementation, the agreement created a joint commission, consisting of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, and the United Nations with the governments of Portugal, the United States, and Russia observing.

Political order evolved toward seven core components: transformative constitutional and human rights engineering in a racially divided society, a clear timetable for the repeal of apartheid laws, the release of political prisoners, full political participation for everyone, a lift of the ban on Black political movements, and a launch of inclusive dialogue about constructing a political system that rests on the consent of the governed, where the rights of majorities and minorities and individuals are protected by law.

## **CONCLUDING THOUGHTS**

America's post-Vietnam paralysis left open avenues for the growth of Communism in developing countries.<sup>61</sup> To reverse this trend, U.S. President Ronald Reagan vowed to extend support to anti-communist countries.<sup>62</sup> Vietnam changed the course of U.S. foreign policy and seriously damaged the domestic foreign policy that Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy so painstakingly constructed, thus largely

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<sup>60</sup> Vines Alex, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Donald S. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 137–38.

<sup>61</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Freedom, Security, and Global Peace: Message of the President to the Congress on 14 March 1986," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 17 March 1986, 356 – 364.

<sup>62</sup> George Shultz, "Statement of the Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 June 1983," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, July 1983, 67.

discrediting America's Cold War strategy of global containment.<sup>63</sup> Because of the divisive impact and remarkably long-term legacy of Vietnam, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all believed that the reconstruction of a domestic consensus constituted a fundamental foreign policy challenge.<sup>64</sup>

Constructive engagement was a failure because Cold War concerns overrode the explicit goal of ending apartheid in South Africa. In the end, the Reagan administration tried to support South Africa without appearing to endorse apartheid. Davies reveals the failure of constructive engagement by pointing out how remarkable it was that Pretoria's admission that it was "not prepared to play the reciprocal role demanded by constructive engagement"—i.e., the reform of apartheid and the release of Namibia in exchange for "respectability" as a U.S. ally in the Cold War—had "no apparent impact" on Crocker's policy.<sup>65</sup> In Southern Africa, the hard-headed calculus of American interests was to dominate foreign policy.

By radically departing from earlier trends of America's vision of world affairs, Reagan's doctrine of reinvigorated global containment ushered in a new agenda for American foreign policy and rested on a particular set of intellectual constructs derived from a general system of foreign policy ideas. American foreign policy and domestic politics played a major role to the diplomacy that produced the December 1988 New York treaties between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa; Namibia's independence in March 1990; the withdrawal of foreign Communist troops from Angola; the liberation of political prisoners; multiracial democracy; and the official demise of apartheid policies in South Africa. By the early 1990s, these policies appeared to have achieved sweeping results in forcing Communism to retreat in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia, and Ethiopia.

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<sup>63</sup> Richard A. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Nixon*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Routledge, 1999). George C. Herring, *America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: McGraw – Hill Inc., 1986).

<sup>64</sup> Melanson, *American Foreign Policy*, xi.

<sup>65</sup> Davies, *Constructive Engagement*.

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- Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).<sup>↑</sup>
37. Chris Simkins, "US Anti-Apartheid Movement Helped Bring Change to South Africa," *Voice of America* (VOA), April 24, 2014.<sup>↑</sup>
  38. David Malone and Robin W. Roberts. "An Analysis of Public Interest Reporting: The Case of General Motors in South Africa," *Business & Professional Ethics Journal* 13 (no. 3 (1994): 71-92.<sup>↑</sup>
  39. S. G. Marzullo, "South Africa: Sullivan Calls for a Pull Out," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1987, Section 3, 2.<sup>↑</sup>
  40. Claiborne, "U.S. Firms Accused of Violating Apartheid," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1987, at A30.<sup>↑</sup>
  41. North Texas [Anti-Apartheid Movement](#), "Constructive Engagement and the Sullivan Principles," <https://blog.smu.edu/theanti-apartheidmovementinnorthtexas/history/constructive-engagement/> (accessed on August 21, 2020).<sup>↑</sup>
  42. Marzullo, "South Africa: Sullivan Calls for a Pull Out."<sup>↑</sup>
  43. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
  44. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
  45. Richard Knight, "American Committee on Africa, Reagan's Administration of 'Constructive Engagement' and the Arms Embargo against South Africa," Statement before the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, April 3, 1984, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/embargo/rknight840403.htm> (accessed on July 15, 2020).<sup>↑</sup>
  46. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Address Prepared for the World Affairs Council," Cleveland (Ohio), June 15, 1987, reprinted in Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S. and Southern Africa: A Current Appraisal," Department of State Bulletin, 1987, 87 (2125), 49.<sup>↑</sup>
  47. Alex Thomson, *Incomplete Engagement U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Republic of South Africa, 1981-1988* (Making of Modern Africa) (Avebury, 1996), 167.<sup>↑</sup>
  48. U.S. Congress, H.R.4868 - Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. 99<sup>th</sup> Congress (1985-1986). H.Rept 99-638 Part 1; H. Rept 99-638 Part 2.<sup>↑</sup>
  49. Ibid.<sup>↑</sup>
  50. S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver F. Williams, "The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," in *Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business The South African Experience and International Codes Today*, eds. S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver F. Williams (Boston: Springer, 2000), 247 – 78.<sup>↑</sup>
  51. Steven V. Roberts, "Reagan Plans to Reject Pretoria Sanctions Bill," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1986, at Y8, col. 1; Steven V. Roberts, "Senate, 78 to 21, Overrides Reagan's Veto and Imposes Sanctions on South Africa," *The New York Times*, October 3, 1986.<sup>↑</sup>
  52. Winston P. Nagan, "An Appraisal of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," *Journal of Law and Religion*, 5 (2) (1987): 327-365.<sup>↑</sup>
  53. Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.<sup>↑</sup>
  54. [North Texas Anti-Apartheid Movement](#), "Constructive Engagement."<sup>↑</sup>

55. U.S. State Department, *Scope Paper: U.S.: - South Africa Relations: Memorandum from Chester Crocker to Secretary of State* (Washington D.C: 14 May 1981).<sup>↑</sup>
56. Testimony of Secretary of State Alexander Haig before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, January 1981, cited in Fred Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1986). 303. <sup>↑</sup>
57. Alex Thomson's interview with Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1979–1981, Washington D.C., October, 20, 1992, cited in Thomson, *Incomplete Engagement*, 181 (n. 70).<sup>↑</sup>
58. United Nations, *Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa*, UN Doc, No. S/20346 (The United Institute of Peace 1988).<sup>↑</sup>
59. United Kingdom Department of Transport, "[Aircraft Accident Report 2/1990 – Report on the Accident to Boeing 747–121, N739PA, at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990_N739PA.pdf)," Air Accident Investigations Branch, Aircraft Accident Report 2/90 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990\\_N739PA.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f36ee5274a1317000489/2-1990_N739PA.pdf).<sup>↑</sup>
60. United Nations, *Peace Accords for Angola*, Annex, UN Doc. S/22609, 1991, 3 Lusaka Protocol, Annex, UN Doc. S/1994/1441 (1994).<sup>↑</sup>
61. Vines Alex, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Donald S. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 137–38.<sup>↑</sup>
62. Ronald Reagan, "Freedom, Security, and Global Peace: Message of the President to the Congress on 14 March 1986," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 17 March 1986, 356 – 364.<sup>↑</sup>
63. George Shultz, "Statement of the Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 June 1983," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, July 1983, 67.<sup>↑</sup>
64. Richard A. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Nixon*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Routledge, 1999). George C. Herring, *America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: McGraw – Hill Inc., 1986).<sup>↑</sup>
65. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy*, xi. <sup>↑</sup>

## CHAPTER 18

# Deliberative Democracy Without Public Participation in Kenya's Elusive Search for Electoral Justice

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## INTRODUCTION

Politicians boast more experience in the political game. Problematically, however, they are also conflicted in the making of election rules. This chapter attributes politicians' vested interests about democracy to their theories of human nature. Despite Kenya's attainment of political independence, the practice of procedural democracy deploys technical rational rules. Compounded by "state capture," this marginalizes the masses. The Kenyan state has reportedly been privatized, repurposed for private gain. Furthermore, notwithstanding constitutional and electoral law reforms in 2010, and although the opposition successfully petitioned Kenya's 2017 presidential election result, the transformation from command to democratic governance has stalled. Remarkably, civil society's struggle for constitutional implementation produced a progressive legal precedent. In 2017, Maina Kiai's Case (as the Supreme Court decision and its ensuing appeals came to be known) prohibited the electoral commission chair from unilaterally altering primary presidential election results after their declaration at polling stations. That decision was upheld in *Raila Odinga v. IEBC* [2017], which nullified President Uhuru Kenyatta's first-round re-election. State repression against opposition protesters culminated in Raila Odinga's swearing-in as the "people's president." Conversely, deliberative democracy, based on collective action theories, can encourage public participation in the making of electoral rules. By promoting equality over liberty, public

participation amplifies political rights. Currently, self-interested politicians prefer skewed electoral rules. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Kenya's Parliament has not enacted legislation to enable expression of views by the masses who disapprove of both primary and secondary rules, particularly electoral laws. Consequently, a proposed Public Participation Bill of 2016 republished in 2019 excludes the public from the making of election laws and policies. This chapter recommends that to be more transformative, Kenya's Building Bridges Initiative of 2018 should have provided for citizen participation in the making of electoral laws. It did not. By invoking *Kiai's Case* to dismiss Odinga's 2022 presidential election petition, the Supreme Court upheld William Ruto's victory, effectively reflecting the majority's dissatisfaction with exclusion from BBI's exclusionary approach.

One solution to a successful democratic transition lies in remodeling Kenyan democracy on *deliberative* democracy,<sup>1</sup> based on a communitarian concept. Rethinking the feasibility of democracy in low-income, multi-ethnic societies entails abandoning the liberal model, based on *procedural* democracy.<sup>2</sup> The trouble with the latter lies in its embrace of market values, which assume that human nature is self-interested and fearful. *Constitutional* democracy mitigates some discriminatory symptoms of formal liberalism but does not cure its disease. For example, although Kenya's 2010 Constitution is widely acclaimed as "transformative and progressive,"<sup>3</sup> its implementers have unduly sacrificed the value of equality by privileging elitist preferences for economic liberty. So far not even civil society activists, in their quest for democratic transition, recognize the advantages of communitarian values proposed by deliberative democracy over the disadvantages of

<sup>1</sup> Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, *The Law of Deliberative Democracy* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Tom Campbell, "Legal Positivism and Deliberative Democracy," in Tom Campbell and Adrienne Stone (eds.) *Law and Democracy* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003) 317-344.

<sup>3</sup> Ben Sihanya, "Electoral Injustice in Kenya under the 2020 Constitution: Implementation, Enforcement Reversals and Reforms" (2017) *Law Society of Kenya Journal*, Vol. 13(1) 1-30, 1.

liberal democratic models.<sup>4</sup> In 2017, the High Court decision in *Maina Kiai v. the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission*<sup>5</sup> was upheld by the Court of Appeal in *IEBC v. Maina Kiai*.<sup>6</sup> This landmark precedent championed constitutional democracy. Kiai's Case was affirmed in *Odinga v. IEBC*,<sup>7</sup> where the Supreme Court famously nullified President Uhuru Kenyatta's August 2017 first-round re-election. Problematically, however, the Constitution requires the top two candidates to immediately contest a re-run organized by an allegedly partisan or incompetent Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. Worse still, the authorities did not prevent the police and pro-government militia from killing over 100 civilians in Nairobi and western Kenya, while repressing mass protests.<sup>8</sup> Importantly, deliberativists instead insisted on public participation in the making of electoral or referendum laws.

This chapter evaluates the extent to which a 2016 Public Participation Bill,<sup>9</sup> which lapsed and was republished in 2019, may effectively eliminate periodic election-related

<sup>4</sup> Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "Moral Disagreement in a Democracy" (1995) *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 12, 1, 87-110.

<sup>5</sup> *Maina Kiai & 2 others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others* [2017] eKLR

<sup>6</sup> *Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Maina Kiai & 5 Others* [2017] eKLR (*Kiai's case*).

<sup>7</sup> *Raila Amolo Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others* [2017] eKLR. (*Raila 2017*).

<sup>8</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Kenya Events of 2018" in *World Report 2019* <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/kenya> <accessed on 8 June 2020>

<sup>9</sup> Public Participation Bill (2016) Special Issue Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 175 (Senate Bills no. 15) 8 November 2016, Nairobi.

violence. It criticizes that bill's failure to facilitate the exercise of "political rights."<sup>10</sup> Instead, on March 9, 2018, President Kenyatta and official opposition leader Odinga reconciled. Their "golden handshake" pragmatically,<sup>11</sup> albeit clandestinely, established a "Building Bridges to a New Kenyan Nation" (BBI).<sup>12</sup> This chapter argues that to the extent that this latest reform initiative failed to engage the public, it was no more transformative than previous efforts.

Beyond the introduction as the first section, Section 2 of the chapter illustrates some problems of applying market theories in Kenya's socio-cultural and political context. It distinguishes two types of liberal democracy: procedural and constitutional, derived from different Enlightenment human nature theories. However, they are afflicted by "state capture." Constitutional democracy's limitations in sustaining public tranquility remain manifest despite a successful presidential election petition, as section 3 illustrates. Deliberative democracy can arguably provide more credible presidential elections, thus preserving political stability and social tranquility. Section 4 demonstrates that because second-order deliberations are key to operationalizing the right to vote, they deserve progressive state support. Citing relevant domestic, international, and regional legal

[http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2016/PublicParticipationBill\\_2016.pdf](http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2016/PublicParticipationBill_2016.pdf) <accessed on 15 September 2020>; See also Public Participation Bill (2019) Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 170 (National Assembly Bills No. 71) 19 October 2019, Nairobi. [http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2019/PublicParticipation\\_No. 2\\_Bill\\_2019.PDF](http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2019/PublicParticipation_No.2_Bill_2019.PDF) <accessed on 15 December 2021>

<sup>10</sup> Article 38, Chapter IV on the "Bill of Rights," Constitution of Kenya (Nairobi Government Printer, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> Jack Knight and James Johnson, *The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Lillian Kwamboka, "14-member Building Bridges Initiative Task Force Gazetted" *East African Standard* 31 May 2018

<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001282464/14-member-building-bridges-initiative-task-force-gazetted> <accessed on 15 September 2020>

instruments, Kenya's 2016 Public Participation Bill, republished in 2019, is critically analyzed in section 5. The chapter attributes Kenya's cyclical electoral crises to an absence of effective public participation in designing and implementing political rights. Not only did the BBI process exclude the people's input, but this factor also contributed to the failure of its *de facto* co-driver Odinga's 2022 presidential election bid, this time in a peaceful environment. In conclusion, to enhance electoral justice, citizens should be involved in the making of electoral laws through local assemblies.

## **THE LIMITS OF MARKET DEMOCRACY**

### **LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS RATIONALE**

#### **THE ROLE OF SECONDARY RULES**

In a democracy, the law of politics requires political choice. Its regulations revolve around three values: liberty, equality, and integrity. These normative frameworks assume that politics inspires intractable conflicts to the exclusion of "the possibility of agreement."<sup>13</sup> Disagreement is the first principle of governance,<sup>14</sup> just as truth is the first virtue of thought, justice of social institutions<sup>15</sup> and scarcity of sensible property talk.<sup>16</sup> Jeremy Waldron explains that in a utopia consisting of angels and omniscient people, there would be no disagreement over what the truth is. However, disagreements are inherent in real societies where we dwell: first, because there is need for public goods and services which can only be produced by groups of people; and second, because it is not possible for any diverse collection of people to agree on what is the best or ideal

<sup>13</sup> Levy and Orr, *supra* note 1, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Jeremy Waldron, *Law and Disagreement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

<sup>16</sup> Jeremy Waldron, *The Right to Private Property* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).



distribution of rights or about who should own or do what in relation to any subject matter. Disagreements over the distribution of public goods give rise to social conflicts. Kenyans disagree on the distribution of voting rights, which are partly public goods.

Consequently, if citizens wish to minimize violent conflicts concerning adverse claims to truth, and if Kenyan government does not wish to perpetually engage in governance tasks, all participants in the discussion must agree on a “rule of authority.” This is a secondary rule pertaining to elections. It entrusts officials to make and enforce other secondary rules of governance—i.e., modification, adjudication, and enforcement rules which enact and decide when primary rules of obligation have been violated and implement them. Governments perform the tasks of making both secondary and primary rules.<sup>17</sup> Assuming that ordinary people are equally rational and reasonable and further assuming that equality is the sovereign virtue,<sup>18</sup> then to resolve rights-allocation disputes—specifically, to determine access to elective positions—democracies based on participatory majority accept the “one-man-one-vote” principle. Since the 1960s, “modern electoral, referendum, party and parliamentary laws, national (including local) statutory, development, delegated regulation and case law have complicated campaign length and voting systems.” Nowadays, many countries experience “rising juridification (subjecting politics to legal ordering) and judicialization (court review of political controversies).”<sup>19</sup> Deliberation is a better alternative to voting for making election laws. Voting procedures provide democracy with a short-cut, by which equal individuals agree to disagree, and instead accept to abide by the majority’s choice. In such majoritarian systems, even if the majority makes rules with which the minority disagree, the minority is precluded from civil disobedience. Nonetheless, in a democracy “the law enacted by majority rule will sometimes have scope for refusal on the basis of conscience” and because “the existing

<sup>17</sup> H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford University Press, 1992 [1961]).

<sup>18</sup> Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 2000).

<sup>19</sup> Levy and Orr, *supra* note 1, 4-5.

law established by other majorities that meanwhile have become a minority.”<sup>20</sup> At worst, marginalized or underrepresented residents may become conscientious objectors who try to persuade majorities to change their views. Instead of divisive presidential elections, therefore an electorate may agree to share positions peacefully and to implement inclusive and progressive policies.

## **STATE CAPTURE OF PROCEDURAL DEMOCRACY**

Market theories assume that social problems are conflictual. Because elections possess fixed preferences regarding outcomes, they require mechanisms to facilitate *strategic bargaining*. They are processes where constituents exchange votes to purchase representatives, and in turn policies, corresponding to their self-interests. Market theorists emphasize the voting phase which produces a final result as being decisive for producing legitimate rules. Fairness, for them, requires aggregation of demographic numbers to determine which policy has a popular majority.<sup>21</sup>

Market theories deploy economic analyses to understand democracy.<sup>22</sup> Along a procedural-constitutional continuum,<sup>23</sup> they oscillate between two extremes. At the pendulum’s procedural end, for Joseph Schumpeter, democracy is “a competitive struggle for the people’s vote, a competition between elites which then debate, vote, and legislate, ostensibly on behalf of the people.”<sup>24</sup> Generally, market theories make various assumptions about political markets, which are analogous to perfect economic markets.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Bert van Roermund, *Legal Thought and Philosophy: What Legal Scholarship is about* (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton USA: Edward Elgar, 2013), 175.

<sup>21</sup> Waldron, *supra* note 14.

<sup>22</sup> Campbell, *supra* note 2.

<sup>23</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *supra* note 4.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1942).

<sup>25</sup> Campbell, *supra* note 2.

However, these assumptions are untenable, particularly in African contexts. Consider Kenya's *procedural* democracy: it tends to produce a "majority" that often represents an ethnic coalition of big tribes to the exclusion of ethnic "minorities." However, the emergent "tyranny of numbers" sows the seeds of its own destruction. This is because perpetual minorities, those ethnic groups whose interests are continuously ignored, have legitimate reason to reject procedural democracy altogether. Sectional governance precipitates mass protests against declining social welfare. Moreover, factions within majorities which benefit from monopolistic inefficiencies are tempted to perpetuate their incumbency through "state capture."

Procedural democracy is further hobbled by what an Africog Report terms as "state capture." According to that report, "[t]o be able to transition 'capture' across elections, from one regime to another, as Kenya did in 2002 and again in 2013 and 2017, involves repurposing 'politics' so as to limit 'the political agency of citizens.'"<sup>26</sup> That is why "democracy has to be reframed in purely formal and procedural terms. The political class is then able to use the democratic process, especially elections, to frustrate what Michael Johnston calls 'deep democratization.'" By calling it procedural democracy as opposed to deep democratization, he means that "the procedural elements of democracy are used to hollow out its substantive commitments whilst keeping the diplomatic respectability that is conferred by regular elections."<sup>27</sup> This kind of democracy is therefore "drained of substance and communal mores, which are purloined to give social legitimacy to vice, erodes democracy's emancipatory power and robs the public of the moral resources they

<sup>26</sup> Wachira Maina, *State Capture: Inside Kenya's Inability to Fight Corruption* (Nairobi: Africog, 2019).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 8 *ibid.* citing D. Burbidge, *The Shadow of Kenyan Democracy: Widespread Expectations of Widespread Corruption* (Ashgate Publishing 2015) 20, quoting Michael Johnston, "More than Necessary, Less than Sufficient: Democratization and the Control of Corruption" (Winter 2013) *Social Research: Corruption, Accountability, and Transparency*, 80, 4, 1237-1258.

need to confront bad governance.”<sup>28</sup> The extent to which the alterative ethics of deliberative democracy can save the Kenyan state from such procedural democracy bedeviling it is the key. First, it is necessary to consider why the public ethics of liberal democracy is problematic in Africa.

## **THE HOBBSIAN STATE**

Assumptions about human nature under a liberalism of fear are essentially misanthropic, anticipating the worst of human beings. To pioneer European Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Hobbes, for example, “but for” restraint by an absolutely powerful state, self-interested individuals would become embroiled in a perpetual “war of all against all.”<sup>29</sup> It is through voting that citizens choose their representatives and authorize the exercise of state power. However, his fearful “liberal democracy had very little to do with democracy. While Athenians were concerned with people governing themselves for themselves, Hobbes’s only concern is how people might protect themselves from others.”<sup>30</sup> Hobbes’ philosophy further claimed that “sovereignty can be destroyed not only by a foreign power, but also by a sovereign’s own corruption. Such sovereign, it could be a group or even an elected parliament....when ruled by passion or ignorance, may govern in its own interests or prove too incompetent to protect the interests of its subjects.”<sup>31</sup> Therefore, Suri Ratnapala observes that “Hobbes’ confidence that absolute power will deliver safety of life, liberty and property of the individual subjects was seriously misplaced.”

<sup>28</sup> Maina, *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Penguin Books, 1981[1651]).

<sup>30</sup> Claude Ake, *The Feasibility of Democracy* (Dakar: Codesria 1996), 14.

<sup>31</sup> Suri Ratnapala, *Jurisprudence* (Cambridge University Press 2009), 29-30.

## CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS LIMITS

### JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

At the liberal pendulum's other end, constitutional democracy prohibits any government, whether majoritarian, pluralist, or minority, from departing from certain fundamental rights of the individual. Irrespective of one's entitlement to hold public office, it is simply morally wrong to violate certain values.<sup>32</sup> For instance, Kenya's Constitution confers judicial authority upon the judiciary. It expressly mandates the High Court to enforce the Bill of Rights.<sup>33</sup> Among certain non-derogable human rights and fundamental freedoms is the right to a fair trial.<sup>34</sup> Hence, constitutional democrats invoke the court's judicial review powers to strike down overreaching legislation or administrative action which violates the Constitution.

### LOCKE'S SOCIAL CONTRACT

Enlightenment theorists who prioritize property rights begin with John Locke's social contract, which conceives of atomized individuals peacefully co-existing in an idyllic Garden of Eden. To satisfy their need to hold private property, they decide to establish a state. Although people possess fundamental duties to provide mutual aid, the Lockean state is required to superintend over the enforcement of contracts. Tax levies remunerate public officials for performing revenue collection and other administrative duties. Yet, altruism is limited. Hence, collecting tax requires compulsion. It is for efficiency in revenue collection purposes that people's voices must be considered before any coercion may be introduced to stimulate their generosity.

Ultimately, Locke's approach holds that "[t]he strength and appeal which made [Locke's] *second treatise* a classic of liberalism is not its advocacy of human rights of

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Article 165, Constitution, *supra* note 10.

<sup>34</sup> Article 25(c), *ibid.*

government by consent, let alone popular participation in government.” Rather, as Claude Ake notes, it was “its unabashed privileging of property as the one right that counts, the right which called government into being in the first place.”<sup>35</sup> Therefore, Locke advocated limited government, which provides scope for constitutional review of administrative action. Nonetheless, as Ratnapala concludes, “If the sovereign violates the natural rights of the people...[they] retain the right of resistance to the sovereign.”<sup>36</sup>

In sum, Kenya’s unjust wealth distribution between social classes is attributable to unequal primary rules enforced by an all-powerful Hobbesian executive. Presidential power has entrenched ruling elites through widespread electoral injustices perpetrated by enacting administrative violence, bribing voters, corrupting polling officials, or even rigging computer technology. Judicial remedies in a Lockean sense provide limited, piecemeal, or reactive relief. Constitutional democracy’s critics thus contend that although courts are independent of the other branches of government, judges are a part of the ruling elite. Social contracts are market theories of democracy. By vindicating the court’s role as impartial arbiters of the common good and protectors of fundamental rights against majority indifference and market failure, they avoid moral commitments. Yet, in practice, judges are not simply appliers of rules mechanically identified as valid. Beyond Hobbes and Locke, ethical positivism is “a model in which we seek to establish rather than pre-suppose a body of ordinary and mandatory constitutional rules that can be recognized and applied in a value-neutral manner.”<sup>37</sup> Executives neither accurately reflect the wishes of the people, nor are they controlled by the people’s representatives. Lord Hailsham calls for “a more realistic view of democracy in our time” and a reappraisal of

<sup>35</sup> Claude Ake, *The Feasibility of Democracy* (Dakar: Codesria 1996), 16.

<sup>36</sup> Ratnapala, *supra* note 32, 150.

<sup>37</sup> Tom D. Campbell, *The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism* (Brookfield, USA: Aldershot, 1996).

the constitutional standards of freedom.<sup>38</sup> For him, democracy is “elective dictatorship,” and courts are protectors of marginalized citizens from unrepresentative executive power.

## ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR ELECTORAL JUSTICE

### KIAI’S CASE

Kiai’s Case<sup>39</sup> was a remarkable instance of private citizens invoking judicial review to reinterpret electoral rules. In an appeal to the Court of Appeal, the IEBC argued for a centralized and thus individualistic approach to the interpretation of its chair’s role during the vote-tallying process of presidential elections. Accordingly, Ben Sihanya recounts how “the role of the IEBC chairperson in the 2017 General elections changed from high-level executive decision making under the previous IEBC regulations, to administrative and ceremonial.”<sup>40</sup> Sihanya elaborates:

[Under] Article 138(2) read together with Article 86(c) of the Constitution, the word ‘returning officer’ is construed to mean an officer of the IEBC who is in charge of elections at the constituency level...therefore it was unconstitutional for the IEBC through the Elections (General) Regulations to appoint the IEBC chairman as the returning officer of a presidential election.<sup>41</sup>

Purporting to conceive of the chair as the returning officer of the presidential election, pursuant to Article 138(3)(c) of the Constitution as being the “head” of the IEBC, would entitle him to unilaterally alter “provisional” results, ignoring “announcements” by the presiding officers at polling stations or returning officers at constituencies. Instead, the judges unanimously rejected IEBC’s claim and upheld the public-spirited citizens’

<sup>38</sup> Hon. Justice Gerard Brennan, “Courts, Democracy and the Law” (1991) *Australian Law Journal*, 65, 32-42, 32.

<sup>39</sup> *IEBC v Kiai*, *supra* note 6.

<sup>40</sup> Sihanya, *supra* note 3, 18.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

arguments that declarations made by IEBC polling officials at all three levels are unalterable, save by an election court.

### **ODINGA'S 2017 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PETITION**

On September 1, 2017, by a 4-2 majority decision, Kenya's Supreme Court nullified the August 8, 2017, presidential election and ordered the IEBC to conduct fresh polls within 60 days.<sup>42</sup> However, that merely delayed Kenyatta's victory. Since Odinga boycotted the October 26 repeat poll, Kenyatta won by a 98% majority, albeit with a paltry 37% voter turn-out. On November 26, he resumed office.

At that time, only three presidential polls had been reversed worldwide. These were in Austria, Maldives, and Ukraine.<sup>43</sup> Notably, Kenya was the first African country to do so. Odinga's petition succeeded because *Kiai's test* constrained IEBC's chairman to merely collate primary results received from all 40,883 polling stations. His verification duty entails aggregating and declaring, rather than altering, results. Curiously, IEBC Chair Wafula Chebukati himself admitted that on August 11, 2017, when he purportedly declared Kenya's August 8 presidential results, he was yet to receive any form 34A's from 11,000 of the polling stations.<sup>44</sup> The Court inferred that it was not possible to declare results in the absence of such primary data. Furthermore, it ordered IEBC to disclose the electronic voting data inside its transmission servers located in France and Spain. That trail could reconcile discrepancies between the real-time results recorded by polling officers both manually and electronically, and subsequent alterations of postings at the national tallying center. However, the IEBC did not disclose this information.

The opposition candidate was aggrieved that results, which were contemporaneously beamed on IEBC's electronic screens at Nairobi, appeared computer-generated and lacked supporting primary documentation from the polling stations. Besides concealing the electronic data trail of forms 34A in its servers, the IEBC purported

<sup>42</sup> *Odinga v IEBC*, *supra* note 7.

<sup>43</sup> Sihanya, *supra* note 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*



to rely on forms 34B from the 290 constituencies. However, Odinga protested that forms 34B were secondary documents allegedly manufactured to portray Kenyatta as having maintained a consistent, spurious 54-44% margin throughout vote-counting. Mysteriously, the missing 11,000 forms 34A resurfaced on August 18, 2017. Clearly, the delay in availing them provided the IEBC with ample opportunity to falsify information. No explanation accounted for their unavailability on August 11 when the opposition requested to see them.

### **RADICAL PROTEST BY THE “PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT”**

Kenyatta’s first-round electoral victory was nullified notwithstanding that the number of votes in dispute were insufficient to alter the final result.<sup>45</sup> From late 2017 to early 2018, Odinga’s National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition metamorphosed into the National Resistance Movement of Kenya (NRMKe), which incited widespread public demonstrations. Nationwide opposition protests expressed dissatisfaction with electoral injustice. However, NRMKe was declared an organized criminal group.<sup>46</sup> Despite state repression and ignoring threatened prosecution for treason, on January 30, 2018, Odinga was sworn in as the “people’s president before a mass public gathering at Uhuru Park in

<sup>45</sup> Silas Apollo, “Githu Muigai: CJ Maraga erred by Annuling Uhuru’s win” *Daily Nation*, 25 August 2020

<https://nation.africa/kenya/news/githu-muigai-cj-maraga-erred-by-annulling-uhuru-s-win-1925844>

<accessed on 12 September 2020>.

<sup>46</sup> Section 22, The Prevention Organised Crimes Act, 2010; See Rhoda Odhiambo “State declares National Resistance Movement Criminal Group” *The Star*, 30 January 2018,

[https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/01/30/state-declares-national-resistance-movement-criminal-group\\_c1706425](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/01/30/state-declares-national-resistance-movement-criminal-group_c1706425) <accessed on 5 July 2020>

Nairobi."<sup>47</sup> Surprisingly two months later, he and Kenyatta reconciled. Observers remain baffled by the rationale underpinning their Memorandum of Understanding.<sup>48</sup> What follows explains how communitarian theory provides alternative rules for resolving serious disagreements over the distribution of electoral positions, namely deliberative democracy.

## **DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY**

### **FIRST-ORDER DELIBERATIONS**

Democracy demands that reasonable individuals should attempt, in good faith, to persuade fellow citizens to change their preferences. The state should therefore establish spaces to not only receive the public's views, but also to facilitate deliberations about important and controversial moral topics.<sup>49</sup> Deliberativists insist that legitimate social rules are capable of selection through debate, discourse, discussion, and consensus. For them, the electoral process is important since it gives candidates an opportunity to campaign and explain why certain policies or rules may be beneficial or disadvantageous. Roy Levy and Grahame Orr distinguish between first-order and second-order deliberations.<sup>50</sup> First-order deliberations comprise debates which regulate physical behavior of citizens *in-between* elections. Second-order deliberations concern rules that regulate both officials' and citizens' behavior *during* elections or referendums. Alasdair

<sup>47</sup> Beatrice Kangai, "Raila sworn in as 'People's President', Kalonzo absent" *Daily Nation* 30 January 2018

<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Raila-Odinga-Sworn-In-as-Peoples-President-/1064-4284622-f9350kz/index.html> <accessed on 5 July 2020>

<sup>48</sup> Joseph Warungu "Letter from Africa: The handshake that left millions of Kenyans confused" *BBC News* 18 April 2018 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43656971> <accessed on 29 September 2020>

<sup>49</sup> Waldron, *supra* note 14.

<sup>50</sup> Levy and Orr, *supra* note 1, 9.

Macintyre's groundbreaking deliberative literature, also known as neo-Aristotelian or virtue ethics, is instructive. This school of thought offers a departure from deontological or teleological human nature concepts, which give rise to Hobbesian and Lockean: "this tradition does not locate ethics within the autonomous individual, but within the community. That is ethics emerges from the relational context within which people act—within the public square."<sup>51</sup> Guy Adams and Danny Balfour posit that "critical and active citizenship is a key aspect of building a viable deliberative democracy." Furthermore, because exclusion, nonparticipation, and exploitation "weaken the community by undermining the civic bonds that unify it," public policies based on such vices "are entirely inimical to deliberative democracy."<sup>52</sup>

Similarly, Africog decries the "pathological view—that there is a decent state trying to do a good job but sundered by institutional infirmities." It rejects "principle-agent" theories which hold that "leaders (the 'agents') are given authority by voters (the 'principals'), with the expectation that they will govern in the best interests of the country" since "the effort of the agent is not always observable."<sup>53</sup> Instead, Africog expresses skepticism about attempts to increase transparency as a solution to "high impunity environments," since the "flood" of such reforms "have only been in public finance management." Yet Kenyan parliamentarians remain reluctant to enact enabling rules to involve citizens in the making of oversight mechanisms that may facilitate their own ouster and provide free and fair elections.

<sup>51</sup> Alasdair C. Macintyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), cited in Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, *Unmasking Administrative Evil* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p 160.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, citing Paul Lawrence Farber, *The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 929.

<sup>53</sup> Maina, *supra* note 27, 10.

## SECOND-ORDER DELIBERATIONS

Consecutively, both of Kenya's 2016 and 2019 Public Participation Bills attempted to establish "regulative authorities" and contain "guidelines" for citizen inclusion in first-order deliberations regarding debates about everyday primary rules. However, while being identical, they conspicuously omitted citizens in the making of second-order deliberations that regulate how power is acquired during elections. Electoral laws regulate, *inter alia*, the drawing of administrative boundaries; registering political parties and voters; declaring seats vacant; regulating campaign conduct; capping expenditure; advertising; establishing polling stations; printing and acquiring of ballot papers; procuring boxes and other paraphernalia (e.g., electronic equipment to facilitate voter identification); recording results and their transmission; recruiting presiding and returning officers and other personnel; organizing vote-counting; and conducting election petitions.<sup>54</sup> Problematically, market theories assume that "public officials can do no wrong."<sup>55</sup> They assume that elected elites represent their constituents' best interests and that because the representatives are people of integrity, they should not only select primary rules to regulate production and consumption but also vacate office upon an adverse vote. But more importantly still, market theories assume that people's representatives should also select secondary rules which balance electoral liberty and equality so as to produce optimum representatives. However, all these assumptions are false. On the contrary, incumbents tend to be interested in their own re-election.<sup>56</sup> Hence, if unchecked, parliamentarians invariably enact biased electoral laws and policies. Because liberal democracy's proponents propagate economic freedom to the detriment

<sup>54</sup> Adams and Balfour, *supra* note 53, 161.

<sup>55</sup> *Odinga v IEBC*, *supra* note 7.

<sup>56</sup>Noel Whelan, "Changing the Rules of the Political Game" in Bláthna Ruane, Jim O'Callaghan, and David Barniville (eds) *Law and Government: A Tribute to Rory Brady* (Ireland: Round Hall, 2014).

of social equality, therefore, emergent widespread impoverishment precipitates mass protests agitating for public participation in election law-making.

## **THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE**

### **LEGAL BASIS FOR THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE**

This section explains the origins, scope, and rationale of the right to participate. It demonstrates that notwithstanding the Kenyan Constitution's formal articulation of this value in its preamble, the relevant authorities have failed, neglected, or refused to realize effective public participation in the making of secondary rules. Although in *Odinga's case* the Supreme Court recognized Odinga's "political rights" to transparent polls, ordering a re-run in 60 days was hardly practical to realize their enjoyment. Rather, the opposition candidate legitimately anticipated that without reforms, IEBC was ill-prepared to superintend over a fresh poll. Meanwhile, soon after he threatened to boycott the re-run, the ruling party's parliamentary majority amended the Elections Act<sup>57</sup> by giving precedence to manual transmission of results, reducing the quorum of the IEBC to the bare minimum of three (substituting the previous five out of seven commissioners), and empowering its vice chairperson to declare the winner in lieu of its chairman.<sup>58</sup> Justice Chacha Mwita invalidated that amendment as undemocratic and unconstitutional.<sup>59</sup> This section lays down the constitutional and international legal basis for a right to participate in making election laws. There is no intrinsic reason why decisions about controversial

<sup>57</sup> The Elections Act No 14 of 2011.

<sup>58</sup> Francis Gachuri, "Court Nullifies changes to Kenya Election Laws" *Citizen Digital*, 7 April 2018

<https://citizentv.co.ke/news/court-nullifies-changes-to-kenya-election-laws-196144/>

<accessed on 3 October 2020>.

<sup>59</sup> Election Laws (Amendment) Act No. 34 of 2017, invalidated by the High Court in *Katiba Institute & 3 others v Attorney General & 2 others* [2018] eKLR.

debates, whether the death penalty, abortion, affirmative action, or even the type of voting system should necessarily be made by judges or politicians alone. Rather, provided that ordinary people possess sufficient information, the conditions may be engendered for deliberation about political controversies. Indeed, such decisions may be more legitimate than choices purportedly made on their behalf, whether by legislatures or courts.<sup>60</sup>

## **POLITICAL RIGHTS UNDER KENYAN LAW**

### **THE CONSTITUTION**

Consistent with internationally-recognized self-determination rights, Article 38 of Kenya's Constitution guarantees "political rights" as follows:

- (1) Every citizen is free to make political choices which includes the right—
  - (a) To form, or participate in forming a political party;
  - (b) To participate in the activities of or recruit members of a political party;
  - or
  - (c) To campaign for a political party cause.
- (2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair, and regular elections based on universal suffrage and the free expression of the will of the electors for—
  - (a) Any executive public body or office established under the Constitution;
  - or
  - (b) Any office of any political party of which the citizen is a member.
- (3) Every adult citizen has the right, without unreasonable restrictions—
  - (a) To be registered as a voter;
  - (b) To vote by secret ballot in any election or referendum; and

<sup>60</sup> Campbell, *supra* note 2.

(c) To be a candidate for public office, or office within a political party of which the citizen is a member and, if elected, to hold office.<sup>61</sup>

The Constitution's opening chapter enshrines national values and principles of governance which bind all state organs, state officers, public officers, and all persons.<sup>62</sup> These values include the rule of law, democracy and participation of the people,<sup>63</sup> equality as well as integrity.

## **THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION BILL**

By a Bill for an Act of Parliament entitled the Public Participation Bill in 2016 and reproduced in 2019, the legislature seeks to "provide a general framework for effective public participation; to give effect to the constitutional principles of democracy and participation of the people under Articles 1(2), 10(2), 35, 69(1)(d), 118, 174(c), and (d), 184(1)(c), 196, 201(a) and 232(1)(d) of the Constitution."

The bill's guiding principles are inclusiveness of the public, communities, and organizations to be affected by a decision.<sup>64</sup> It provides that "the public's right to be consulted and involved in the decision-making process" shall be realized by "provision of effective mechanisms" for the "involvement" of those "affected or interested in a decision. Furthermore, the bill's schedule sets out general participation guidelines which "provide reasonable and meaningful opportunities for public participation." The responsible authority must consider "the nature of legislation or decision to be made, their importance, intensity, and impact on the public."<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Article 3, Chapter IV on the "Bill of Rights," Constitution, *supra* note 10.

<sup>62</sup> Article 10, *ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Section 2(a), Public Participation Bill, *supra* note 9.

[http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2016/PublicParticipationBill\\_2016.pdf](http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2016/PublicParticipationBill_2016.pdf) <accessed on 15 September 2020>.

<sup>64</sup> Schedule to the Bill, *ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

The mischief in Kenya's 2016 (and subsequently 2019) Public Participation Bill's objects and guidelines lies in their conspicuously narrow scope. For example, "the relevant authority may decline to give information to an applicant where (a) the request is unreasonable in the circumstances; or (b) the applicant fails to satisfy any confidentiality requirement imposed by the responsible authority."<sup>66</sup> More glaringly, right from the bill's preamble, its objects and purposes exclude the giving of effect to "political rights."<sup>67</sup> This omission assumes that citizens are too ignorant to contribute to second-order decisions concerning designing the framework or democratic theory that determines selection of their representatives. Rather, under the bill, public participation is restricted to debate regarding first-order deliberations about primary rules affecting everyday life, such as locomotion, taxation, or matrimony.<sup>68</sup> Yet, second-order deliberations concern the making of second-order rules, including electoral or referendum laws that set out structures regulating election dates, campaign expenditure and modalities, balloting apparatuses, polling stations and personnel, as well as election petition rules. This is no coincidence since self-interested incumbents design electoral procedural laws to exclude ordinary people from selecting and/or designing them. It results in recycling representatives or others who share their interests. In consequence, elected representatives who lack integrity tend to produce inefficient or unjust substantive primary rules to the detriment of overall social welfare. Yet, Kenya is a signatory of numerous international legal instruments imposing obligations to enshrine the right to participate.

<sup>66</sup> Guideline 10(4), "circumscribing Article 35 of the Constitution," *ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Article 38, Constitution, *supra* note 10.

<sup>68</sup> Levy and Orr, *supra* note 1.



## POLITICAL RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW

In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (“the Colonial Declaration”),<sup>69</sup> known as the “Magna Carta of decolonization.” It “affirmed that [a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination [and]... by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”<sup>70</sup> Similarly, the right to self-determination is enshrined under the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.<sup>71</sup> The pioneering international instrument facilitating universal suffrage, the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights requires that:

- (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in their country.
- (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal

<sup>69</sup> Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml> <accessed on 15 September 2020>

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* para 2; See also Hennie Strydom and Christopher Gevers, “Statehood and Recognition” in Hennie Strydom (ed.) *International Law* (Oxford University Press 2015) 35-62, 50.

<sup>71</sup> Article 20, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter) adopted in Nairobi, 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986. <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights> <accessed on 15 September 2020>

and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.<sup>72</sup>

Furthermore, its protocol, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, grants citizens not only “the right to vote in elections” but also “the right and the opportunity...to take part in the *conduct of public affairs*, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”<sup>73</sup>

## **THE RIGHT TO VOTE AS A SECOND-GENERATION HUMAN RIGHT**

On the continent’s return to multiparty democracy, John Harbeson claimed that “African circumstances often dictate that pacts that are broadly constructed in terms of participants, scope, and duration *prior* to the holding of initial multiparty elections are more conducive to enduring democratization than are more narrowly constructed pacts or in the absence of any such pact.”<sup>74</sup> Kenyan electoral history reveals frequent resorts to state-sponsored ethnic violence, economic influence, and electronic manipulation by the ruling elite to rig results. Since post-colonial continuity of command governance, the public has historically been excluded from participating in the decision-making of electoral

<sup>72</sup> Article 21, Right to take part in government, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A, at Paris on 10 December 1948.

<sup>73</sup> Article 25, “Right to Political Participation” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> <accessed on 15 September 2020> (emphasis added)

<sup>74</sup> John W. Harbeson, “Rethinking Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa” in Richard Joseph, *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 1999) 39-56, 43.

law. The first problem is that elected officials tend to make second-order rules that entrench incumbent advantages and produce skewed outcomes.

A second problem lies in the technicality-ridden implementation and adjudication of electoral law. That is why, for example, much of Kenya's pre-2017 election debate concerned the replacement of former IEBC chairman Isaack Ahmed Hassan.<sup>75</sup> Despite the bungling of his successor, Chebukati, during the first round of the 2017 presidential election, he retained the chair's office. Fatefully, the 2022 tallying and verification exercise was marred when four commissioners dramatically informed the public of their rejection of the yet to be announced result, terming it "opaque" due to the chair's excluding them.<sup>76</sup> Although such internal antics did not invalidate the result, they tainted public perceptions of the IEBC's performance. Henceforth, the chair's mandate is curtailed, depriving him any "special or extraordinary powers with regards to tallying or verification of results." Instead, such powers are not "to be exercised by him or her alone without regard to the rest of the Commissioners." Rather, his collective responsibility *vis-à-vis* the Commissioners "is as a 'first among equals' without any veto powers."<sup>77</sup> Ethnic loyalties and party or coalition allegiances aside, due to the notion that individuals think that their vote will not make a difference, they may be discouraged from voting in future elections. Deliberative democracy is effective in overcoming such voter apathy that generates free-rider problems.

<sup>75</sup> Intelligence Unit, "Kenya: Opposition Protests Spark Police Crackdown" *The Economist*, 24 May 2016

<http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=464249230&Country=Kenya&topic=Politics>  
<accessed on 15 September 2020.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* para 239, 102.

<sup>77</sup> *Odinga & 16 others v Ruto & 10 others; Law Society of Kenya & 4 others (Amicus Curiae) (Presidential Election Petition E005, E001, E002, E003, E004, E007 & E008 of 2022 (Consolidated))* [2022] KESC 54 (KLR) (Election Petitions) (5 September, 2022) (Judgment) para 233, 100.

A third problem is that individuals whose views are not considered when decisions affecting them are made feel a sense of indignation. According to Waldron, this is because all human beings were created equal, and if lesser consideration is accorded to some people's views while determining how to distribute public goods, they tend to feel humiliated.<sup>78</sup> In one sense, voting is a negative right, because it precludes state interference with individual liberty. It is a first-generation human right. These claims protect core physical integrity. However, it is not possible for an individual to exercise their right to vote in isolation from other people. Notwithstanding the relative insignificance of an individual's vote because of the importance of other public goods which collective voters determine, the state mobilizes resources and personnel to create an enabling environment for its realization. The state's role in facilitating voting resembles that of promoting second-generation human rights, such as rights to food, healthcare, or housing, which are progressively realizable.<sup>79</sup> To this extent, low-income countries may currently lack the capacity to implement international obligations to instantly deliver transparent elections. Hence, liberal democratic elections hardly satisfy Kenya's international obligations to voting or participation rights, creating the need to make African democracies more deliberative.

## **BEYOND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORIES: A CALL FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION**

Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the commons"<sup>80</sup> is what Africog calls "collective action" ethics. Africog contends that "consumers of goods who know that they cannot be excluded from benefit have no incentive in producing the goods—they are free riders."<sup>81</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Waldron, *supra* note 14.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (December 1968) *Science, New Series*, vol. 162, 1243-1248.

<sup>81</sup> Maina, *supra* note 25, 11.

This is because “individuals gain little from abstaining from or resisting corruption if they cannot trust that others will do the same.” Rather, “people abstain from reform advocacy and free-ride on the efforts of the collective, hoping to benefit from a low corruption environment when and if it is ever achieved.” However, “in high impunity environments, many voters prefer the corrupt politician from their in-group to the honest politician from the out-group—an institutionalized form of adverse selection.”<sup>82</sup>

Even disregarding principal-agent (liberal ethics) justifications for the right to participate, participation in elections is contingent upon the state’s provision of enabling mechanisms which facilitate its exercise. Collective action is central to participation. Evidence from Kenyan history and current practice suggests that social trust makes collective action possible. Evidently, in the African context, human nature has traditionally been cooperative. In 2018, the president’s “golden handshake” with his erstwhile political rival and “people’s president” Raila is reminiscent of how the latter’s father, Jaramogi Odinga, during pre-independence negotiations with the British government, selflessly declined the presidency, instead insisting on Jomo Kenyatta’s release from detention as a pre-condition to Kenya’s independence.<sup>83</sup> It is also reminiscent of how KADU’s small tribes crossed the floor of the House in 1964 to join KANU’s big tribes, thereby historically ushering in a parliamentary supermajority.<sup>84</sup> These reconciliatory moments revive hope for national unity. Bert van Roermund realizes that sense of hope:

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.* p 3, citing H. Marquette and C. Peiffer, “Corruption and Collective Action” (2015) *DLP Research Chapter 32* University of Birmingham, 3.

<sup>83</sup> Julius Sigei, “If only Jaramogi became Kenya’s First Premier as the Governor Had wanted...” *Saturday Nation*, 16 November 2013 <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/1064-2076166-wqt4i8/index.html> <accessed on 18 July 2020>

<sup>84</sup> Walter O. Oyugi, “Uneasy Alliance: Party State Relations in Kenya” in Walter O. Oyugi (ed.) *Politics and Administration in East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1994) 153-192, 160.

Democracy comes under many guises and they present multiple features as essential for democracy. Here we focus on majority vote solely. Democracy, according to Hans Kelsen's distinction of 'majority rule' is the political order in which the majority leaves the minority the institutionally warranted chance of becoming a majority. Thus provisionally, the majority...is in this sense dependent on their being a minority and its existence as a set of interests is to be taken into account even if these interests do not codetermine policy.<sup>85</sup>

He concludes that insistence on "full" deliberation sets a very high standard that "has been met only rarely, and then only after multiple iterations."<sup>86</sup> Rather, deliberative democracy "is a process that can, over time, grow citizens, fostering growth both in the capacity for practical judgment and in the art of living together in a context of disagreement—hence a public ethics. As in a liberation of fear, tolerance is elevated to a central virtue in public life." Ultimately, the nature of the communication involved is such that "the participants strive to rise above win-lose exchange; over time, they aspire to becoming a learning community."<sup>87</sup>

## **PRAGMATIC DEMOCRACY AS A PRECURSOR TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY**

The Kenyatta-Odinga "golden handshake" in March 2018 extinguished longstanding tension between two of Kenya's major ethnic protagonists, the Kikuyu and Luo. An escalating feud regarding injustices afflicting the 2017 presidential election and its controversial re-run threatened to divide the country once again. An immediate dividend borne of that pact was political stability and peace. However, no details have so far emerged concerning its secret basis. To the extent that public participation did not

<sup>85</sup> Roermund, *supra* note 21, 114.

<sup>86</sup> Adams and Balfour, *supra* note 53, 160.

<sup>87</sup> Daniel Yankelovich, *The Magic of Dialogue: Transforming Conflict into Cooperation* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), cited in *ibid.* 159.

ratify BBI's draft,<sup>88</sup> its legitimacy became untenable. Clearly, constitutional *arguments* using *reasons*, in *Kiai's Case for Jackson Knight and James Johnson*<sup>89</sup> are no different from market-driven strategic bargaining using *threats* or *promises*. During protracted disagreement over the 2017 presidential rerun, Kenyatta's Jubilee Party-dominated Parliament threatened to unilaterally amend the rules of the game so as to empower the IEBC vice chairperson to declare Kenyatta victorious. Either way, citizens' exclusion from the BBI was attributable to a legislative process based on liberal democratic theories and human nature concepts whose rigid laws perennially trigger protests against perceived presidential electoral injustices. This time, grievances were canvassed peacefully. In March 2022, the Supreme Court struck down the BBI's attempts to change the Constitution through a referendum. First, because "[t]he President initiated the amendment process" but "cannot initiate Constitutional amendments or changes through the popular initiative under Article 257 of the Constitution."<sup>90</sup> The popular initiative route is reserved for common citizens. Second, since "[t]here was no evidence of deliberations or public participation on the change of the Bill to add the Second Schedule."<sup>91</sup> The public participation process must be qualitative, rather than quantitative. What matters is neither the number of submissions that are made by stakeholders, nor the number of

<sup>88</sup> Lillian Kwamboka, *supra* note 12.

<sup>89</sup> Knight and Johnson, *supra* note 11.

<sup>90</sup> *Attorney General & 2 Others v David Ndii & 79 Others*, Petition No. 12 of 2021 (consolidated with Petitions 11 & 13 of 2021 – Building Bridges Initiative – BBI full Supreme Court Judgement.

<https://www.judiciary.go.ke/download/petition-no-12-of-2021-consolidated-with-petitions-11-13-of-2021-building-bridges-initiative-bbi-full-supreme-court-judgement/> <accessed on 9 October 2022> 926-927.

<sup>91</sup> *Attorney General & Others v David Ndii* *supra* note 92, 928; see also Sam Kiplagat, Kenya's Supreme Court declares BBI Unconstitutional, *The East African*, 31 March 2022. <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-s-supreme-court-declares-bbi-unconstitutional-3766868> <accessed on 7 October 2022>

stakeholders that participate in such an exercise. In decision-making, promoters must consider and examine the submissions made by the public.<sup>92</sup> To break the impasse, Knight and Johnson<sup>93</sup> call for *pragmatic democracy*. This provides that social institutions should ensure that deliberative democracy is effective in improving policy outcomes. They recommend that private citizens' assemblies can complement official legislative processes, which otherwise tend to be merely formal but ineffective. Such a pragmatic model is what BBI, upon the President's historic "peace handshake" with the official opposition leader, seemed predicated on. However, it was declared unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding President Kenyatta's backing of opposition leader Odinga, who favoured BBI's proposed constitutional amendments, Deputy President Dr. William Ruto subsequently won the August 9 presidential elections. He garnered 50.49 percent of the votes to Odinga's 48.8 percent. External observers, including the African Union and the European Union, praised the IEBC's performance, saying it represents "a significant achievement in a country where violence has marred previous polls and where public trust in electoral institutions has historically been low."<sup>94</sup> Odinga's compounded failure may partly be attributable to widespread public dissatisfaction with the non-participatory manner in which the government and opposition conspired to exclude ordinary people from the BBI process. On his part, he blamed failure on an anonymous "group of right-

<sup>92</sup> Ibrahim Ouko, "Public Participation: BBI Promoters did not involve Kenyans" *Daily Nation*, 17 May 2021.

<https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/so-what-does-public-participation-entail-3402844>

<accessed on 8 October 2022>

<sup>93</sup> Knight and Johnson, *supra* note 11.

<sup>94</sup> International Crisis Group, "A Triumph for Kenya's Democracy" *Statement*, 8 September 2022.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/triumph-kenyas-democracy>

<accessed on 7 October 2022>



wing politicians and a group international monopoly capital.”<sup>95</sup> He accused a “middleman” of influencing the outcome. However, the judges unanimously rejected allegations of rigging by the IEBC as “forgeries,” “incredible hearsay,” and “hot air” that took the court on a “wild goose chase.”<sup>96</sup> Significantly, the petition rules do not permit sufficient time to explore circumstantial evidence. The Court followed its precedent with the Kiai Case, adopted in *Raila 2017*, to assert that the primary forms 34A derived from actual balloting at polling stations generate the presidential election results. This upheld Ruto’s victory<sup>97</sup> and effectively his pledge, *inter alia*, to replace “state capture” with bottom-up economics.<sup>98</sup> The court reiterated its 2017 recommendation on the need to extend the 14-day constitutional timeline to afford parties sufficient time to ventilate their cases.<sup>99</sup> This calls for a constitutional amendment. As such, it must be preceded by public participation.

<sup>95</sup> Silas Apollo, “I lost because Foreign Powers, Multinationals Meddled in Election, Raila now says” *The Citizen*, 8 October, 2022. <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/east-africa-news/i-lost-because-foreign-powers-multinationals-meddled-in-election-raila-now-says-3977066> <accessed on 7 October, 2022>

<sup>96</sup> *Odinga v Ruto* (Judgment) *supra* note 78 para 155, 71.

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## CONCLUSION

Assumptions that democratically elected representatives are necessarily people of integrity are false. Self-interest explains why Kenya's ruling elite prefer procedural democracy, which enforces formal legal rules. Yet, such rules are hardly scrutinized by ordinary citizens as the election date approaches, when they tend to be enacted. Indeed, the IEBC's personnel are invariably presidential appointees, and their policies thus tend to favor an incumbent.<sup>100</sup> In 2013, Kenya's presidential elections were allegedly rigged by manipulating the voting register, ballot boxes, or final results.<sup>101</sup>

A third way of transformation—namely, the right to participate—vindicates the notion that the enactment of electoral laws should be deliberative. Deliberative democracy is based on the ideal of public participation through dialogue, debate, and discussion about ills facing society. In 2017, because liberal democratic electoral processes are fraught with technical rational legal hurdles and despite successfully petitioning Kenyatta's presidential election victory, Odinga demanded "irreducible minimum" reforms, including amending the electoral law. Amid violent repression of public protests, political instability ensued. Peaceful protests galvanized the executive's acceptance of the need for reforms. It demonstrated the need for marginalized residents to provide reasons or arguments to persuade majorities to accept the democratic possibility of electoral defeat and suppression of "electoral dictatorship." So far, attempts to enact legislation to facilitate a more direct, rather than representative democracy, have not succeeded. Procedurally, two proposed bills recognize the quality of reasonableness as being the standard which should guide public participation practices. Substantively, the bills failed to expressly provide for second-order deliberations in the making of rules which impact on political rights. Because the self-interested political class persists in monopolizing debate on democratic models, either the opposition or civil society is likely to resort to galvanizing the public to protest bureaucratic technicalities and state capture

<sup>100</sup> Knight and Johnson, *supra* note 11.

<sup>101</sup> Sihanya *supra* note 3.

that typically manifest in complaints against illegitimate presidential election processes and outcomes. To illuminate the dynamics of pragmatic democracy that united former political protagonists under Kenya's BBI between 2018 and 2022, democratic deliberations facilitate the making of second-order rules, that is, election law. However, in 2022, the executive-driven and non-participatory BBI process was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Ruto, the candidate opposed to the government's exclusionary pre-electoral constitutional reforms, was vindicated at the presidential election. Crucially, 14 days are insufficient time to test the veracity of petition evidence. This procedural technicality undermines the court's role as protectors of minority rights. Finally, in election law-making, the quality of stakeholders' opinions matters. Latent disparities in debating skills and bargaining powers can distort public opinion in fragile societies. To encourage critical thinking about controversial democratic models, developing countries need support for localized social institutions, such as private citizens' assemblies, by creating safe spaces and providing information for empowerment.

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**CHAPTER 19**

**Perceptions of Secondary School Igbo Language Students  
on the Use of Mobile-Assisted Language Learning  
Application:  
A Case Study of JSS Students in Lagos State**

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**INTRODUCTION**

Since the introduction of smartphones and their use by a significant number of the population, different applications have been developed and utilized to enhance learning and other activities. Many scholars have pointed out language improvement and learner engagement as positive results that the use of mobile applications for language learning have recorded. These scholarly works were carried out in other languages. Therefore, this study focuses on the perceptions of Igbo language students in secondary school on using mobile-assisted language learning applications in acquiring the Igbo language. The data was collected from a descriptive survey through a questionnaire of 22 items distributed by the researcher among the study population, comprising all junior secondary school students in the purposely selected school. The study sample consisted of 150 students randomly selected from four secondary schools in Lagos state. A simple percentage was used to calculate and analyze the collected data. The results obtained from the analyzed data showed that mobile language learning applications will be advantageous to the teaching and learning of language in schools, that students of Igbo language are slightly aware of the available Igbo Language Learning Mobile Applications, and that the introduction of Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application (ILLMA) will be beneficial to the teaching and learning of Igbo language in junior secondary schools (JSS).

These findings underscore the potential of mobile language learning applications and recommend the development and accessibility of more Igbo language applications for students, instilling hope for the future of language acquisition in Nigeria.

Improvement in the teaching of the Igbo language in Nigeria began when the government of Nigeria started showing interest in teaching Nigerian languages through the National Curriculum Conference of 1969. The result of that conference led to the production of the first official document on education, "The National Policy on Education," first published in 1977 and revised in 1981, 1998, 2004, and 2014.<sup>1</sup>This policy made it mandatory for all secondary schools in Nigeria to teach Nigerian languages. Even the 1981 revised edition of the policy made it compulsory for every child to learn their mother tongue by secondary school in addition to one of the three major Nigerian languages (Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba) as a second language (L2). However, as the objectives and curriculum for the subject illustrate and the methods/strategies used in the teaching/learning of the subject determine, to an extent, the policy achieved the stated objectives. There is a need to rethink the choice of teaching and learning methods used in schools because continuing conventional teaching methods does not advance learners' critical thinking skills. To develop the higher-order skills (Competence and Skills) needed by 21st century learners, the learners would engage in meaningful inquiry-based learning that will arouse their interest, motivate them, and sustain the interest. Mobile-Assisted Language Learning (MALL) is the answer to it with its potential to engage students, increase their interest, and sustain their motivation in learning the Igbo language.

MALL serves as this chapter's main illustration because of the rapid increase in the use of smartphones in Nigeria. Statista 2018 gave the increase data: 2014, 11 million users; 2015, 13.2 million users; 2016, 15.5 million users; 2017, 18 million users; 2018, 20.5 million users; and a prediction of 23.3 million in 2019. Also, the 4th edition of a report by Jumia Nigeria revealed that while there are 1.04 billion and 82% mobile

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<sup>1</sup>*National Policy Education*. Lagos: NERDC, 2014)

subscriptions in Africa, Nigeria, with an estimated 193 million population, has 162 million mobile subscriptions, which amounts to 84% of the population.<sup>2</sup>

## STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

According to the nine factors purported by UNESCO on language vitality and endangerment, the Igbo language fits the characteristics of an endangered language. Reasons for this endangerment range from lesser intergenerational transfer, non-availability of materials for its education and literacies, non-enforcement of the language policies made by the Nigerian government, and parents and their children preference of speaking other languages than Igbo. The partial implementation of language policy in some schools is yielding poor results; this poor result has been reported to have been caused by many factors, including teaching and learning methods. Uzuegbunam (2019)<sup>3</sup> showed that Nigerian teens rely extensively on mobile phones and mobile internet for social connectivity; 66% use mobile phones between 1 to 5 hours whenever they get a chance. The lack of interest of students toward learning the Igbo language alongside their addiction-like attachment toward mobile phones provides a reason to investigate the perceptions of Nigerian language students on the use of mobile-assisted language learning applications, particularly with the Igbo language JSS-3 students.

The main objective of this study is to investigate the perceptions of secondary school Nigerian language students toward the use of mobile-assisted language learning applications. This objective contains specific components:

- To determine the students' perception of the importance/advantages of mobile language learning applications to language teaching and learning processes.

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<sup>2</sup> Adeyemi Adepotun, "Jumia Mobile Report Nigeria 2018," *The Guardian*, March 16, 2018, <https://guardian.ng/business-services/nigerias-mobile-phone-penetration-hits-84-per-cent/>.

<sup>3</sup> Chikezie Uzuegbunam, "The Digital Lifeworlds of Young Nigerians-Exploring Rural and Urban Teens' Practices with, and Negotiation of Digital Technology" (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 2019), 197.

- To determine the level of awareness of the JSS 3 students of the available Igbo language learning mobile applications.
- To gather students' views on introducing the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application (ILLMA) as a language learning tool as a tool in teaching and learning the Igbo language in Nigerian secondary schools.

## REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The focus on Mobile Assisted Language Learning (MALL) started with the invention of such things as the clay tablet, the scroll, the book, audio recordings, and audio-visual technologies (Burston 2012).<sup>4</sup> In the language learning trends, MALL followed Computer Assisted Language Learning (CALL), making smartphone devices for not only making and receiving calls, receiving and sending SMS, interacting in social media, and exchanging emails; MALL has been updated to help students in learning both their language and others' languages. Students are now able to learn different languages and access language-related materials through mobile applications like Busuu, Byki, Duolingo, English to Igbo, Igbo 101, Igbo Dictionaries (e.g., Lite Dictionary, Work Offline English and Igbo Dictionary, Offline English Igbo Dictionary), Isabi Igbo, Mango Languages, Memrise, Mindsnacks, Penyopal, Rosetta Stone, Soro, and Voxy,<sup>5</sup> (Heil et al. 2016)<sup>6</sup>.

Mobile phones are significantly helpful in people's everyday lives (including but not limited to students); they make available many capabilities that enable independent

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<sup>4</sup> Jack Burston, "Mobile Language Learning: Getting IT to Work," in Foreign Language Instructional Technology: Theory and Practice, ed. Jack Burston, Fryni Kakoyianni-Doa (Cyprus: University of Nicosia Press, 2012)

<sup>5</sup> Catherine Heil, Jason Wu, Joey Lee, and Toben Schmidst, "A Review of Mobile Language Learning Applications: Trends, Challenges and Opportunities," *The EUROCALL Review* 24, no 2 (2016): 31-50

<sup>6</sup> Soran Salim and Ibrahim Ahmed, "The Use of Handheld and Mobile Devices for Language Learning," in 9th International Visible Conference on Educational Studies & Applied Linguistics, 2018, 3-12.

learning, cooperative learning, constant learning, and learning of other languages (Salim and Ahmed 2018)<sup>7</sup>. The availability of MALL tremendously expanded the opportunities for learning languages worldwide. Traxler (2007),<sup>8</sup> listed about ten characteristics that mobile language learning is known for: bite-sized, context-aware, informal, opportunistic, personal, pervasive, portable, private, situated, and spontaneous. <sup>9</sup>MALL also gave room for expanding learning practices beyond the four walls of the school, ensured by lots of downloadable language learning applications, thereby reducing the excuse of no opportunities to learn languages (Kukulka-Hulme, 2012).<sup>10</sup> Cavus and Ibrahim (2009, in Chen 2016) examined the effects of mobile technology and texting in language learning and confirmed that students enjoyed and learned new words with the help of their mobile phones.

MALL has had a significant influence on language learning. For example, the New Media Consortium's 2013 report determined that eTablets and mobile applications provided precious near-term tools for learning both in and outside the school environment (Lindaman and Nolan 2015)<sup>11</sup> This finding agrees with Czerska-Andrzejewska's<sup>12</sup> emphasis on the borderless nature of MALL in terms of time and place. MALL gives room for spontaneous and in-situation learning, providing also helpful links between the subject and the object of study. Regarding the objective of capturing students' interests, Burston (2013) found that the students' attitudes toward the use of MALL in learning have been

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<sup>7</sup> Özgür Çelik and Fatih Yavus, "An Extensive Review of Literature on Teaching Vocabulary Through Mobile Applications," *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali University Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, 3, no 1 (2018): 56-91.

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<sup>10</sup> Dana Lindaman and Daniel Nolan, "Mobile-Assisted Language Learning: Application Development Projects Within Reach for Language Teachers," *The International Association for Language Learning Technology (IALLT)*, 45, no 1 (2015): 1-22.

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<sup>12</sup> Burston, "Mobile Language Learning: Getting IT to Work"

greatly positive. According to Celik and Yavuz (2018)<sup>13</sup>MALL has made a great and deep impact on language instruction and learning, as evidenced from principles, techniques, strategies, teacher and learner roles, material use, and finally, the evaluation process.<sup>14</sup>

## **METHODOLOGY**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN**

This current study employed descriptive survey design to examine the use of mobile applications in teaching and learning the Igbo language. Descriptive survey design, as explained by Cohen et al. (2017),<sup>15</sup> gather data at a particular time to describe the nature of existing conditions, to identify standards against which existing conditions can be compared, or to determine the relationships that exist between specific events.

### **POPULATION**

The study's population is made up of all JSS students in the purposely selected schools in the Yaba local government of Lagos State. A simple random sampling technique was used to select 150 students from the selected schools.

### **RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS**

The data for the study was collected through a carefully constructed 4 Likert scale questionnaire (student perception questionnaire) prepared to encompass the study's objectives; it consisted of twenty-two (22) items, which the researcher distributed among the sample of the selected population. The respondents indicated their degree of

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<sup>13</sup> Celik and Yavuz, "An Extensive Review of Literature on Teaching Vocabulary Through Mobile Applications".

<sup>14</sup> Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison, *Research Methods in Education* (London: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>15</sup> Salim and Ahmed, "The Use of Handheld and Mobile Devices for Language Learning"



agreement or disagreement on their perceptions of the use of MALL applications in the study of the Igbo language. The aspects covered include the advantages of its use, their awareness level of its existence, and their thoughts on its introduction into school activities. The participants were monitored, which resulted in collecting all the distributed questionnaires. Simple percentage analysis was used to calculate and analyze the collected data.

## RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Below is the data from the questionnaire distributed to and collected from the study sample. The data provided an overview of the answers to the research questions. They include the importance of MALL, the level of JSS 3 students' awareness of the available ILLMA, and a conclusion about how the introduction of ILLMA as a language learning tool will affect the learning of Nigerian languages (Igbo).

### RESEARCH QUESTION 1

Of what importance/advantage is Mobile Language Learning Application to language teaching and learning processes in general? The research question has seven (7) items with the response as follows:

| Of what importance/advantage is mobile language learning application (MLLA) to language teaching and learning processes in general? |  | <b>SA<br/>(%)</b> | <b>A<br/>(%)</b> | <b>D<br/>(%)</b> | <b>SD<br/>(%)</b> |
|---|--|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 1   | The use of mobile language learning applications will make learning of languages easy.   | 94<br>62.7%       | 54<br>36%        | 2<br>1%          | 0<br>0%           |
| 2   | The use of mobile language learning applications makes learning of languages flexible.   | 41<br>27.3%       | 86<br>57.3%      | 18<br>12%        | 5<br>3.3%         |
| 3   | Without the physical presence of teachers I can learn any language if I have access to the language learning mobile application. | 52<br>34.7%       | 46<br>30.7%      | 39<br>26%        | 13<br>8.7%        |

|   |  |             |             |            |           |
|---|--|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
| 4 | Mobile language learning applications will allow me to learn at my own pace.   | 80<br>53.3% | 55<br>36.7% | 11<br>7.3% | 4<br>2.7% |
| 5 | Using mobile language learning applications will make my learning of any language faster.  | 79<br>52.7% | 48<br>32%   | 21<br>14%  | 2<br>1.3% |
| 6 | I can learn any language anywhere, anytime and anyhow with the use of language learning applications.  | 87<br>58%   | 41<br>27.3% | 18<br>12%  | 4<br>2.7% |
| 7 | I can share my learning experiences with my friends and peers due to the additional internet connectivity attached to language learning applications | 90<br>60%   | 52<br>34.7% | 8<br>5.3%  | 0<br>0%   |

From the data gathered, 98.7% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed that using mobile-assisted language learning will make language learning easy. Meanwhile, only 1.3% of respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed. 84% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that using MALL applications makes learning of language flexible, while 15.3% disagreed/strongly disagreed. 65.4% of the correspondents strongly agreed/agreed that any language can be learned without the language teacher's presence once there is MALL applications available. 90% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that MALL applications allow for individualized learning, while 10% disagreed/strongly disagreed. 84.7% of the respondents agreed/agreed that using MALL applications can make language learning faster, while 15.3% disagreed/strongly disagreed with the affirmation. 85.3% of respondents strongly agreed/agreed that MALL applications can help eliminate distance, time, and methods that can hinder language learning, while 14.7% did not agree. 94.3% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that the internet connectivity interface built into MALL applications allows for peer tutoring and exchanges, while 5.7% did not agree.

Table 1 above shows that from the percentage of responses received, more students agreed that using mobile language learning applications greatly benefits

language learning. A few of them feel that there is no benefit to using mobile language learning applications.

## RESEARCH QUESTION 2

To ascertain the level of awareness of the available Igbo language learning mobile applications by the students, the survey has ten (10) items with the response as follows:

| To ascertain the level of awareness of the available Igbo language learning mobile applications by the students. |  | <b>SA<br/>(%)</b> | <b>A<br/>(%)</b> | <b>D<br/>(%)</b> | <b>SD<br/>(%)</b> |
|--|--|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 8  | I am aware that there are Igbo language learning applications available.                                 | 67<br>43.3%       | 31<br>20.7%      | 32<br>21.3%      | 20<br>13.3%       |
| 9  | I use Igbo language learning application whenever I am studying.   | 24<br>16%         | 23<br>15.3%      | 69<br>46%        | 34<br>22.7%       |
| 10   | Igbo language learning applications help me with solving Igbo language related problems.                 | 65<br>43.3%       | 47<br>31.3%      | 26<br>17.3%      | 12<br>8%          |
| 11   | I use the Isabi Igbo language learning application in dealing with my Igbo language related problems.    | 17<br>11.3%       | 21<br>14.3%      | 67<br>44.7%      | 45<br>30%         |
| 12   | I use the Mango Languages application for Igbo language in my personal study time.                       | 14<br>9.3%        | 14<br>9.3%       | 66<br>44%        | 56<br>37.3%       |
| 13   | I use the Soro (Talk Soft) Igbo language application when studying Igbo Language.                        | 26<br>17.3%       | 17<br>11.3%      | 67<br>44.7%      | 40<br>26.7%       |
| 14   | I use the Igbo 101 language learning application with my friends whenever we are studying Igbo language. | 26<br>17.3%       | 25<br>16.7%      | 52<br>34.7%      | 47<br>31.3%       |
| 15   | I use the English to Igbo: Common Words in Igbo language learning both at home and in schools.           | 59<br>39.3%       | 28<br>18.7%      | 34<br>22.7%      | 29<br>19.3%       |

|    |  |             |             |             |             |
|----|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 16 | I use the "Speak in Nigeria" language learning application whenever I want to find meanings of words in Igbo.  | 35<br>23.3% | 19<br>12.7% | 50<br>33.3% | 46<br>30.7% |
| 17 | I use Igbo Dictionaries to find out the meanings of words: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lite Dictionary</li> <li>• Work Offline English and Igbo Dictionary</li> <li>• Offline English Igbo Dictionary.</li> </ul> | 50<br>33.3% | 23<br>15.3% | 46<br>30.7% | 31<br>20.7% |

Table 2 above highlighted the respondents' views on the survey questions. 64% of them indicated that they are aware of the available ILLMA in the market. While 34.6% said they were unaware of the available ILLMA in the market. 31.3% of the respondents stated that they use ILLMA in their Igbo language learning process, while 68.7% of them, although aware (by some of them) of ILLMA, do not use them. 71.6% of the correspondents use ILLMA to solve Igbo language learning-related problems, while 25.3% do not use it. 25.6% of the correspondents use the Isabi Igbo application in their Igbo language learning process, while 70.3% do not use the language application. 18.6% of the correspondents use the Mango Languages application in their Igbo language learning process, while 81.3% do not use the language application. 28.6% of the correspondents use the Soro (talk Soft) application in their Igbo language learning process, while 71.4% do not use the language application. 34% of the correspondents use Igbo 101 Language Learning application when studying the Igbo language with friends, while 66% do not use the language application with friends. 58% of the correspondents use English to Igbo Common Words in their Igbo language learning process at home and in school, while 42% do not use the language application. 36% of the correspondents use the Speak in Nigeria Igbo language application in searching for difficult words in Igbo, while 64% do not use the language application. 48.6% of the correspondents use Igbo Dictionaries, an Igbo language application, in searching for the meaning of words, while 51.4% do not use the language application.

In all, Table 2 above shows that few of the students have used the few mentioned Igbo language mobile applications available in the market, while most of them are not even aware of the available ILLMA, let alone use them in their Igbo language learning activities.

### RESEARCH QUESTION 3

To ascertain if the introduction of Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application (ILLMA) as a language learning tool will benefit the teaching and learning of Nigerian languages in secondary schools. The survey has five (5) items with the responses as follows:

| To ascertain if the introduction of the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application (ILLMA) as a language learning tool will be beneficial to the teaching and learning of Nigerian languages in Secondary Schools. |  | <b>SA<br/>(%)</b> | <b>A<br/>(%)</b> | <b>D<br/>(%)</b> | <b>SD<br/>(%)</b> |
|---|--|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 18  | Using the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application will make learning of Igbo interesting and easy for me.  | 94<br>62.7%       | 39<br>26%        | 14<br>9.3%       | 3<br>2%           |
| 19  | Availability and use of the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application will improve my understanding of Igbo language.  | 82<br>54.7%       | 59<br>39.3%      | 8<br>5.3%        | 1<br>0.7%         |
| 20  | Availability of the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application will help me to improve on the four language skills needed for effective communication in Igbo language. | 64<br>42.7%       | 68<br>45.3%      | 12<br>8%         | 6<br>4%           |
| 21  | The availability of the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application will arouse my interest and stimulate my effective participation in the learning of Igbo language.   | 76<br>50.7%       | 49<br>32.7%      | 24<br>16%        | 1<br>0.7%         |

|    |  |             |           |            |         |
|----|--|-------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| 22 | The use of the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application has the potential to meet the individual students' learning styles. | 71<br>47.3% | 57<br>38% | 13<br>8.7% | 9<br>6% |
|----|--|-------------|-----------|------------|---------|

88.7 of the correspondents strongly agreed/agreed that the use of ILLMA will make learning the Igbo language interesting and easy for them, while 11.3% of the respondents do not agree with such. 94% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that the availability and accessibility to ILLMA will improve their understanding of the Igbo language, while 6% disagreed with the assertions. 88% of the respondents believe that the availability of ILLMA will improve the four language skills that help in effective communication, while 12% disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. 83.4% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that ILLMA use can arouse interest and active participation in the Igbo language learning process, while 16.7% disagreed with the assertion. 85.3% of the respondents strongly agreed/agreed that ILLMA use can bridge the language learning gap created by individual learning styles, while 14.7% disagreed with the assertion.

Table 3 above shows from the major responses that the introduction of ILLMA and its use will improve the learning of the Igbo language and increase the interest of learners using ILLMA, while fewer responses showed that it would not do so.

## **DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

Research question 1 above shows that a more significant number of students agreed that using mobile language learning applications will greatly benefit language learning. This finding aligns with Salim and Ahmed (2018),<sup>16</sup> which emphasized that language learning becomes more flexible, more mobile, and more exciting with the use of multifunctional mobile applications once integrated into educational settings and

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<sup>16</sup> Ecem Ekinici and Mithat Ekinici, "Perceptions of EFL Learners about using Mobile Applications for English language Learning: A Case Study," *International Journal of Language Academy*, 5, no 5 (2017) 175-193.

language learning contexts. Also parallel to this finding is the study of Ekinci and Ekinci (2017),<sup>17</sup> which states that the language learning applications helped the participants in their study to learn and revise the learning content of the language application. They further explained that mobile apps help students feel motivated during language learning, and also, mobile apps make learning more efficient, especially vocabulary.

Responses to research question 2 showed that few students use the mentioned Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application that is available in the market. At the same time, the majority of them are not even aware of the ILLMA availability not to mention using them in their Igbo language learning activities. This result points to the fact that while ILLMA is available in the market, students are not aware of the application. There is a need to broadcast the available ILLMA and encourage learners of the Igbo language to make use of them to aid in their language acquisition.

Responses to research question 3 showed from most of the correspondents that the introduction of ILLMA and its use would improve the learning of the Igbo language and also increase the interest of learners using ILLMA. This sense of the application's potential is reflected in a class project, which found students more willing and confident to get involved in activities involving the use of mobile phone applications than those using computers, as reported by Kim et al. (2013).<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, Zhu (2018) showed that students are always satisfied and happy with using mobile apps for language learning. Al-Shehri (2011) and Zou and Li (2015) also support this assertion, stating that students positively perceive mobile learning and the use of mobile phones as educational tools.

## **CONCLUSION**

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<sup>17</sup> Daesang Kim, Daniel Rueckert, Dong-Joong Kim, and Daeryong Seo, "Students' Perceptions and Experiences of Mobile Learning," *Language Learning & Technology*, 17, no 3, (2013): 52-73.

<sup>18</sup> Jiawen Zhu, "Students' Perceptions on the Use of Mobile Applications in English Language Learning," in *Proceedings of the E-Learn 2018 - Las Vegas, NV, United States*, October 15-18, 2018.

Mobile Language Learning Applications have positively impacted the field of language learning. Coming specifically to the field of Igbo language learning among Nigerian Junior Secondary School Igbo language learners, the low level of awareness of the available Igbo Language Learning Mobile Applications (ILLMA) can be said to be the cause of the lack of interest in the learning and using of Igbo language. This can be seen in the respondents' answers to research question two, where the majority of them, through their responses, said they were not aware of the available ILLMA. The paper further examined the respondents' views on introducing ILLMA in their language activities, which, through their responses, showed that they would embrace such and gain more from it. Mobile Language Learning Applications have come to stay with many advantages, including motivation in learning languages, flexibility in the mode of learning, interest in learning the language, and sustenance of the interest. Creating awareness of the available MLLA and ensuring its use will go a long way in improving language acquisition in Nigeria, including Igbo languages.

## **RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

- What are the students' perceptions of the importance/advantages of mobile language learning applications to language teaching and learning processes in general?
- What level of awareness do the JSS 3 students possess of the available Igbo Language Learning Mobile Applications (ILLMA)? Why do you think their awareness resulted in the provided statistics?
- To what extent, in the students' view, will introducing the Igbo Language Learning Mobile Application (ILLMA) be beneficial to teaching and learning Nigerian languages in secondary schools?

## **END NOTES**

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## CHAPTER 20

# Greasing the Wheels of Human Progress: Emerging Technologies and Africa's Societal Transformation<sup>1</sup>

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## INTRODUCTION

Technologies have evolved steadily throughout human history, certainly greasing the wheels of human progress, and are fundamental to Africa's future societal transformation. Emerging technologies could transform every aspect of human life: education, healthcare, agriculture, industry and manufacturing, governance, and security. Interest in emerging technologies, especially among experts, policymakers, and analysts, has grown over the last 30 years. The term "emerging technologies" represents an unbroken continuity of what technology represents for humanity. Although there is no "consensus on what classifies a technology as 'emergent,'" Rotolo, Hicks, and Martin have identified five key attributes of emerging technologies as radical novelty, relatively fast

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<sup>1</sup> This article is a revised keynote address delivered by Ogechi E. Anyanwu at the 2024 Hybrid Conference of Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Faculty of Education in Collaboration with Fontis Aid Foundation, Anambra, Nigeria, at ASUU Secretariat, May 2, 2024.

growth, coherence, prominent impact, and uncertainty and ambiguity.<sup>2</sup> They conceive of emerging technologies as radically novel and relatively fast-growing technologies characterized by a certain degree of coherence that persists over time with the potential to impact the socio-economic domain and be observable through actors, institutions, and patterns of interactions. They believe these technologies' future impact is still uncertain and ambiguous.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter focuses on five major categories of emerging technologies: educational technology, biotechnology, information technology, nanotechnology, robotics, and artificial intelligence. It examines how African countries engage these technologies to facilitate development, why they have yet to maximize the benefits of these technologies, and what they could do to utilize them to reach their full socio-economic potential. The transformative power of these technologies is unimaginable and holds great promise for Africa, a continent with the world's youngest and fastest-growing population. According to the International Labour Organization, "out of 600 million young people entering the labor market by 2030, one in three will be a young African."<sup>4</sup> The continent's fast-growing youth population could drive global growth as China's young workers once powered the global economy.

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<sup>2</sup> Daniele Rotolo, Diana Hicks, and Ben Martin, "What is an emerging technology?" (University of Sussex, 2023), Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://hdl.handle.net/10779/uos.23420075.v1>

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> International Labour Organization, "The Future of Work for Africa's Youth," *Press release*, November 1, 2016, Retrieved March 2, 2024, from [https://www.ilo.org/africa/media-centre/pr/WCMS\\_534052/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/africa/media-centre/pr/WCMS_534052/lang--en/index.htm)

As this chapter argues, the attentiveness of governments, educational institutions, and the private sector in Africa to the transformative power and risks of emerging technologies along with their openness to deliver and manage them is the undeniable way to guarantee Africa's accelerated and sustainable development in the 21st century. African countries can put their faith in older technological and developmental models or allow their views and attitudes toward development to be modified by an open-ended conversation surrounding emerging technologies. Africa's collective openness to these new technologies is fundamental to any meaningful progress in agriculture, education, governance, healthcare, industry and manufacturing, and security. The continent could prepare a future-ready generation by fully utilizing all the educational technologies available and teaching students, as part of required general studies classes in higher institutions, the knowledge of using information technology, biotechnology nanotechnology, robotics, and AI to address natural and human obstacles that impede accelerated development in Africa.

## **FROM OLD TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES**

The history of human progress has been tied directly to technology. Humans have always used technology to tackle the challenges the natural environment poses to their survival and flourishing. According to Walter Rodney, the human capacity to deal with the environment "is dependent on the extent to which they understand the laws of nature (science), on the extent to which they put that understanding into practice by devising

tools (technology), and on the manner in which work is organized."<sup>5</sup> Although understanding science and labor organizing is essential, the role of technology is decisive as it is an indispensable grease in the wheels of human progress.

The earliest humans constructed hammers, knives, and scrapers from bones, tusks, stone, and wood about 2.3 million years ago during the Old Stone Age. These tools boosted hunting, food preparation, and survival.<sup>6</sup> The discovery of fire about 1.3 million years ago by *Homo erectus* allowed humans to cook food, offered visibility at night, and provided a source of warmth and protection from predators.<sup>7</sup> During the Neolithic Period about 12,000 years ago, humans discovered farming and domesticated animals, changing from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to one of settled existence. They built mud and clay houses to improve their lives, making fabrics from animal fur and skin to create cloth.<sup>8</sup> The Copper Age, about 5,000 BCE, and the Bronze Age, about 3300 BCE to 1200 BCE, saw humans extracting copper and bronze to make tools and create more accurate, smooth-shaped mechanical tools.

About 1200 BC-500 BCE, the revolutionary discovery of iron during the Iron Age allowed humans to make more capable, simple, potent, and economical tools and weapons, replacing earlier materials like bronze and stone. This age saw improvement in

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<sup>5</sup> Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London and Tanzanian Publishing House, Dar-Es-Salaam, 1973), 4.

<sup>6</sup> David Christian, *Big History: Between Nothing and Everything* (New York: McGraw Hill Education, 2014).

<sup>7</sup> Steven R. James, "Hominid Use of Fire in the Lower and Middle Pleistocene: A Review of the Evidence," *Current Anthropology*, 30, no. 1 (Feb. 1989): 1–26.

<sup>8</sup> Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi, Alberto Piazza, *The History and Geography of Human Genes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

agricultural techniques, trade networks, and forms of warfare. The Iron Age also saw the rise of more complex, diverse societies, including the emergence of early civilizations worldwide. For instance, the mastery of iron technology allowed the Bantu-speaking people of West Africa to conquer or control the cultures they encountered during their long migration. In the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations about 800-2000 BCE, the annual floods from the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates rivers rejuvenated the soil with rich alluvium deposits, prompting discoveries of wheels that powered construction, water transportation, and irrigation. About 25 BCE–390 CE, humans witnessed advances in engineering and scientific knowledge, leading to inventions such as concrete, dams, glassblowing, reservoirs, and other advanced building technology during the Roman Empire.<sup>9</sup> The period between the 5th and 15th centuries, otherwise known as the Dark Ages, saw some significant technological discoveries such as blast furnaces, buttons for clothing, eyeglasses, firearms, gunpowder, the heavy plow, hourglasses, magnetic compasses, mechanical clocks, modern glassmaking, movable type printing presses, the numbering system, paper money, quarantine, sawmills, spinning wheels, and tidal mills, among other inventions of tools and methods. These innovations contributed to shaping our contemporary world.<sup>10</sup>

Technology has witnessed tremendous modernization since the 16th century. Some of the discoveries in the 16th century, such as the blast furnace, firearms, horizontal

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<sup>9</sup> Robert Angus Buchanan, "History of Technology," *Britannica*, March 4, 2024, Retrieved March 21, 2024, from <https://www.britannica.com/technology/history-of-technology>

<sup>10</sup> Mary Bellis, "Invention Highlights During the Middle Ages," April 21, 2019, Retrieved March 21, 2024, from <https://www.thoughtco.com/middle-ages-timeline-1992478>

water wheel, nautical compass, pocket watch, printing press, and other tools, shaped various aspects of society and contributed to the Scientific Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, and the democratization of knowledge. In the 17th century, technological discoveries such as blood transfusion, calculating machines, devices for measurement (e.g., micrometers, barometers, pendulum clocks), more types of scopes (e.g., reflecting telescopes, microscopes that could see bacteria), and steam pumps powered societies forward. Significant technological discoveries in the 18th century, such as the flush toilet, the lightning rod, lithography, the navigational clock, a vaccination for smallpox, and other advancements, transformed health and transportation. Some of the major technological discoveries in the 19th century—such as the automobile, the Bessemer process, the electric battery, electric motor, steam locomotive, telegraph, telephone, and X-rays—impacted society, transforming various aspects of everyday life, industry, transportation, communication, and entertainment, and influenced social, cultural, and economic development.

In the 20th century, inventions such as airplanes, antibiotics (including penicillin), DNA structure, the internet, the mobile phone, nuclear energy, personal computing, space exploration, the television have significantly <sup>11</sup> the world, transforming the way humans communicate, travel, understand the universe, and improve our daily lives. [OBJ] While the invention of airplanes has enabled humans to reach places faster than before, the computer and the internet have allowed humans to perform numerous complex and

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<sup>11</sup> Mary Bellis, "16th Century Timeline 1500–1599, July 3, 2019," Retrieved March 22, 2024, from <https://www.thoughtco.com/16th-century-timeline-1992483>



critical operations within seconds, turning the world into a global village. In sum, the modern world would have been unthinkable without technological development throughout history.

Africa played a significant role in the technological development of humans in architecture, astronomy, engineering, mathematics, medicine, metallurgy, and toolmaking, among other fields. Ancient Egyptians developed high-school-level math concepts 35,000 years ago, including division and multiplication of fractions and geometric formulas. Egyptians also built "the bafflingly raised obelisks and the more than 80 pyramids."<sup>12</sup> Ancient African cultures charted the sun's movement, constellations, and the moon's cycles. Advancements in metallurgy include art; carbon steel and bronze weapons; copper and iron tools and weapons; glue; metal chisels and saws; nails; and steam engines.<sup>13</sup> Many medical treatments used today were employed by several ancient peoples throughout Africa, including using "Kaopectate, and extracts that were confirmed in the 20th century to kill" gram-positive bacteria.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For more information, see Ivan Van Sertima, *Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991); Sydella Blatch, "Great achievements in science and technology in ancient Africa," *ASBMB Today*, February 1, 2013, Retrieved April 19, 2024, from <https://www.asbmb.org/asbmb-today/science/020113/great-achievements-in-stem-in-ancient-africa>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid  
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<sup>15</sup> R. C. Richey, K. H. Silber, and D. P. Ely, "Reflections on the 2008 AECT Definitions of the Field," *TechTrends*, 52(1) (2008): 24-25.

The new technologies of the 21st century promise to facilitate economic, political, and social developments in Africa. Africa's academic institutions must prepare the future-ready generation by utilizing available educational and information technologies and ensuring that graduates possess the knowledge, skills, or interest in how biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, and AI could address natural and human obstacles undermining accelerated development in Africa.

## **A FUTURE-READY GENERATION VIA EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY**

Educational technology is fundamental to preparing a future-ready generation in Africa. Educational technology combines computer hardware, software, and academic "theory and practice to improve teaching and learning."<sup>16</sup> The Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT) defined educational technology as "the study and ethical practice of facilitating learning and improving performance by creating, using, and managing appropriate technological processes and resources."<sup>17</sup> Worldwide investment in educational technologies has surged in the past twenty years, promising to boost African development in all sectors.

The gap between education in Africa and advanced countries is vast. Therefore, the accessibility, equity, and quality of education on the continent have ramifications for the continent and the world. Since the number of young people in Africa will grow,

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<sup>16</sup> Winthrop, R., & McGivney, E.. Why wait 100 years? Bridging the gap in global education. The Brookings Institution. June 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Peter Phillips, "Why the world should look to Africa for education innovation," January 25, 2024, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.africaspeaks4africa.net/why-the-world-should-look-to-africa-for-education-innovation/>

educational institutions should offer them skills for the future. According to the Brookings Institution, "it will take the average student in sub-Saharan Africa almost 100 years to catch up to the average student in high-income countries in terms of how many years of school she will attend and how much she will learn."<sup>18</sup> The World Economic Forum suggested that the world should look to "Africa for education innovation" because "Africa could provide the majority of the world's new workers within the next 30 years."<sup>19</sup> Ruchir Sharma echoed this sentiment in *The Financial Times*, arguing, "The biggest problem for global growth is Africa, now home to 1.5bn people."<sup>20</sup>

An increasing number of African countries are leveraging innovation in educational technology to address the most pressing challenges facing education, such as access, quality of instruction, lack of resources, and teacher shortages, and other African countries can learn from those initiatives. Ethiopia and Liberia have implemented the Luminos Fund's Second Chance program, which is an accelerated learning program for out-of-school children. Malawi implemented technology-enabled, child-directed personalized learning using solar-powered tablets.<sup>21</sup> The War Child Holland's Can't Wait

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<sup>18</sup> Ruchir Sharma, "The world economy's biggest problem is Africa," *Financial Times*, December 18, 2023, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.ft.com/content/178bdc1c-256b-475b-b7c1-a9f68df9f933>

<sup>19</sup> Rebecca Winthrop, "Improving Access to quality public education in Africa," February 11, 2022, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/improving-access-to-quality-public-education-in-africa/>

<sup>20</sup> J.M. Ledgard, Digital Africa, *Intelligent Life Magazine*, Spring 2011, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.buala.org/en/da-fala/digital-africa>

<sup>21</sup> Damian Okaibedi Eke, Schmidt Shilukobo Chintu, Kutoma Wakunuma, "Towards Shaping the Future of Responsible AI in Africa," in *Responsible AI in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Damian Okaibedi Eke, Kutoma Wakunuma, Simisola Akintoye (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 169-193.

to Learn initiative—a tablet-based gaming application in Sudan and Uganda—has provided Internally Displaced People (IDPs), out-of-school youth, and teachers and refugees with access to education through online courses, mobile devices, and WhatsApp study groups. There are also the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Vodafone Foundation's "Instant Network Schools." Based in eight refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Sudan, and Tanzania, these initiative<sup>22</sup> connect refugee students and teachers to digital educational content. J.M. Ledgard was right when he declared, "In a continent with few computers and little electricity, a smartphone is not just a phone—it's a potential revolution."<sup>23</sup> Nothing could be further from the truth.

Lack of funds to purchase educational materials can be overcome through Open Educational Resources (OER) and content licenses that make academic content available to students and teachers. Siyavula and South Africa's Department of Basic Education (DBE) developed open-source science and math textbooks for every grade 10-12 student. It has also digitalized its curriculum, making all content and materials available online. The UK Open University's Teacher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa (TESSA) Secondary

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<sup>xxii</sup> "Incorporating Digital E-Learning Teaching Technologies into Africa's Primary School Education Systems," *Auda-NEPAD: African Development Agency*, April 28, 2021, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.nepad.org/blog/incorporating-digital-e-learning-teaching-technologies-africas-primary-school-education>; UNESCO, "Educational Technology's Successes and Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa Secondary Systems," *International Institute for Educational Planning Learning Portal*, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://learningportal.iiep.unesco.org/en/blog/educational-technologys-successes-and-challenges-in-sub-saharan-africa-secondary-systems>

<sup>23</sup> Patience and Claudius Anyanwu Foundation, *Our Mission*, Retrieved October 12, 2024, <https://pacaf.org/>

Science program provides teachers in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia with open education resources, teaching resources, and other materials. Ugandan learners use Toolkit to help build academic and life skills through interactive, self-paced, and personalized learning over SMS, measuring progress and performance. Eneza Education in Kenya is helping primary and secondary school students using virtual tutorials on curriculum-aligned content in all subjects. In Nigeria, Tuteria uses AI to connect qualified tutors to students within a particular area and budget, verify IDs, conduct background checks, and evaluate tutors' performance. In South Africa, Botlhale AI specializes in conversational AI; with emphasis on natural language processing tools, this company ensures that those who speak African languages are included in<sup>24</sup> Ubongo, a Tanzanian learning platform, uses interactive education to teach math and science to primary school students. *Stereo.me*<sup>25</sup><sub>[obj]</sub> The initiatives could serve as a model for other African countries to make education accessible to millions, thus closing the educational gap between them and the advanced world.

Supplementing traditional school offerings also furnishes technical skills that students do not receive in secondary school. Andela (in Kampala, Lagos, and Nairobi) and Gebeya (in Ethiopia) train secondary-school graduates and out-of-school youth to be full-stack software developers and match them with paying clients. More private schools

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<sup>24</sup> James Agberebi, Madonna University Founder Boast female students graduate as virgins," *The Guardian*, March 20, 2024, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://guardian.ng/news/madonna-university-founder-boasts-female-students-graduate-as-virgins/>

<sup>25</sup> PAC, 1992, 64, 143, *Glossary for chemists of terms used in biotechnology* (IUPAC Recommendations 1992)), 148.

across Sub-Saharan Africa are using ICTs to support knowledge delivery. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, parents and students are making evident their dissatisfaction with low-quality education by moving their children into low-cost private schools. Many of these mixed primary and secondary school chains—e.g., SPARK in South Africa and Nova Pioneer Schools in Kenya and South Africa—use blended learning and computer-aided instruction to provide students with more individualized instruction and remediation. The Patience and Claudius Anyanwu Foundation in Nigeria is consciously offering free after-school lessons to middle and high school students to promote “African community development by imparting self-employment skills to the African youth through capacity building in education, mentoring, computers, agriculture, sewing, sports, women empowerment, and healthcare.”<sup>26</sup>

Many African higher institutions have IT departments yet have not adequately leveraged these technologies to advance scholarships, teaching, and administration. Many lecturers in higher institutions needlessly waste time in the 21st century entering their results manually before submission. If technology is fully utilized, students can see their results within one week after the end of the semester. There is no reason for graduates to wait endlessly to obtain their academic transcripts while educational technologies, such as Blackboard and Canvas, exist to make it easy.

Challenges facing the educational sector must be addressed to maximize the opportunities for educational technologies. These technologies can be fully utilized only

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<sup>26</sup> Sachin D. Misar, Kiran R. Borkar, Sunil S. Chaudhari, and Dhiraj G. Atla, *Applied Zoology and Biotechnology* (India: AGPH Books, 2023), 173.

by addressing concerns such as cybersecurity threats, data privacy issues, inadequate hardware, poor internet connectivity, protection of sensitive information, and unreliable electricity. Many schools and communities still need the necessary infrastructure, such as computers, internet connectivity, and electricity. The government should address the existing disparities in access to digital literacy skills among teachers, students, and communities with adequate resources. Concerns such as heavy reliance on external funding and lack of long-term planning should be addressed for the benefits of educational technologies to be sustainable. More importantly, educating educators is critical. Sufficient training and support for teachers to effectively integrate technology into their teaching practices are fundamental to their success. Social sensitization is essential to educate society about the benefits of technology and overcome the cultural attitudes that exacerbate resistance to changes in education.

Educational institutions should be at the forefront of instilling the knowledge of emerging technologies. They must find ways to discuss the utility of these technologies as fundamental to transforming the continent, unconstrained by discussion of morality. Recently, the founder and proprietor of Madonna University, Reverend Father Emmanuel Edeh, announced that girls who were admitted as virgins into the university always graduate as virgins. Is this an achievement worth celebrating? What would that do to society if those graduates were also virgins in terms of knowledge of emerging technologies?<sup>27</sup> Africa needs to graduate students from our educational institutions with

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<sup>27</sup> Bibi-Aisha Wadvalla, "Advancing biotechnology to solve Africa's food challenges," *News Feature*, July 29, 2022, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-022-00106-8>

knowledge of the transformative power of educational technologies and understanding and engaging with other technologies that could potentially boost growth in health, agriculture, and other vitally important areas of human development. That is biotechnology. Africa must prepare students with the skills employers seek in the 21st century, such as those who can manipulate new technologies, not those who graduated as virgins. The world is changing fast, and Africans must keep up with the changes in how they learn.

## **USING BIOTECHNOLOGY TO ENGINEER HEALTH AND FOOD SECURITY**

Africa needs students trained in using biotechnology to engineer health and food security. Higher educational institutions must produce those graduates. Biotechnology is a multidisciplinary field that integrates natural and engineering sciences to achieve the application of organisms, cells, parts thereof, and molecular analogs for products and services.<sup>28</sup> Often called biotech, biotechnology has existed since the beginning of civilization with the domestication of plants and animals and the discovery of fermentation.<sup>29</sup> It uses biology to develop new products, methods, and organisms to improve human health and society. Biotechnology can facilitate African development by improving agriculture, addressing health challenges, managing the environment,

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<sup>28</sup> African Union, "The African Leader's Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action," September 6, 2023, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from [https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the\\_african\\_leaders\\_nairobi\\_declaration\\_on\\_climate\\_change-rev-eng.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the_african_leaders_nairobi_declaration_on_climate_change-rev-eng.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> Bibi-Aisha Wadvalla, "Advancing biotechnology to solve Africa's food challenges."



industrial development, improving nutrition, supporting sustainable development, building scientific capacity, addressing climate change, supporting enterprises, and improving livestock.

According to Eric Danquah, a plant geneticist and the founding director of the West Africa Centre for Crop Improvement (WACCI), agriculture is the most significant contributor to the economy, employing two-thirds of the workforce and contributing 20-60% of GDP. Yet, it faces challenges such as diseases, low productivity, pests, post-harvest losses, soil fertility loss, threats from climate change shocks, and water scarcity.<sup>30</sup> Even though Africa contributes just four percent of global carbon emissions, climate change devastates the continent. African heads of state and government gathered in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2023 and acknowledged that "climate change is the single greatest challenge facing humanity."<sup>31</sup> Africa is particularly vulnerable, comprising 50% of the world's smallholder farmers. Climate change negatively affects agriculture due to rapid changes in weather patterns, rising temperatures, and the prevalence of drought incidences, floods, and plant diseases. Pathogens have continued to reduce crop productivity significantly. Pest outbreaks are frequent in Africa and account for up to 40% of maize, potato, rice, soybean, and wheat crop yield losses worldwide, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In a world where food

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<sup>30</sup> Muhammad Umair Yasin, "Feeding the World with Agricultural Biotechnology and World Food," February 4, 2018, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://agrihunt.com/articles/pak-agri-outlook/feeding-the-world-with-agricultural-biotechnology-and-world-food/>

<sup>31</sup> Emmanuel Okogbenin, "Fostering biotechnology adoption for a more food-secure Africa," *ACAT*, October 5, 2023, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://acat.aatf-africa.org/fostering-biotechnology-adoption-for-a-more-food-secure-africa/>

insecurity is already the reality for more than 800 million people, the losses are catastrophic.<sup>32</sup>

Agricultural biotechnology, which applies scientific techniques to modify and improve plants, animals, and microorganisms to increase their value, can address some of the problems imposed on food production by climatic change.<sup>33</sup> Biotechnology has improved trait expression, productivity, and product quality through techniques and novel genetic strategies. Several crop varieties have been developed through biotechnology.<sup>34</sup> Biotechnology can enhance crop yields, disease resistance, and drought tolerance, improving food security. Emmanuel Okogbenin, Director of Program Development and Commercialization at the African Conference on Agricultural Technologies (ACAT), argues, "The adoption of biotechnology and complementary innovative technologies can catalyze productivity transformation and improve food system resilience in the developing world."<sup>35</sup> Yet few African institutions are equipped with the resources and human capacity to undertake disease diagnosis and management.<sup>36</sup>

Biotechnology is helping to develop drought-resistant crops that can tolerate harsh environmental conditions, such as drought, improving crop yield that can help address

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid

<sup>33</sup> Bibi-Aisha Wadvalla, "Advancing biotechnology to solve Africa's food challenges."

<sup>34</sup> Emmanuel Okogbenin, "Fostering biotechnology adoption for a more food-secure Africa," *ACAT*, October 5, 2023, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://acat.aatf-africa.org/fostering-biotechnology-adoption-for-a-more-food-secure-africa/>

<sup>35</sup> Bibi-Aisha Wadvalla, "Advancing biotechnology to solve Africa's food challenges."

<sup>36</sup> Nkechi Isaac, "Bt cotton in Africa: Role models and lessons learned," *Alliance for Science*, August 20, 2020, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://allianceforscience.org/blog/2020/08/bt-cotton-in-africa-role-models-and-lessons-learned/>

food security challenges. Kenya is one of the African countries using biotechnology to develop drought-resistant crops. In addition to Ethiopia, scientists in Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan are also developing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Over the last two decades, advances in monitoring systems have boosted the capacity for disease diagnoses. For example, Sampea 20-T is a pod borer resistant (PBR) cowpea variety that is tried for improved protection from *Maruca vitrata* to optimize cowpea productivity. This biotech product was released in Nigeria in 2021.

Another major project developed to address climate change impact is the TELA Maize, a public-private partnership program that has developed drought-tolerant, insect-protected maize against stem borers and FAW in several countries—including Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Nigeria.<sup>37</sup> In 1998, South Africa became the first African country to plant biotech crops, beginning with insect-resistant cotton, followed by maize and soybeans. Only six other African countries have approved GM crops: Eswatini, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, and Kenya. It is under development in 11 different states. Malawi, Nigeria, and Sudan grow GM cotton, while field trials of several other GM crops—e.g., banana, cassava, cowpea, and Irish potato—occur in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, and <sup>38</sup>established by the African Agricultural Technology

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Kagee, "Why Kenya is turning to genetically modified crops to help with drought," *BBC News*, Nairobi, November 8, 2022, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63487149?fbclid=IwAR1LP1f3rwaWDgUAHztI1c\\_Ix\\_P4GeCfqW5-W0kReiPJGMb-Z19cRf5RgSo](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63487149?fbclid=IwAR1LP1f3rwaWDgUAHztI1c_Ix_P4GeCfqW5-W0kReiPJGMb-Z19cRf5RgSo)

xxxvii J. E. O. Rege, Joel W. Ochieng & Keith Sones, "The State of Applications and Impacts of Biotechnology in the Livestock Sector," *First Online*: June 23, 2022,

Foundation (AATF) in 2006 as a platform for advancing stakeholder interactions on agriculture biotechnology and supported by AUDA-NEPAD.<sup>39</sup>

Sixty percent of Africans are involved in agriculture. Why are they not feeding the world? Why are Africans food insecure? Conventional farming in Africa seems inadequate. Farmers still rely on unimproved seed. Farmers need improved varieties powered by technology. Africa needs to plant for food and jobs. Farmers in Africa could be better. Over 70% of Africans make a living through agriculture, and technology could transform their world. The governments in Africa need to subsidize farming, especially big-time ones. Making products from biotechnology available to farmers is vital to increase productivity, alleviate poverty, and increase nutrition. Promoting new technology-powered farming without destroying existing ones is also fundamental. BT cotton, a genetically modified crop, has had a mixed impact in Africa; it has improved yields and reduced pesticide use in South Africa and Sudan. However, in Burkina Faso, it led to lower-quality cotton and reduced demand. Its adoption is limited in other countries due to concerns over quality and licensing fees.<sup>40</sup> The adoption of GMOs in Africa has been minimal due to concerns about safety, trade, compatibility with local farm systems, and

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Retrieved March 20, 2024, from [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-04349-9\\_5](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-04349-9_5)

<sup>39</sup> Glynn Cosker, "What Is Information Technology? A Beginner's Guide to the World of IT," May 2, 2023, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.rasmussen.edu/degrees/technology/blog/what-is-information-technology/>

<sup>40</sup> M. Krönke and L. Olan'g, "Democratic dividend: The road to quality education in Africa," *Afrobarometer Policy Paper* No. 63, 2020, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp63-democratic-dividend-road-quality-education-africa/>

dependence on foreign private sectors for the technology.<sup>41</sup> Biotechnology should not undermine local knowledge but build upon it; it should recognize that other members of the ecosystem depend on existing species. African countries must understand that foreign interests pushing for new species are marketers looking for profits. Biotechnology is improving livestock production in African countries such as Kenya, where probiotics improve the weight gain of indigenous chickens. Ethiopia uses community-based breeding programs to improve small ruminant genetics. Kenya uses infection and treatment methods to control East Coast fever in cattle. Ethiopia uses the same for chicken breeds for better growth performance in different agroecological zones.<sup>42</sup>

Biotechnology is used to cure diseases in Africa, such as developing new drugs and treatments for malaria, like artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs). It has enabled the development of antiretroviral therapy (ART) drugs, which have significantly improved treatment outcomes for HIV/AIDS patients in Africa. It has led to new diagnostic tools and treatments for tuberculosis, such as GeneXpert. It was used to develop experimental vaccines and treatments during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It has led to the development of gene therapy and other treatments for sickle cell anemia, which is prevalent in many African countries. It has led to the development of new

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<sup>41</sup> Matthias Krönke, "Africa's digital divide and the promise of e-learning," *Afrobarometer Policy Paper* No. 66, June 2020, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342165040\\_Africa's\\_digital\\_divide\\_and\\_the\\_promise\\_of\\_e-learning](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342165040_Africa's_digital_divide_and_the_promise_of_e-learning)

<sup>42</sup> Association for the Development of Education in Africa, "Synthesis Report: Study on the Use of ICT in Education and Remote Learning during Crises and the Required Investment in Digital Transformation for African Countries," June 2, 2023, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://www.adeanet.org/en/publications/synthesis-report-use-ict-education-remote-learning-during-crises>

vaccines and treatments for cholera, which is a significant public health concern in Africa. It has helped to develop new drugs and diagnostic tools for river blindness. These are just a few examples of how biotechnology is used to cure diseases in Africa. Biotechnology has the potential to impact healthcare in Africa significantly, and research should be ongoing to develop new treatments and therapies for various diseases.

Africa must find ways to engage in a conversation about using these technologies to promote health and well-being in Africa that is not held hostage by Iron Age views and attitudes, as observable in our religious institutions, where many still seek divine healing. Understanding technology's power in Africa should undermine popular faith healing. Emerging technologies will answer many health questions that drive millions to church, hoping for a miracle when AI can easily potentially detect the problem. Men and women of God have perpetrated open fraud by engaging in false faith healing when energies could have been directed to biotech.

Biotechnology's potential to transform human life in Africa is endless. It could help clean up pollution, monitor environmental health, improve waste management, and support the growth of biofuels, bioplastics, and bioproducts. It could enhance the nutritional value of crops, address micronutrient deficiencies, and help Africa reduce poverty, improve health, and promote sustainable agriculture. It could create new business opportunities and support entrepreneurship in Africa. It could improve animal health, breeding, and productivity, supporting livestock production and food security. However, it is essential to ensure that biotechnology is developed and deployed responsibly and ethically, addressing access, equity, and safety concerns.

## RESHAPING AFRICA COMMUNITIES THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Information technology (IT) is a broad field that includes computer systems, software, programming languages, and data processing and storage. It also consists of the design, development, application, implementation, support, and management of computer-based information systems.<sup>43</sup> It has improved transparency in governance and facilitated e-commerce, e-learning, telemedicine, mobile banking, and cybersecurity in various African countries. Information technology drives almost every aspect of our modern world, and Africa must prepare students who are attentive to using these technologies to promote development.

Information technology is an integral part of educational technology and has been used to promote e-learning in various ways. According to UNESCO, approximately 1.2 billion students and youth worldwide were affected by school and university closures because of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the idea of "business as usual" in education is unfeasible in the foreseeable future as governments, students, parents, and teachers must all adjust to the changing circumstances.<sup>45</sup> The ICT Transforming Education in Africa project, launched in 2015, fosters human and social development in

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<sup>43</sup> Matthias Krönke, "Africa's digital divide and the promise of e-learning."

<sup>44</sup> "How e-commerce supports African business growth," January 17, 2019, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/how-ecommerce-supports-african-business-growth>

<sup>45</sup> Kimberley Botwright, "8 ways to help African e-commerce fulfill its potential," *World Economic Forum*, September 3, 2019, Retrieved April 21, 2024, from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/8-ways-to-help-african-e-commerce-fulfill-its-potential/>

African countries by using information and communication technology (ICT) for education.<sup>46</sup> Many African countries are implementing distance, e-learning, and open initiatives and have incorporated digital e-learning teaching technologies to enhance accessibility. Unless the digital divide affecting millions in Africa is addressed, IT will not fully support education and economic growth. To fully realize the potential of e-learning, citizens need access to smart devices and high levels of digital literacy. Cultural willingness to engage in remote learning will point to more educated adults with reliable access to electricity. By comparison, people's overall level of wealth and geographic location are less likely to shape their ability to participate in the transition to e-learning.<sup>47</sup>

Information technology is powering a flourishing e-commerce in Africa, with 400 million internet users, making it a vast and promising market. Jumia, Africa's most significant internet group, has succeeded in e-commerce despite logistical challenges like lack of addresses and fragmented logistics. The International Trade Centre (ICT) reports 631 online marketplaces in Africa, with 2.2 billion visits in 2019, primarily driven by ten countries.<sup>48</sup> E-commerce benefits include creating jobs, empowering women entrepreneurs, and serving rural areas. However, challenges persist, such as low

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<sup>46</sup> Wayan Vota, "ICT Works: 10 Examples of Successful African e-Government Digital Services," January 24, 2024, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.ictworks.org/examples-african-e-government-digital-services/>

<sup>47</sup> Joana Eva Dadoo, Hosam Al-Samarraie, Ahmed Alsswey, "The development of telemedicine programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress and associated challenges," *Health Technol*, 12, 1(2022): 33-46, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34849325/>

<sup>48</sup> "INTERPOL report identifies top cyberthreats in Africa," October 21, 2021, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2021/INTERPOL-report-identifies-top-cyberthreats-in-Africa?fbclid=IwAR0iY19cwpEqUfHhPFRLCO1A2jZ0ZiYLJoJxale31bHaDpara1SZBrf2fGo>



consumer digital trust, inadequate infrastructure, and limited payment systems. Addressing these issues can unlock e-commerce's potential for sustainable development in Africa.<sup>49</sup>

Some initiatives in Africa use information technology to improve governance and promote transparency in Africa. Wayan Vota co-founded ICTworks and has shown how many African countries have used information technologies to enhance their work in his research. Ghana introduced a digital revenue collection platform that modernizes how it collects fees and pays vendors. Benin established a government data interoperability framework to allow public sector organizations to share and reuse information effectively. Côte d'Ivoire implemented a Security Operations Centre (SOC) to address cybersecurity challenges and ensure the reliability of digital transactions. Kenya established Huduma Digital Access Centers, which provide citizens with easy access to government services through an online portal. Rwanda launched IremboGov, an online portal that offers over 100 citizen-centered public services, reducing corruption and promoting transparency.<sup>50</sup> Challenges include low literacy rates, underdeveloped telecommunication infrastructure, a lack of government commitment to genuine digital transformation, and a more transparent and citizen-centric approach. Other challenges include digital literacy, governance, ICT skills, leadership, and resource access.

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<sup>49</sup> "Artificial Intelligence: What it is and why it matters," Retrieved April 18, 2024, from [https://www.sas.com/en\\_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html](https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/what-is-artificial-intelligence.html)

<sup>50</sup> Lillian Barnard, "Governing AI in Africa: Policy frameworks for a new frontier," January 28, 2024, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://aka.ms/AfricaAI>

African countries have been using information technology to promote telemedicine. Ethiopia implemented a telemedicine program in 1980 under the HealthNet project. Sudan implemented a telemedicine program between 2011 and 2012 through the Gezira Family Medicine Project. Ghana established a consultation network with Medicare Line (US) in 2009 to facilitate communication between physicians and surgeons. Nigeria launched initiatives to integrate cloud computing for building its telemedicine infrastructure in 2017. Rwanda introduced tele-robotics to treat COVID-19 cases. Uganda witnessed an increased use of teleconsultation to ensure continuity of healthcare for patients, established call centers, and online healthcare to provide triage and referral services to the general public. South Africa and Mozambique used telemedicine services (mainly internet-based technologies) for distance learning and teleconsultations in 2000-2001. Angola introduced telepediatrics to expand specialist pediatric and child healthcare services between 2007 and 2008. Mauritius and Botswana implemented a nationwide telehealth project to promote more comprehensive access to patient care while advancing medical education for physicians. Botswana launched initiatives to integrate cloud computing for building its telemedicine infrastructure in 2017. These examples demonstrate the progress in implementing telemedicine programs in Africa, highlighting the potential for improved healthcare access and outcomes.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Abejide Ade-Ibijola and Chinedu Okonkwo, "Artificial Intelligence in Africa: Emerging Challenges," in *Responsible AI in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Damian Okaibedi Eke, Kutoma Wakunuma, Simisola Akintoye (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 101–117

Africa is an emerging world leader in digital and mobile banking, with the highest number of account holders, services, and transactions. In Africa, mobile banking started as a facility for transferring airtime between mobile accounts but quickly became an alternative money transfer system due to a lack of well-developed nationwide banking networks. Mobile payment services like M-Pesa in Kenya and OPay in Nigeria have expanded across the continent and into other developing markets. INTERPOL identifies the top cyber threats in Africa, including botnets, business email compromise, digital extortion, online scams, and ransomware. The INTERPOL report highlights the importance of a coordinated regional response and a robust cybersecurity framework to combat cybercrime. Additionally, a 2022-2023 report on the cybersecurity threatscape<sup>52</sup> [OBJ] African countries have used information technology to promote cybersecurity. Kenya established the Kenya Cybersecurity Alliance, a public-private partnership to enhance cybersecurity awareness and coordination. South Africa launched the National Cybersecurity Hub to report and respond to cyber threats. Nigeria established the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, a law aimed at combating cybercrime. Ghana set up the National Cyber Security Centre, a government agency responsible for online safety and protection from infiltration. Rwanda launched the Rwanda Cybersecurity Initiative, a program to enhance cybersecurity skills and awareness. Mauritius established the Mauritius Computer

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<sup>52</sup> Fred Schwaller, "Could AI transform health care in Africa?" *Science Africa*, December 1, 2023, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://www.dw.com/en/could-ai-transform-health-care-in-africa/a-67597556>; Ayomide Owoyemi, Joshua OwoyemiJoshua Owoyemi, Adenekan OsiyemiAdenekan Osiyemi, Andy BoydAndy Boyd, "Artificial Intelligence for Healthcare in Africa," *Health Informatics*, Vol. 2 (2020), Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/digital-health/articles/10.3389/fdgth.2020.00006/full>

Emergency Response Team, responsible for acting efficiently and effectively act in instances of cyber threats. Egypt launched the Egyptian Computer Emergency Readiness Team, a team responsible for enhancing cybersecurity and responding to criminal and unauthorized use of the country's web-based systems. Morocco established the Moroccan Cybersecurity Agency, a government agency responsible for detecting and stopping criminal use of its technology. These examples demonstrate how African countries proactively use information technology to enhance cybersecurity and protect their digital infrastructure and citizens from cyber threats.

Law enforcement agencies, governments, and civil society organizations could use IT to combat kidnapping and other forms of crime in Africa. Africans use information technology in various ways to fight crime. Some examples include geospatial technology, which uses satellite imagery and geographic information systems (GIS) to track and locate kidnapping victims. Mobile phone tracking uses cellular signals to trace the location of kidnappers and victims. Social media monitoring involves analyzing activity on social networks to identify and track kidnapping gangs. Data analytics requires tools to analyze patterns and trends in kidnapping incidents. Online reporting platforms involve creating online platforms for citizens to report kidnapping incidents and provide tips to law enforcement. Facial recognition technology uses biometric systems to identify and track suspected kidnappers by comparing a large database of facial photos.

## **SMART DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS**

Artificial intelligence and robotics work hand in hand, changing our world, touching every industry, from finance to farming, ushering in the 4th industrial revolution. African governments should invest in these technologies to ensure the continent is not left behind. AI allows machines to learn from experience, adjust to new inputs, and perform human-like tasks. Most AI examples today—from chess-playing computers to self-driving cars—rely heavily on deep learning and natural language processing. Artificial intelligence helps healthcare, retail, manufacturing, and banking. Robotics is the interdisciplinary study and practice of robot design, construction, operation, and use.<sup>53</sup> Current and potential applications include agriculture, automated mining, autonomous transport, construction, lawncare, manufacturing, medicine, military, and robots to perform tasks.

AI and robotics can facilitate African development by enhancing learning through interactive robots and e-learning platforms; automating farming processes to increase efficiency and productivity by predicting weather patterns; assisting with surgeries, patient care, and medical research; tracking and mitigating the effects of climate change, deforestation, and pollution; expanding access to financial services, such as mobile payments and micro-lending; optimizing natural resource extraction and conservation; and improving safety and efficiency in mining operations. They could also create new business opportunities and jobs in the robotics industry, improving productivity and quality in industries such as automotive and textiles; construction, maintenance, and

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<sup>53</sup> Lillian Barnard, "Governing AI in Africa: Policy frameworks for a new frontier," January 28, 2024, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://aka.ms/AfricaAI>

monitoring of roads, bridges, and buildings; and assisting with renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power.

The transformative potential of AI and robotics is destined to reshape work, society, and human development. The impact is felt around the globe. Africa is witnessing a surge in AI innovation, with startups and local solutions emerging to tackle challenges in agriculture, education, and healthcare. According to the President of Microsoft Africa, Lillian Barnard, "Embracing the transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is central to our vision for Africa's future." As Barnard puts it, "AI will revolutionize the way we do business across the African continent. This revolution transcends mere technological advancement; it marks a strategic turning point wherein AI will be leveraged to catalyze sustainable growth and chart a course towards a future brimming with innovation and boundless opportunity for Africa."<sup>54</sup> In Kenya, Chatbots provide healthcare services to people without visiting doctors. In Nigeria, a data-driven platform called Zenvus delivers insights to farmers; it is a pioneering precision farming technology company that uses computational algorithms and electronics to transform farms. Zenvus collects soil fertility and crop vegetative health data to deliver precision agriculture at scale. It then uses the aggregated and anonymized data to provide financial services to farmers. Mama Money and Mukuru enable easy and quick transfers across African countries in South Africa. Kudi, a Nigerian AI-powered Chatbot, aims to provide financial

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<sup>54</sup> Yeshiel Panchia, "The AI In African Innovation Explained," Retrieved April 21, 2024, from <https://www.forbesafrica.com/technology/2023/09/14/the-ai-in-african-innovation-explained/>

services to underprivileged people. Nigeria and South Africa have online shopping facilities such as Konga and TakeAlot that use AI to enhance customer experience.<sup>55</sup>

Many countries in Africa address malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and HIV/AIDS through AI-aided disease diagnostics. AI is filling the gap of “medical deserts” by supporting healthcare worker shortages through AI-assisted diagnosis and treatment. It helps to analyze medical images and genomes to improve diagnosis and treatment. In Mozambique, TB is diagnosed using AI-connected X-ray machines. It helps develop region-specific AI models to tackle healthcare concerns by optimizing community health worker scheduling and drug discovery.<sup>56</sup> AI-powered diagnostic solutions are used in Ghana and Rwanda to improve medical imaging analysis, enabling early detection of diseases like breast cancer and tuberculosis. AI is aiding farmers in Kenya and Nigeria with data-driven recommendations for fertilizer application, increasing efficiency and productivity. AI-driven educational tools are being used to enhance learning and employability, and AI is revolutionizing banking in East Africa, enabling financial inclusion through mobile banking platforms like M-Pesa.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, “Nanotechnology,” nd, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/default.html>; Keith Richard Limbo, “The Nanotech Revolution Is Here,” nd, Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://www.nucleiotechnologies.com/the-nanotech-revolution-is-here/>.

<sup>56</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Towards African Nanotechnology Future: Trends, Impacts and Opportunities* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, 2020), Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43804>

<sup>57</sup> Xinge Yu, “Intelligent soft electronics for healthcare monitoring and VR,” iCANX Talks Vol. 182, April 19, 2024, <https://www.africanmrs.net/events/>

Africa could deploy AI to fight crime. AI-powered systems can detect fraudulent transactions like unauthorized credit card use or identity theft. AI-powered cameras can analyze footage from surveillance to detect suspicious activity and alert authorities. It could facilitate the analysis of forensic evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints. AI-powered facial recognition systems can help identify suspects and track their movements. AI-powered chatbots can help engage with the community and support community policing. Finally, it could help investigators analyze large amounts of data and identify connections between cases.

However, the adoption and use of AI and robotics in Africa also face challenges such as ethics, government policies, skills acquisition, insufficient infrastructure and network connectivity, lack of structured data ecosystem, uncertainty, and user attitude. AI and robotics can potentially revolutionize the African economy, but challenges include limited infrastructure, data availability and quality, legal and policy issues, and costs. Senegalese AI expert Seydina Moussa Ndiaye highlights the potential benefits and warns against "digital colonization" by foreign companies exploiting African data without local involvement. The UN's AI advisory group aims to address these concerns and ensure international <sup>58</sup>Addressing these challenges is crucial to harnessing the full potential of AI to promote development in Africa. However, addressing data privacy, bias, and

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<sup>58</sup> Bibi-Aisha Wadvalla, "Advancing biotechnology to solve Africa's food challenges," *News Feature*, July 29, 2022, Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-022-00106-8#:~:text=Modern%20biotechnology%20has%20shown%20its,resistance%20and%20drought%20tolerance%20genes.%E2%80%9D>



security challenges is vital to ensuring that AI is developed and deployed to benefit African communities and economies.

## **NANOTECHNOLOGY, THE ENABLER OF OTHER TECHNOLOGIES**

Nanotechnology is the enabler and enhancer of other technologies and products. It involves creating nanostructures by rearranging the atoms of the objects, thus making new, lighter, and stronger properties. This field uses novel properties and phenomena at this scale to create new materials, devices, and systems. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on a near-atomic scale to produce new structures, materials, and devices."<sup>59</sup> It could promote scientific development in consumer products, energy, manufacturing, materials, and medicine, among other avenues.

Nanotechnology is increasingly found in many commercial products, from mobile phones and cosmetics to pharmaceuticals and robotics. Nanotechnology offers new opportunities for promoting sustainable development in ways that were perceived as impossible only a few decades ago. Today, cheaper but faster, smaller, smarter, and more energy-efficient materials, components, and devices drive growth in information technology, biotechnology, and energy and environmental technologies. Significant

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<sup>59</sup> Shivraj Hariram Nile, Venkidasamy Baskar, Dhivya Selvaraj, Arti Nile, Jianbo Xiao, Guoyin Kai, "Nanotechnologies in Food Science: Applications, Recent Trends, and Future Perspectives," *Nano-Micro Letters* (2020): 12:45.

progress in robotics, electronics, and artificial intelligence would not have been possible without developing increasingly light, small, and robust nanotechnology materials and components. Indeed, a smartphone today has more storage capacity, processing power, and longer battery life than the average laptop of two decades ago. At the heart of this revolution lies nanotechnology, which enables manufacturers to manipulate matter on an invisible scale to build increasingly small, light, solid, and intelligent materials and devices.<sup>60</sup>

Nanotechnology has the potential to facilitate African development in various ways, including advanced materials and manufacturing, chemical- and bioprocessing, energy, food production, health care, mining and minerals, and water purification. Additionally, it can contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. African countries have made some contributions to nanotechnology research and applications. From nano filters for water purification in Ethiopia and Tanzania to nanocatalysts and nanosensors in Egypt and South Africa, nanotechnology broadens "the scope of current approaches and creates"<sup>61</sup> Egypt is currently the top nanotechnology research country in Africa. At the same time, South

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<sup>60</sup> Ndeke Musee, Lucky Sikhwivhilu & Mary Gulumian, "Relevance of Nanotechnology to Africa: Synthesis, Applications, and Safety," in *Chemistry for Sustainable Development in Africa*, ed. Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, Jacobus Nicolaas Eloff (London: Springer, 2013), 123–158.

<sup>61</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Towards African Nanotechnology Future: Trends, Impacts and Opportunities* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, 2020), Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43804>.

Africa is the African country that has filed the most patents and established the most nanotechnology companies and institutions.

Nanotechnology can revolutionize food production in Africa by improving food security, safety, and quality through enhancing food bioavailability, consistency, taste, and texture; improving food processing, packaging, and preservation; reducing food waste and increasing shelf life; detecting food toxins and contaminants; and developing nano-based delivery systems for nutraceuticals. Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Tanzania use nanotechnology in food production. Researchers in South Africa are researching and developing nanotechnology in food production, specifically in meat production, food processing, packaging, and preservation. Walter Sisulu University in South Africa also has a niche area focused on small-scale agribusiness and rural non-farm enterprises, which research nanotechnology applications in agriculture and food production.<sup>62</sup> Implementing nanotechnology in food production in Africa may also have challenges, such as regulatory frameworks, public acceptance, and potential environmental impacts.<sup>63</sup>

Nanotechnology can potentially improve health in Africa by treating HIV/AIDS and malaria, including improving access to clean water through disinfection processes,

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<sup>62</sup> N. Z. Nyazema, J. T. Chanyandura, P. O. Kumar, "Nanomedicine and regulatory science: the challenges in Africa," *Frontiers in Biomaterials Science*, vol 2 (2023): 1-8. Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <file:///C:/Users/anyanwu/Downloads/fbiom-02-1184662.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> Shivraj Hariram Nile, Venkidasamy Baskar, Dhivya Selvaraj, Arti Nile, Jianbo Xiao, Guoyin Kai, "Nanotechnologies in Food Science: Applications, Recent Trends, and Future Perspectives," *Nano-Micro Letters* (2020): 12:45.

purification, and remediation.<sup>64</sup> Egyptian scientists synthesized silver nanoparticles to develop antimicrobial coatings for medical devices and wound dressings. South African researchers created a nanostructured titanium implant to improve bone growth in dental and orthopedic applications. South African company Nanolek developed a nanoparticle-based drug delivery system for treating tuberculosis. Kenyan researchers used nanotechnology to develop a low-cost, point-of-care diagnostic tool for malaria. Moroccan scientists developed a nano <sup>65</sup>

African researchers can learn a lot from applying nanotechnologies to improve health and the environment. However, it's essential to consider the potential risks posed by nanotechnology-based products to humans and ecological systems. Some of the challenges of using nanotechnologies in Africa include the lack of a harmonized regulatory framework for nanotechnology, limited human capacity and skills in regulatory science, limited research and development partnerships between industry, universities, and research institutions, restricted access to technology and technical knowledge, limited industry applicability and practicality in education and training programs, and resource constraints. Addressing these challenges could involve capacity-building programs,

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<sup>64</sup> Ndeke Musee, Lucky Sikhwivhilu & Mary Gulumian, "Relevance of Nanotechnology to Africa: Synthesis, Applications, and Safety," in *Chemistry for Sustainable Development in Africa*, ed. Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, Jacobus Nicolaas Eloff (London: Springer, 2013), 123–158

<sup>65</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Towards African Nanotechnology Future: Trends, Impacts and Opportunities* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, 2020), Retrieved March 20, 2024, from <https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/43804>

regional centers of excellence in nanotechnology, and collaboration with international organizations.<sup>66</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Given the potential for Africa to transform its economy and society by adopting emerging technologies, the government and the private sector must partner to position Africa to reap the rewards these technologies promise. Human civilization is a product of an unbroken continuity of technological discoveries and advances that previous generations have increasingly made over millions of years. Africans today are linked to the past. They are part of a system. They are part of a fellowship that started before birth and will continue after death. What they do now matters. It matters to them today and the next generation. Africa must place its confidence in emerging technologies and maximize their opportunities to accelerate economic and social development in the 21st century. Africa's willingness to embrace the idea that technological advances are unstoppable and could transform human societies in unthinkable ways is the only hope of leaving the continent a better place for future generations. If Africa is to use the full measure of human knowledge and creativity in science and technology to solve problems facing the continent, it must embrace emerging technologies.

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<sup>66</sup> N. Z. Nyazema, J. T. Chanyandura, P. O. Kumar, "Nanomedicine and regulatory science: the challenges in Africa," *Frontiers in Biomaterials Science*, vol 2 (2023): 1-8. Retrieved April 18, 2024, from <file:///C:/Users/anyanwu/Downloads/fbiom-02-1184662.pdf>

## END NOTES

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## **CHAPTER 21**

# **IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF DEVELOPED NATIONS: A NEW WAVE OF SYMPATHETIC IMPERIALISM**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

*Men ran to meet their chains thinking they have secured freedom* - Jean Jacques Rousseau.<sup>1</sup>

Immigration is a global phenomenon. There are nuances of reasons and arguments surrounding the phenomenon which is drawing the attention of many scholars. There have been compelling arguments both for and against the idea of open borders in the philosophy of immigration. Who benefits from open immigration policies? The sending or receiving nation? Are such policies acts of charity to sending nations?

The relaxing of immigration policies (open borders) by developed countries (such as United States) is coated with the impression that it is a real expression of freedom of movement and is presented as a way to ameliorate the poverty crises in developing nations. Many scholars proffer arguments that allowing immigrants will benefit the home nations (hereafter, sending countries or nations) through such factors as remittances and human capital development (improved skills). Of course, the immediate beneficiaries and their relations tend to believe so.

This chapter posits that this new form of colonialism is worsening the gross poverty margins in supply nations. Under normal circumstances this type of "charity" and sympathy would not be made available to developing nations' citizens. The receiving countries' open immigration opportunities are in most cases only trying to balance a distorted equilibrium in their home country while perpetuating one in the sending countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les Fondements de l'inégalité parmi les Hommes* (*Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men*. Vol. II. (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), P.54



This work is mostly gleaned from the philosophical perspective. However, the historical and economic perspectives would be equally applied in the course of analysis of the idea and concept of *sympathetic imperialism*. To form the foundation of the analysis, this chapter will explain the concept of immigration, the trends involved, its primary causes, and the concept of imperialism. There is also the need to establish the primary or fundamental spoor of decay or decoy by developed countries to spark this issue of forced migration through certain international economic policies forced on developing nations, especially Asian and African countries who are popularly seen as the major victim/affected societies.

Immigration is an applied philosophy issue, unlike a concept within core philosophy, which includes epistemology, ethics, logic, metaphysics, and politics. According to Hudson, a renowned scholar and philosopher of immigration, most applied philosophy employs moral philosophy and involves serious ethical theorizing and analyses to understand a specific issue, especially one of a public nature<sup>2</sup>. For Risse, a philosopher and scholar on the ethics of immigration, who believes and argues that immigration is a moral issue, immigration debates should "not look at the scenario solely from the standpoint of 'what is good for us' without regard for the justifiability of immigration policies to those excluded and left behind."<sup>3</sup> Applying philosophical standpoints to immigration, this chapter asks whether there is something or nothing wrong with *sympathetic imperialism* and if it is any different from exploitation. Of course, its impacts—whether positive or negative—have a role in the equilibrium (balancing) of any society. Some ethical theories and approaches—e.g., the justice approach, the common good approach, the fairness approach—may be employed. Popular media show cases of helplessness created by the powerfully advantaged over the disadvantaged. What are the moral justifications to *buy away* a society's talented, reliable, and available middle-class human resources to serve their own needs and thereby create a lacuna in the sending countries? Also, what morally justifies the *selection* criteria of destination or receiving countries if they discriminate between

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<sup>2</sup> James L. Hudson, "The Philosophy of Immigration," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* No.1, Vol. VII (1986): 51.

<sup>3</sup> Matthias Risse, "On the Morality of Immigration." *Ethics and International Affairs* 22(1) (2008): 25.

applicants with skills and those without skills, as if those without the necessary skills hold no rights to the same freedom of movement and association as being advocated by those in support of open borders? This chapter offers a look at “ethical recruitment” policies and practices and the role of international bodies in this regard.

Policies such as the U.S. Visa lottery, immigration laws, and other programs affect developing countries of Africa and Asia. Some policies and measures adopted by international organizations—e.g., the International Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO)—are ethical in their efforts to address international immigration policy problems. However, many immigration policies of developing nations are not ethically justifiable; there is an intentional and active recruitment of skilled personnel away from developing countries; and there is a need to address such injustices. In the long run, despite its influence on economics, immigration has a strong ethical dimension as it affects human rights, justice, exploitation, enslaved labor, responsibility, and climate ethics.

Immigration and its impacts cut across disciplines and sectors. There is a vacuum somewhere in the receiving countries that immigration policy is trying to fill; otherwise, the rate of migrants would have been seriously curtailed. A question arises regarding the unprecedented rush and increase in the recruitment of medical and health personnel from the developing countries of Asia and Africa. There is a distorted equilibrium being taken care of, which creates a disequilibrium somewhere, in a vicious cycle.

Additionally, the analogical method, which makes for ease of references and inferences, is inherently employed in this research. The analogical method is very strategic and useful in explanations as this chapter tries to explain the underlying presumptions of open borders policy as it relates to developing countries. This method will enable us to see the analogy between “colonialism” (mostly before the achievement of independence of most developing nations) that depleted our material resource base and the “imperialism” (mostly postcolonial) that is depleting our human resource base.

Determining the origin of what is believed to be the crisis of impoverishment in developing countries of Africa could reveal the remote or ulterior motive behind the present trend of subtle “buying away” within migration. There will be critical

assessment and analysis of immigration selection criteria of receiving nations. This will also tell us how morally justifiable such would be. Why hunt for the highly specialized middle class in developing nations? This is a depletion of available middle-class personnel who would have contributed to the development of their home nation – this is from the functionalist perspective. It is intended here to challenge the situation and suggest that philosophy should play a serious role in addressing the entire scenario with the hope that it is time to fulfill the eleventh Marxian thesis on Feuerbach, which is a clarion call to put philosophy and thoughts to action. Philosophy is a special discipline in the art of *aletheia*, the art of unveiling and saying the unsaid. Africans must come of age. It is not every bait that Africa must fall to. No matter how well-coated the arguments for open borders for the sake of developing nations, African nations should put up significant resistance to all forms of imperialism.

## **IMMIGRATION AND ITS NATURE**

Immigration is a broad term. However, it is usually associated with the movement of non-indigenes or natives to other areas or lands for settlement. This definition is, however, associated with different rights and privileges. Immigration happens for different reasons and occurs in types such as individual/voluntary, forced, and mass migrations.

## **ORIGINS/FOUNDATIONS OF IMMIGRATION**

Immigration happens for various reasons, especially since the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Douglas S. Massey, a social scientist and an international immigration scholar, believes that immigration is a global phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> He noted that despite the fact that immigration is influenced in most cases by proximity of borders, business interests, and political allies, these no longer hold water. He identified several causes and foundations of the immigration of humans, but he highlights four areas as being crucial for a better understanding of immigration: first, the economic bases of immigration;

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<sup>4</sup> Douglas S. Massey, "The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration" *The Social Contract*. Spring (1994): 183.

second, its social foundations; third, its policy foundations; and fourth, the voluntary policy bases of immigration.

Within the economic bases of immigration,<sup>5</sup> Massey disagreed with the argument that wage differentials in sending and receiving countries are the major reason for economic migration. He also dismissed the idea that immigration is spurred by lack of development in sending countries. Massey argued that if wage differentials are the major economic reason, then when migration happens, it would reduce the differentials in receiving countries. This process leads to equilibrium, a balance, thereby removing any differentials. When this equilibrium or balance is obtained, it does not put a stop to immigration. He therefore reasoned that wage differential is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for migration.

According to Massey, economic migration is not solely an individual issue. It involves families or family members in decision making, especially in contributing to generate resources along with financial resources to fund the migration. Furthermore, economic conditions in developing countries are volatile, not only a wage issue. The nature of such volatility includes natural disasters, political upheavals, insecurity, and economic recessions. These factors make migration a safety net for families from the risks associated with such conditions. Thus, migration is not necessarily solely to maximize wages. In Nigeria and in many other African countries, many families collectively contribute to send one of their family members to a developed country to diversify the strategies to take care of such volatilities.

Massey asserts that since immigration is caused by lack of development in sending countries, then once the situation is improved, the migration rate should reduce greatly. Otherwise, he argued that development has its many inherently destructive impacts on the average citizens of the society, which creates infinite cycles: "Many development projects and policies destabilize existing economic situations or status quo to which the people have adapted."<sup>6</sup> Such situations, he argues, tend to increase the quest for emigration because "economic development destroys previously stable economic and social systems, peasant agriculture, by substituting capital for labor, privatizing landholding and creating markets."<sup>7</sup> The destruction of peasant economic systems creates a pool of socially and economically displaced people, who begin to seek alternative routes. Migration increases. The cycle continues.

With the social foundations of immigration, which is his second reason for immigration, Massey argued that migration "creates social networks of interpersonal

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<sup>5</sup> Massey, "The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration". 183

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 183

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 183

ties."<sup>8</sup> He observed that the bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origins (especially Africans) facilitate and enlarge the migration spread. Thus, there is a tendency for immigrants to go where they have kin already. Those who have moved already create room for their relations to come over. Therefore, Massey concluded that once a "network of connections reaches a certain threshold, migration becomes self-perpetuating."<sup>9</sup>

In relation to policy foundations of immigration, which is Massey's third factor in the comprehension of immigration, some policies meant to control immigration are in most cases the major causes of inflow of increased migrants. He observed that many "economic policies embarked upon due to economic growth have led to great demand for foreign workers in certain sectors."<sup>10</sup> But when the need or demand has been fulfilled or met, the inflow would presumably reduce, but unfortunately this effect has never been the case. The migrants continue to bring in their families, and the circle continues to expand. It appears plausible, based on Massey's paradigm, that immigration somehow involves an infinite regress. It is self-replicating.

Voluntary policy recruitment,<sup>11</sup> Massey's fourth factor of immigration, relates to the third reason. In most cases, visa lotteries lure labor across the globe, but not everybody who has the capabilities is qualified. Selection criteria, in most cases, recruit away human resources from sending countries. When people with specialized and professional talents are seriously recruited with such simple methods or conditions of migration that they wouldn't have otherwise received, they feel compelled to emigrate. Under such conditions, middle-class medical and health professionals are recruited away from their home countries. Because the process has been officially made facile for them, the tendency to voluntarily emigrate increases. These lotteries and other efforts to broaden selection criteria offer a reason for the high numbers of foreign medical and health professionals.

If the lack of development in sending countries is the major reason for immigration, why would nations that buy the idea indulge in recruiting away middle-class professionals who would have contributed greatly and immensely to the development of their home countries? This question raises serious ethical issues. Levantino and Pecoud, scholars of economics and social justice, suggest that the out-migration of skilled workers (e.g., engineers, doctors, teachers, nurses) is commonly "associated with negative consequences and raises serious range of normative questions,

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 184

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 184

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 185

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 185

especially the roles of developed countries in attracting (buying away) the 'best and brightest' from poor/less developed nations."<sup>12</sup>

## **THE ORIGIN/CRISES OF IMPOVERISHMENT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS**

When the colonialists came to Africa and most other colonized nations of the world, economic interests were topmost in their mission. The industrial revolution in the West brought many ills and woes to the developing nations. The West had to take many measures to sustain the quest for industrial development, which had far-reaching negative consequences on other nations. Many African nations and other developing nations outside Africa were seen as havens for the harvest of the necessary material and human labor resources. Thus, exploitation of both human and raw material resources of Africans and other developing nations became the order of the day. These were exported to the West for their economic development at the detriment of the developing nations.

In such a situation, the need for economic survival became the trouble of every individual in the developing country, and the crisis became a collective responsibility and challenge. It appeared that there was no collective challenge and that the solution was only an individual issue. This perception became a problem and a starting point for political and economic tensions, especially corruption and the get-rich-by-all-means syndrome that bedevils these developing nations. The idea of collectivity and collective survival became a mirage. Individuals had to look for options in their own ways. What others reasonably rejected, others willingly accepted to better themselves, and collective will for survival was defeated. The adverse conditions generated by the impact of colonialism created such conditions.

After impoverishing these nations, especially during the colonial periods, an era marked by exploitation of human and material resources led to fewer alternatives for survival within the developing country. The possibility of migration became a carrot

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<sup>12</sup> Antonio Levatino and Antoine Pecoud, "Overcoming the Ethical Dilemmas of Skilled Migration: An Analysis of International narratives on the 'Brain drain'" *GRITIM Working Paper Series* No.11, Spring (2012): 1259.

dangling in front of their faces as bait. Falling prey to such conditions became facile for individuals and catatonic for the countries. They could not distinguish between bait and bread because of desperate situations.

Colonialists did not leave voluntarily as their missions were mostly incomplete because many of the African nations started rising up against the colonialists, fighting for independence, especially after the Second World War (WWII). The colonialists attached a string to the granting of independence to many of the African nations, their colonies, in the form of economic and political influences. Many French-speaking African nations were hooked through the policy of assimilation after independence that is, to a great extent, still operational. This is the major grouse of the younger generations there, especially the Francophone West African nations, who have spurred the military takeover (*coup d'état*) of governments, alleging that their past leaders have been colonial stooges. However, before the colonizers left, they had already created a channel or a condition to perpetuate their exploitation. This is because the economic situation has been made uncomfortable for these nations and conducive to a new dimension of exploitation. One such strategy remains their immigration policies, which have evolved into a new wave of "sympathetic" imperialism.<sup>13</sup>

Another source of decay occurred through the contentious policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The developed nations, through the auspices of IMF, came up with the idea of privatization. The majority of the government establishments were sold, such as the public power supply companies (e.g., National Electric Power Authority or NEPA) in Nigeria, national oil companies (e.g., Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation or NNPC), mail and telecommunications companies (Nigerian Postal Services or NIPOST; Nigeria Telecommunications or NITEL; Kenya Electricity Generating Company; Telkom Kenya; Kenya Reinsurance Corporation; and Kenya Railway Corporation. In many African nations, the government remains the major provider of employment. Jobs were lost, coupled with the corruption that challenged the entire privatization process. The public sector could no longer offer

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<sup>13</sup> In this trend of thought, one necessarily has to recall Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. This remains one of the cries/foresights of the imperialization of Africa.

hope to the labor markets. Citizens of developing nations were then forced to look elsewhere for their livelihoods and survival. A gap was thus created. Privatization was a condition for aid from the developed nations. This sequence of events illustrates imperialism. Foreign buyers came or bought shares through their African cronies. As a result, Africans were divested of their establishments.

This scenario has been corroborated by some scholars and analysts. Many analysts have become aware of these developments and tactics. For example, the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL) has it thus:

Migration is as old as humanity itself, with large-scale migrations typically produced by natural disasters... Today, migration is caused less by natural inadequacies and more by countries' integration into a global economy organized around the profit motive, and the deliberate underdevelopment of certain countries to the benefit of others.<sup>14</sup>

The PSL further observed:

We frequently hear how immigrants are merely "seeking a better life for their children" and trying to fulfil the "American Dream," but there is no discussion of why the world is such that people cannot sustain their families in their home countries and must migrate to the United States.<sup>15</sup>

These developments in different sectors are impacting other areas and subsectors of the entire developing world. They appear as coordinated efforts in the long run.

## **IMPERIALISM**

Imperialism is a broad term covering a broad spectrum of economic, political, and cultural aspects. It is also known as neo-colonialism, and it no longer involves a physical presence (settlements) of superior powers. A generic definition of imperialism comes from the Encyclopedia Britannica: "state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining

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<sup>14</sup> Party for Socialism and Liberation, *Imperialism, immigration and Latin America: An Analysis of Why People Migrate*. (2020) 1.

<https://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/newspaper/vol-7-no-6/imperialism-immigration-and-latin-america.html> (Assessed: 03/03/2020)

<sup>15</sup> Party for Socialism and Liberation, *Imperialism, immigration and Latin America: An Analysis of Why People Migrate*. 1.



political and economic control of other areas. Because it always involves the use of power, whether military force **or some subtler form**, imperialism has often been considered morally reprehensible.<sup>16</sup> Imperialism involves further perpetration of exploitation of the material and human resources in developing nations, possible through foreign policies being imposed on many developing nations across the globe.

When *Encyclopedia Britannica* defined imperialism as being possible not only through physical force and presence but also through some other “subtler forms,” the idea of sympathetic imperialism becomes a predictable outcome.

## **SYMPATHETIC IMPERIALISM**

There are many types of imperialism, such as economic and cultural imperialism. However, economic imperialism occurs through immigration policies and most prominently affects developing nations, especially in Africa.

Imperialism is a new dimension of colonialism. Whereas colonialism involves direct contact and interference with a particular nation’s affairs (prior to their independence and sovereignty), imperialism is the opposite way around (mostly post-independence) a sort of neocolonialism. Examples of nations still under the weight of pronounced imperialism are some Francophone nations of Africa, like Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and a few others in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) region, which still remit taxes to the French government and do not hold absolute control over their own natural resources, leading to a major reason for a spate of military coups this millennium. Imperialism can come about through policies. Colonialism has a political undertone and involves direct settlements whereas imperialism (neocolonialism) is more economical and operates from the outside through policies. Colonialism in Africa started with the scramble and partition of Africa around the 1880s with two notable imperial powers, Britain and France. At the Berlin Conference of 1885, Africa was shared by the colonizers on the drawing table. The colonial powers drew their own boundaries, and they joined together (in some cases through the process of amalgamation) peoples who were otherwise strange bedfellows and separated

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<sup>16</sup> Britannica.com, *Imperialism* (2020), <https://www.britannica.com/topic/imperialism>. (Assessed: 03/03/2020).

homogeneous societies. Typical examples are Nigeria (with different ethnic nations who have different languages, cultures, and religions but were amalgamated) and Congo (with a common language) was split into two, Congo Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) and Congo Kinshasa (DR Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo), respectively. The Congolese were one people but two imperial powers, Belgium and France, scrambled and partitioned them into two separate nations. In the case of Burundi, the result was genocide through an ethnic war between the Hutu and the Tutsi around 1994. In some of these instances, the colonial masters seem to have favored one ethnic nation over others and those who were favored continue to lord it over others. This divisiveness has been causing perpetual conflicts in many African nations and equally cause people to migrate. These are some instances of unholy marriages commissioned by the colonial powers that remain causes of political and economic instability in most African nations.

Sympathetic imperialism is a condition whereby the developing nations, through an initial scenario created by both colonialism and current global economic development policies, have been put into an economically precarious situation. This situation made them have no options other than to accept exploit-laden and bondage conditions given them as if they were avenues for assistance. Latently these serve the interests of the nations with such policies. These conditions appear to be primarily for the good of the developing nations, but a deeper look unveils that they are for the good of the developed nations. It is a case of sympathizing with someone and at the same time exploiting them in a predicament of need. The irony is that the initial situation that led to the cause of the sympathetic situation was engineered by the same people, agents, and policies sympathizing with them and offering a cure that acts like the disease.

Then how is immigration a source or avenue for economic imperialism. Is a person not free to migrate? What are the issues in immigration that make it an avenue for imperialism? What is ethically wrong with immigration policies as they affect developing nations?

From the sending nations' perspective, when the economic environment becomes inconducive for the citizens to the point of impoverishment, one of the options left for them is migration to greener pastures as a means of livelihood and

sustenance. From the perspective of the developed nations, there is a dire need to fill the gap in the labor force created by the unwillingness of most of the citizens to take up certain jobs which they consider as "demeaning" for average citizens. Thus, disequilibrium has been created. To fill these gaps and balance the equilibrium, there has to be a relaxation of the immigration policies in relation to the developing countries of the world.

It is not that the developed countries are not aware of the economic and underdeveloped situations in most developing countries and are therefore indifferent. But the way they have chosen to respond and contribute is the major issue. To show concern is not wrong, but the manner this concern/sympathy is operationalized is the major factor. If the only way developed nations can assist developing nations is to facilitate the movement away of skilled citizens from their own countries, then such a policy is suspect. In most cases the immigration policies of these developed nations are formulated so that only the middle-class citizens of sending countries can be privileged and lured. In essence, the policies are discriminatory since not all citizens of every class are qualified and privileged.

If the economic conditions of the sending countries were conducive, there would still be migration, but it would have been limited, or the reason for migration would not have been economic. If the developed nations wanted to show sincere and committed concern, they would have to fight the situation from within by investing in those nations and formulating economic policies that would assist such nations and discourage migration. In effect, these policies encourage middle-class citizens to immigrate to developed nations with promises for a better life. The movement is economy-driven. Thus, the already impoverished nations continue to be impoverished in human resources.

The other perspective that leads to sympathetic imperialism is the attempt to balance the economic/labor disequilibrium created by the unwillingness of the citizens of developed nations to perform jobs they consider as demeaning. If there was no such gap, these immigration policies wouldn't have become what they are today. The borders wouldn't have been easily accessible to developing nations as is the case with many western (for example, Scandinavian) countries. It would have been a herculean task for the current beneficiaries. These policies are couched in a way that appear to

show sympathy for sending nations, as if to cushion the effect of their economic hardships or predicaments. The major thrust and primary beneficiaries of these policies are the receiving nations.

If the developed countries were truly sincere in their stated mission of helping the developing countries, the policies would allow for a longer or even no time limitation for renewing the agreement of services. When the services of most policy beneficiaries are no longer needed, their time frame can no longer be renewed. But in most cases, when some of the migrants have made serious and substantial impacts on any of their social and economic sectors, in most cases the person must sign an agreement—called an “undertaking”—not to leave to ensure that such knowledge is not transferred to any other organizations or countries. A typical example is Saudi Arabia, where migrants apply for both resident and work permits. The “Iqama” visa or permit gives the migrant legal residency and a work permit so they may live and work in Saudi Arabia. This strategy seems helpful to the expatriate, but because the undertaking is designed by employers,<sup>17</sup> the employer has the right to cancel an Iqama at any given time and prohibits the employee from leaving the organization. In such an undertaking, the person has no option not to sign an Iqama. This kind of unethical requirement represents imperialism, and it is why many migrants stay in crucial positions and sectors of many western nations instead of returning and helping their home countries.

In most cases the quest to lure and keep the best employees also spurs these immigration policies. Most developed countries lack adequate numbers of professionals, but their underqualified workforce cannot be compared with developing nations. The small numbers of professionals in developing nations are being taken away from them.

However, the Iqama and similar contracts are not the only reason why professionals stay in the developed countries. At home, they constitute the middle-class, and they complain that because they are not well remunerated, the immigration policies make it rosy for them to exit. They are being massively recruited away. In the

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<sup>17</sup> Expat.com, *Iqama Visa in Saudi Arabia*. (2020), <https://www.expat.com/en/guide/middle-east/saudi-arabia/8461-iqama-visa-in-saudi-arabia.html>. (Assessed: 04/03/2020).

long run, a great gap occurs in the sending countries, thereby aggravating the economic situation. Levatino and Pecoud assert that "high-skilled migration has distributive consequences, usually benefiting receiving countries while imposing costs on sending nations."<sup>18</sup> They also point out that there is serious "competition among developed nations for skilled migrants."<sup>19</sup> To illustrate the enormity of this situation as a matter of urgency, the UN and WHO appealed to high-income receiving countries to refrain from "actively recruiting away skilled personnel in countries already experiencing skilled workforce shortages" because of the adverse consequences on sending nations.<sup>20, 21</sup> Kapur and McHale strongly believe that "competition for developing countries' talents will increase in the years ahead."<sup>22</sup> According to Sriskandarajah, the African Capacity Building Foundation reported that "African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world every year."<sup>23</sup> Worried by the above situations, Brock points out:

Arguably, it is not the total number of health care professional that exist in the world today that is the problem, but rather their distribution. Consider how, for instance, while only 21 percent of the world's population resides in Europe and North America, it commands 45 per cent of the world's doctors and 61 percent of its nurses. Africa, which contains 13 percent of the world's population, has only 3 percent of its doctors and 5 percent of its nurses. An estimated 1.3 percent of the world's health care workers provide services to 13.8 percent of the world's population in a region suffering 25 percent of the world's disease burden.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Antonio Levatino and Antoine Pecoud, . (Assessed: 04/03/2020)., 1259.

<sup>19</sup> Levatino and Pecoud, 1259.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, "International Migration and Development" *Report of the Secretary General* (New York: UN General Assembly, 2006), 19.

<sup>21</sup> WHO, *World Health Report 2006: Working Together for Health* (Geneva: WHO, 2006), 103.

<sup>22</sup> Devesh Kapur and John McHale, "The Global Migration of Talent: What Does it Mean for Developing Countries?" *CGD Brief*. Global Centre for development (October 2005): 1.

<sup>23</sup> Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, "Reassessing the Impacts of brain drain on Developing Countries" *Migration Information Source*. Migration policy institute (August 1. 2005): 1.

<sup>24</sup> Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 196-199.

In such situations, most of the sending nations greatly suffer and are in most cases helpless. Brains are being drained away. The country's development is stunted. The issue of signing these undertakings to keep expatriates hangs like an albatross on the neck of the developed countries. When a person gains knowledge that can help their country exit poverty and rise in technology, they are restrained. This further disproves that any sympathy for the impoverished country ever existed.

The combination of broadened immigration policies with restrictive residency permits signals unethical arrangements on the part of the developed countries. There are abundant examples of developed countries that actively recruit away the available middle-class human resources of developed nations. This practice has reached a worrisome level in the views of the WHO, ILO, and the UN. These humanitarian organizations question the justifications of "aid" that developed nations offer in depleting the little that the developing nations have. This depletion aggravates an already precarious situation in such nations. If indeed there is a sense of justice in the efforts of these developed nations toward assisting the impoverished nations, then they should find a way of making conditions conducive for these middle-class citizens to stay in their countries and help with further development. If, for example, the WHO says that there should be a healthcare worker for every 50 citizens in the globe, then considering the population of developing countries with regard to the level and degree of education of trained health professionals, there is no morally justifiable ground for the recruiting away of such human resources. Such recruitment unfortunately worsens the health situation in these affected developing nations. Even if it creates an economically advantageous situation for the individual professionals, the general wellbeing of such societies will continue to dwindle beyond the estimated average. This effect of depleting a country's already limited resources is inconsistent with the UN's "health for all" program.

Moreover, some developed countries exclude some categories of people from entry, such as some major Western nations' immigration policies. According to Ochel: Various instruments may be used in the selection of immigrants. Countries with a tradition of immigration use priority lists (United States) or point systems (Canada, Australia, New Zealand). The American priority lists contain a ranking of desirable skills, with priority given to applicants with

the highest qualifications. In the point systems, points are awarded for the various requirements met by an applicant.<sup>25</sup>

The U.S. Diversity Visa (DV) lottery specifies a range of professional and technical qualifications and experience for participants, ensuring the active recruitment of middle-class professionals from developing nations.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs, there are serious conditions for qualification to immigrate through the DV lottery:

#### Qualifying Occupations

Successful DV entrants must be eligible to receive a visa by qualifying based on education, work, and other requirements. The law and regulations require that every DV entrant must have at least:

- A high school education or its equivalent; or
- Two years of work experience within the past five years in an occupation requiring at least two years' training or experience.<sup>26</sup>

These requirements demand ethical justification for the exclusion of people without such qualifications on the basis of justice, fairness, and equity. The stipulations directly attempt to target and deplete middle-class human resources in developing nations, evident in the different, relaxed requirements for other developed nations. Undoubtedly, these policies are not targeted at global poverty reductions. Rather, these developed nations show preference for immigrants with skills and other special abilities that benefit their national interests.

When some of these migrants/beneficiaries thrive and excel to a high level, based on fears of competition and technology transfers some are forced to sign undertakings, like Saudi Arabia's Iqama. This practice is ethically unjust. The fundamental rights of the individual are being infringed upon when they are coerced to sign such undertakings. Duress implies absence of freedom. Many world-class firms and establishments owe their great reputes to migrants, such as Apple, Google, PayPal, Yahoo, and other large, successful corporations.

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<sup>25</sup> Wolfgang Ochel, "Selective Immigration Policies: Point system versus Auction Model". *CESifo Forum* Vol.2 (2001): 48.

<sup>26</sup> Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Diversity Visa (DV) Program*. 1. (2019), [https://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types\\_1322.html#occupations](https://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1322.html#occupations). (Assessed: 06/06/2019)

## MIGRANTS AND FREEDOM AND THE RECEPTIVITY OF HOSTS

Many immigration policies of developed countries have been called highly elitist, and many citizens oppose their nation's immigration policies as an attempt to deconstruct them, most especially their national identities. Cases of xenophobia across the globe raise concerns about immigration. Many scholars have sounded a caution call in their works, including *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* by Samuel P. Huntington. Such work represents the resentments toward immigration policies in many developed nations of the West. Some of them (particularly American writers) have pointed out what they considered the origin of the decay of the entire situation to the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Immigration Law of 1965. Huntington cited the passage of this act, especially its misinterpretation, as the major point of his and few others' identification as the source of the crises, especially Title VII, which prohibits discrimination. Huntington pointed out that this bill intended to encourage hiring candidates based on ability and qualifications, not race or religion. However, the courts added a requirement not intended by the proponents of the act. Even though the act's proponents expressed their rejection of the additional requirements, the newly passed version of the act gave extended rights and privileges—like rights to teach and to learn immigrant languages—which started affecting American identity.

From another perspective, Huntington pointed out that American identity has been threatened by mass immigration and predicted that America would soon become a bilingual, bicultural nation. This view was based on his fears of Hispanicization, which he saw as a threatening culture. Such trends, he argued, would necessarily lead to the "revival of the discarded and discredited racial and ethnic concepts of American identity and to create an America that would exclude, expel or suppress people of other races, cultures or ethnicities."<sup>27</sup> He further asserted that the current immigration policies were engineered by elites (politicians and bureaucrats) to promote their own interests, which led to the promotion of minority rights to the detriment of individual

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<sup>27</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. (Assessed: 06/06/2019)uster, 2004), 231.



rights. Huntington further noted that these were measures “consciously designed to weaken America’s cultural and creedal identity and to strengthen racial, ethnic, cultural and other subnational identities.”<sup>28</sup> These points illuminate some of the hidden agendas of the elites and corroborate the thesis of this chapter that immigration policies are couched with ulterior economic motives. Huntington is among those scholars and some Americans who see immigration as a threat to social security of developed nations.

## **CRITICAL EVALUATION**

There has been a justification employed to favor this trend of immigration, arguing that it actually favors the sending countries. They sustain this argument by what they termed “degree of remittance” to their home countries. But a closer analysis using the Marxist surplus value theory indicates that the migrants’ earnings are deducted as taxes/commissions and support the receiving countries. These regular remittances make the money transfer market boom. The family members of the migrants at home do not pay for these services as their migrant relations have already paid the major bulk of the charges, which increases the coffers of their host/receiving nations.

The argument of global poverty reduction is a circular one. In the immigration policies only the already advantaged in the sending countries succeed or benefit from the entire process. In the long run, remittances go only to the already advantaged families and still leave the poor in their conditions, and in most cases, it widens the margins of poverty existing in such societies.

The entire scenario indeed indicates the economic dimension and motivation that sustains sympathetic imperialism. Sympathetic imperialism once more is an elite policy because despite the gains in receiving countries, the average citizens are beginning to feel the brunt. The employers of these migrants make great profits as these migrants are ready to settle for a lower salary for jobs that have been rejected by host/receiving citizens. In Britain, France, South Africa, and even the U.S., there is clear apprehension of the threatening situation of open borders.

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<sup>28</sup> Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity*, 231.

In the philosophy of immigration, there is an argument in support of open borders based on global poverty reduction. According to Wilcox, the basic claims of this argument are that "members of affluent societies have strong obligations to mitigate global poverty" and "policies favoring open borders are an effective means of fulfilling these obligations."<sup>29</sup> Supporting this line of argument is Peter Singer, who sees immigration as a moral obligation and as such should be guided by strict moral principles. If this had been the case, the current trend of sympathetic imperialism would not have been obtainable. The argument here is that, if it is true that the major reason for open borders is on charitable grounds, why create a criterion focusing on certain professional skills and talents that deplete resources from the immigrant's home country? How can such nations claim to be contributing to fighting global poverty by recruiting away the few available specialized human resources in developing nations? Many developing nations in Africa are worried about "brain drain," the term used for the phenomenon of large numbers of professionals leaving in droves. Some countries are even trying to promulgate various policies to reverse the trend.

Based on the normative perspective, ethical theories and principles justify whether there is anything wrong in this trend of sympathetic imperialism. Economics is, of course, a normative science and, as such, cannot escape moral scrutiny. One of the major criticisms of capitalism is exploitation in the quest for profit maximization. Maximized profit without an ethical basis is unjustifiable. Many believe that migration policies are guided and motivated by economic forces and factors, which subject them to normative scrutiny.

Developed countries argue that visas privilege immigrants at the cost of depleting human resources of poorer nations, but this justification ultimately fails. From the Kantian and Rawlsian perspectives, the unjustifiability becomes glaring. From the Kantian principle of the "categorical imperative," it is unjustifiable to use others as a means to an end. Also, from the Kantian deontological perspective, such actions and policies are not motivated by the duty imperative, and acts performed for self-

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<sup>29</sup> Shelley Wilcox, "The Open Borders Debate on Immigration". *Philosophy Compass* 4(5) (2009): 813.

benefit or ulterior purposes can be seen only as acting from inclination instead of duty.<sup>30</sup>

One of the normative questions in economics is about whose preference that policies should satisfy: should economic policies favor the worst-off or the better-off? Rawls, a philosopher and a social justice advocate, believes that policies that favor only the least disadvantaged or worst-off have value and should be the goal. In essence, Rawls concluded that it would be unjust and unfair for anybody (particularly the already rich and advantaged) to engage in anything that would make the poor even more disadvantaged. Such actions and policies only perpetuate poverty and marginalization.<sup>31</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Social boundaries pose a great problem in human societies and in the philosophy of immigration. Many societies latently and manifestly show their level of acceptance of migrants. Through their policies, some societies discriminate against migrants through practices such as racially forced segregation (e.g., Bahrain) and restriction from working in many organizations. Yet, the majority of these societies profess to be liberal democracies, offering a great philosophical challenge. After all, philosophy is a pedestal for unveiling injustices among humans.

Many western nations are still enacting and promoting policies that have adverse economic consequences on developing nations. They entice these individuals and later sometimes make it impossible for them to return to their home countries through the compulsory signing of bonds/undertakings. Such practices defeat the entire argument of proponents of brain drain.

The relaxed policies of many developed nations are not necessarily for the good of developing nations, but policies couched in ways that appear as if they are sympathetic toward poor nations but serve only the interests of the developed nations

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<sup>30</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 68-69.

<sup>31</sup> John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 42-45.

in an imperialistic trap—a trap that made developing nations' citizens run to meet their chains while they think they have secured freedom.

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*“Ancient and Modern: The African Experience is one of the few Open Educational Resources centered on African history. It makes high-quality academic research accessible and free to students worldwide. It is ideal for any class focused on understanding African history, societies, and institutions.”*

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